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ABSTRACT 
 
CEMAL PASHA’S GOVERNORATE IN SYRIA, 1915-1918. 
M. Talha ÇİÇEK, 
History, PhD Dissertation 
Supervisor: Yusuf Hakan Erdem 
August, 2012 
 
This dissertation is on Cemal Pasha’s Governorate in Syria during WWI. The aim is to 
explore the military, social and political reasons behind his existence in Syria. The 
outbreak of the WWI signified a new period in the history of Ottoman Syria and gave an 
occasion to the Ottoman Government to save themselves from all kinds of foreign 
influences and to assert state authority over Ottoman citizens in Greater Syria. With this 
motivation, the third man of the ruling party, the CUP, was sent to Syria to establish the 
state’s authority there, and to organize an expedition against Egypt to liberate it from the 
“British yoke”. This dissertation elaborates Cemal’s preparations for an expedition 
against Egypt and his activities to remove all the intermediaries between state and its 
citizens in Syria, examining all the influential groups such as the Arabists, the Zionists 
and the Christians. 
 
Keywords: Cemal Pasha, Syria, First World War, the Egyptian Expedition, Zionism, 
Arabism, the Armenian Deportations, Famine, Sharif Hussein. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vii 
 
ÖZET 
 
CEMAL PAŞANIN SURİYE VALİLİĞİ, 1914-1917 
M. Talha ÇİÇEK, 
History, PhD Dissertation 
Supervisor: Yusuf Hakan Erdem 
August, 2012 
 
Bu çalışma, I. Dünya Savaşı dönemindeki Cemal Paşa’nın Suriye Valiliği hakkındadır. 
Çalışmanın amacı Cemal Paşa’nın olağanüstü yetkilerle Suriye’de bulunmasının 
arkasındaki siyasi, askeri ve sosyal nedenleri incelemektir. Birinci Dünya Savaşı’nın 
patlak vermesi Osmanlı Suriyesi’nin tarihinde yeni bir dönemin başlangıcına işaret etti ve 
Osmanlı Hükümetine bütün yabancı etkilerden kurtularak Suriye’de devlet nüfuzunu 
kurmak için fırsat verdi. Bu amaçlarla iktidardaki İttihat ve Terakki Fırkası’nın üçüncü 
adamı Mısır’ı İngiliz “boyunduruğu”ndan kurtaracak seferi organize etmek ve Osmanlı 
devlet otoritesini kurmak maksadıyla savaş başlangıcında Suriye’ye gönderildi. Bu tezin 
amacı Mısır Seferi’nin ve Cemal Paşa’nın Suriye’de devletle vatandaşları arasındaki 
barrierleri kaldırmak için yaptığı faaliyetlerin amacını irdelemektir. Cemal’in, 
Hıristiyanlar, Arapçılar, Siyonistler gibi Suriye’deki bütün etkin ve bir ölçüye kadar 
otonom gruplarla yaptığı mücadele incelenmiştir. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Cemal Paşa, Suriye, Birinci Dünya Savaşı,  Mısır Seferi, Siyonizm, 
Arapçılık, Ermeni Tehciri, Kıtlık, Şerif Hüseyin 
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INTRODUCTION: MULTIPLE BACKGROUNDS 
 
 
 
 
“Of course it was our one hope to free ourselves through the 
World War from all conventions, which meant so many attacks on 
our independence, and to be able to live in future as an 
independent and free nation, which in its own territory, of its own 
ititiative introduces the reforms which local necessities have made 
imperative. Just it was our chief aim to annul the Capitulations and 
the Lebanon statute…”1 
 
 
Ottoman Entry to World War I and Cemal Pasha’s Appointment to Syria 
 
Because of the aims described in the quotation, the outbreak of WWI made a 
fundamental impact on the course of the Ottoman political life. Immediately after the 
commencement of the hostilities in Europe, the Ottoman Government, dominated by the 
members of the CUP [Committee for Union and Progress], ascribing great importance to 
the immunity of the governmental affairs from all the internal and external interventions in 
the political sense for the strengthening of the Ottoman Empire, announced the abolition of 
the Capitulations, and terminated all the privileges of the foreign states in the Ottoman 
lands.2 Concordantly, the CUP leaders embarked on a quest for a military alliance with the 
                                                 
1 Djemal Pasha, Memoires of A Turkish Statesman, 1913-1919, Newyork: George H. 
Doran Company, 1922, p.138; Cemal Paşa, Hatırat 1913-1922, Dersaadet, 1922, p.112.  
2 For a recent study on the abolition of the Capitulations, see: Muhammet Emin Külünk, 
Kapitülasyonların Kaldırılması, İstanbul: Yeditepe Yayınları, 2011. 
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Great Powers, not to be exposed to a possible partitioning of the Empire after the 
conclusion of the war. The failure to take any guarantee from the Entente Powers regarding 
the integrity of the Ottoman Empire3, directed the Unionists towards Germany for an 
alliance to realize the aims mentioned in the quotation above. At the end of the process, an 
alliance treaty was signed with the German Government, which gave an equal status to the 
Ottoman Empire as its ally.4 As a result of intense pressure by Germany, on 10th 
November, the Ottoman cabinet declared war against the Entente powers and their allies 
Belgium, Montenegro, and Serbia.5  
 The Ottoman authorities took the proclamation of the war as an occasion to save 
the country from the yoke of the Great Powers throwing off all kinds of international 
pressure, and to increase the sense of the loyalty of their citizens. With the remarks of 
Cemal Pasha, their aim was “either to live like an honorable Nation or to exit the stage of 
history gloriously”.6 With these considerations, the Empire entered into a new period of 
political and military mobilization for “full independence” by way of a reorganization of 
the Empire in the direction of the Young Turks’ political ideas. As part of these ideas, the 
Unionist leaders, with the suggestion of Germany, also calculated to propagate the 
liberation of Muslims under the rule of the Entente States in the context of the policy of 
Pan-Islamism, which aimed at instigating the rebellion of the Muslim peoples under the 
rule of the Entente.7 In this regard, they primarily performed military operations within the 
                                                 
3 For a description of this process, see: Kazım Karabekir, I.Dünya Savaşı Anıları, 
İstanbul: Yapı-Kredi Yayınları, 2011, pp. 52-57. 
4 For a detailed analysis of the Ottoman quest for alliance in Europe, see: Mustafa 
Aksakal, Ottoman Road to War, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp. 93-
118; For another study on the Ottoman-German alliance and Enver Pasha’s role in this 
event, see: Mustafa Çolak, Enver Paşa Osmanlı-Alman İttifakı, İstanbul: Yeditepe 
Yayınları, 2008. 
5 Aksakal, Ibid, p. 183. 
6 Aksakal, Ibid, pp.19.  
7 For an analysis of Germany’s policy of causing a rebellion in Egypt applying Jihad 
propaganda, see: Salvador Oberhaus, “Zum wilden Aufstande entflammen": Die deutsche 
Propagandastrategie für den Orient im Ersten Weltkrieg am Beispiel 
Ägypten,Saarbrücken: VDM Verlag, 2007; For a comparison of the British and the German 
Policies of Egypt, see: Donald M. McKale, War by Revolution: Germany and Great 
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territories under direct or indirect rule of the Entente Powers neighboring the Ottoman 
country on the advice of Germany. Besides that, they used the freedom of action that came 
with the proclamation of war, to secure “the internal order of the Empire” for the 
forestallment of any loss of territory in future, which could be emanated from the demands 
of the non-Turkish nationalist movements. 
 In this context, immediately after the proclamation of the war, the third man of the 
CUP and the Minister of the Marine, Cemal Pasha was sent to Syria to put the mentioned 
aims into practice in the Syrian realm, when he was 42 years old. According to the remarks 
in his memoirs, he took over the commandership of the Ottoman 4th Army in order to 
“prepare (and carry through) the attack on the Canal, and also maintain peace and internal 
order in Syria.”8 With these considerations, Cemal was appointed as the Commander-in-
Chief of the 4th Army and the Governor General of the Syrian District authorized with 
absolute power on both civil and military officials. The proclaimed reason of his presence 
in Syria was the reconquest of Egypt from the British “yoke”. As will be clarified in the 
first chapter, he strove wholeheartedly to realize this aim, and believed in this idea till the 
end of the year 1916. 
As for the second goal that Cemal made a great effort, he would strengthen the 
weak image of the Ottoman Government in the eyes of the Syrians by the establishment of 
the Ottoman authority and the increase of the direct control of it over its citizens in Syria as 
well as undertaking some activities to make the Syrians ideal Ottomans, who were loyal to 
the idea of the unity of the Empire and were meant to be against any supremacy of foreign 
states. Because of these goals, the boundaries of his authority were far more than a military 
commander; he was rather a governor of all the provinces in Syria, Palestine and the West 
Arabia and his position was exceptional. All the commanders in the coastal cities and the 
whole of the gendarmerie divisions were subordinated to Cemal’s command. All the civil 
bureaucrats were required to implement his orders on the political issues regarding the 
defense of the country and the maintaining of the internal order. The bureaucrats in Syria 
had to give the first priority to the orders of Cemal rather than that of the central 
                                                                                                                                                    
Britain in the Middle East in the era of World War I, Kent: The Kent State University 
Press, 1998. 
8 Djemal Pasha, Ibid, p.138; Cemal Paşa, Ibid, p.112.  
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government.9 In the beginning, the governors of the principal cities in Syria, such as 
Beirut, Damascus and Aleppo, were surprised with this decision and they opposed to the 
Central Government about that. But the order of the Ministry of Interior compelled them to 
accept Cemal’s authority in Syria.10  
Immediately after his appointment, as precondition of his agreement with Enver, 
Cemal sent a telegram to Enver and requested to announce to all it may concern, not to 
intervene in military and political issues of Syria without his consent.11 In summary, in the 
words of Muhittin Birgen, the Chief Editor of the Tanin Newspaper during the War period, 
he was “the regent of Sultan [Sultan Naibi]” in Syria,12 and, in the remarks of a German 
military official, the “Vizekönig” [Vice king] there.13 Similarly, his chief of staff Ali Fuad 
Bey called him the “uncrowned king” of Syria.14 
 Besides the organization of the expedition against Egypt, Cemal would secure the 
maintenance of “peace and internal order in Syria”. These are the key concepts to 
understand the nature of Cemal’s rule in Syria, and the reasons behind his actions towards 
the different sections of Syrian society. Cemal attributed the maintenance of a perpetual 
peace in Syria to the establishment of an excellent authority of the Ottoman state in Syria, 
which would work in a smooth way even after the war. To achieve this, the Syrians had to 
be made as loyal as the Turks to the ideal of the Ottoman unity and had to oppose the 
                                                 
9 BOA, DH.EUM 5.Şb 3/23, Cemal to Vali of Syria, 27 Teşrin-i Evvel 1330 [10 
November 1914]. 
10 For the opposition telegrams of the Valis see: BOA, DH.EUM 5.Şb 3/23, Hulusi to 
Talat, Damascus, 27 Teşrin-i Evvel 1330 [10 November 1914]; Bekir Sami to Talat, 
Beirut, 26 Teşrin-i Evvel 1330 [9 November 1914]; Celal to Talat, Aleppo, 26 Teşrin-i 
Evvel 1330 [9 November 1914]. 
11 ATASE Arşivi, Kls. 4130, Ds. H-1, Fih. 1-84, Cemal to Enver, 18 November 1914, 
in Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Harbi: Sina-Filistin Cephesi, Vol IV, Part I, Ankara: 
Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1979, p. 135. 
12 Muhittin Birgen, İttihat ve Terakki’de On Sene, İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2006, p. 
223. 
13 BA-MA, RM 5/2321, Humann to the Chef of the Admiralty of Marine, “Eindrücke in 
Syrien”, Constantinople, 30 January 1917. 
14 Ali Fuat Erden, Birinci Dünya Savaşı’nda Suriye Hatıraları, İstanbul: Türkiye İş 
Bankası Yayınları, 2006, p. 107. 
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occupation of any foreign power in Syria. In Cemal’s viewpoint, all the obstructions for 
this aim had to be either checked or destroyed. As will be analyzed in the following 
chapters in detail, in his belief, the achievement of such an order would be realized by the 
elimination of the social and religious interlayers, preventing the penetration of the state 
authority into the Syrian realm and the allegiance of the Syrians like the citizens of the 
nation-states. His struggle with the Arabists, Zionists and the other independent-minded 
religious and administrative bodies like the Maronite clergy and the Government of 
Lebanon was to serve this aim. As could be easily realized, all these actions were quite 
convenient to the monolithic state idea of the CUP. 
 Geographically, Syria was important since it was a bridge connecting Anatolia to 
Hijaz and it had Jerusalem the first qiblah of the Muslims before Mecca and therefore 
sacred for the Muslims. Besides that it had a large number of the Arab population, who are 
a fundemental nation of Islam. Due to those, the CUP leaders set a premium on the 
fortification of the Ottoman authority in Syria to maintain the Caliphal and Pan-Islamist 
claims and to continue the Empire’s influence over the Muslim World. Before an 
evaluation of the existing literature to determine the contribution of the present study, a 
description of the prehistory of the Syrian Governorate will be beneficial for a better 
understanding of the reasons behind Cemal’s appointment to Syria as the “authority 
builder”.  
 
 
Pre-History of Cemal’s Syrian Governorate 
 
Ahmed Cemal Pasha was born in Mytlene in 6th May 1872. His father, Mehmed 
Nesib Bey, was a pharmacist in the Ottoman army. He was graduated from the Military 
High School in Kuleli [Kuleli Askeri İdâdîsi] in 1890. Following his graduation from the 
Imperial War School [Mekteb-i Harbiye-i Şâhâne] in 1893, he completed the Ottoman War 
Academy [erkân-ı harbiyye] education. He rose in rank of an erkân-ı harb captain in 1895. 
He was employed in the construction department [istihkâm inşaat şubesi] in Kırkkilise 
within the body of the Second Ottoman Army till 1898. From this date onwards, He was 
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appointed to Salonika as the chief of staff of the reserve squadron [redif fırkası] under the 
command of the Third Army. In 1905, he was promoted to the rank of major.15 
 Beginning with his appointment to Salonika, Cemal sympathized with the CUP 
organization, although he did not actively participate in the activities of that society till 
October 1906, when he became a member of the Ottoman Freedom Society [Osmanlı 
Hürriyet Cemiyeti], a society in Salonika inspired by the CUP’s ideas16 that was 
established in 5 September 1906.17 There, he was assigned as the military inspector of the 
railway construction. He would control and accelerate railway construction around 
Salonika.18 By means of this post, Cemal could easily travel in Rumelia and could make a 
significant contribution to the organization of the Freedem Society there.19 His efforts to 
spread the influence of the society in Rumelia made him one of the most prominent figures 
of the society. On 26th December 1906, Cemal was assigned by the society to make 
negotiations by the pro-CUP officers to open a branch in Bitola. As a result of his visit, on 
30th December 1906, a center of the society was established there.20 It is worth to mention 
that he was a member of Veritas Lodge of the Freemasonry organization.21 
 Following the 1908 Revolution22, Cemal was selected by the central office of the 
CUP in Salonika to the delegate to negotiate with the Government together with Talat, 
                                                 
15 M.Şükrü Hanioğlu, “Cemal Paşa”, TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi, Vol: 7, p. 305; in his 
biography, in Nevsal-i Milli journal the birthplace of Cemal was wrongly written as 
Istanbul. See: Nevsal-i Milli, “Miralay Cemal Bey”, 1330 [1914], 1. Sene, p. 288. 
16 Hanioğlu, “Cemal Paşa”, p. 305. 
17 Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler I, İstanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 
1988, pp. 53-54. 
18 Nevzat Artuç, Cemal Paşa: Askeri ve Siyasi Hayatı, Ankara: TTK Yayınları, 2008, p. 
10. 
19 Artuç, Ibid, p. 20. 
20 Kazım Karabekir, İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti, İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2009, 
p. 88.  
21 Tunaya, Ibid, p. 412. 
22 For some studies on the 1908 Revolution, see: M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, Preparation for a 
Revolution, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001; Aykut Kansu, 1908 Devrimi, İstanbul: 
İletişim Yayınları, 1995; Karabekir, Ibid; Tunaya, Ibid. 
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Hakkı, Necib, Rahmi, Hüseyin and Cavid Beys.23 After that, he was chosen as a member 
of the reform delegation [Heyet-i Islahiye] to investigate the possible reforms in the 
Eastern Anatolia.24 Because of the outbreak of the 31 March Incident the dispatch of this 
delegation to the Eastern Anatolia was abandoned.25 Upon this, Cemal fled to Salonika and 
returned to Istanbul with Hareket Ordusu [the Movement Army] under the command of 
Mahmud Şevket Pasha.26 When the army arrived at İstanbul, Cemal was chosen to the 
membership of the court martial created to provide peace and order at the Capital. After 
the restoration of order there, Cemal Bey was appointed to the sub-governorate 
[mutasarrıflık] of Üsküdar. In this post, Cemal shone out with his implementations, which 
could be interpreted as the steps in the direction of the “Westernization” and “control” of 
the society. He applied to the strict measures to give an order to the public life there.27 The 
most outstanding action applied by Cemal in Üsküdar was the prohibition of taking a roll 
with the evening dresses in the street like loose robe [entari] for men and putting on patten 
[takunya] without socks to give an end to the “recklessness” [laubalilik] of the people of 
İstanbul. Cemal strictly implemented those prohibitions to all without discrimination.28 In 
those days, according to the famous author Yahya Kemal, he was talked as a newly 
emerging reformer with these implementations.29 The prominent Westernist Abdullah 
Cevdet interpreted those actions as “the opposition to the continuance of the lifestyle 
belonging to the Middle Ages in the twentieth century in the Capital” of the Ottoman 
                                                 
23 Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, Türk İnkılabı Tarihi, Vol: I, Part II, Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 
1991, pp. 68-69.  
24 Artuç, Ibid, p. 53-54; Hanioğlu, “Cemal Paşa”, p.305. 
25 Artuç, Ibid, p. 54. 
26 Nevsal-i Milli, Ibid, p. 288. 
27 Nevsal-i Milli, Ibid, p. 288. 
28 Ziya Şakir, Paşalar: Enver Talat Cemal, İstanbul: Kaknüs Yayınları, 2010, p. 173; 
Abdullah Cevdet, “Nafia Nazırı Cemal Paşa Hazretleriyle Mülakat”, İctihad, 15 Şubat 
1914 [28 February 1914]No: 93, p. 2077. 
29 Yahya Kemal, Siyasi ve Edebi Portreler, İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2006, p. 
107. 
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Empire. Those were enough “to see the tendency in his [Cemal’s] mind [ruh] to order 
[intizam] and to the customs of the civilized world”.30 
 On 2nd August 1909, upon the outburst of the conflict between the Muslims and the 
Armenians in April 1909, Cemal Bey was appointed to the Governorate of Adana to give 
an end to the conflict in that city and to provide order there.31 His activities in Adana are 
conductive to understand both his personality and his political attitude towards the 
problems of the Ottoman Empire. The British Vice Consul depicted Cemal with the 
following words:  
“Djemal Bey dressed like an English gentleman, and possesses a most courteous presence, 
a fair knowledge of French, and a pretty wit... I should judge that he possesses an untiring 
energy and a determination brooking no interference… The principle danger to his career 
is perhaps its rather headlong nature…”32  
In his another report the Vice-Consul states that he was excessively optimistic like most of 
the young turks. 33  
Immediately after his arrival, Cemal aggregated the Muslim Ulema and notables, 
and “advised” them to finish the hostilities in the city and to break the ices between the 
Armenians and the Muslims.34 Similar to that Cemal addressed to the heads of the 
Armenian and Syrian Churches and, with the remarks of the British Vice-Consul, left “a 
happy impression on all his hearers”.35 
Similar to his construction works in Syria, Cemal applied the labor force of the 
local people for the reconstruction of the ruined city by the incidents. With the remarks of 
the British Vice-Consul in Adana, Cemal was “dead set against idling and battening on 
                                                 
30 Abdullah Cevdet, Ibid, p. 2077. 
31 BOA, DH. MKT, 2892/34, Ministry of Interior to Cemal, 22 Temmuz 1325 [4 
August 1909] 
32 PRO, FO 195/2307, British Vice-Consulate to the British Ambassador in 
Constantinople, Adana, 25 August  1909. 
33 PRO, FO 195/2307, British Vice-Consulate to the British Ambassador in 
Constantinople, Adana, 13 October 1909. 
34 BOA, DH. MKT, 2914/1, Cemal to Ministry of Interior, Adana, 11 Ağustos 1325 [24 
August 1909]. 
35 PRO, FO 195/2307, British Vice-Consulate to the British Ambassador in 
Constantinople, Adana, 1 September  1909. 
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temporary relief doles, and means to drive the loafers from tavern and bazaar to lend a 
hand in the work of reconstruction”36. At the public reading of his firman of appointment, 
Cemal “called down a thousand curses (“bin kader [kadar] la’net”) on the authors and 
perpetrators of the massacres, referred to the necessity of the union of all the classess in the 
work of reconstruction, and declared his intention or suppressing all idling with a strong 
hand”. The Governor also created committees for the restoration of peace and order in the 
city under his presidency in collaboration with the foreign assistance organizations. Some 
of those committees were as follows: “a committee for the finding of work for the 
unemployed”, “ a committee to draw up a plan for the reconstruction of the ruined quarter 
of the town”, “a committee to draw up a plan for the foundation of orphanages”.37  
In a month, Cemal was able to clean the ruined houses and the streets by the gangs 
of prisoners.38 He wanted to reconstruct the city “enlarging the streets with a view to 
tramway traffic, and of laying out the city on an approved model are all very well for 
Midhat Pashas”.39 Before the winter many of the Armenians in the villages was settled to 
the houses.40 In cities, between 11st and 15th December, 25 Muslims were hanged, which 
were tried in the courd and found responsible for the Armenian massacres.41 By 13th 
December 1909, with the zealous efforts of the Governor of Adana, according to the report 
of the British vice-consul, all was well in Adana.42 The Vice-Consul states in another 
                                                 
36 PRO, FO 195/2307, British Vice-Consulate to the British Ambassador in 
Constantinople, Adana, 25 August  1909. 
37 PRO, FO 195/2307, British Vice-Consulate to the British Ambassador in 
Constantinople, Adana, 25 August  1909. 
38 PRO, FO 195/2307, British Vice-Consulate to the British Ambassador in 
Constantinople, Adana, 22 September 1909. 
39 PRO, FO 195/2307, British Vice-Consulate to the British Ambassador in 
Constantinople, Adana, 10 November1909. 
40 PRO, FO 195/2307, British Vice-Consulate to the British Ambassador in 
Constantinople, Adana, 27 October 1909. 
41 PRO, FO 195/2307, British Vice-Consulate to the British Ambassador in 
Constantinople, Adana, 16 December 1909. 
42 PRO, FO 195/2307, British Vice-Consulate to the British Ambassador in 
Constantinople, Adana, 13 December 1909. 
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report that, by February 1910, “much material progress” had been “made with relief and 
rebuilding” of the ruined city.43 By 23rd February, in the words of the British Vice consul 
the following improvements had been provided in Adana: 
“1. The general condition of the town and its inhabitants is satisfactory, and promises well 
for the future. 
2. General security is good. 
3. Local trade is reviving, and things are on the upgrade. 
4. The ruined houses are gradually being rebuilt. 
5. The vali is taking everything in hand in a most energetic way, and is the object of 
commendation from all classes of the population”.44  
His relations with the British Vice-Consul in Adana were quite well, and the remarks of 
the Vice-Consul on Cemal was very positive. An interview of the Vice-Consul with Cemal 
is illuminating about his political ideas and gives us important information about his 
evaluations on the general Ottoman politics, his ideas about the opposition to the CUP, his 
approach to any alliance with a foreign power etc. The following remarks reported by the 
British Vice-Consul is valuable to uderstand Cemal’s mentality of giving a new order to 
the Ottoman state by way of controlling the “autonomous” structures and opposition 
organizations within the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire:  
“Touching on the general conditions of the country, he [Cemal] said that the present time 
was most critical as “they” [the CUP] had many enemies, but that, if, the present line of the 
policy could be continued for five years, all opposition would be done away with and the 
country saved. To this end, went on the Vali, a general disarment [disarmament] must be 
carried out; -we have found a “pretext” in Albania for this and we shall now disarm the 
Hauran, and Syria; afterwards we shall do the same to Kurdistan; the Yemen is not so 
important and such measures will not be necessary there yet awhile. Then branching into 
more general politics His Excellency said that he for his part did not want to see Turkey 
entering into any alliance whatsoever at present; the country was far to[o] weak and poor 
and would, therefore, be certainly given the worst of the bargain.”45  
It is clear in these statements that Cemal had a monolithic and authoritarian state idea and 
saw the opposition as a danger for the Ottoman Empire as well as the maintenance of the 
armed autonomous structures, like tribes in Hauran and Kürdistan.  
                                                 
43 PRO, FO 371/998, Lowther to Grey (Tranmitting the Vice-Consul in Adana), 7 
February 1910. 
44 PRO, FO 371/998, Lowther to Grey (Tranmitting the Vice-Consul in Adana), 23 
February 1910. 
45 PRO, FO 195/2337, British Vice-Consulate to the British Ambassador in 
Constantinople, Adana, 27 August 1910. 
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After the restoration of peace and order in the city on 26th August, Cemal was sent 
to Baghdad by the Ottoman Government to restore the Ottoman authority in that province 
and its around, which was weakened by the increase of the British influence there and to 
reorganize the state institutions in the city.46 As stated in his firman of appoinment, which 
was publicly read at the saray of the Governor on the 30th August, the Governor was “to 
turn the rivers of Mesopotamia to account (?) [sic.] by means of navigation and irrigation”. 
For that purpose, “at least 40.000 turkish liras would be granted annually”. His authority 
on the Bureaucracy was quite extensive. Cemal was “empowered to appoint and dismiss 
all civil officers, except those of the ordinary Judicial and Shar’i Departments”. Similar to 
this, the Governor was “to reorganize the Police and open a Police School if possible”. 
Furthermore, he had some authority over the bureaucrats in the neighboring provinces. As 
expressed in the firman “in case of urgent or important internal questions” Cemal Bey was 
“authorized to summon the Wali of Basrah to Baghdad for consultation”. According to the 
documents revealed by Artuç, Cemal was authorized to solve most of the important issues 
for the Ottoman Government in Mosul and Basra.47 Finally, he would “formulate a 
scheme, with the least possible delay, for the settlement of the nomad tribes upon the 
land”, which could be considered as a component of giving a modern “order” to the state’s 
representation in Baghdad.48  
 His speech, following reading of the firman, was quite indicative regarding the 
aims of Cemal’s existence in Baghdad. Quite the reverse of his “pro-British” and 
“Ottomanist” attitude in Adana, Cemal was exactly an “Islamist” and “anti-imperialist” in 
Baghdad. Similar to his anti-French policy in Syria, and in accordance with his strong 
conviction in the necessity of a strong state authority on the conduct of its citizens for the 
continuation of the Ottoman Empire, Cemal aimed at the reduction of the British influence 
in Iraq since the British had some future plans in Iraq, like that of France in Syria. 
According to the reports of the British Consul in Baghdad,  
“His speech was garnished with pious Muhammedan expressions; and to have made 
slanting allusions to foreigners against whom, he said, ‘an iron door’ must be closed at 
                                                 
46 Artuç, Ibid, pp. 86-89. 
47 Artuç, Ibid, p. 90. 
48 PRO, FO 195/2369, the British Consul to FO, Baghdad, 26 September 1911. 
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Basrah. The ‘iron door’ phrase is not reproduced in the published account of the speech. 
He is also said to have remarked that ‘the hand coming from the south must be warded 
off’.”49 
In addition, Cemal heralded the construction of a great street through the middle of the 
town to carry an electric tramway to provide a modern appearance to the city. His first 
action reported by the British consul was to dismiss the Christian Mayor of Baghdad and to 
replace him by a Muhammedan, which can be evaluated as an attitude to win the hearts of 
the Muslim population.50  
 Throughout his governorate in Baghdad, Cemal maintained his Islamist and anti-
imperialist attitude with his meetings and visits. In the first days of his governorate, the 
Governor visited Muadhdham, where the tomb of Abu Hanifah, the great Sunni theologian, 
is situated. According to the report of the British consul, at that time, similar to the 
Selahaddin-i Eyyubi Külliyesi in Jerusalem, the Ottoman Government proposed to 
establish a famous college on the model of the Nizamiyeh, which existed at Baghdad in the 
days of Abbasid Khalifate. In this visit, Cemal expressed his unhappiness that the Ottoman 
Government had only one school at Baghdad.51 
 During his governorate in Baghdad, Cemal’s anti-imperialist language showed 
itself in every occasion. In the words of the British consul, in a dinner meeting held in his 
house to all the editors of newspapers in Baghdad, on 17th September, the Governor stated 
that “the contract given to the Germans for the construction of the Baghdad Railway would 
ruin Turkey”.  In this speech Cemal accused Abdulhamid of “giving ‘too much face’ to 
foreigners in general, with the result that the said foreigners now considered themselves 
the rulers of the country”. By that reason, the supremacy of the foreigner had been so 
increased that “even foreign travellers conducted themselves in Turkey as if they were 
Walis [Governors]”. He promised to the journalists of Baghdad that the present 
constitutional Government of Turkey would not “give way to foreigners any longer. The 
interests of Turkish subjects should be considered before those of foreigners; at present 
they came in the second place”. To manage this goal, Cemal “advised the editors to 
                                                 
49 PRO, FO 195/2369, the British Consul to FO, Baghdad, 16 October 1911. 
50 PRO, FO 195/2369, the British Consul to FO, Baghdad, 16 October 1911. 
51 PRO, FO 195/2369, the British Consul to FO, Baghdad, 16 October 1911. 
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impress these ideas on those whom they met”. He also promised that the Baghdad official 
newspaper, the ‘Zaura,’ “should again appear in Arabic as well as Turkish, as was the 
custom before Nazim Pasha’s time”. Similarly, in another meeting at the military club, he 
added that Europeans were “accustomed to think that the Turks are afraid of them. This is 
no longer the case, and Europeans ought to know it”.52  
 Cemal did what was necessary to forestall the spread of the British activities in the 
province of Baghdad. Two examples are significant in this sense. Once, in April 1912, the 
British consul appointed the British officials with the British official dresses to guide the 
Indian Shiites, who would visit Najaf and Karbala. Those Indians entered into Baghdad 
accompanied by the mentioned British officials. The Governor strongly protested this 
action and reported to the Ottoman Foreign Ministry that the real aim of this action was to 
employ the British officials in Baghdad.53 According to Cemal, allowing the British consul 
to employ those officials would increase the influence of his state while humiliating the 
Ottoman Governor.54 Upon Cemal’s request, the Ottoman Ministry of Interior prohibited 
the mentioned British officials to maintain their works.55 
 Another problem with the British Consul emerged due to the establishment of a 
British court in Kazımiyeh and appointment of the British mukhtars by the Consul to some 
quarters in the same city. The mukhtars would give residence permit to the British citizens, 
who did not have one. Frustrated with this action, Cemal urgently demanded from the 
Ottoman Foreign Ministry to intervene in the issue and to close the court and to dismiss the 
mukhtars. The Governor threated the Ministry of Interior to resign from his post. Upon 
this, the British Consul visited Cemal and agreed with him on closure of the court and 
dismissal of the mukhtars.56 
                                                 
52 PRO, FO 195/2369, the British Consul to FO, Baghdad, 16 October 1911. 
53 Artuç, Ibid, p. 94. 
54 BOA, HR.SYS, 91/4, Cemal to the Foreign Ministry, Bagdhad, 17 Nisan 1328 [30 
April 1912] in Artuç, Ibid, p. 94. 
55 BOA, HR.SYS, 91/4, Cemal to the Foreign Ministry, Bagdhad, 7 Mayıs 1328 [20 
May 1912] in Artuç, Ibid, p. 94. 
56 Artuç, Ibid, p. 95. 
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 Similar to his attitude in Syria and in accordance with his belief in the damage of 
the opposition parties to the unity of the Ottoman Empire, Cemal also struggled with the 
Ottoman opposition movements in Baghdad. He wholeheartedly strove for the victory of 
the CUP candidates in Baghdad in the 1912 elections for the Ottoman Parliament and 
made an effort against the candidates of the Liberty and Concord Party [Hürriyet ve İtilaf 
Fırkası][LCP hereafter].57 According to Muhammed Kamil Bey, a member of the LCP, 
Cemal left his post for three months and propagated for the Unionist candidates. He 
influenced the members of the courts to prevent the activities of the opposition. In the last 
days of his governorate in Baghdad, on 3 August 1912, Cemal closed the branch of the 
LCP in that city.58 
 Besides emphasizing the European threat for the Muslims and the struggle to 
forestall it, and the strivings to “do away with” the opposition movement, Cemal also made 
it remember the “backwardness” of Muslims and emphasized the need for the development 
of the Muslims to be saved from the European colonization. In one of his speech to the 
prominent ulema of Baghdad, his remarks referring the glorious past of the Islamic 
civilization and the were too much similar to those of the famous Islamist scholars Afghani 
and Abduh:  
“The Muhammadan scholars of Baghdad who composed and put into literary form (sic) the 
invention of the clock, -that orderer of the time of man, -the proof of the roundless of the 
world, the determination of the meridian and, finally, countless and innumerable eternal 
monuments including medicine, philosophy, literature, mathematical sciences and 
astronomy, breathed the air of this very land, were warmed by this very sun, slaked their 
thirst with the water of this very land, and lived on the natural products afforded by this 
very land for the use of humanity. 
But, alas, the successors who came after them did not make the necessary effort to follow 
the traces of their glorious ways; the bright sun of learning and knowledge which had been 
revealed in the land of Iraq became gradually dim; and naturally, in this manner, wealth 
and affluence disappearing, they were left in a state of ignorance, nomadism, dispersion, 
and weakness. Some attribute the present ruined state of the country to the 33-year long 
Hamidian regime, but this view is not correct; the period of decline of the land of Iraq 
                                                 
57 BOA, BEO 4015/301052, Sadaret to Ministry of Interior, 29 Şubat 1327 [13 March 
1912] 
58 BOA, DH.MTV 18/47, Müftüzade Muhammed Kamil Bey to Ministry of Interior, 
Baghdad, 22 Temmuz 1912 [3 Ağustos 1912]. 
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began five or six hundred years ago, and the Hamidian regime has only been the cause of is 
reaching an extreme point.”59  
As will be shown in Chapter 6, Cemal showed great interest to the restoration of the 
historical monuments during his governorate in Syria. It seems that he had a similar 
interest while he was in Baghdad. In the second week of his appointment, Cemal visited 
Salman Pak, on the left bank of Tigris, near which were the celebrated ruins of Ctesiphon 
and Seleucia. The British Consul stated the aim of the visit as unknown. However, its aim 
could be to inspect the monuments to prevent their smuggling by the British and to protect 
them in the boundaries of the Ottoman State.60 
 The change of the political balance in mid-1912 to the detriment of the CUP 
sounded the death knell for Cemal Bey in Baghdad. Upon the accession of the Freedom 
Party to the power, on 12th August 1912, Cemal resigned from his post and returned to 
Istanbul.61 
 Upon the outbreak of the Balkan Wars, Cemal applied to the army to take charge in 
the war. He was appointed as the commander of auxiliaries from Konya and his troop had 
to retreat like the Other Ottoman forces. He stayed in this post till 14 November 1912, 
when he was stricken by cholera epidemic.62 
 Following the First Balkan War, the CUP made a coup d’etat [Bab-ı Ali Baskını] 
and captured the Government. Immediately after that, on 27th January 1913 Cemal was 
appointed as “the military governor of Istanbul” [İstanbul Muhafızı] with a broad authority 
to provide “order” in the city, who was famous with his “disciplinarian” and “organizer” 
character.63 With Cemal’s own remarks, by this event, he directly started to be busy with 
the general policy of the Empire. He managed to restore the public order in Istanbul and 
prevent a counter attack against the CUP. Two measures applied by Cemal Bey during his 
governorate in Istanbul are worth to mention to understand the mind and character of him. 
                                                 
59 PRO, FO 195/2369, the British Consul to FO, Baghdad, 16 October 1911. 
60 PRO, FO 195/2369, the British Consul to FO, Baghdad, 16 October 1911. 
61 Artuç, Ibid, p. 98. 
62 Artuç, Ibid, p. 99-103. 
63 Artuç, Ibid, p. 110. 
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Firstly, “There were… a number of smugglers who were offering smuggled tobacco (in 
Government packets) in the streets of the city, Sultan Hamam, Sirkedji, and Mahmud 
Pasha Hill and Bayadzid Square”64. According to Cemal, that open smuggling showed 
weak the Government in the eyes of the people. Therefore, he “announced to all those 
concerned that anyone who indulged in illicit trading, whether wholesale or retail, would 
be arrested and banished from Constantinople”. In the next week, he had four or five at 
most of these individuals deported, and “the court martial passed sentence on a few 
smugglers who were caught in a kiosk no far from the Seraglio”. With Cemal’s own 
remarks, “the result was that the common swindling which had become an everyday 
occurrence was soon exceptional, and the people of Constantinople and its suburbs could 
henceforth enjoy perfect security.”65  
 The second one is more interesting to demonstrate Cemal’s vision of 
modernization. In Cemal’s own words, “there were many people in Constantinople who 
indulged in the vicious habit of making amorous remarks to Mohammedan ladies as they 
passed them out walking, on the boats and bridges, or in the streets and bazaars”. Those 
people “laid hands on elegant and well-dressed women”. Cemal applied severe measures 
against them and threatened those people to exile interior parts of Anatolia. After 
punishing four or five men, with the remarks of Cemal, the “women were able to walk in 
the streets without further molestation”.66 
 Cemal’s interpretations on this measure are important in terms of clarification of 
his approach to the place of women in the “development” and “modernization” of a 
country. He states in his memoirs that: 
“For the first time a definite step had been taken to place the personal freedom of Turkish 
women on a secure basis… I believe firmly in the important part which woman is called 
upon to play not only in social life, but also in public affairs… I am absolutely convinced 
that the civilising agencies of a country can best and soonest be promoted with the help of 
woman, and that those nations which keep their womankind in a state of slavery are on the 
high road of inevitable decay.” 67 
                                                 
64 Djemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 16. 
65 Djemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 17. 
66 Djemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 17. 
67 Djemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 17-18. 
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By these remarks, it can be concluded that the reforms performed by Mustafa Kemal 
regarding the status of women in the Early Republican Era were also thought by Cemal as 
required for the development of a country. Similarly, his activities of opening girl’s 
schools in Syria to increase of education of women with Halide Edib emanated from that 
conviction. 
 After the abolition of the military governorate of Istanbul, on 16th December 1913, 
Cemal was appointed as the Minister of Public Works [Nafia Nezareti]. Although he 
prepared some construction projects of railroads and chausseed roads as well as some 
channeling projects for irrigation, on 11th March 1914, some 85 days later, he was 
appointed as the Minister of Navy.68 He also made some reform projects for the Ottoman 
Navy, but some 10 months later, upon the entry of the Ottoman Empire into WWI, Cemal 
was appointed to the Governorate General of Syria and the Commander of the 4th Army 
there, when he was 42 years old. 
 Cemal’s prehistory and personality played a crucial role in his appointment to the 
Governorate General of Syria. As can be easily realized from the information given above, 
“disciplinarian”, “reformer”, “state-worshipper” [devletperest], “anti-imperialist” and 
“order builder” characteristics of him due to his personality and background made him a 
good candidate for the Syrian Governorate. In Adana, he had restored the interrupted state 
order with his severe measures and applied an Ottomanist discourse. In Baghdad, Cemal 
struggled with both the British influence and the activities of the Arabists. Because of his 
experiences in Baghdad, according to his memoirs, Cemal was treated by the CUP as an 
expert on the Arab affairs.69 In Istanbul, he suppressed a counter-revolt of the opposition 
and gave strength to the state with his severe actions against the “disorderliness”, and again 
in Baghdad, he struggled with the opposition. As a result of all these experiences, Cemal 
was seen by the CUP as the most suitable candidate for the Syrian Governorate General, 
where the authority of the state was thought by the Unionists as weak. Therefore, Cemal 
was sent to Syria with an extraordinary authorization to re-form there the Ottoman state in 
a modern sense. 
                                                 
68 For detailed information about these projects, see: Artuç, Ibid, pp. 134-138, 146. 
69 Djemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 58. 
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Nature of the Ottoman Reforms in Syria: An assessment of the Literature 
 
A number of scholarly works published over the last decades have greatly 
contributed to the study of the Ottoman modernization in the Arab provinces. One of the 
first to mention in this sense is Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine, 1840-1861 by 
Moshe Ma’oz. The study evaluated the Tanzimat reforms in the Syrian Provinces during 
the years 1840-1861 and described their impact on government and administration, on 
social and economic developments and on the position of the non-Muslim subjects. Ma’oz 
claimed about the impact of those reforms that “It brought an end to centuries of confusion 
and backwardness and opened a new age of stability and modernization. During these 
years local forces were destroyed, regional autonomies undermined, and a solid foundation 
of Ottoman direct rule was established”.70 Similar to Ma’oz, Albert Hourani states that,  
“The reforms of the tanzimat period in the Ottoman Empire…would, if carried to their 
logical conclusion, have destroyed the independent power of the notables and the mode of 
political action it made possible. The aim of the reforms was to establish a uniform and 
centralized administration, linked directly with each citizen, and working in accordance 
with its own rational principles of justice, applied equally to all.”71 
However, more recent studies made on the same period question this argument and 
demonstrate that the Ottoman reforms took the local interest groups into consideration 
from its very beginning. In her study on the nature of the Tanzimat reforms Jens Hassen 
indicates the reflections of the Ottoman reform during this period on the local elites: 
“The practices of integration that evolved during the stormy mid-decades of the nineteenth 
century represented multiple processes of negotiations between imperial an local interest 
groups and their representations. Focusing specifically on certain imperial strategies of 
crisis management in the Arab provinces, such as imperial inspection tours, local petitions 
and councils, and model provinces, there emerged distinct and subtle modes of 
contestation, appropriation ad co-operation in the provincial peripheries that determined 
the application of Tanzimat reforms. Moreover, what have consistently been considered 
impositions of state power, malicious or benevolent, under closer scrutiny turned out to be 
                                                 
70 Moshe Ma’oz, Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine 1840-1861, London: Oxford 
University Press, 1968, p. V. 
71 Albert Hourani, “Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables”, in Albert Hourani, 
Philip S. Khoury and Mary C. Wilson (eds.) The Modern Middle East, Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1993, pp. 94-95. 
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attributable to socio-political processes and agencies in the provincial peripheries that were 
then adopted in İstanbul as imperial legislation.”72 
Leila Fawaz demonstrated, in the case of Beirut, another aspect that compelled the 
Ottoman officials to take the local notables into consideration. According to her study, 
during the year 1840-1860 “the duality of European and Ottoman influence in Beirut 
insured a certain political and social openness that remained characteristic of the city in 
modern times”.73 As a result of this competition, the local notables could find a place in the 
local political life in Beirut. According to the scholarly works made on the Hamidian era, 
the situation did not change in this period and competition between the Ottomans and the 
European Powers gave shape to the local politics in Syria. Adil Baktıaya demonstrates in 
his study this competition through the educational institutions. In his words, “the aim of 
the [Ottoman] State with the centralization policy and the reform efforts after 1860 was to 
retard the Western penetration”.74 However, Baktıaya doesn’t emphasize the role of the 
local notables in this rivalry. This gap is filled by the work of Abdülhamid Kırmızı: In his 
study on the Governors of Abdulhamid II, Kırmızı confirms, for the period of the 
mentioned Sultan using the Ottoman arcival sources, that the Governors of the Hamidian 
                                                 
72 Jens Hassen, “Practices of Integration-Center-Periphery Relations in the Ottoman 
Empire”, in Jens Hassen, Thomas Philipp, Stefan Weber (eds.), The Empire in the City: 
Arab Provincial Capitals in the Late Ottoman Empire, Beirut: Orient-Institut der DMG 
Beirut, 2002, p. 74; for another study on the central role of Damascus Council, consisted of 
the local notables, in the public life of the province, see: Elisabeth Thompson, “Ottoman 
Political Reform in the Provinces: Damascus Advisory Council in 1844-1845”, IJMES 25 
(1993), pp. 457-475. 
73 Leila Fawaz, “Foreign Presence and the Perception of the Ottoman Rule in Beirut”, in 
Jens Hanssen, Thomas Philipp, Stefan Weber (eds.), The Empire in the City: Arab 
Provincial Capitals in the Late Ottoman Empire, Beirut: Orient-Institut der DMG Beirut, 
2002, p. 93; for another study on the Ottoman-European competition in Acre with similar 
arguments, see: Thomas Philipp,  “Acre, The First Instance of Changing Times”, in Jens 
Hanssen, Thomas Philipp, Stefan Weber (eds.), The Empire in the City: Arab Provincial 
Capitals in the Late Ottoman Empire, Beirut: Orient-Institut der DMG Beirut, 2002, pp. 
77-92. 
74 Adil Baktıaya, Osmanlı Suriyesi’nde Arapçılığın Doğuşu, İstanbul: Bengi Kitabevi, 
2009, p.109. 
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era always took the local notables into consideration while they were trying to centralize 
the Ottoman realm and they clashed with the Center for the demands of the periphery.75  
 The situation was similar after the proclamation of the second constitution. Hasan 
Kayalı’s acclaimed study, Arabs and Young Turks76 shed light on the Arab policy of the 
CUP as well as a discussion of the Arab concerns between 1908 and 1918. In this regard, 
he demonstrates that the ideology of Islamism remarkably overshadowed Arab and Turkish 
nationalisms during this period. On the other hand, Kayalı demonstrates that the CUP 
leaders always took the political demands of the Arab notables into consideration “for a 
larger representation in state offices and a wider use of Arabic in the Arab provinces”.77 
According to him: 
“The Young Turk policies were perceived as discriminatory partly because the Unionist 
purge of the Hamidian cadres from important positions had resulted in the dismissal of 
many Arabs, the influential ones from the palace coterie of Abdülhamid… Setting aside 
the aberration of the Hamidian regime, which departed from bureaucratic norms in the 
recruitment of a palace administration, the Young Turk period compared more favorably to 
past patterns with respect to the recruitment of Arabs. A comparison of the 1877-78 and 
1908 Parliaments does not show a relative decline in the size of Arab representation…”78 
However, Kayalı disregards the rupture in the Arabist and Syrian policy of the CUP 
beginning with the appointment of Cemal as the governor general in Syria. Immediately 
after Cemal’s arrival at Syria, the policy of reconcilition, which was followed throughout 
the whole period of the reform century, was abandoned, and a policy of control and 
elimination was adopted. Similarly, as will be demonstrated in the second chapter, the 
Unionist intentions to eliminate the Arabist movement, which belonged to the pre-War 
period, were not taken into consideration by Kayalı. Furthermore, the CUP rarely saw the 
Arabists as sincerely demanding reform in Syria. Rather they were assessed by the 
Unionists as several self-seekers. This point was also underestimated in his study.  
                                                 
75 For detailed informations about the relations between the Central Government and the 
periphery, see: Abdulhamid Kırmızı, Abdülhamid’in Valileri, İstanbul: Klasik Yayınları, 
2007. 
76 Hasan Kayalı, Arabs and the Young Turks: Turkish-Arab relations in the second 
constitutional period of the Ottoman Empire 1908-1918, Berkeley: California University 
Press, 1997. 
77 Kayalı, Ibid, p. 210. 
78 Kayalı, Ibid, p. 209. 
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 Another study that treats Cemal’s governorate is Nevzat Artuç’s work, Cemal Paşa: 
Askeri ve Siyasi Hayatı.79  The author dedicates more than one hundred pages to the Syrian 
period of Cemal’s life. Half of it is a summary of the military preparations for the Egyptian 
expedition. The other half tries to describe his administrative activities in Syria. Although 
the book at times engages in some analysis, there is no consistent narrative throughout the 
book. On the other hand the language of the book implies that it was written by an admirer 
of Cemal Pasha, who really likes what he did, rather than trying to understand and 
contextualize of Cemal’s period in the history of Syria. Furthermore, many critical subjects 
for the period were glossed over in a few pages. For example, the Famine, the most 
staggering event of the period for the common people, was summarized in four pages 
without touching upon the reasons and consequences of it. Similarly, the educational 
acitivities were handled in three pages. Evaluation of the existing literature is sometimes 
made with scanty information. For example, Hasan Kayalı’s study, which is a pioneer in 
terms of its application of the Ottoman sources in the Arab studies is evaluated with these 
words: “Kayalı disregarded the Turkish archives, the main source of the subject, and was 
influenced by the foreign writers and archives.” 80 After that he accuses Kayalı of being 
subjective in his evaluations on Cemal Pasha.  
 This aside, in recent years, another discussion regarding the character of the 
Ottoman modernization in the Arab provinces has begun in the literature by the study of 
Ussama Makdisi claiming that the Turkish rulers of the Empire adopted an orientalist 
attitude towards their treatment of the Arabs. He maintains that “in an age of Western 
dominated modernity, every nation creates its own orient. Nineteenth century Ottoman 
Empire was no exception”.81 In Makdisi’s viewpoint,  
“Through efforts to study, discipline, and improve imperial subjects, Ottoman reform 
created a notion of the pre-modern within the empire in a manner akin to the way European 
                                                 
79 For the related chapter in the book, see: Artuç, Ibid, p. 208-245. 
80 Artuç, Ibid, p. XLI. 
81 Ussama Makdisi, “Ottoman Orientalism”, American Historical Review, 107/3, (June 
2002), p. 768; similar evalulations can be found in Selim Deringil’s studies on the tribal 
Arabs: Selim Deringil, “‘They live in a state of Nomadism and Savagery’: The Late 
Ottoman Empire and the Post-Colonial Debate”,  Comparative Studies in Society and 
History, Vol. 45, No. 2 (Apr., 2003), pp. 311-342. 
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colonial administrators represented their colonial subjects. This process culminated in the 
articulation of a modern Ottoman Turkish nation that had to lead the empire’s other 
putatively stagnant ethnic and national groups into an Ottoman modernity”.82 
In a similar way, he asserts that, 
“Nowhere, perhaps, was this paradox of Ottoman reforms –inclusivist insofar as it sought 
to integrate all provinces and peoples into an official nationalism of Ottomanism and yet 
also temporally segregated and ultimately racially differentiated- more apparent than in the 
Arab provinces of the empire”.83 
According to the classification of Makdisi, in the progressive way of civilization, the West 
was in the first floor whereas the Ottomans followed them in advance of the Arabs. 
Makdisi created a hierarcy as Westerner-Turk-Arab in the viewpoint of the Ottoman elites. 
With their civilizing mission, like the colonial governments of the Western States, the 
Ottomans legitimized their domination over the non-Turkish territories, the Arab countries 
being in the first place. In summary, he implies that the Turks established a colonial empire 
over the other ethnies of the Ottoman country, like those of the French in Africa and the 
British in India. 
Considering Cemal Pasha’s Governorate and its before, Makdisi’s approach can be 
criticized in several aspects. First of all, he totally neglects the Ottoman struggle with the 
Western powers on the Arab provinces for influence. In the article, the Ottomans were 
represented as the only absolute authority of the region, and the Arab people were totally 
disregarded as a factor in the process of modernization. Yet the Ottoman Empire was 
competing in the Arab provinces with the Western Powers, and had to persuade its Arab 
citizens that their State was as progressed as that of the Western states, prevent them from 
orientating sympathies to the Western powers. As claimed by Makdisi, the Ottoman 
Empire was not in a position to mediate between its own “backward” orient and the 
civilized West since the Western civilization was inside the Arab provinces thanks to its 
educational and religious institutions and, in many cases, they were more influential over 
the different Arab peoples than those of the Empire. As demonstrated by Fawaz and 
                                                 
82 Makdisi, Ibid, p. 769. 
83 Makdisi, Ibid, p. 770. 
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Philip84, the Ottoman elites got involved in a process of modernization in the Arab lands 
commenced by the Western institutions opened in the Arab provinces, and they tried to 
create their loyal citizens against the Western threat of colonization. Secondly, the 
difference between nation-building and colonization is not clear in his text. For example, 
the author is not clear whether we can classify the creation of Modern France under the 
same ideal type with that of the transformations experienced in India in the direction of 
modernization under the British colonization, or the Ottoman treatment of the Arabs with 
that of the British India and the French Africa. It seems to the author of the present study 
that the Ottomans modeled the treatment of the Western states towards their own citizens 
rather than their conduct in the colonies. Third, it is true that the Ottoman elites regarded 
some sections of Arab society as “backward”. But that was not special to the Arabs, similar 
remarks by Turkish authors or statesmen can be found for the Turks. For example, some 
words in the novel of prominent Turkish writer Yakup Kadri, called Ankara, demonstrate 
that this representation could not only be limited to Arabs.85 Non-modern Turks were also 
classified in the same category. On the other hand, there could rarely be found orientalist 
remarks for the nationally-spirited modernized Arabists in case of Cemal Pasha. 
Contrarily, his struggle with the Arabists was, in a sense, a competition of the different 
kinds of modernizations. Therefore, this is rather the perception of the non-moderns by the 
moderns. Fourth, Makdisi’s claim regarding that the Empire was aimed to transform into a 
Turkish-dominated structure86 seems to be controversial, at least, for Cemal’s governorate. 
It is true that Cemal, to a considerable extent, turkified the Syrian bureaucracy. But he did 
not apply this method to “civilize” Syria with a colonial mission, but to replace the 
Western influence –a higher category in Makdisi’s classification- with that of the 
Ottomans. As a proof of this, the Arab bureaucrats, who were thought to be influenced by 
the Western Powers, were not dismissed, but appointed to equal posts in Anatolia, i.e., 
assigned to govern “the first class citizens” of the Empire by the words of Makdisi. Was it 
                                                 
84 Fawaz, Ibid, p. 93, Philip, Ibid, p. 77-92. 
85 This dialogue regarding the native people of Ankara is interesting: “instead I 
resemble them, they resemble me. We brought civilization here”: Yakup Kadri 
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possible for an Indian to be a sub-governor in a British town? This is a question worth to 
consider. Fifth, it seems that the author differs from Said’s definition of orientalism. As 
expressed by Kayapınar, there is no historical, cultural, ethnic and geographic basis to 
define the “ontological and epistemological” differences of a Turkish orientalism towards 
the Arabs. In other words, in the eyes of the Turks during the Ottoman times, some parts of 
Arab society was “backward”, like some other parts of the Turks, but the “backwards” 
were also a part of Ottoman society. Namely, there was not any necessary differentiation 
between Turks and Arabs in the eyes of the Ottoman elites.87  
 
 
The Character of Cemal’s Governance in Syria 
 
Different from what Makdisi claims, the aims of Cemal’s reforms were, first, to 
abolish the influence of the great powers, and, second, to eliminate the local particularisms, 
which, according to him, prevented for years the proper establishment of the State’s 
authority and the creation of a sense of the Ottomanness in Syria. They were also a threat 
for Cemal’s aims due to their “connections” with the Great Powers. For those aims, Cemal 
established a special bureaucracy in Syria, consisted mainly of Turks. Throughout his 
governorate, he strove to create a powerful [Muktedir] team of high-ranking bureaucrats in 
Syria, which would be able to work in harmony with him. In one of his telegrams to Talat 
about the appointment of kaymakams to Salt and Kerak, he explained some characteristics 
of the bureaucrats that were needed in Syria with the following remarks:  
“For one year, there has been no kaymakam in Kerak and Salt. In these days, which we 
strive for the establishment of the authority of the state in a sound [sağlam] way, [the 
questions of] that lack of bureaucrats [memur] or the arrival of the incapable [fena] 
bureaucrats must be solved...I request you to appoint a powerful official [as the kaymakam] 
to Salt”88  
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As inferred from this telegram, he wanted to redesign the Syrian bureaucracy to strengthen 
the existence of the Ottoman state and to implement other projects there. For this aim, 
Cemal prerequisites two personal characteristics for the bureaucrats, who would be 
appointed in Syria: might [iktidar] and capability. Some other prerequirements were 
mentioned in another telegram. When he requested the appointment of a new Governor to 
Jerusalem, he assumed the characteristics of the new Governor for Jerusalem as follows: 
“...of being a Turk; of having a morality, which would not possible to be corrupted; of 
having served as sub-Governor or kaymakam...; of having a sense of justice;... of being 
brave...; of being a member of the Committee of Union and Progress...”89 
 As can be inferred from the telegram, besides some personal capabilities, Cemal 
attributed importance to the ethnicity of the high-ranking Bureaucrats. In Cemal’s 
viewpoint, since most of the Arab high-ranking bureaucrats in Syria were either 
sympathizers or members of the Arabist parties, which influenced by the Great Powers and 
since they advocated the reorganization of Syria in a decentralized way, or they did not 
adopt the ideals of the Ottomanness, they weren’t reliable bureaucrats in a process of re-
formation of the State in Syria. In one of his telegrams, the supreme ruler of Syria 
demanded the appointment of the governor [Mutasarrıf] of Hauran to a place in Anatolia 
on grounds that he wanted to solve the Government’s problems with the Druzes and the 
sub-governor was incapable to serve this goal since “he is an Arab before anything else”.90 
In the same way, he requested from Talat the appointment of the [Arab] kaymakams of 
Syria to the Anatolian towns.91 Most of his demands in this direction were fulfilled by the 
Central Government for the sake of the strengthening of the state authority in Syria.92 In 
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spite of his regulations for the appointment of the Turks to posts in the Syrian bureaucracy, 
it can not be claimed for Cemal that he was a turkifier. Because, as will be demonstrated in 
the second and sixth chapters, Cemal did not undertake any systematic action to remove, 
transform or eliminate the Arab culture, language or any other thing, which belonged to the 
Arabs. Rather, he tried to replace the Western influence with the Ottoman one and 
attempted to spread the Ottoman ideals. Cemal’s insistence on teaching Turkish to the 
Arabs was due to the desire of a direct communication between the state and its citizens in 
Syria.  
 For further comprehension of the reasons behind Cemal’s insistence on the 
appointment of the Bureaucrats, who had Turkish origins, it is important to analyze 
Cemal’s remarks on Turkishness and Arabness. He, indeed, explains his ideas on the place 
of Turkishness and Arabness in the Ottoman Empire in his memoirs:  
“Speaking of myself, I am primarily an Ottoman, but I do not forget that I am a Turk, and 
nothing can shake my belief that the Turkish race is the foundation-stone [temel taş] of the 
Ottoman Empire and the rise of the Ottoman Empire in the sense of civilization and 
education [irfan] strengthens the Ottoman community [camia] and fortifies [te’yid] the 
Ottoman Empire, because, the Ottoman Empire is a Turkish creation in its origins.93 
If any evidence is required, look at the tragic situation in which we find ourselves to-day. 
Look at the Arabs, who rose against us in the hope of gaining their independence Where 
are they to-day? I have referred to this point before… 
Does anyone in those countries ever speak of Ottomanism ? On the contrary, the cry “By 
the grace of God we are freed from Ottomanism,” is ever on the lips of a crowd of traitors 
who have lived on the favour of the Government. But the voice raised in Anatolia –that 
sacred land to the Turks- proclaims that the “Ottoman Empire” still exists, her noble sons 
who dwell in Western Thrace –that little Turkish corner- have never ceased to strive for 
their union with the Empire. In short, all Turks –wherever they are- endeavour to assert 
themselves and seek refuge in the glorious Ottoman name…”94 
These remarks were quoted by Makdisi as the proof of the Turkish priority in the Ottoman 
Empire and “Turkish responsibility to conduct the affairs of state”.95 However, this 
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privilege rather belonged to the “conscious” Turkish elite rather than to all the Turks. The 
privileged position of those Turks in the Ottoman Empire stems from their allegiance to 
the ideal of the Ottoman unity, and their strivings to maintain the Ottoman existence 
against the Great Powers. In the quoted text, he criticizes the Arab elite of not following 
the ideal of the Ottomanism, similar to his critics to Sharif Hussein. By the term “Arab”, he 
means those, “who rose against us [the Ottomans] in the hope of gaining their 
independence”, rather than blaming the whole Arabs. That was the reason for the so-called 
“unpreferrable” treatment of the enlightened Arabs. In summary, there were a certain 
group of “modernized” Arabs in Cemal’s view, but they were not sufficiently loyal to the 
ideal of the Ottoman unity. Therefore, the Turks were more “preferable” in comparison to 
the Arabs, and, in the struggle for the establishment of the Ottoman state authority in Syria, 
he employed the “enlightened” Turks in his bureaucracy instead of untrusted Arabs. His 
educational and other activities in Syria should be evaluated in this regard. The increase of 
the sense of loyalty to the Empire could be measured by the struggle for continuance of the 
Ottoman state. As the result of the position of the Turks in Cemal’s mind, he regarded 
Anatolia as his motherland.96 This is nothing than a strong sense of patriotism, required for 
the citizens in the nation-states, and the process introduced by Cemal Pasha in Syria was 
the re-formation of a modern state according to the nation-state model. Cemals himself 
answers the claims of Turkification in his memoirs with the following remarks: 
“I reply emphatically that our policy was not a ‘Turkish’ policy, but the policy of Ottoman 
unity. If we had accepted the decentralisation principle, the Committee would, indeed, 
have had to pursue a ‘Turkish’ policy, for we should have had to demand the same local 
autonomy for vilayets inhabited solely by Turks as for the other provinces. So those who 
confess themselves ‘Turks’ only are really advocates of ‘decentralisation’, for in effect 
they are simply following a purely Turkish policy. We, on the other hand, whose policy 
was Ottoman unity, had accepted as a fundamental principle that the influence of the 
Central Government on the vilayets should not be diminished, though the local 
                                                 
96 He described the delegate of authors visited Syria towards the end of the year 1916 as 
“the most distinguished faces of the motherland [Anavatan]”. For the whole of the 
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administration should be granted the most extensive powers, always provided that the unity 
of army organisation should not be prejudiced… 
Can it be said that the ‘Turkification’ of the nations was involved in the demand that the 
Turkish language should be the official tongue in the Ottoman Empire? Were we engaged 
in the ‘Turkification’ of the other nations when we said that public education in the 
Ottoman Empire must be under the supervision of the Government and well conducted?”97  
Especially the second paragraph is significant to understand the character of Cemals policy 
of “Turkification”. By the partial ‘turkification’ of the Syrian bureaucracy and education, 
he did not undertake a transformation process regarding the Arab culture. It was rather a 
part of his policy of re-formation of the state existence in Syria. When these steps were 
considered together with his actions to eliminate the social intermediaries, like the 
notables, Zionists, clergy etc. the imposition of Turkish will be more meaningful. 
On the other hand, being a Turk on its own was not adequate for Cemal to be 
employed in Syria. For those, who did not have the conditions mentioned before were in 
some ways dismissed regardless of their ethnicity. The governors, sub-governors, or 
kaymakams, who couldn’t adopt to Cemal’s way of administration was either dismissed or 
they resigned. In the first year of his existence in Syria, he changed almost all the 
governors of the principal cities in Syria. At the end of his first year, the Governors of 
Beirut, Damascus, Lebanon and Aleppo had all been changed with the new ones. He made 
the Governor of Beirut Bekir Sami Bey dismissed, accusing him of extortion98 [irtikab] 
and punting with the Bank managers.99 The Governors of Aleppo and Damascus changed 
their places of duty since they were not attuned to Cemal’s way of administration. 
According to the report of the Austrian Consul in Damascus, the Governor Hulusi Bey 
resigned from his post due to his disapproval of boundless rigor applied by Cemal 
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Pasha.100 Almost all of these administrators had good relations with the members of the 
Arabist parties.101  
 When the Central Government appointed a bureaucrat in contradiction to the 
requests of Cemal, he was usually able to secure the bureaucrat’s dismissal from his post. 
The most outstanding example of this was the appointment of a new Governor to Syria 
following Hulusi Bey. Cemal suggested the Governor of Erzurum, Tahsin Bey, to the 
central governor as the successor of Hulusi.102 However, the Central Government 
appointed Azmi Bey [not Azmi Bey of Beirut] to Syria. As a result, that governor couldn’t 
maintain his office in Syria and had to return to Istanbul in a short span of time. Upon the 
request of Cemal that Azmi was not sufficiently experienced and powerful to administrate 
the province of Syria, he had to resign from his post.103 
 The characteristics of the high-ranking bureaucrats appointed by Cemal 
demonstrate his intentions regarding Syria. The case of Azmi Bey, appointed as the 
Governor of Beirut upon his request is a good example of his ideal bureaucrat. When he 
resigned from his office in June 1918, the German Consul in Beirut identified him with 
these remarks: “extremely strong headed” towards the foreign representatives, “relentless”, 
and “chauvinist” against all the foreign powers including the allies of Turkey. On the other 
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Kurd Ali, al-Mudhakkirat, al- Juz al-Awwal, Damascus, Matbaatu al-Tarakki, 1948, p. 
103; From the memoirs of  Salim Ali Salaam, it is inferred that Bekir Sami had established 
close relations with the Arabists of Beirut: Salim Ali Salaam, Mudhakkiratu Salim Ali 
Salaam (1868-1938), Hassan Ali Hallak (ed.), Beirut: al-Dar al-Jami’iyya, 1982, p. 188-
189. 
102 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 493/61, Cemal to Talat, 30 Eylül 1331 [13 October 1915]. 
103 Shakib Arslan claims in his memoirs that Cemal didn’t like Azmi Bey since the 
Central Government appointed the latter without consent of Cemal. Therefore, Azmi had 
to return shortly after his appointment: Shakib Arslan, Siratu Zatiyya, Beirut: Dar al-Tali’a, 
1969, p. 177-178; presumably with the similar reasons, Cemal proposed the dismissal of 
Azmi by reason of that he couldn’t make governorate in Syria: BOA, DH. ŞFR. 516/34, 
Cemal to Talat, 3 Nisan 1332 [16 April 1916]. 
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hand, the consul states, Azmi worked in Beirut during his governorate with a tireless 
energy.104 The typical bureaucrat that was undesirable by Cemal could be schematized by 
the first Governor of Jerusalem, Macid Bey. According to the diaries of the Spanish consul 
of Jerusalem, he had a conflict with the commander of Jaffa, Hasan Bey, who was favored 
by Cemal, and therefore, resigned. When “he had tendered his resignation, which produced 
a real panic in the city” the Spanish consul visited the other consuls and “all telegraphed 
Constantinople asking that his resignation not be accepted. Even the four Patriarchs (the 
Latin, the Greek, the Armenian and the Coptic) sent a message too”.105 As can be inferred 
from this quotation, Macid Bey had good relations with the local interest groups and the 
foreign consuls, two barriers in the eyes of Cemal for the establishment of a direct 
diffusion of the state power into the realm.  
 As will be analyzed below, in Cemal’s viewpoint, Syria was a semi-colonized part 
of the Empire, which ought to be cleaned from foreign influence and had to be integrated 
to the body of the Ottoman State. By the regulations in Syrian bureaucracy and the 
appointment of the powerful bureaucrats, Cemal wanted to amend the image of the 
weakness of the Ottoman Government among the Syrians and set his seal on Syria as its 
founder in the modern sense. He opened schools, built streets106 and fountains there called 
after his name; People hanged Cemal’s photos signed by him to the most conspicuous 
places of their houses as the symbol of their loyalty to the leader of their country107; he 
organized selamlık ceremonies when he was going to friday prayer, which were in fact, 
special to the Ottoman sultan; the most conspicious places of the Syrian provincial 
capitals, like Damascus, Jerusalem, Aleppo, were reserved for him as headquarter.108 In 
summary, during his governorate, he wanted to remove the weak image of the Ottoman 
                                                 
104 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.17, Mutius to Hertling, Beirut, 23 June 1918.  
105 Conde de Ballobar, Jerusalem in World War I: The Palestine Diary of a European 
Diplomat, Eduardo Manzano Moreno and Roberto Mazza, London: I.B. Tauris, 2011, p. 
36. 
106 Erden, Ibid, p. 89. 
107 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.17, Weber to Hertling, Constantinople, 26 June 1918,  
108  Ziya Şakir, Ibid, p. 180; he also listened to the complaints of the people after the 
Friday prayer like the second Caliph Umar: Erden, Ibid, p. 89. 
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Government by his authoritarian personality, and didn’t hesitate to demonstrate the 
strength of the State to the Syrians for this aim. Second, by his policies towards the 
different components of the Syrian society, Cemal wanted to increase the sense of the 
Ottomanness of the Syrians.  
 
 
A Review of the Literature 
 
This study sets out to portray the aims of Cemal Pasha’s appointment to Syria as 
military commander and governor general, and the transformations caused by his policies 
the “governmentality” of the Ottoman rule in Syria throughout the war period will be well 
within the scope of the present study which aims to utilize primary as well as secondary 
sources. In the sense of the first hand sources, the documents in the Ottoman Archives 
(BOA) have primary importance for the subject under the study. Availability of many 
telegrams and reports in these Archives belonging to Cemal and his bureaucrats enabled 
the author of the present study to analyze the ideas of the actors of the period on the 
subjects discussed throughout this study. However, the writers of those documents could 
sometimes hide the realities not to disclose that they were unsuccessful to overcome the 
problems. Usage of the German and Austrian consular reports minimized this problem for 
this study. Another archive that has the Ottoman documents is the archive of the Turkish 
General Staff (ATASE Arşivi), the documents of the Ottoman War Ministry. As the 
commander of the Ottoman 4th Army, this archive includes very valuable documents for 
Cemal’s era in Syria. Unfortunately, the documents of this archive are not completely open 
to scholars. The officials employed in the Archives survey the documents and select the 
related documents according to the subject of the researchers. In addition, there are some 
special document collections in the Archives of the Turkish History Association [Türk 
Tarih Kurumu], (TTK Arşivi). The collection of Kazım Orbay, the aide-de-Camp of Enver 
Pasha and the collection of Enver himself are in this archive and open to all scholars. There 
can be found many samples of correspondence between Enver and Cemal regarding 
political and military situation in Syria.  
32 
 
On the other hand, the Archives of the European states include valuable files 
regarding Cemal Pasha’s governorate in Syria. Since it was the war period, as the allies of 
the Ottoman Empire, the reports of the German and Austrian officials are the most 
valuable ones among the others. Many times, they could reflect the local conditions better 
than the Ottoman documents since they were not responsible for governing the region. 
Especially, the close relations between some German officials and Turkish officials make 
the information in the German documents (PA-AA, BA-MA) valuable to understand the 
background of some events. A similar statement can be made for the Austrian Archives 
(HHStA). Since there was no British or French representative in Syria as a result of the 
hostilities between the Ottoman Empire and the Allied states, the Archives of those states 
(PRO, MAEE) have a lesser importance. Indeed, there can be found plenty of inaccurate 
information in those archives regarding Syria. However, the remarks of some Arab 
deserters and some intelligence reports could be used for the War period. In this study, the 
documents of the Entente states have been used counter-checking them with the Ottoman, 
German and Austrian Archives as much as possible. 
The period is also generous in terms of the memoirs and diaries in Turkish, Arabic, 
German and English. In this sense, the availability of Cemal’s own memoirs has a capital 
importance as well as the accounts of some others from his immediate entourage. In his 
memoirs, Cemal touches on many subjects examined in the present study and asserts 
claims pertaining them. However, he is understandably and considerably apologetical in 
his assessments and does not deal with any subject, which would tarnish his name. For 
example, he never mentions his treatment against the Zionist movement for presumably 
not to present himself with difficulties in the international political arena taking into 
consideration the strength of the Zionists in shaping the international polıtıcs. Obviously, 
for him, the international circumstances would have a big say in determining the new 
leader of Turkey that Cemal had a big desire to get. Similarly, the bases of his policy 
towards the Druzes, being only explained in the Turkish version, probably to give an 
answer to the critics of his policy in Syria among the Turks. Cemal’s words in his memoirs 
will be critically evaluated in this study in detail. 
Besides Cemal Pasha, persons from his immediate circle left valuable accounts on 
the events and policies with regard to this study. In Turkish, first to mention is the memoirs 
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of Ali Fuad Erden, the Chief of Staff of Cemal’s army in Syria. He is considerably 
“objective” in the evaluation of Cemal’s activities. He doesn’t hesitate to criticize Cemal, 
when necessary. For example, in the case of the execution of the Arab notables, he did not 
avoid to accuse his commander of setting the law at naught and of hanging the innocent 
Arabs.109 Similarly, he frankly explained the failure of the Ottoman Army in the first 
expedition against Egypt.110 However, the memoirs are contradictory regarding the aims of 
that expedition. In the beginning of the memoirs, Erden claims that the aim of the 
expedition was to bind the British troops in the Canal and Egypt.111 But, throughout the 
book, he publishes numerous documents demonstrating that Cemal actually planned an 
operation of conquest towards Egypt.112 In addition, the memoirs include valuable 
information on Cemal’s other activities in Syria, such as public works,113 struggle with the 
epidemics,114 and the Armenian question.115 
Another crucial account has been provided by Von Kress, the German Commander 
of the troops in the Sinai Desert, who made the preparations for the second expedition 
against Egypt following the first one. The book is a good account of all the operations 
towards the Canal, from the first expedition against Egypt to the capture of Palestine by the 
British. Besides those, Von Kress provides significant details regarding the daily life in 
Syria during the WWI. For example, he narrates the excitement of the Palestinians vividly, 
while the Sacred Flag of the Prophet Muhammed [Sancak-ı Şerif] was brought there to 
                                                 
109 Erden, Ibid., p.273-274. 
110 Erden, Ibid, p. 58. 
111 For their evaluations regarding the Expedition see: Erden, Ibid, p.2. 
112 Enver to Cemal, 23 Kanun-ı Sani 1330 [5 February 1915], in Erden, Ibid, p. 46; 
Cemal to Enver, 23 Kanun-ı Sani 1330 [5 February 1915], in Erden Ibid, p. 47; Enver to 
Cemal, 20 Şubat 1330 [5 March 1915], in Erden, Ibid, p. 72: Cemal to Enver, 6 Temmuz 
1331 [18 July 1915], in Erden, Ibid, p. 149-154. In addition, Erden places a considerable 
place to the preparations for the Egyptian Expedition: Erden, Ibid, p. 85-101, 157-161. 
113 Erden, Ibid, p. 143-146. 
114 Erden, Ibid, p. 141-143. 
115 Erden, Ibid, p. 119-124. 
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motivate the people and soldiers to the Canal Expedition.116 His words regarding impact of 
the locust plague,117 famine118, epidemics119 and on the provisioning conditions are also 
valuable to understand the difficulties of daily life in Syria.  
Finally, the book Zeytindağı by Falih Rıfkı should be mentioned. The book was 
written in the Republican period and reflected the orientalist prejudices of the Republican 
elites towards the Arabs. An orientalist approach to Arabs in the sense that was portrayed 
by Makdisi can be, indeed, found in this book. Although it is a literature book and far from 
the hard facts, Falih Rıfkı’s opinions put forward in Zeytindağı deeply influenced the 
Turkish perception of the Arabs until today. All the Ottoman background of the Arab 
countries was neglected in the book, and, in accordance with the Republican ideology, the 
Arabs were described as aliens to the Turks. He depicted Beirut as “hundred times more 
alien than Dobruca”.120 
In addition, some of the Arabs in Cemal’s immediate circle also wrote their 
memoirs regarding Cemal Pasha. In this regard, Shakib Arslan and Muhammad Kurd Ali 
should be mentioned in the first place. Shakib Arslan makes important assessments on the 
character of Cemal Pasha’s regime and, in this regard, dedicates a large place in his 
memoirs to critisize in a harsh way Cemal’s policy of executions and exiles towards 
Arabists. Shakib accuses Cemal of planting seeds of hate between the Turks and the Arabs, 
as the one, who set his heart on the ideal of the Ottoman unity and who was an opponent of 
the Arabist movement.121 In spite of his Arabist tendency, Kurd Ali’s memoirs doesn’t 
engulf into the Arab nationalist narrative created after the Ottoman era and evaluates 
Cemal’s governorate in a broader perspective. As a journalist, he gives valuable details 
about the propaganda policy of Cemal by way of the press in competition with the 
                                                 
116 Friedrich Freiherr Kress von Kressenstein, Mit den Türken zum Suezkanal, Berlin: 
Verlag Otto Schegel, 1938, p. 78. 
117 Von Kressenstein, Ibid, p. 119-120, 168, 179-180. 
118 Von Kressenstein, Ibid, p. 143. 
119 Von Kressenstein, Ibid, p. 196. 
120 Falih Rıfkı Atay, Zeytindağı, İstanbul: Ülkü Yayınevi, 1943, p. 43. 
121 For some examples, see: Arslan, Ibid, pp. 154-219. 
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Germans122 as well as the plans of the Arabists with the outbreak of the War.123 Some close 
relations between the CUP and the Arabists are also indicated by Kurd Ali. For example, 
he conveys the appreciation of Talat Pasha to Abdulwahhab al-Inglizi due to his useful 
service to the Ottoman state and the efforts of the former to help him to go abroad to save 
him from the wrath of Cemal.124 Furthermore, he skilfully describes the aversion of Cemal 
Pasha to any kind of foreign influence in Syria –especially those of the Germans.125  
Apart from those, a considerable number of memoirs were published by the 
prominent Arabists involving evaluations on Cemal’s rule in Syria. However, these sources 
were widely influenced by the nationalist atmosphere of the post-war period, and 
contextualized Cemal’s governorate in harmony with their nationalist narrative. According 
to the claims of that narrative Cemal’s persecutions demonstrated the independence will of 
the Arab people and the proof of the maturation of the nationalist feelings among the 
Arabs. However, Cemal’s atrocities could not prevent this desire, and following the death 
penalties, the Sharifian Revolt broke out.126 For example, Faris el-Khoury and Amin Said 
describe in their memoirs that upon the executions, Faysal escaped from Damascus and 
launched with his father, the Sharif’s revolt in response to Cemal’s executions.127 Another 
problem of these memoirs is that they restrict their descriptions regarding the War period 
only to Cemal’s executions. Yet, the War period witnessed more disastrous incidents like 
famine, epidemics, and battles. Since they were written in the mandate period, the authors 
of those memoirs set their narratives to legitimize the place of the Arab nationalist 
movement in the post-war period. 
                                                 
122 Kurd Ali, Ibid, pp. 107-111. 
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124 Kurd Ali, Ibid, pp. 152-153. 
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126 For some examples, see: Ahmad Kadri, Mudhakkirati an Thawrat al Arabiyya al 
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Finally, the Diaries can be mentioned as another first hand source of the present 
study, written at the period of the War. In this regard, the diaries of Ihsan Turjman, a 
common soldier in Cemal’s Army in Jerusalem, and the diaries of Conde de Ballobar, the 
Spanish Consul in Jerusalem, deserve special attention. Ihsan Turjman’s diaries are 
important in terms of exploration of the life of the common people and their feelings 
towards the Ottoman Empire and the activities of Cemal Pasha. The transformations in the 
daily life caused by the entrance into the War and their impact on the attitude of the 
ordinary people towards the Ottoman Government were explored throughout the diaries.128 
Since it was a contemporary account, it is possible, at least to some extent, to measure the 
real attitude of the people. Similar information can be found in the diaries of Ballobar. In 
addition, his diaries were useful to conceive the transformation of the Ottoman 
Government in its treatment of the foreign consuls. Furthermore, the diaries show the 
Ottoman sensitivity in regard to their independence and their efforts to remove the foreign 
influence from the Ottoman realm as well as the resistance of the old bureaucrats to the 
new implementations of Cemal Pasha. For example, the Governor of Jerusalem requested 
from Ballobar to apply to the Spanish ambassador in İstanbul to lobby at the Ottoman 
Government for the dismissal of the kaymakam of Jaffa.129 
  *   *   * 
Chapter 1 of the present study examines the primary reason for Cemal’s appointment to 
Syria, i.e. the organization of an expedition against Egypt. In his memoirs Cemal Pasha 
claims that: 
“I should never have seriously pretended to myself that with resources which did not 
permit of our remaining more than four days on the Canal…we could have crossed a Canal 
at least a hundred meters wide defended by an army so mobile and brave as the English 
                                                 
128 For pro-Ottoman feelings of the common people, see: Salim Tamari, Year of the 
Locust, Berkeley: California University Press, 2011, p. 105; For the dissatisfaction of the 
people in Jerusalem with the entrance of the Ottoman Empire into the War, see: Tamari, 
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and provided with every conceivable means of defence from the largest warships to 
armoured trains.”130 
Ali Fuad Erden, from Cemal’s immediate military entourage, agrees with what Cemal 
explained regarding the aims of the Expedition claiming that neither Turkish nor German 
Headquarters demanded an expedition of conquest against Egypt.131 Some scholarly works 
also support Cemal’s claims. İsmet Üzen claims in his voluminous book on the expeditions 
against Egypt/Canal that the primary goal was“to bind the British troops as much as 
possible”132. Apart from that, a critical analysis of these sources was not made in Üzen’s 
study. On the other hand, the study has a defensive language towards what Cemal did in 
the Suez Canal. It seems that the author felt himself obliged to show Cemal successful in 
his military undertakings. Likewise, Nevzat Artuç asserts that “in our viewpoint, from the 
beginning of the expedition, Cemal Pasha was aware of the impossibility of the conquest 
of Egypt…he might aim at busying the British troops at Canal as long as possible”133 
Different from those, the present study demonstrates that, at least till the end of 1916, 
Cemal had a plan to reconquer Egypt. In this regard, firstly, the organization of the 
Egyptian Expedition will be examined to see the goals of this operation. Quite the reverse 
of what the actors of this expedition and the mentioned academics claimed, a close 
examination of the contemporary documents indicate that Cemal himself sincerely desired 
and worked for the conquest of Egypt. The denial of the primarily responsible persons of 
this aim most probably stems from the effort to cover the failure of this aspiration. 
The second reason for Cemal’s existence in Syria was “to maintain peace and 
internal order in Syria.”134 In relation to this, Chapter 2 investigates the meaning of 
“peace” and “order” with reference to his activities while struggling to eliminate the 
Arabist movement. This chapter fills a gap in the existing literature. In such a way that the 
origins and development of the Arabist movement, till the outbreak of the War and for the 
                                                 
130 Djemal Pasha, Ibid, p.155; Cemal Paşa, Ibid, p.127. 
131 Erden, Ibid, p.2. 
132 İsmet Üzen, Osmanlı’nın Çöl Yürüyüşü: Kanal Seferleri, İstanbul: Paraf Yayınları, 
2011, p. 596. 
133 Artuç, p. 231. 
134 Djemal Pasha, Ibid, p.138; Cemal Paşa, Ibid, p.112.  
38 
 
post-war period, was studied from various aspects. Ernst Dawn demonstrated that the 
Arabist ideology was mainly Ottomanist till the outbreak of the War.135 Different authors 
following the path opened by Dawn clarified the Ottomanist character of the Arabist 
movement in various Arab provinces.136 In the same way, as assessed earlier, Hasan Kayalı 
made a significant contribution to relations between the Arabists and the CUP 
demonstrating the Ottomanism of the former and the Islamism of the latter. In Turkish, a 
study has been recently published by Şaban Ortak on the deportation of the Arabs to 
Anatolia by Cemal Pasha, called Suriye ve Garbi Arabistan Tehciri. The author describes 
the process of the deportation by utilizing the documents from the Ottoman Archives. 
However, the study lacks a persuasive narrative giving the reasons and consequences of 
the subject. In addition, the author asserts the aim of the Arab deportation in its 
introduction as the prevention of a rebellion by the Arabs, “while fighting against the 
supreme forces of enemy”137.  However, the book is not able to document this claim by 
reliable sources. Furthermore, the evaluations of Cemal’s immediate entourage in Syria on 
the reasons for the deportation, such as Ali Fuad Erden and Falih Rıfkı Atay, have not been 
dealt with adequately. On the other hand, the study does not bear the requirements of an 
academic work as to the form: the last chapter of the book consists of writing the reasons 
of the deportation for each exile, item by item. Normally, it should be in the section of the 
appendix since it doesn’t have any study question and doesn’t have any consistent 
narrative.138 
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The Arab scholars also paid considerable attention to Cemal’s governorate in Syria 
in connection with the Sharifian Revolt. However, following the foot prints of the memoirs 
of the Arabist leaders assessed above, almost all the studies in Arabic on this era examine 
Cemal’s governorate a part of the history of the Sharifian Revolt, by their words “the Great 
Arab Revolt”, and only lay stress on his persecutions of the leaders of the Arabist 
movement. They claim that the Arabist movement was seeking independence from the 
Ottoman Empire, and therefore, Cemal Pasha atrociously crushed that movement. For 
example, in his work on the Sharifian Revolt, Kadri Kal’acı claimed, following an analysis 
on the relations between the Sharif and the Arabists in Syria, that “the Turkish government 
discovered in Syria the signs of a wide range scheme, which organized secretly in various 
centers in Damascus and Beirut and Baalbek and the other cities, and its goal was to 
announce a revolt against the Turks and it desires the independence of the Arabs, and the 
severe measures were taken”.139 They also evaluated the Sharif’s rebellion as a 
counterreaction to the hangings, which were outputs of considerably different processes. 
Furthermore, these studies do not endeavor to understand the nature of Cemal Pasha’s rule 
in Syria stressing the different policies implemented by him towards the Jews, Christians 
or the Lebanese. On the other hand, as will be indicated below, their evaluations regarding 
the Arabist movement are quite miscontextualized due to the impact of the later periods of 
Arab nationalist ideologies. In other words, today’s image of Cemal Pasha among the 
Arabs was created by the later process of Nation-building in the Arab countries based upon 
the otherization of the Ottoman rule during Cemal’s period.140  
Differing from those scholarly works, the present study focuses on the changing 
direction of the policies towards the Arabists by the governorship of Cemal in Syria, thus, 
questioning Kayalı’s thesis of continuity of the Unionists’ Arab policy before and during 
the War period. First of all, it is worth to mention that the conclusions of this study on 
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Cemal’s policy of Arabism don’t match up with those drawn in Cemal’s memoirs. He 
claimed that, while he arrived at Damascus, he did not consider, in the beginning, 
eliminating the Arabist movement and damage the unity of the Muslims,141 but the 
unearthing of “treasonous” activities of the Arabists to organize a rebellion against the 
Ottoman Government compelled him to take action against this movement. In Cemal’s 
own words, “the discovery of these traitorous activities showed the aim and purpose of the 
enemy’s operations, and henceforth I, of course, considered it would be simply fatuous on 
my part to place any further trust in the reformers. I decided to take ruthless action against 
the traitors”.142 If these remarks are taken into consideration together with Cemal’s words 
at the first pages of the Chapter in his memoirs regarding the Arab movement, his intention 
will be clearer:  
“Yet to take immediate legal action against these traitors might well endanger the success 
of the Islam unity movement, which was the goal of our endeavour. If we had taken such 
action at once, Mohammedan countries such as Egypt, India, Algiers and Morocco, which 
had lost contact with us, would have thought that the Turks were yielding to feelings of 
vengeance or endeavouring to secure the supremacy of the Turanian nation by taking the 
lives of the most influential Arabs. In the mighty struggle upon which we had entered to 
free the Mohammedan world from a foreign yoke it was our principal task to preserve 
unity of aim and effort in the lands of Islam. For that reason we decided not to breathe a 
word about this matter for the time being.”143 
As implied in this paragraph, quite the reverse of his claim, Cemal’s struggle with Arabism 
was a result of his political aims rather than a fear of military threat. The thought of 
elimination of the Arabist movement go back to the pre-War period. In this regard, an 
analysis of the opinions the CUP leaders in the preceding years of Cemal’s appointment 
shows that, in spite of their reconciliatory attitude towards the Arabs, they considered the 
Arabist movement “harmful” for the continuation of the Ottoman administration in Syria, 
and thus, desired to eliminate it due to their perception of an ethnicity-based policy as 
“separatism”. Cemal’s punishment of the members of the Arabist parties was nothing else, 
but an implementation of these ideas in a radicalized way. Cemal saw the Arabist notables 
of Syria as a barrier preventing the Syrians of being ideal citizens of the Empire, and 
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implemented a rule of terror to abolish the existense of this movement in Syria. Another 
method used by Cemal to struggle with Arabism was Panislamist propaganda. He reflected 
the Arabists as the enemies of Muslim unity. For this aim, he published a newspaper in 
Damascus called al-Sharq. Towards the end of the war, the deteriorating conditions of the 
War had to make him abandon this policy, and, by the pressure of the Central Ottoman 
Government, he had to moderate his policy. Peace negotiations to give an end to the 
Sharif’s revolt could be evaluated in the same context. By this action, Cemal and his 
successors planned to forestall any shift of sympathy among the Syrians towads the Sharif. 
Quite the reverse of what is claimed in the existing literature,144 the correspondence with 
the Sharif shows that the latter sincerely wanted a peace agreement with the CUP. But 
playing for time by the Ottoman Government to delay an agreement making some 
concessions to the Sharif and unexpected end of the Ottoman rule in Syria gave an end to 
this process. As a final remark it is worth to maintain that Cemal’s struggle with Arabism 
was a result of his political aims rather than a fear of military threat. 
Another aspect of Cemal’s policy to make the Syrians ideal and loyal Ottomans 
consisted the measures directed to various autonomous entities such as Zionism, the 
Government of Lebanon and the Christian clergy. Chapter 3 aims at the analysis of 
Cemal’s struggle with these intermediaries. As part of this policy, he directed his attention 
to restrict the authority of the Zionist movement on the Jewish population of Palestine. 
First, he naturalized non-Ottoman Jews to broaden the Ottoman state authority on them as 
well as disarming the Jewish colonists. Second, he exiled or deported the Zionist leaders 
from Palestine for better integration of the Jews with the state. Although the history of 
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Totally overpassing what the CUP intended about the Sharif’s existence in Hijaz, Ardıç 
claims that “When it became clear that the Ottoman Empire would indeed join the German 
side in the war, Sharif Hussein, who was already semi-independent, stood out as the best 
option for Britain’s hopes of undermining the Caliphate”: Nurullah Ardıç, Islam and the 
Politics of Secularism, London: Routledge, 2012, p. 200; However, as demonstrated by 
Kayalı, the Sharif was compelled by the CUP policies to change his side during the War, 
for details, see: Kayalı, Ibid, pp. 181-192; As will be shown in the first chapter of this 
study, in the beginning of the War, he supported the Ottoman proclamation of War and 
sent troops to the first expedition against Egypt. 
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Zionism has been analyzed in every detail, Cemal’s policy of Zionism did not attract the 
attention of the scholars. A notable exception is Fuat Dündar, who touches upon Cemal’s 
policies claiming that he made ethnicity engineering by expulsion of the Jews. However, 
the broadening authority of the State over its Jewish citizens by the outbreak of the War 
was considerably disregarded by Dündar. Besides Zionism, Cemal focused his attention on 
the autonomy of the Christian clergy and the autonomous Government of Lebanon, and 
managed to assert the Ottoman state authority on them. The clergy of the Maronites, 
Greek-Orthodox and Greek-Catholics lost their autonomies and were put under the 
authority of the Ottoman Sultan. Similarly, all the autonomous institutions of the Lebanese 
Government were either removed or controlled by the Central Government with the 
intervention of Cemal Pasha.  
While Cemal was governing in Syria, as a result of the deportations from Anatolia, 
he had to resettle enormous numbers of the Armenians in Syria. Chapter 4 concentrates on 
the integration of the Armenian deportees into the Syrian society in connection with 
Cemal’s general policy towards the various peoples of Syria. This study analyzes 
deportation and settlement policies of Cemal Pasha and connecting them with his general 
policy of re-formation of the state in Syria. As will be detailed in Chapter 4, Cemal’s aim 
in Syria was neither to destroy the Armenians nor to make an ethnic engineering in the 
sense that would create a balance for the Arabs in Syria using the deported Armenians. But 
he dispersed them through Syria to make them a “harmless minority” [zararsız cüz’iyet], 
and in this sense, he was an ethnic-engineer. In addition the Pasha tried to do his best both 
during the deportations and its aftermath, to protect the Armenian deportees. To save them 
from the policy of the deliberate negligence by the radical wing of the Central 
Government, Cemal pretended to enforce them to change their religions and established a 
special committee for the resettlement of mainly “converted” Armenians. He also opened 
orphanages for the Armenians orphans. Both the consular reports and the accounts of the 
Armenians themselves indicate that all of those activities were a measure to protect them 
from the implementations of the radical group within the CUP. By this way, Cemal mainly 
intended to “transform the dangerous Armenian multitude [külliyet] into harmless minority 
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[cüziyet]”.145 In other words, to make them loyal citizens, who did not have any political 
aspiration for a separation from the Ottoman Empire in future.  
Besides the internal threats for the diffusion of the state authority in Syria, Cemal 
struggled for the abolition of the foreign influence there, mainly that of France, which 
created a considerable impact in Syria for years with their educational and religious 
institutions and displayed the Ottoman authority as weak in the eyes of its citizens, which 
is analyzed in Chapter 5. In this regard, first, Cemal launched a process of deportation for 
the religious and educational men of France from Syria, who acted as the agents of the 
French influence there. After that, he either closed or ottomanized those institutions. As 
another part of the policy of struggling the foreign influence, Cemal prevented the 
replacement of any other ally of the Ottoman Empire of France. Thus, he harshly reacted to 
any action of foreign consuls in the direction of the intervention to the internal affairs of 
the State as well as inhibiting any cultural propaganda of those states, Austria and 
Germany being in the first place. 
 In accordance with the policy of the elimination of internal and foreign “barriers” 
between the state and its citizens, Cemal Pasha implemented a policy towards the Syrians 
to turn them into ideal Ottoman citizens, and a policy of modernization of the Syrian cities 
to make these more penetrable for the State. Chapter 6 examines Cemal’s pursuit for the 
ideal citizens in Syria. In this sense, the liable Syrians were conscripted and, by this way, 
intended to be disciplinized both mentally and bodily. Their alienation to the military life 
and loss of motivation after the first expedition of Egypt caused an increase in the number 
of the desertions, and the recruitment became the nightmare of the Syrians throughout the 
War period. As a second pillar of that aim, Cemal opened schools in Syria aiming at the 
creation of the modern Ottoman Syrians. The absolute ruler of Syria did not neglect to 
transform cities in a way that would facilitate the penetration of the state. As part of the 
modernization project of the cities, the Pasha restored the historical artifacts from the 
Byzantine, Umayyad and the Ottoman times. It is worth to mention here that he did not 
follow a Turkist policy in these restorations and renovated the Arabic monuments as well 
                                                 
145 See, BOA, DH.ŞFR. 486/118, Cemal to Talat, 30 Ağustos 1331 [12 September 
1915]; Cemal to Enver, 27 September 1917, Arşiv Belgeleriyle Ermeni Faaliyetleri VII, p. 
698 
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as the Ottoman ones. 
 Chapter 7 studies the policy followed by Cemal towards the tribal groups and 
nomads of Syria during his governorate. Differing from the policies followed towards the 
city-dweller of Syria, Cemal maintained the traditional Ottoman policy and gave freedom 
of action to those groups in return for their loyalties. This policy was rather different than 
the policies followed by his predecessors to settle those groups and attach them to the 
government.146 Since it was war period, Cemal avoided any action to frustrate those groups 
and applied a policy of balance towards them. In this regard, he gave a large autonomy to 
the Druze and made them immune from much responsibility to the government. Although 
it was not as much as those of the Druze, the Bedouin groups also enjoyed a certain 
freedom and were not exposed to any action of subjugation to the state authority. That 
policy was due to a competition with Great Britain for the allegiance of those groups and 
Cemal was mainly successful till the last moment to secure their loyalties. Especially after 
the outbreak of the Sharifian Revolt in Mecca and the advance of the Sharif’s troops 
towards Akaba, that competition was heated up and the freedom provided to those groups 
was increased. As a result, none of the Druze supported the Sharif and the British and a 
considerable amount of the Bedouins remained loyal to the Ottoman authority till the end 
of the Ottoman rule in Syria.  
 Throughout the WWI, one of Cemal’s greatest “enemies”, both militarily and in 
terms of the implementation of the reforms, was famine and its consequences influencing 
the whole Syrian territory. The ways that Cemal struggled to cope with the famine and its 
consequences are dealt with in Chapter 8. The mutual responsibility of the sides –the 
British, Ottoman- in the event of famine in Syria was persuasively demonstrated by Linda 
Schatkowski Schicher as well as Cemal’s attempts to forestall the famine in Syria. In 
general, the Ottoman requisitions of the agricultural production and the conscription of its 
labor for the Army were the Ottoman activities causing the famine. The Entente’s blockade 
of the Syrian coasts prevented the foreign assistance to Syria from the neutral states. 
Furhtermore, Schicher suggests that famine was not a disaster special to Lebanon, but for 
                                                 
146 For an analysis of the Ottoman policy to subjugate those groups in the case of 
Transjordan, see: Eugene L. Rogan, Frontiers of the State in the Late Ottoman 
Empire,1850-1921, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
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the whole Syrian realm. Thus, Schicher proved that Cemal did not deliberately starve the 
Lebanese because of their sympathy to France. Agreeing with Schicher’s study, the present 
study also touches upon the reasons of the famine and measures taken by Cemal with 
further reference to the Ottoman, German and Austrian sources. On the other hand, the 
famine made considerable social impact on the Syrian realm. The increasing needs of the 
Army for provisioning and the decreasing amount of the grains in Syria paved the way for 
the intensification of the state pressure over the farmers. Those kinds of actions both 
reduced the agricultural production and increased the frustration of the Syrians to the 
Ottoman State. The struggle with famine also shows the changing nature of the state in 
Syria with Cemal. For example, some high-ranking officials appointed by Cemal strongly 
opposed the foreign assistance on the grounds that it would show the State weak in the 
eyes of its citizens. Furthermore, the struggle with epidemics indicates Cemal’s new policy 
based on the State’s control of the bodies of its citizens. 
 The capture of Baghdad by the British troops signified the beginning of the end for 
Cemal. The Ottoman and German Headquarters made a plan of combination of the 
Ottoman troops in Syria and Iraq under a German commander. As will be detailed in the 
last Chapter, General Falkenhayn was appointed for this job and Cemal was disempowered 
militarily. Following the Ottoman victories in the first and second battles of Gaza, while 
the Ottomans were busy with the change of the General Commander in Syria, the British 
completed their preparations for a third attack against Gaza, which was considered the gate 
of Jerusalem. As a result, Jerusalem was captured by the British troops, on 10th December 
1917, and ten days later Cemal resigned from his post because of his disagreement with 
Falkenhayn. Thus a crucial period in the history of Syria was closed. Cemal accuses 
Falkenhayn, and implicitly Enver, for being responsible for the loss of Jerusalem in his 
memoirs with these remarks:  
“For myself, I maintain that if (1) the idea of recovering Bagdad had never been mooted 
and all available troops had been concentrated on the Palestine front, (2) von Falkenhayn 
had not been put in command of the army in Palestine, we could have held the Gaza-
Beersheba [sic] line for years, and on the day of the armistice Syria and Palestine would 
still have formed part of the Ottoman Empire.”147  
Indeed, an examination of the contemporary documents shows that this failure of the 
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Ottoman troops, to a large extent, emanated from Enver’s insistence on an offensive 
operation to recapture Baghdad instead of defending Palestine with the troops in the hands 
of the Ottomans. Falkenhayn was a result of this project. 
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CHAPTER I  
 
THE EGYPTIAN EXPEDITION 
 
 
 
As emphasized above, the first aim of Cemal in Syria was to organize an offensive 
against Egypt. The idea of an expedition against Egypt was originated from the German 
Emperor himself in the beginning of the War. It was a part of Germany’s policy of alliance 
with the Ottoman Empire. The main goal of Germany in its alliance with the Ottomans was 
to provoke a rebellion of the Muslim peoples under the rule of the Entente states against 
their political masters,148 and to dislocate the center of the War from the Western war 
theatre, and thus, to relieve the German troops there and to climb over the congestion in 
that front. That idea also seemed very attractive to the CUP leaders since they thought that 
an operation against Egypt would be quite convenient for the Ottoman war aims.149  
In this regard, opening of a new front in Egypt looked as if very sensible for both 
states. First, as will be examined below, the Egyptian public opinion kept faith 
overwhelmingly with the pan-Islamist ideal under the leadership of the Ottoman Caliph, 
and dissatisfied with the British protectorate. Therefore, an uprising in Egypt would put 
Great Britain in a very difficult position to overcome and possibly would pass the 
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149 Çolak, Ibid, p. 24.  
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domination of Egypt into the hands of the Ottoman Empire. The second reason for an 
Expedition against Egypt was to invade the Suez Canal, and thus, to cause the interruption 
of the traffic between Great Britain and India, which provided the largest part of the British 
supplies throughout the war.150 The expedition would also produce a considerable benefit 
for the international and domestic policies of the Ottoman Empire, especially in the Arab 
provinces. A defeat of the British troops in Suez or a conquest of Egypt would extremely 
increase the prestige of the State among its citizens, who were influenced by the Great 
Powers, and among the Muslims outside its territory.151 As will be examined in Chapter 6, 
the expedition would be used to agitate the Syrians against the Great Powers, which was 
considered by Cemal a part of the Ottomanness. 
 By these considerations, preparations were commenced to open a new front in 
Syria some 4 months before the Ottoman official entrance into the war. First, Zeki Pasha 
and later Cemal Pasha were appointed to command this operation. As will be explained in 
the following sections, half of the war period passed in Syria to put this project into action 
and those preparations became the reason for most of the miseries that hit Syria during that 
span of time. Apart from that, earlier commencement of the preparations also shows that 
the Ottomans planned to enter into the war from the very beginning. 
 The preparation process of the Egyptian expedition and its performance influenced 
the region very deeply during the WWI. It is partly because of this expedition that 
conscription and famine, the nightmares of the Syrians, were introduced to those lands. 
Many problems like epidemics and desertions occurred, are in fact, related to those events, 
which ruined the smooth flow of the daily life in Syria as well as the attitude of the people 
towards the Ottoman Government. In spite of its centrality in the history of the region, 
there is no proper study in English examining that expedion. In Turkish, on the other hand, 
the expedition process is relatively well-described by some academics in spite of some 
                                                 
150 The Germans were aware of the importance of the Canal for Great Britain. The 
German academic Franz Stuhlmann evaluated the place of the Canal in the British Policy 
with these remarks: “England regards the possession of Egypt as a question of life and 
death, and that she is also most vulnerable there.”: PRO, FO 371/2783, Holderness to FO, 
“Germany, Turkey, England and Arabia, Dr. Franz Stuhlmann's recently published book”, 
India Office, London, 2 November 1916. 
151 Ziya Şakir, Ibid., p. 179. 
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crucial problems of those studies. The first to be mentioned in this sense is the work of 
Nevzat Artuç, who wrote a biography of Cemal Pasha. He reserved a broad place in his 
book to the examination of the expedition. But, the text is not organized in a consistent 
0way to answer some study questions. Furthermore, there are many ruptures in the 
description of the process. The flow of the text implies that the writer arrayed all the 
documents in his hands according to their dates of issuance without endeavoring to create a 
consistent narrative. On the other hand, the social impact of that process is never tackled 
with.152 Another book on the subject under the study was written by İsmet Üzen. Different 
from the first one, this study describes the process in every detail. But, the writer is usually 
unable to reach the contemporary documents of the period. Since its arguments are, to a 
large extent, built on the memoirs and the Turkish and British official histories of the War, 
the study is largely a repetition of the narrations of Erden, Von Kress, Cemal Pasha and 
those military histories. In summary, Üzen’s book is rather a military history of the Sinai 
Front.153  
Different from these works, this chapter will set out to clarify the political and 
military aims of Cemal Pasha with this expedition and transformations that caused by the 
expedition in the Syrian realm rather than giving a detailed account of the military 
operations. Our focus will rather be Cemal himself than the process of the preparations for 
the Egyptian Expedition. The detailed analysis of the preparations will be made to 
understand Cemal’s intentions with this attack. Since the process created multi-lateral 
consequences combined with the Syrian policies of Cemal Pasha and its government, the 
analysis of the social impact of this expedition is distributed to the following chapters. 
 
 
 
1.1 Mobilization of the Troops for the Canal Expedition 
 
 
                                                 
152 For the related chapter in the book, see: Artuç, Ibid, p. 208-245. 
153 Üzen, Ibid, 664 p. 
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In accordance with the abovementioned war aims of the Ottoman Empire and 
Germany, the preparations for an expedition against the Suez Canal were commenced in 
Syria by the wish of the German Emperor, Wilhelm Iii, on 2nd August 1914.154 It was 
planned in the beginning as an operation to bind the British troops in Egypt and to threat 
the Canal.155 For that purpose a general mobilization of the troops was proclaimed and the 
Ottoman Army in Syria entered into a period of preparations with great energy.156 For this 
purpose, Zeki Pasha was appointed as the General Commander for the Syrian provinces 
immediately after the proclamation of the mobilization.157 Although he was an opponent of 
the expedition, it can be said that Zeki performed his duty at all points. The agricultural 
and human sources of Syria were mobilized for the needs of the Army. As an initial step, 
10 % production of cereals from Hauran, 280 000 kg of barley from local cereal 
merchants, 1500 sacks flour from the local mill owners were requisitioned by the Army. 
For these items, nothing was paid to them. They were collected in the context of war taxes. 
For further purchases, the promises were made for payment.158  
Towards the end of the second month of the preparations, the Germans directly 
intervened into the activities to accelerate the process. For this aim, Colonel v. Kress, with 
four other German military officers, joined the Syrian Army on 20th September 1914.159 
These officers were distributed between Damascus, Nablus and other military centers. 
Some of them, in conjunction with Turkish staff officers, reconnoitered the lines of 
                                                 
154 Aksakal, Ibid, p.155. 
155 Von Kressenstein, Ibid, p. 24. 
156 HHStA. PA 38/363, Ranzi [Austrian Consul in Damascus]to Berchtold[Minister of 
Foreign Affairs], Damascus, 10 August 1914; MAEE. Guerre 1914-1918, 867/Turquie, 
Syrie et Palestine, Cote [French Representative in Port-Said] to MAE, Port- Said, 29 
August 1914.  
157  ATASE Arşivi, Kls. 126, Ds. 590, Fih. 23-29, Harbiye Nezareti to Army 
Commanders, 3 August 1914; Because of his opposition to the Egyptian Expedition, on 9th 
September 1914, the boundaries of his authority was restricted to the completion of the 
preparations. The implementation of the operations was assigned to Mersinli Cemal Pasha, 
the Commander of the 8th Army Corps. For further details, see: Birinci Dünya Harbinde 
Türk Harbi, Cilt I, p. 121. 
158 HHStA. PA 38/363, Ranzi to Berchtold. Damascus, 18 August 1914. 
159 Von Kressenstein, Ibid, p. 27.  
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advance towards Egypt, whereas the remaining officers took care of the exercise and 
training of the troops to enable them to reach the standards of those nearer the capital.160 
In the third month of the preparations, a considerable number of soldiers had been 
mobilized in Syria. To the estimation of the British Military Attache, in the midst of 
October 1914, the mobilised strength of a Turkish division (with 3 battalion regiments) 
was about 12 000 men. At Homs division, the number of the soldiers was approximate to 
one division with 30 guns. Adding some reserve battalions of gendarmerie, the full would 
be about 45 000 men. Finally, with the arrival of the 35th division which moved south, 
another 10 000 men must be added to the troops at Homs (2 battalion regiments only) with 
42 guns. The 73rd and 75th infantry regiments of the 25th (Damascus) division had been 
moved down the line, the remainder of the division still being at Damascus. Of the 27th 
(Jerusalem) division, 2 battalions of the 80th regiment and 2 mountain batteries were 
reported at Birüssebi, the remainder of the division was at Nablus-Jerusalem. Of the Homs 
division, the engineer and transport units began to move down the line and have been 
followed to Damascus by an advanced party of the 67th regiment. Already at Gaza and 
along the frontier, there were 2 battalions of Gendarmeries.161 
Besides the mobilization of the regular army, another important part of the 
preparations for the Egyptian Campain was to gain the support of the Bedouin tribes in 
Syria, to ensure both pack animals for the transportation of the Army needs in areas where 
no railways were available and manpower contributions as volunteers. Furthermore, since 
the Syrian land had large groups of the tribes, they should be won over for the Ottoman 
side not to cause any disturbance by the agitation of Great Britain. For those purposes, 
initially, the local Algerian notable Amir Said al-Jazairi was employed within the body of 
the Army by Zeki Pasha to acquire the allegiance of the Bedouins living around the Canal 
Zone. As an achievement of his mission a group of Bedouin chiefs, consisted mostly of the 
chiefs of the smaller tribes, came to Damascus to assure their allegiance to the 
Government, and to notify their readiness for help in the Jihad (the Holy War). Besides, 
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Halim Pasha. Constantinople, 2 October 1914.  
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Amir Said created a volunteer troop from the Algerian immigrants in Syria.162 Three days 
after the declaration of mobilization, in his telegraph to German Foreign ministry, Amir 
Said stated his readiness for service with 500 Algerians to march against France.163 
The intensification of the military mobilization paved the way for an increasing 
interest of the Central Government towards Bedouins. Enver Pasha’s Aide-de-Camp 
Mümtaz Bey was appointed by Enver himself as the commander of the tribes [urban 
kumandanı]. He was assigned with the mission to create forces from the Bedouin tribes, 
and Senator Abdurrahman Bey el-Yusuf was appointed to facilitate gaining the support of 
them for the expedition.164 Mümtaz would also recapture the Sinai Desert from the British 
troops there.165 In one and a half months, following the mobilization order for the Ottoman 
Army, the allegiance of almost all the Bedouins and the Druzes in Maan, Deraa and 
Amman was assured by the efforts of Hulusi Bey, the Governor of Syria, Senator 
Abdurrahman Bey el-Yusuf, and Mümtaz Bey.166 Because of their proximity to the field of 
the Expedition, the support and allegiance of the Bedoins in and around Jerusalem placed a 
vital importance for the Government. For this aim, Mümtaz and Hakkı Beys went to 
Jerusalem and ensured the political loyalties of the Bedouin Sheikhs around there. They 
promised 5.000-6.000 Camels and equal number of volunteers. Abdurrahman Bey took the 
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road for Hama and Homs and met the chief of the tribes annexed to these cities 
administratively. Regarding the Bedouin support in Hauran, the Government didn’t have 
the intention to benefit from the Bedouins in and around Hauran in a long expedition. They 
promised, however, to provide volunteers in the defense of Syria and not to occupy the 
Governmental posts in a case of invasion by the Entente.167  
Another critical center for an expedition against the Canal was Birüssebi, which 
was located in the Sinai desert. Again, Mümtaz Bey visited the Bedouins around that town 
with Asad Shukayr. The leaders of these tribes were invited to a meeting at Bayt Jaydin 
village. In the meeting, Shukayr expressed to the aims of the Ottoman Government in the 
War to the Bedouins. They declared their allegiance to the Caliph and their obedience to 
the orders of the State. As a requirement of this declaration, they promised 3000 
dromadery, 2.000 camel and 25.000 infantry. All of them swore their loyalty to the 
Sultan.168 Following a feast for the Bedouins settled in the Had Kasıl and Lazkiye, They 
also assured their participation to the Army in case of an operation.169 Efforts to gain the 
support from the Bedouins produced its fruits in a short span of time. According to the 
report of the Austrian Consul, in two months after the mobilization, 12.000 horses and 
5.000 mules and 5.000 camels were collected for the military transportation.170 As stated 
by Von Kress, although they couldn’t be benefitted militarily since their battle techniques 
were obsolete, the Bedouins in the Sinai Desert remained loyal to the Ottoman 
Government till the end of the Ottoman rule.171 
While making preparations for the Canal Expedition, the first commander of the 
expedition, Zeki Pasha was opposing to the idea of an operation against Canal from the 
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168 ATASE Arşivi. Kls.159, Ds.705, Fih. 23-1, Macid to Başkumandanlık Ministry, 
Jerusalem. 17 September 1914[4 Eylül 1330]; ATASE Arşivi. Kls.159, Ds.705, Fih. 23-2, 
Zeki to Enver, Damascus, 18 September 1914 [5 Eylül 1330],.  
169 ATASE Arşivi. Kls. 159, Ds. 705/23-3, Zeki to Başkumandanlık Ministry. 2 
October 1914 [19 Eylül 1330]. Damascus.  
170 HHStA, PA 38/363, Ranzi to Berchtold, "Agitation gegen England". Damascus, 9 
October 1914.  
171 Von Kressenstein, Ibid, p. 52. 
54 
 
very beginning, and always advocated the organization of a strong defense in Syria 
instead.172 In his telegrams to Enver, Zeki firstly pointed out that the Army that would go 
to Egypt would have to suffer from water scarcity in the Sinai Desert, and would meet with 
a strong British defense at the Canal. Moreover, more training was required for the 
Ottoman soldiers in Syria. Finally, he thought it dubious to enter into Egypt with these 
troops.173 Apart from that, since he was not a member of the CUP, it was not easy for him 
to make his requests accepted by the civil authorities in Syria.174 On the other hand, there 
was a diarcy in the Syrian Army: Zeki Pasha was not the chief commander of the troops, 
which had been organized for the conquest of Egypt. He would only carry out the 
preaparations for the expedition and would command the forces reserved in the rear to 
defend Syria. The actual Expedtion would be commanded by the Commander of the 8th 
Army Corps, Mersinli Cemal Pasha.175 Besides those military difficulties, according to the 
remarks of Von Kress, there was also a passive resistance among the civil governmental 
authorities of Syria.176 As a result of all these problems, both to harmonize the commands 
of the defense and the offensive forces in Syria combining them under one commander, 
and to maintain the preparations in a more enthusiastic manner,177 Enver contemplated that 
Cemal Pasha was ideally suited for this job, who previously proved his efficacy during his 
governerships in Adana and Istanbul.  
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1.2 Cemal Pasha and the Expedition against Egypt 
 
 
As mentioned earlier, Cemal had been authorized by Enver “prepare (and carry 
through) the attack on the Canal.”178 However, in his farewell speech at the Haidar Pasha 
station, Cemal scaled-up the aim of the expedition and added the conquest of Egypt to his 
goals in Syria. He delivered the following remarks regarding his aims in Syria: 
“I was fully conscious of the greatness as of the immense difficulties of the task before me. 
If our enterprise failed, and my corpse and those of the brave men going with me were left 
at the Canal, the friends of our country who would then have to take up our work must 
sweep over us and rescue Egypt, the rightful property of Islam, from the hands of the 
English usurpers.”179  
The prospective conqueror of Egypt was welcomed in Damascus like a tiaraed king180 and, 
as will be seen below, after the appointment of Cemal to Syria, in all the correspondences 
regarding the expedition, both Enver and Cemal defined it as the conquest of Egypt. 
However, Cemal explained in his memoires that he personally “was not so sure of the 
ultimate success of this campaign” and he was aware “of perfection the English had 
brought their Canal defences”. In spite of this awareness, he “used to talk to the troops 
every night about the victory in store, and what a glorious victory it would be”. By doing 
so, Cemal claims that he intended “to keep the sacred flame alive in the whole force”.181  
Furthermore, Cemal set forth in his memoires that he contemplated this attack 
merely as a demonstration that targeted two aims: first, “to make the English realize that 
… [they] had no idea of sitting down quietly on the Canal”, and secondly, in accordance 
with their “design of tying down considerable forces in Egypt.” These statements are more 
than enough to clarify his alleged intention:  
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“…I should never have seriously pretended to myself that with resources which did not 
permit of our remaining more than four days on the Canal, i.e., fourteen thousand rifles, a 
few mountain gun batteries, a single howitzer battery, and nothing but ten pontoons with 
which to cross the obstacle –we could have crossed a Canal at least a hundred meters wide 
defended by an army so mobile and brave as the English and provided with every 
conceivable means of defence from the largest warships to armoured trains.”182 
Besides him, Ali Fuad Erden, his Chief of the Staff, expressed in his memoires that the 
expedition was rather a threat attack than having occupatory aims. Erden claims that both 
German General Staff and Ottoman Head Quarters didn’t give any order in the direction of 
the conquest of Egypt. It was only propaganda to motivate public opinion for the 
Expedition.183 In contrast to this remarks, he publishes many documents by Cemal Pasha in 
his memoirs demonstrating Cemal’s enthusiasm on the conquest of Egypt. A comparative 
analysis of his memoirs can easily show the contradiction between these documents and 
Erden’s arguments regarding the aims of the expedition.184 In a similar way, Eşref 
Kuşçubaşı, who was the head of the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa185 in the Arab provinces, claimed 
in his interview with Stoddard that none of the Ottoman commanders believed in the 
realization of the plan to conquer Egypt.186 Reading of Artuç and Üzen about the aims of 
the expedition aren’t different than those arguments. They also neglected to question the 
reason for such great preparations in the desert to facilitate the transfer of the troops.187 
Von Kress is suspicious about the aims of Cemal by this expedition. He expresses in his 
memoirs that he never understands “whether Cemal Pasha believed in the actuality of the 
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capture of Egypt” or used that operation as propaganda to motivate the Arab soldiers to the 
expedtion.188 
 On the other hand, the prominent Kemalist Historian Yusuf Hikmet Bayur claims 
that, even before the war, Cemal Pasha planned to take over the conquest of Egypt in case 
of any hostility with Great Britain. He claims that Cemal told the French Ambassador 
Bompard that “Egypt is my Alsace Lorraine”, and planned to be the Khedive of Egypt. 
However, this argument seems weak. If Cemal had drafted such a plan, then he would go 
to Syria immediately after the proclamation of the mobilization instead of waiting in 
Istanbul for 4 months.189 
The fact that all these statements belonged to the post-war period makes it 
mandatory for an analysis of the contemporary documents, which is going to make the 
aims of the Expedition clear. The examination of the documents, which belong to the 
preceding months of the first expedition, don’t confirm that the Canal expedition aimed at 
a demonstration, or a threat, or an exploratory offensive. 
However, we can make some inferences from the preparations for the expedition 
and conclude about the aims of it. For example, in his action plan, which he sent to Talat 
two weeks before the expedition, Cemal Pasha was planning to pass and conquer Egypt 
with approximately 20-25.000 men.190 The impossibility of carrying out the occupation of 
a country, guarded by 80.000 troops191 by these troops, could easily be realized for anyone 
who knew the circumstances of the region.192 On the other hand, gathering troops in such a 
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great amount before the Canal only for threat or demonstration and making some 1400 of 
them cross to the other side of the Canal with pontoons shows that, this operation had a 
more serious aim. In this point the most plausible explanation is that Cemal attached 
greater importance in his plan to a rebellion of the Egyptians. According to the memoirs of 
Von Kress, the Egyptian nationalists informed Cemal that the people in Egypt would assist 
the Ottoman troops in the widest range. As soon as the first Ottoman soldier appeared 
before the Canal, all Egypt would rebel against Great Britain as a united body.193 For this 
purpose, Cemal Pasha assigned Eşref Kuşçubaşı to engage in a propaganda to foment an 
uprising in Egypt, following the passage of the Army through the Canal. By Eşref’s 
remarks in Stoddard’s book, it is understood that the success of the troops in front of the 
Canal through igniting a rebellion of the Egyptians was seriously taken into consideration 
by the CUP leaders in advance of the first expedition.194 It is impossible to guess whether 
Cemal Pasha would be successful in the Canal front, if the Egyptians had actually rebelled 
against the British authority. However, it can be said that, before the first expedition, he 
believed in the success in case of a general uprising in Egypt.195  
In the preceding months of the first expedition, Cemal always defined the aim of 
the expedition as the conquest of Egypt in his reports.196 However, after performing the 
first expedition, quite the reverse of what he said before the expedition, he changed the 
name of the first expedition and defined it as an “exploratory offensive”, most probably to 
appease the public critics against his movement. He expressed in his declaration to the 
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newspapers that, with this “exploratory offensive”, they understood well the requirements 
for the conquest of Egypt, and guaranteed that soon a new attack would take place and 
would result with success197. But, it is very easy to comprehend that 20.000 soldiers 
transcend very much the number of an exploratory offensive. As was expressed by Ali 
Fuad Erden, “the failure was called the exploratory offensive”.198 
In a report, sent by Cemal Pasha to the Ottoman Headquarter on the reasons of 
failure, the Pasha explained that he didn’t calculate that an attack –with the number of the 
troops and ammunitions at his disposal-, would fail, although his enemies doubled their 
troops. In spite of the prevalence of the Enemy in number, he planned to demolish the 
Canal, and thus to settle and fortify the occupied shores of the Canal preventing the help of 
the British warships. In addition, he estimated that, during the attack, the British warships 
wouldn’t have fired with heavy artilleries from the Canal. It is worth to mention that, in 
this report, he never implied that the aim of the expedition was a threat or should have 
transformed into a threat and didn’t give any recommendation to the Headquarter advising 
any revision in the aims of the expedition from conquest to threat. Quite the reverse, Cemal 
highlighted the necessities for the conquest of Egypt.199 The developments, which occurred 
in the aftermath of the first expedition –the battle of Dardanelles, famine, and inflation 
etc.- compelled the Ottoman center –and also Cemal- to delay –but not a total 
abandonment- the aim of the conquest of Egypt. 
The failure in the first attack and the withdrawal of the troops back to the 
Birüssebi-Gaza line caused suspicious interpretations on the aims of the expedition among 
the people. The remarks of an Armenian doctor, who worked in the 4th Ottoman Army and 
afterwards captured by the English, prove us that, at least immediately afterwards the first 
attack, the objective of the expedition came to be questioned among the people. He said 
that the object was “partly to retain troops in Egypt, but mainly with the idea of making it 
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believed that they always intend to attack with a small force”.200 However, none of the 
contemporary expressions, which belonged to Cemal Pasha and other high officials, 
confirm that kind of remarks. 
The object of the expedition was changed by Cemal only as an excuse when it 
became apparent that the conquest became impossible: In a public speech in Lebanon, in 
the third year of the War, Cemal confessed that due to the insufficiency of the sources, 
Egypt could only have been seriously threatened.201 In the same way, at the end of the year 
1916, in his conversation with the Austrian ambassador while he was in Istanbul, 
mentioning the difficulties of a conquest, Cemal expressed wholeheartedly his regret about 
the attachment of such great sources for this expedition and said that “from the very 
beginning, the aim of the expedition must have been restricted to the binding of the British 
troops to Egypt”.202It is the most obvious statement that the aim of the Expedition was not 
only to threat the British existence in Egypt.  
The conquest of Egypt was not crucial for the Germans. They rather aimed with 
this expedition to threat the Suez Canal and to shed blood between the Turks and Great 
Britain. By this way, they would achieve both to dislocate the center of the war to the non-
Western theatres and to assure the loyalty of the Ottomans to the alliance between two 
states.203 However, for Cemal, the situation was not like that. He paid attention to the 
conquest of Egypt, for both his personal career and the war aims of the Ottoman Empire. 
It is reasonable to conclude that after the arrival of Cemal, the aim of the expedition 
became clearer and transformed into an operation of conquest for Egypt with the help of a 
prospective rebellion in Egypt caused by his success at the Canal. He believed that a 
conquest of Egypt would have taken place if he were able to capture the Canal Zone of 
Egypt for a few days. But, failure prevented the Ottoman troops from entering into Egypt. 
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After the first attack, he prepared a long list of the deficiencies to realize the conquest,204 
and continued the preparations for a second larger expedition spending great amounts of 
money. Before an analysis of the preparations undertaken following the first expedition, 
the public opinion in Egypt and the operations itself will be analyzed to understand 
Cemal’s aims with this expedition and the character of the operations in a better way. 
 
 
1.2.1 The Expedition, Egyptian People and the Ottoman Caliph  
 
With the beginning of the war, the dissatisfaction of the Egyptians from the British 
protectorate made them overwhelmingly pro-Ottoman. Therefore, as stated above, even 
before the entrance of Turkey into the war, Germany considered an operation against 
Egypt to benefit from this potential for their goals. In accordance with this, one of the most 
important part of Cemal’s plans for the conquest of Egypt was a rebellion of the Egyptians 
to support the Ottoman troops attacking there. Therefore, an analysis of the attitude of the 
Egyptians will show the reciprocity of Cemal’s plans among this people.  
After the outbreak of the WWI, for the success of the expedition, firstly, the 
Ottomans and Germans closely cooperated with the Egyptian nationalists and the ex-
Khedive Abbas Hilmi, both of whom enjoyed a considerable amount of popular support in 
Egypt.205 Immediately after the Ottoman entrance to the War, the Khedive issued a 
proclamation, with the approval of Enver Pasha, to the Egyptians and invited them to help 
the Ottoman forces, which would attack Egypt to save it from the British yoke.206 In a 
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similar way, all the prominent members of the Egyptian Nationalist Party, al-Hizb al-
Watani, supported Cemal’s expedition with the same reasons.207 
As for the approach of the Egyptian people towards the Ottomans, their loyalty to 
the Ottoman Caliphate and their support to the British rule in Egypt were diversified 
depending on the social class that they belonged to. According to Kemalist historiography, 
the Egyptians were induced by the British and turned against the Ottoman Caliphate. For 
example, Bayur claimed that, for this aim, the Ulema of Al-Azhar were applied to persuade 
the people for their support in the British side, and they managed to reach their goals.208 
However, the picture drawn by the contemporary documents is quite different. In this 
regard, information given by the French representative in Cairo, who held an interview 
with a prominent merchant of Cairo, clarifies the attitude of the Egyptians in this issue. 
The consul states that the most crucial part of the Egyptian society was the people who 
held the power in their hands; they consisted of the members of the court, senior officials 
and members of the upper classes. Most of them had  Turkish origins, and in the case of 
the destruction of the Ottoman Caliphate, these families could accept the possibility of 
conferring the title of caliph to the Sultan of Egypt. But for the period of the wartime, they 
were undoubtedly pro-Ottoman.209 
The second were the enlightened classes who shared a concrete attitude in regard to 
the Ottoman Caliphate. Most of them claimed that the title of the Ottoman Sultan as Caliph 
didn’t base on Islamic doctrine, and they always regarded the Turks as usurpers of the 
Caliphate and professed a profound horror for them. They considered that the Caliphate 
should be transferred to a Sherif, but not pointing any special person. It is worth to mention 
that their impact on the people was limited.210 However, among the members of the 
traditional Ulema of Al-Azhar, there was plentiful numbers of people who had a pro-
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Ottoman attitude. With the beginning of the War, they got stronger. According to a British 
report, at the end of the year 1915, the Pro-Turkish party was gaining ground while pro-
English members of the University were losing confidence.211 As an indicator of their pro-
Ottoman attitude, on 21st Haziran 1915, a delegation of prominent Egyptians, consisted of 
Ulema and Notables, appeared before the Sultan of Egypt to express that their religious 
feelings were offended by the war that Great Britain was carrying out against the Caliph of 
Islam. By that reason, they requested for the Sultan to hold an official talk to the English 
for the ending of this war.212   
The common people, overwhelmingly the largest part of the Egyptian society, had 
unshakeably believed in the legitimacy of the Ottoman Caliph. They were firmly attached 
to the idea that the Ottoman Empire would have the final victory and believed in the 
invincibility of the Ottoman Sultan. They refused to debate the transfer of the title of the 
Caliph to anyone else, even to their Khedive.213 According to an Ottoman intelligent 
report, in a Friday prayer in the Abdusselam Mosque, Shaikh Mecdi Efendi from the 
Ulema Class, compared the Sultan of Egypt to the Prophet during his preach. The People 
in the Mosque raised a protest to him and took him off the pulpit. The attempt of the 
Education Ministry to convert the orthography of Qur’an was strongly opposed by the 
People.214 As conveyed in the memoirs of Muhammad Farid, when the Ottoman aviators 
bombarded Cairo in 14th November 1916, the people cheered for the fall of the bombs with 
takbirs in the hope that the Ottomans would save them from the British “yoke”.215 
Although the Egyptians had not rebelled against Great Britain, in a way they made 
considerable contributions to the Ottoman side militarily, as their country had to be policed 
by the British troops. The preparations and attacks of the Ottoman troops on Egypt and 
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their propaganda for the conquest of Egypt caused great excitement among the Egyptian 
people. By that reason, the British Government had to bind considerable number of troops 
in Egypt. A revolt was seriously feared by the international public. Italy fortified Tripoli 
considering the possibility of the spread of the revolt there. The Petrograd Consul of Italy 
visited Fahreddin Bey, his Ottoman Colleague, to bid a farewell to him and requested the 
Ottoman help in the case of skittering the Egyptian revolt to Tripoli and Eritrea to appease 
them.216  
Becoming aware of this reality, even before the Ottoman entrance to the War, the 
British authorities in Egypt sent the Muslim officers to Sudan and transferred 400 British 
officers to lead the British Army there.217 Proving the British suspicion right, in March 
1915, according to the diaries of Muhammad Farid, a Sudanese officer in the British Army 
at Sinai had turned his coat with 20 Sudanese soldiers under his command.218 Furthermore, 
the British were attentive not to deploy Muslim Indians in Egypt, but to bring Buddhist 
soldiers instead.219 Similarly, after the commencement of the War, the passport issues in 
Egypt were taken over by the British officials, but later, because of the lack of the 
sufficient number of personnel, they assigned it back to the Egyptians.220  
However, the Ottoman and German officials had over-estimated the likelihood of 
the Egyptians taking any active measures to throw-off the over-lordship of Great 
Britain”.221 According to the information given by a citizen of an allied state [the name of 
the state is not specified in the text], who lately returned from Egypt, to the Ottoman 
Consul at the Hague, the Egyptian people didn’t consider a rebellion against the English 
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authority. Instead, they were expecting of the Ottoman Army to save them from the British 
yoke. But, as time went by, their expectation in this direction had been disappointed. 222 
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1.2.2 The First Attack: “Conquest” or “Reconnaissance” 
67 
 
Source: www.firstworldwar.com 
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In this section, a description of the first expedition will set out to be made to check 
the truth of the claims regarding the aims of the expedition. It will be seen below that the 
expedition was not an exploration or demonstration, but rather an undertaking for the 
capture of the both sides of the Canal. If that attempt had been succeeded, then the 
conquest of the whole Egypt would be taken into consideration through the support of the 
Egyptian people. 
For this purpose the expeditionary force moved from Jerusalem in the night of 
January 14-15, 1915 under the command of Cemal Pasha. Some 16 days later, they would 
arrive before the Canal.223 The offensive was able to take up to advance against the Canal 
at 03:30, in the night of 2-3 February [20-21 Kanun-ı Sani]. The amount of the Ottoman 
troops and its artilleries attacking the Canal was reported by Cemal as follows: 10 
battalions of the 8th Army Corps, 6 battalions of the 10th Division. In Addition to that, 4 
quick-fire field batteries, an ordinary battery, and 2 ordinary mountain batteries which 
belonged to 8th Army Corps, and 2 ordinary batteries and a quick-fire obusian battery. 
They made at 4 different points a demonstative offensive at the Canal: at al-Kantara 
through about 3.000 soldiers, at al-Fardan by 2.000 soldiers, and towards Ismailiyya, 
Shaluf and Suez by similar troops. In El-Fardan, there was only a demonstration during 
which several shots were exchanged throughout the day of the 2-3 February. In front of El 
Kantara, the attack had emerged a little more clearly and was driven, up to 700 meters of 
fortifications nearer to the Indians.224 
As defined before, the main offensive was carried out between Toussoun and 
Serapeum by the help of the pontoon bridges, which had been carried by the soldiers 
throughout the desert. The column headed this part of the troops consisted of 12.000 men. 
The largest part of this column was supported with the pontoon bridges on the chosen point 
for passage. It was flanked on the north and south by smaller squadrons. The southern 
flank guard was merely skirmishing with the position of Serapeum. The flank guard of the 
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North attacked the positions at Toussoun. These troops advanced about 3:30 am up to 200 
meters of that position.225  
Firstly, the whole of the 74th and the half of the 73rd regiment were able to cross the 
Canal and attacked the British soldiers there with bayonets, not to make the British troops 
aware of their existence. However, the British trenches in the shore of Africa were close 
enough to the pontoons to sink them with the help of the lighting service of the Canal 
Company by the fire of the batteries. Therefore, the passage for the remaining of the troops 
to the Egyptian side of the Canal wasn’t actualized. Those who were able to cross the 
Canal were all killed or taken prisoner. Many were drowned.226 On the other hand, two 
British battle cruisers in the Lake Timsah and one in the Bitter Lake had made interlocking 
fire on the Ottoman artilleries in the eastern side of the Canal and to the soldiers who were 
trying to cross the Canal.227 
During the two days of 2-3 Febraruy, the Ottoman Army renewed its attacks again 
and again. The firing of artillery caused little damage and loss on the side of their enemies. 
A small column that marched against Ismailia on the morning of February 2nd, sent a few 
missiles at the hospital without reaching it, and many of them fell into the lake Timsah. 
The British auxiliary cruiser Hardinge received several blows, one of its captains was 
slightly injured and one of its chimneys was damaged. The Warship Requin, by a lucky 
shot, blew out the fire of the heavy piece. The British side executed a counter-attack with a 
company of Gurkhas.228  
On the evening of 3rd February, Cemal realized the impossibility of getting through 
the British defense at the Canal and decided to retreat the Ottoman troops from the 
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Canal.229 The Ottoman losses varied in Cemal’s and the Entente records. The former 
calculated the losses -not all killed- as 803 men and 16 officers, and 124 men killed, while 
the latter gave the number of the killed as 10 officers, 800 men. The difference enlarged on 
the wounded and the prisoners: the French records calculated the number as 700 prisoners, 
100 wounded, several hundred drowned. Cemal informed the Ottoman headquarters that 
the number of the wounded was determined as 417. The British headquarters calculated the 
total at least 3,000 men while Cemal reported it as 1360. The British casualties were only a 
hundred men: killed: one officer and 20 men wounded: 5 officers and 80 men.230 
With this attack, Cemal Pasha did not only intend to create a threat in the Canal for 
the English, but also to cross it and, with a temporary invasion of the Canal zone, to pave 
the way for a general uprising in Egypt, and possibly to conquer Egypt. The population in 
Cairo and around the Canal, for one can say that all, that is Muslim, was at heart, anti-
English. According to the evaluations of the French Consul, “If the Turks were informed 
about the forces defending the Canal, they could not hope to pass.” But, from the Ottoman 
intelligence reports we understand that the Turks had the knowledge of the number of the 
troops defending the Canal.231 Then, what was the aim of the troops attacking Egypt? The 
answer was, too, given by the French Reprensentative; “They were probably relying on a 
revolt of the Egyptian population, if successful even temporarily. But it was difficult to 
know the cowardice and apathy of Egyptians.”232 The mentioned consul defined the 
Second aim of the attack incisively. He accepted that “the Turks, or rather the Germans 
showed the English that the Sinai desert could be crossed” and the troops that they settled 
in the Canal and Egypt was not enough to save these places from the enemy attack from 
Palestine.233  
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1.2.3 Preparations for a Second Larger Expedition to conquer Egypt 
 
Immediately after the first attack, due to the issues of water and foodstuff, it 
seemed impossible to stay in and around the Canal. As a result of that, Cemal ordered the 
expeditionary force to retreat to the line of Nahıl-Ibin-Arish, then gathered them at Gaza, 
Hanyunus, Birüssebi and Maan.234 
In spite of that fiasco, Cemal didn’t abandon his goal of the conquest. He reported 
to Enver that:  
“Even if the attack, which took place as a raid, couldn’t be achieved, the requirements for 
an attack against the Canal were properly realized. I am going to start the preparations to 
pass the Canal by more powerful troops…I ensure that none of our hopes was perished. 
Quite the reverse, due to that the required means were comprehended, the hopes for the 
success have increased” 235  
Immediately after the first expedition, Cemal sent a telegraph to the newspapers stating 
that the troops moved towards the Canal for an exploratory offensive, and with this 
operation they understood very well the requirements for the conquest of Egypt. Due to the 
impact of the failure of the first attempt, he launched the preparations for a larger second 
expedition. Within a month of the first expedition, he completed the list of the 
requirements for a second expedition and sent it to both Istanbul and Berlin with his Aide-
de-Camp von Frankenberg.236 His report included all the details for a successful operation 
to capture the Canal and later Egypt: firstly, he planned a better reinforcement of the 
Desert in terms of water and foodstuffs supplies for the longer stay of the Army. Secondly, 
his plan included the construction of railroads and chausseed roads for the transportation of 
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the soldiers and their provisions and ammunition, and finally he decided to deploy troops 
on the shores of Palestine, Aleppo and Lebanon in the case of an operation against the 
Canal.237  
The following preparations demonstrate that this telegram was not sent only to 
console Enver for the failure of the first attack. Following this, Cemal was convinced that 
the conquest of Egypt couldn’t come to be realized without heavy artillery, which requires 
a railway for transport.238 Becoming aware of this necessity, Cemal Pasha, in agreement 
with Germans, accelerated the construction of the Birüssebi railway, which would be 
reaching the Canal as “the Egyptian branch of the Hejaz railroad”.239 For the realization of 
the ultimate goal of the Egyptian Campaign, Meissner Pasha, a German Engineer, was 
assigned by Cemal Pasha to build these new railroads as the head engineer.240 
The first expedition made it clear for Cemal Pasha that, for the capture of the Canal 
and later for a conquest of Egypt, he must considerably have fortified the Desert. In a 
report to Enver on the requirements for the conquest of Egypt, Cemal stated that he needed 
at least 150.000 soldiers. With the available means of transportation it seemed impossible 
to him to move these troops to the Canal and to supply their needs for a longer expedition. 
Therefore, he made the construction of the Egyptian Branch accelerated that had already 
been started to construct in order to provide a connection between Egypt, Syria and 
Hijaz.241 For this purpose, in consultation with Liman v. Sanders, Enver Pasha had decided 
to send Meissner Pasha to Damascus for the building a new railway in Southern Palestine 
right after the Ottoman entrance to the War. He was given a monthly salary of 150 liras, 
and 200 liras premium in every three months. The Ottoman Cabinet reserved montly 
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40.000 lira for this construction and for the wages of the labourers.242 However, at the end 
of the 8th month of the construction only 90.000 of 320.000 could be sent.243  
On the other hands, the Cabinet strictly emphasized in its decision to construct the 
Egyptian branch that all the rights of that branch belonged to the Hijaz Railroad 
Company244 to prevent any greed of the great powers –presumably Germany- on this 
branch. In the same decision, they cancelled the agreement, which was signed with France 
before the war for the construction of a railway from Tulkarem, to forestall any dispute 
with her after the War.245  
After the first attack against Egypt, Meissner Pasha accelerated the construction 
process working with an everlasting energy. As a result of that, the first part of the railway 
was completed, and on 5th May, the first train was able to enter into Lejda station (63 
km.).246 According to the estimation of the German Consul in Jerusalem, the construction 
works would go 45 km. beyond Birüssebi at the end of 1915.247 Further extention of the 
lines to Suez was stipulated by the progress of the military movement planned against 
Egypt.248 But, the extension of the rails beyond it would never be enacted because of the 
problems caused by the war. Simultaneously, the construction of a railway was given a 
start on 15th January from Tulkarem via Al-Tirah to Ludd, and on 20th January, from 
Ludd towards the North. For the construction of this branch, 450 trained soldiers were 
recruited under the command of Meissner. In addition to that, at the end of January a 
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labour battalion consisted of 700 men had arrived on their locations and, at that time, 
another 800 were about to arrive.249 
His assiduous works produced the first considerable fruits on Saturday, 30th 
October 1915. The Egyptian branch arrived at Birüssebi (158 km. from Ramin), which was 
determined as the center for the Desert Corps after the first attack against the Canal.250 In 
his speech in the opening ceremony, Meissner expressed that this enormous work was 
accomplished owing to Cemal Pasha, who provided all the means at his disposal.251 When 
the circumstances of the war were taken into consideration the work was achieved quite 
fast. It was constructed in 9,5 months (15th January-30th October). In five months 64 km. of 
the road was accomplished to finish (15th May) building 17,5 km. per month.252  
Since it was the wartime and the transportation of the construction materials by the 
way of sea was impossible because of the blockade, Meissner encountered a series of 
problems throughout the construction period. However, Cemal offered all the resources of 
Syria to his service to overcome the problems of the construction process. First and 
foremost, Meissner had to deal with the deficiency of the Metals to construct railways. It 
was coped with taking up the rails of Mezerib-Midan railway (101 km.)built by France and 
the Railway between Beirut-Meameltin??(20km.). With some parts of them, The Ramleh-
Jerusalem gauge was widened.253 In the same way, 20 km. of Jaffa-Jerusalem railway till 
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Leyda station was ripped in February 1915, to use its rails in other constructions. It is 
worth to mention that, like Midan-Müzeyrib line, the operating rights of this line were 
hired to France before the War.254 Presumably, the aim of those actions was to prevent 
staking any claim by France on the railways of Syria after the War. Apart from that, taking 
up the railways connecting the towns of Syria to reach Egypt demonstrate the cruciality of 
the expedition for Cemal Pasha. 
The second problem preventing the building of the new railroads were the scarcity 
of the traverses (the battens under the rails). Besides that provided by the picked up 
railways, the ocaliptus trees were cut to satisfy this need.255 But, all these measures could 
provide the extension of the railway to Birüssebi. After that point, due to the deficiencies 
of construction materials, instead of the railroad, a road for wheel traffic was made across 
the desert.256  
Thirdly, Meissner had to wait for the arrival of the construction materials with 
trains. The overload of Hijaz Railway delayed the completion of the railways in the 
scheduled time. By the same token, burning the wood as rolling stock in the locomotives 
reduced the speed of the trains. The railway was carrying foodstuffs for both the soldiers 
and the Syrians, who were exposed to Famine. Additionally, in some places, the Armenian 
deportees from Anatolia were transported by the same lines. Last, but not the least, the 
troops were moving by these lines.257 
German Consul of Damascus conveyed from Meissner that the railway 
construction would have continued beyond Birüssebi in the direction of Egypt till Hafir al-
Auja (240 km.), if the required construction materials had been supplied properly. In 
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September 1915, he estimated to complete it on 13th January 1916, 2 days before the 
anniversary for the commencement of the contruction of the Egyptian branch. Therefore, It 
is plausible to claim that the construction works were interrupted as the consequence of the 
transportation of the Armenian refugees, the movement of the troops, the supply of the 
foodstuffs for the starving people. The ripping of the old railways to extend the Egyptian 
branch was not actuated due to the impossibility of their transportations with trains because 
of the abovementioned reasons.258  
The extension of the desert railroad built by Meissner Pasha was emergent to 
reinforce the preparations in the Desert, and must have been, therefore, swiftly constructed. 
As was explained before, at Birüssebi, a military colony had been established to coordinate 
all the military activities in the Canal region.259 For that reason, these railroads were not 
built in high standard and they were seriously damaged by the unusual desert rains. The 
speed of the trains was significantly limited by that reason –only reaching 9 km. speed in 
an hour between Birüssebi and Ramleh. In spite of that, 2-3 train services could be 
accomplished in a day.260 In October 1917, A British official compared the railways of the 
two battling sides in Sinai as follows:  
The ends of the two railways, British and Turkish, are now only two miles apart, but 
whereas the British railway is magnificently laid and will last for all time, the Turkish is 
merely thrown down anyhow. They are now beginning to double the British lines through 
the desert.261  
The hurried construction of the railway was the first priority for the Ottomans, hence the 
railway was constructed in a low quality. Although the construction works had some long 
term purposes, its primary objective was to accelerate the organization of the second attack 
against the Canal. The construction process of this branch that explained above shows that 
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Cemal Pasha’s military build-up in the Canal Front was not only for the tactical reasons 
regarding to bind the British troops in the Canal, but a real intention of the conquest of 
Egypt.    
 Another activity of the construction that could be considered in the context of the 
expedition was the digging the tunnels of Amanus and Taurus. By these tunnels, the 
barriers between Anatolia and Syria would be removed and a direct railroad connection 
would be provided. For that purpose, the efforts continued throughout the war and the 
Amanus tunnel was finished at the end of the year 1917, whereas the other one could be 
put into service towards the end of the War.262 Apart from their military benefits, these two 
tunnels would facilitate the communication between Anatolia and Syria and, thus, would 
provide a considerable contribution to the purpose of the integration of the Syrian land to 
the imperial body both politically and economically.  
Besides those railway enterprises, carriage roads and chausseed roads were 
constructed in the desert. One chausseed road was built in the desert till Hassana and 
another one connected El-Arish with Hafir. However, they were not true roads. But they 
were suitable for the heavier loads. These roads were badly influenced by the unusually 
strong rains whose floodwaters were reaching up to 30 m. As a result of that, the chaussee 
between Jerusalem and Birüssebi were covered by muck.263 Besides that, a really good 
carriage road was made between Nablus and Silet ed Dahr from the old road-steam rollers 
work on it. The construction of new carriage roads Hebron to Birüssebi and South Latrun 
to Gaza, Jericho to Amman, Nazareth to Damascus were completed. A carriage road was 
also constructed up the hill from Jaauneh to Safed. A stage road [Etappenstrasse] was built 
from Damascus to Afula-Djenin and in this road the lorries could carry the supplies. A 
carriage road was being made from Jaauneh to Nabatieh to join the road from Sidon to 
Jediedeh Merj Ayun on the left bank of Litani.264 
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Cemal wanted to make further investment in the Desert for that goal. But the 
policies of the Central Government and Germany changed. Enver Pasha’s telegram to 
Cemal Pasha on 11th August 1915, on the realization of the Second Expedition shows the 
shift in this sense. He explained that:  
“With regard to general [international] political situation and especially to our own 
situation, I have to state to your highness that the preparations for the Second Expedition of 
Egypt, unfortunately, is not going to be completed on the determined time. [However] As a 
result, the planned undertaking will not be abandoned, but will only be delayed. It is a must 
to keep this new decision secret inside the country.”265 
In his answer, Cemal Pasha pronounced the reality regarding the Egypt Expedition: “I 
strongly believe that the delay in the implemetation of the operation to next year means the 
total abandonment of it.” Similarly, “it was impossible to keep secret an essential change 
in the war strategies from the people”.266 The remarks in the whole of the telegram show 
Cemal’s frustration due to the new decision and his disagreement with Enver’s remarks 
demonstrates Cemal’s willingness to conquer Egypt. 
Immediately after this telegram, Enver wrote a long report to the German 
Headquarters and stated that  
“till now, neither in Flander nor in the Dardanelles we have not been able to inflict heavy 
losses to the English to enforce them to make a peace with us that may [include] acceptable 
[items] for us. In my opinion, if we attack them at their home, India and Egypt, we may 
compel them to such an action. The last of them seems the most hopeful one to me, even 
though the great difficulties in the implementation of it.”267 
In the same report, he notified to the Germans that, with the available means, the capture of 
the Canal and the conquest of Egypt appeared impossible. In order to put the plan into 
practice, he conveyed that Cemal Pasha calculated that, with an army consisting of 
100.000 soldiers, he would be able to conquer Egypt. First of all, with roughly 50.000 man 
in three columns to advance Kantara, Ismailiya and than enforce the Canal. After the 
crossing of the Canal, they were going to build a bridge-head-courteous, as the first job, 
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accross the Canal to draw the second 50.000 man. Cemal Pasha had calculated that, after 
that with 70 or 80.000 man, he would be able to expel the English from Egypt.268  
It is true that a second larger expedition against the Canal could not be actualized, 
because of the hardening conditions of life in Syria and that the British troops in Eygpt 
started to move via the Sinai Desert towards Syria in the second haof of the year 1916. But, 
the construction of these roads, first of all, clarifies the reason why the British 
Expeditionary Force lost so many great number of their troops while capturing Syria, and 
why the Ottoman troops were able to resist the operations of the British forces for so long a 
time. Secondly, It seems meaningless to make that much investment to the Sinai Desert 
only for tying down the British forces in the Desert. These investment in the Desert is the 
most obvious evidence of Cemal’s intention of the conquest of Egypt. Besides these 
military aims, the construction activities also contributed to the settlement of the desert as 
well as the control projects of the Ottoman state regarding the Bedouins of the Sinai Desert 
in future.269  
Taking the preparations for the first and so-called second expeditions, the 
realization of the first attack and the exorbitant loyalties of the Egyptians towards the 
Caliph into consideration, quite the reverse of the general opinion in the existing literature, 
it is reasonable to conclude that Cemal really wanted to be the second conqueror of Egypt 
after Selim II, and thus, transformed the aim of the expedition from a threat attack to the 
conquest. The reasons of this enthusiasm could be the Napoleonic megalomania,270 which 
means to reach the achievements of Napoleon’s, and, related to this, to sit on the first seat 
in the Ottoman Cabinet honored with a victory against Great Britain. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
ABOLITION OF THE “ARABIST BARRIER”: CEMAL 
PASHA AND THE ARABIST MOVEMENT 
 
 
 
As already stated, Cemal Pasha’s second aim in Syria was “to maintain peace and 
order” there. In Cemal’s mind, that meant the elimination of all kind of “barriers” between 
the State and its different peoples in Syria preventing the creation of the ideal citizen. For 
that purpose, immediately after his arrival at Syria, Cemal undertook an action for the 
elimination of those “barriers”. In terms of its social impact, undoubtedly, the most drastic 
“measures” were taken against the Arabist movement, which demanded a certain 
autonomy for the Arab provinces.271 In such a way that, after a short while of his arrival in 
Syria, Cemal launched a process of prosecution against the members of the Arabist party in 
the light of the documents seized from the French Consulates in Beirut and Damascus 
revealing the negotiations between the reformist Arabs and the French consuls mainly on 
utilizing the French influence in the Ottoman Government to implement the decentralist 
                                                 
271 Although some Arabs claimed in their memoirs that the real aim of the movement 
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reforms in Syria. Applying those documents as evidence, Cemal accused the mentioned 
party members of being traitors against the Ottoman Empire and punished the party 
members severely. Some of them were hanged in the squares of Damascus and Beirut, 
while some others were sent into exile to the cities of Inner Anatolia, which was populated 
by Turks in an overwhelming majority. Understandably, as a result of those actions, Cemal 
became one of the most “black hearted” figures in the history of the Arabist movement.  
 It is today well known that the adherents of the Arabist movements, to a large 
extent, supported the continuation of the Ottoman rule in the Arab lands. Rather than a 
demand of independence from the Ottoman Emprie, they demanded the increase of the 
proportional participation of the Arabs to the Government, and insisted that more place to 
be given to Arabic culture in the Governmental policies implemented in the Arab 
provinces. In spite of the abundance of the academic studies on Arab nationalism, and its 
history272, academic studies devoted to understand the intentions of the CUP regarding the 
Arabist movement and the perception of the political actions of the leading Arabs by the 
Unionists are very small in number.273 This chapter mainly concentrates on the Ottoman 
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Manevralarından Suriye ve Garbi Arabistan Tehciri, Pegem Akademi, Ankara: 2011; 
Nevzat Artuç also devoted a short section to the subject in his book. The chapter, to a large 
extent, is made up of a repeat of Cemal’s claims in his memoirs. The writes implies 
throughout the section that he defends what Cemal did regarding the Arabists. Besides that, 
there can be found noteworthy information errors in the book. The writer attributes Cemal 
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policies regarding the Arabist movement in the Greater Syria taking Cemal Pasha’s 
Governorate in Syria as a case. Before an analysis of his draconian actions to suppress the 
movement, an analysis of the Young Turk mind and policies on the Arabist movement in 
the preceding years of the war will contribute to our understanding of the origins of 
Cemal’s actions and to see the continuity and change in the CUP policies.  
 
 
 
2.1. Young Turks and the Arabist Parties before the War 
 
 
Hasan Kayalı asserts in his acclaimed book that “in the Unionist view of 
Ottomanism, ethnic, religious and linguistic differences were of no import”274. From this 
point of view, he concludes that the principal aim of the Unionists was to centralize the 
Empire with a Turkish leading ideology. However, the point that he left unexamined is that 
the Unionist attitude towards the different ethnies did not only cause the assessment of 
those ethnies as insignificant variables in the CUP policies, but also resulted with the 
projects to eliminate the opposition movements ascribing importance to the ethnies of the 
Empire, especially following the Balkan Wars. In this context, it will not be an 
exaggeration to claim that, from the beginning of its acquisition of the governmental 
instruments in 1913, the CUP wanted to make the Arabists abandon their reform demands 
giving them some governmental posts, persuading or punishing them, instead of taking 
their demands into consideration. They thought that giving some privileges to those people 
                                                                                                                                                    
Pasha’s letters to the Bedouin tribes and Imam Yahya inviting them close cooperation, to 
his conciliatory politics regarding the Arabists (p. 300). The remarks in the book on these 
tribal leaders give the impression that the writer assessed those chiefs as members of the 
Arabist movement. Similarly, Artuç claims that Cemal used the documents seized from the 
French Consulates following the first hangings took place in August 1915. Yet, As will be 
demonstrated below, he demanded this documents in May 1915, and the first executions 
also were made applying the evidences available in those documents (p. 306): Artuç, 
Nevzat, Ibid. 
274 Kayalı, Ibid, p. 85. 
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would save the Empire from a “separatist” movement. In this sense, they considerably 
followed the classical methods of the Empire to eliminate a movement of opposition within 
the Imperial realm. However, in the first years of their acquisition of the governmental 
apparatus, the Unionists had to give some reform promises to the members of the reformist 
Arabist Parties, such as Al-Fatat, Al-Lamarkaziyya and Al-Muntadi al-Adabi, probably, 
since they were afraid of any foreign intervention in favor of the demands of the Arab 
reformists. To be more specific, the Arab Congress held by the participation of all the 
reformist Arab parties in Paris between 18 and 23 June 1913275, constituted a turning point 
in this sense. Following that, the prominent Arabist participants of the Arab Congress 
visited the Ottoman Embassy in Paris and the French Foreign Ministry to declare the 
decisions they made. They requested from the Ottoman Empire via the Ambassador the 
implementation of the decisions of the Congress. As for the French Government, they 
demanded support for their reform requests and the pressure on the Ottoman Government 
to materialize these reforms. They also emphasized to the French officials that they were 
loyal to the Empire. The CUP sent the prominent Unionist Midhat Şükrü, and informed 
that their demands for reforms were accepted by the government and, will be implemented 
in a short span of time.276 Their demands, as agreed with the CUP leaders, were principally 
to make the government more decentralized, to reset the curriculum of the primary and 
secondary schools as to include the Arabic language, court decisions in Arabic in addition 
to Turkish, and to be able to submit a petition to the official authorities in Arabic.277 
                                                 
275 The records of the congress was published in Cairo in the same year. For details, see: 
Al-Mu’tamar al-Arabiyya al-Avval, Kahire: 1331-1913. 
276 For the details of the process, see: Salaam, Ibid, pp. 168-190; Afterwards, the Arab 
nationalist considered this Congress as the first towards the Arab independence. For an 
example, see: Al-Hakim, Ibid, pp. 117-118. 
277 For the text of the agreement, see: Majallat al-Manar, Vol: 16/8, 2 August 1913, p. 
638-640; In the high schools, the language of instruction was presumably in Arabic. We 
know that the Imperial High School in Damascus taught in Arabic till March 1916: 
HHStA, PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian, “Einführung des deutschen Sprachunterrichtes in der 
hiesigen Sultanieshule”, Damascus, 21 March 1916. 
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According to the memoirs of Shakib Arslan, the CUP repeated the similar promises to a 
pro-Ottoman Arab delegation in a meeting held in Istanbul during those days.278 
 The most important one among the demands of the Arabists was the change of the 
instruction language to Arabic in the Arab provinces. In this regard, on 11th August 1913 
[29 Temmuz 1329] the Sadaret demanded the Ministry of Education to start preparations 
for teaching in Arabic in the state schools of the Arab provinces.279 For that purpose, a 
“Commission for the Arabic Education” [Arabca Tedrisat Komisyonu] was established 
within the body of the University of Istanbul [Darülfünun]. The main task of the 
commission was to prepare schoolbooks in Arabic for the Ottoman Arabs. In this regard, 
the Commission demanded from Egypt280 and Beirut281 the dispatch of schoolbooks in 
Arabic as examples. While some of the books from Egypt were approved, some others 
were refused on grounds that they were written for Egypt and were not suitable for the 
Ottoman country. Especially, the history and geography books were considered in this 
context. By mid-December 1913, most of the books had been determined by the 
commission.282 In the same regard, a sultani school was established in Beirut on 7th 
October 1913 [24 Eylül 1329], which would instruct in Arabic.283 In regard to the demands 
of the Arabists, the state officials, who could not speak Arabic, were started to be 
                                                 
278 The prominent members of the pro-Ottoman party, like Abdurrahman el-Yusuf, 
Şeyh Esad el-Şukayri and Şekib Arslan, were among the members of the delegation: 
Arslan, Ibid., p. 108; According to memoirs of Salim Ali Salaam, the Unionists aimed at a 
mutual meeting consisted of the members of the reformist and the pro-Ottoman Arabs. 
However, due to the coincidence of the date of the meeting with the date of the departure 
of the reform party members, this meeting couldn’t realized: Salaam, Ibid, p. 184-185. 
279 BOA, BEO 4223/316719, Sadaret to Maarif, 6 Teşrin-i Evvel 1329 [19 October 
1913] 
280 BOA, MF.MKT., 1190/74, The High-Commissary in Egypt to Ministry of Interior, 1 
Teşrin-i Sani 1913 [14 November 1913]. 
281 BOA, MF.MKT., 1190/74, Ministry of Interior to the Commission for the Arabic 
Education, 23 Teşrin-i Sani 1913 [6 December 1913] 
282 BOA, MF.MKT., 1190/74, The Chair of the Commission for the Arabic Education 
to Ministry of Education, 2 Kanun-ı Evvel 1329 [15 December 1913] 
283 BOA, MF.MKT., 1190/59, Ministry of Education to the Governorates of Syria and 
Beirut, 24 Eylül 1329 [7 October 1913]. 
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changed.284 For example, the secretary of Jaffa Custom House was dismissed since he did 
not know Arabic.285 Similarly, upon a complaint, the judge of Nablus was demanded by 
the Central Government to be dismissed if he could not speak Arabic sufficiently.286 
Whereas the CUP gave promises to the reformist Arabs on the one hand, they 
examined the methods to eradicate the movement of Arabism, on the other. This is mainly 
because that the CUP leaders didn’t saw them well-disposed, and thought that they were 
selfish profit seekers as self aggrandizers, and aimed at the separation of the Arab lands 
from the Empire. A conversation between Talat and Mahmut Nedim, the last Ottoman 
Governor in Yemen and also a CUP member, clearly reveals the Unionist opinions and 
intentions regarding the personality of the Arabists: 
“One day, Talat Bey took me aside and asked: 
- I don’t find those [Arabists] [Arap iftirakçıları in the original text] well. Yet, we are not 
so blind for not to see the aims that they seek… What do you say? Have you learnt their 
real aims thoroughly in details? In particular, is there a full agreement among them?  
I replied: 
- I don’t think that there is an agreement among them regarding ideals and intentions, as 
affairs stand. Almost all the prominent Arabs have gathered here [in the Arabist parties]… 
In my opinion, since the self-seekers constitute the majority [of them], first of all, they 
should be satisfied. By saying they should be satisfied, I should add that I think it is not 
appropriate to silence them by the means violence [cebrü şiddet], in these days. 
Talat Bey, 
-… When you dissect their demands, you see that the demands and claims they voice are 
the product of their intolerance to our rule. 
It was this opinion of the CUP. However, they [the CUP] could not hold that against them 
[the Arabists]. It was appropriate then not to hold that against them…”287 
As inferred between the lines of the conversation, there was a tendency among the CUP 
leaders to eliminate the Arabist movement by various means. Especially Talat saw them as 
                                                 
284 In a telegram, the Ministry of Interior warned the Directorate General of Security to 
appoint those, who could speak Arabic to the Arab provinces. For details, see: BOA, 
DH.MTV. 60/19, Ministry of Interior to the Directorate General of Security, 18 Mart 1330 
[30 March 1914]. 
285 BOA, DH.MTV. 49-2/43. Ministry of Interior to the Governorate of Jerusalem, 7 
Kanun-ı Sani 1329 [20 January 1913]. 
286 BOA, DH.İ.UM. 67/23, Ministry of Interior to Undersecretary, 9 Teşrin-i Sani 1329 
[22 December 1913]. 
287 Mahmud Nedim Bey, Arabistan’da Bir Ömür, Ali Birinci (ed.), İstanbul: ISIS Press, 
2001, p. 178. 
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“separatists”, who had “intolerance” to the Ottoman rule, and accordingly, “collaborators” 
of the Great Powers in Syria. An unsigned report sent from Beirut on 26th March 1914 
regarding the methods of struggle against Arabism, presumably written by a prominent 
CUP member, who was probably sent there to examine the state of Arabism, is another 
example of the Unionist approach towards the Arabs in the same direction. Similar to the 
speech quoted above, the beginning of this report clarifies the Unionist doubt about the 
Arabist movement; the author describes Arabism as a movement, which had some 
connections with foreign powers, and therefore, aiming at separating the Arab provinces 
from the Ottoman rule. Because of its foreign origins, the movement was harmful for the 
country. Therefore, the movement should be eliminated by way of gaining its members 
applying various methods. In this regard, the writer gives some advice to the Central 
Government on how to eliminate the decentralist parties in Beirut, which had some 
similarities to the policies applied by Cemal during his governorate. He advises three 
methods to struggle with Arabism; some of the Arabists should be rewarded with the 
Governmental posts, while some others should be punished moderately. As for the third 
way, the writer advised to use the method of persuasion.288  
As the first measure, the Government should gratify some members of the party, 
such as Refik el-Azm and Muhtar Beyhum appointing them to prestigious governmental 
posts. Secondly, Abdülgani el-Ureysi, the editor of El-Mufid newspaper, should be 
persuaded about the good intentions of the Turks, since this man was acting with his 
conscience. The third way, that the writer recommends to prevent further participation of 
the people of Beirut in Arabism, was to punish the members of the movement, who tried to 
manipulate the sentiments of the common people against the Government, and who 
undertook to show the government weaker before the Great Powers. He claims that the 
people of Beirut would be spoiled, if the government had shown indulgence to them about 
their political concerns. However, if the government punishes them, they would repent 
                                                 
288 BOA, DH.EUM. 4.Şb. 10/18, 13 Mart 1330 [26 March 1914]; a transcription of this 
document has been published in Ortak’s book, in spite of some reading faults, for example, 
he transcribed “satvet” [power] as “sukut” [silence], and some unread words. The text 
published by Ortak didn’t follow the original order of the document: Ortak, Ibid., pp. 241-
245.  
87 
 
their partisanship. Interestingly enough, the writer cites decrease in smuggling following 
the arrest of the smugglers as an example to prove his argument.289 
The journalist Ahmet Şerif, the interviewer of the Unionist newspaper Tanin, writes 
in 1910 indicating that a similar approach was common among the Turks at that time. The 
following remarks delivered by him are significant with regard to demonstrate the 
perception of the Arab question among the Turkish governing elite:  
"People say and have been saying that there is not [such] an Arab question; this is the 
invention of some self-seekers, some ill-disposeds and a few Arabic newspapers that have 
monkey businesses. It is an illusion of sentiments and opinion that was followed by some 
to sow discord among the combined Ottoman elements...”290 
It is worth to mention that, as quoted by Şerif, none of the references of the CUP rulers 
dealt with the reform demands of the Arabists. They primarily saw the members of the 
Arabist party as self-seekers, and never made a reference to their political demands. Four 
aspects of these assessments are crucial to understand Cemal’s way of action against 
Arabism: the evaluation of the Arabists as self-seekers and, therefore, could be bought in 
return for prestigious posts; secondly, the underestimation of their political demands 
regarding the administration of the Arab provinces; finally, considering them the agents of 
the foreign powers. The most important one is the belief in the necessity of bribing them 
towards the political line of the CUP to eliminate a possible danger of “separation” from 
the Arabists.  
 
 
2.2. Cemal’s Perspective and Intentions on the Arabist Movement 
 
Cemal was not different from the mainstream of the CUP in his approach on the 
aims and intentions of the Arabist movement. His remarks both in his memoirs and in his 
contemporary correspondence apparently demonstrate that reality. However, his actions 
                                                 
289 BOA, DH.EUM. 4.Şb. 10/18, 13 Mart 1330 [26 March 1914].  
290 Ahmet Şerif, “Türk-Arab”, Damascus, 12 December 1910, Arnavudluk’da, 
Suriye’de, Trablusgarb’de Tanin, Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1999, pp. 126-129: for the 
original of the article, see: Tanin, 29 Teşrin-i Sani 1326 [12 December 1910]. 
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were quite radical from the methods offered in the pre-war period. First of all, similar to 
many of the CUP leaders, Cemal regarded the Arabists as self-seekers. The statements 
quoted below demonstrate that Cemal also thinks that the Arabists could be bought in 
return for money and they were deceitful in their causes:  
“…Through his agency [Abdul Kerim el-Halil] I had a meeting with some of the most 
influential revolutionary leaders, including one of their greatest zealots…I explained to 
them the views of the Government, and insisted that it would be possible to liberate the 
Mohammedan world from a foreign yoke if the great war ended with a victory for us. All 
of them –without exception- agreed with what I said … In the same breath these so-called 
revolutionaries, starting with Abdul Kerim el Halil, began a doleful tale about their poor 
financial position and great need of money. I distributed pretty substantial sums between 
Abdul Kerim el Halil, Melumed Kurd Ali [sic.] and Abdul Gani el Arisi. From that time 
onwards these gentlemen were my most humble servants, and assured me that they would 
lose no time in doing everything in their power to assist me…”291  
Moreover, his contemporary writings are filled with revilement and contempt against the 
Arabists. Before he started the process of prosecution targeting the Arabists, Cemal 
appeased the concerns of Talat with regard to possible disturbance among the Arabs due to 
the punishment of the prominent members of Arab society with these remarks: “by 
breaking the heads of these accurseds [mel’un], there would be no Arab question to 
emerge.”292 In another telegraph, Cemal described those Arabists as “well-known traitors”, 
“wickeds” [hain], and “lacking backbone” [mesleksiz].293 However, there is no mention of 
the political concerns of the Arabists in Cemal’s telegraphs, and no reference to Arabism 
as an ideology demanding reforms in the Arab provinces.  
 Because of that conviction, Cemal thought that the Arabist movement must be 
eliminated. On the other hand, in his memoirs, he claims that, when he arrived in Syria, he 
invited the prominent members of the Arabist party to his headquarter, and agreed with 
them upon their support for the war effort. However, afterwards, he decided to punish the 
Arabists upon finding out the activities of Abdülkerim el-Halil and Rıza es-Sulh to prepare 
a revolt against the Government in Tyre [Sur] and Sidon [Saida].294 It means that a fear of 
                                                 
291 Djemal Pasha, Ibid., p. 198-199. 
292 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 482/127, Cemal to Talat, Damascus, 25 Temmuz 1331 [7 August 
1915],  
293 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 471/47, Cemal to Talat, 3 Mayıs 1331, Jerusalem, [16 May 1915] 
294 Djemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 206-207 
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revolt organized by the Arabists in Syria compelled Cemal to punish them. Quite the 
reverse of that, and apart from the pre-war considerations of the CUP leaders, both his 
contemporary telegraphs and the testimony of persons around him demonstrate the 
existence of a prior planning. In a telegram sent to Talat at the beginning of the process, 
Cemal expresses that the appropriate time came to begin the punishment of the Arabists, 
whose “treason” were well-known, notifying the mentioned activities of Abdülkerim el-
Halil and Rıza es-Sulh.295 By these remarks, Cemal demonstrates that he took advantage of 
that event to destroy the Arabist movement. He also undertook to arrest the prominent 
Arabist, who presided at the Arab congress in Paris, and senator in the Ottoman 
Parliament, Abdulhamid Zahrawi296 using this event as an opportunity. But, Cemal notes 
that, because of Talat’s opposition, he abandoned the idea of hanging him at once.297 The 
Austrian consul in Beirut, on the other hand, wrote that most of the Muslim members of 
the reformist Arabs had cut all their ties with Egypt, and therefore, they felt themselves 
relieved against any punishment of the state.298 Moreover, in the estimation of the 
celebrated orientalist Martin Hartmann, who was employed within the body of the German 
Army in WWI as an expert on the Orient, the Arabist movement was not as strong as to 
drag its members to a revolt against the Ottoman Government. The Arabs, who cooperated 
with Great Britain, were rather those, who resided in Egypt.299 
 It is worth to mention that Cemal’s activities met with little resistance at the level 
of Central Government. In the beginning, Talat was opposed to the hanging of Abdulhamid 
Zahrawi since he was afraid of a public disturbance in Syria.300 According to the memoirs 
                                                 
295 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 471/47, Cemal to Talat, 3 Mayıs 1331 [16 May 1915]. 
296 For a study on the political and religious views of Abdulhamid Zehravi, see: 
Christoph Herzog, Abd al-Hamid az-Zahrawi und das Problem des Osmanismus, 1908-
1916”, Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Albert-Ludwigs-Universitaet zu Freiburg. 
297 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 483/75, Cemal to Talat, 28 Temmuz 1331 [10 August 1915]. 
298 HHStA, PA 38/366, Nedwed to Burian, “Hochverratspozess gegen die Mitgleider 
des revolutionaeren Komités”, Beirut, 25 August 1915. 
299 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 12, Hartmann to Legationssekretaer von Wesendonk, 29 
August 1915. 
300 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 483/75, Cemal to Talat, 28 Temmuz 1331 [10 August 1915]. 
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of Muhittin Birgen, the editor of Tanin, Talat refused several times Cemal’s requests to 
deliver Zahrawi due to the reasons expressed above. But later he had to send the senator to 
Syria due to the pressure from Enver and Cemal.301 Similarly, Falih Rıfkı notes that Enver 
Pasha wanted to prevent the execution of Shafik al-Muayyad.302 The convinced Arab 
member of the CUP, Shakib Arslan claims in his memoirs that Enver and Talat, gave 
shrouded consent to Cemal’s atrocities giving him freedom of action in Syria.303 In the 
same way, Falih Rıfkı expresses that, the requests of Talat and Enver from Cemal, to 
forgive the punishment of some Arabists did not mean that they were against Cemal’s 
implementations. In essence, they agreed with Cemal that the “traitors” must be punished. 
But, due to some personal relations, they demanded an exemption for some persons.304 
Having considered the general CUP attitude against the Arabists, it is not surprising to see 
the approval of Cemal’s rule of terror by the Central Government.305 
 Looking at Cemal’s attitude toward the Arabs in general, it can be inferred from 
Cemal’s remarks quoted above that he didn’t generalize these ideas to all of the Arab 
population. Moreover, he expresses his confidence to the civil population of Syria in his 
memoirs.306 This confidence is not because of his perception of Syria as the loyal 
supporters of the Ottoman unity, but, of their apolitical situation. He mentions Anatolia as 
“the motherland” [Anavatan] both in his memoirs and his contemporary writings.307 This 
                                                 
301 Birgen, Ibid, p. 272. 
302 Atay, Ibid, p. 50. 
303 Arslan, Ibid, p. 159-160. 
304 Atay, Ibid, p. 50. 
305 In one of his telegram, Enver reported to Cemal that there was no opposition to his 
activities in Syria among the prominent CUP members: TTK Arşivi, KO Koleksiyonu 
10/5, Cemal to Enver, 4 Kanun-ı Evvel 1332 [17 December 1916]. 
306 These remarks in his memoirs show his confidence to the Arab population: “… As I 
felt perfectly sure of the civil population, I had no hesitation whatever in committing the 
safety of the country to the Arab formations and leaving the coastal districts practically 
without surveillance. I am certain that if the English had had the slightest doubt about the 
loyalty of the civil population of Syria and Palestine they would certainly have attempted a 
landing…”: Djemal Pasha, Ibid., p. 206; Cemal Paşa, Ibid., p. 178. 
307 He described the delegate of authors visited Syria towards the end of the year 1916 
as “the most distinguished faces of the motherland [Anavatan]”. For the whole of the 
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separation was presumably due to his approach to the Syrians. At that time, as will be 
analyzed in chapter six, he did not assess the Syrians as the ideal citizens of the Empire 
because of the weakness of their political consciousness in terms of the loyalty to the 
Ottomanness. As a result of these considerations, he doesn’t equate Syria in his mind with 
Anatolia as  an equal part of the Empire. A different interpretation of these words makes 
his attempts to create ideal citizens from the Syrians meaningless. 
  As for Cemal’s attitude regarding the cultural demands of the Arabs, it can be put 
forward that he was not against those ideals in principle, but he did not believe in the 
Arabists’ themselves. Most of the nationalist Arabs claim in their memoirs that Cemal 
aimed at the elimination of the Arab culture and undertook to Turkify it. He saw the 
Arabists as threats to his designs in the direction of the Turkification of Syria, and 
therefore, severely punished the members of this movement.308 However, Cemal didn’t 
make a fuss about the increase of the Arab national awareness. In a speech that he 
delivered in an event organized by the prominent Arabists, Abdulkerim el-Halil and 
Abdurrahman Shahbandar, in the beginning of January 1915,309 he openly advised the 
Arab Youth to work for the national awakening of the Arabs, following his suggestion to 
gather under the flag of the Caliph: 
“…Today I am in a position to assure you that the Turkish and Arab ideals do not 
conflict.310 They are brothers in their national strivings, and perhaps their efforts are 
complementary. The aims of the Young Turks311 are to awaken national feeling in the 
Turkish nation, train their countrymen to work, free them from the Slav yoke, give them 
health and national expansion, increase the welfare and prosperity of Turkish countries… 
                                                                                                                                                    
document, see: BOA, DH.ŞFR. 538/11, Cemal to Talat, Jerusalem,8 Teşrin-i Sani 1332 
[21 November 1916]; similarly, in his memoirs he depicts Anatolia as the motherland with 
the following remarks: “ 
308 For example, Shakib Arslan puts this claim into words while evaluating the exile of 
the prominent Arab families to Anatolia: Arslan, Ibid., p. 156. 
309 That date is determined in the memoirs of Amin Said: Said, Amin, Al-Thawrat al-
Arabiyya al-Qubra: Tarihu mufassal cami’ lilkadiyyeti’l-Arabiyye fi rub’ kurn, Vol:1, 
Maktabatu’l-Madbuli, Cairo: Undated, p. 64. 
310 The sentence is different in the Turkish version of the memoirs: Türklük Cereyanı 
Arabluk Cereyanının katiyyen düşmanı değil: Turkism is not an enemy of Arabism; Cemal 
Pasha, Ibid, p. 172. 
311 Turkish Youth [Türk Gençliği] in the original, Cemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 172. 
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The Young Turks have resolved to work tirelessly to achieve these objects. As one of 
them, I appeal to you in your own tongue that, as the representatives of Young Arabia, you, 
too, should work for the success of this cause… I turn to the youth of Turkey and Arabia 
and say these two nations will be doomed to destruction the moment they separate. Discord 
between these two great pillars of the Islam religion will bring it the downfall of the 
Mussulman pover, and ultimately it will be impossible to avert slavery under the 
Slavs…”312 
As is understandable from the text, for Cemal a national awareness was not dangerous as 
long as it was not influenced by the foreign powers, which undermines the loyalty to the 
Ottoman Empire, and as long as it doesn’t prevent the integration of the Syrian lands to the 
Imperial body, offering an alternative political system. His focus was rather on the increase 
of the loyalties of the Syrians towards the Ottoman Empire. The Arabists were hanged by 
Cemal Pasha not because they championed the Arab awakening, but they upheld the 
decentralization of the Empire and they had connections with the great powers. If he had 
been aware that the Arabists were pro-Ottoman in essence, in all likelihood, he wouldn’t 
punish them by applying such severe methods. As a matter of fact, there is no reference to 
the demands of the Arabists in the documents penned by Cemal. The “separatist” 
perception in Cemal’s mind, prevented him from comprehending the true nature of the 
Arab movement. 
The Pasha didn’t touch those Arabists, who didn’t have a relation with the foreign 
powers and who undertook to revive the cultural nationalism among the Arabists. The 
most conspicuous example of that is his treatment of journalist Muhammad Kurd Ali. In 
the preceding years of the war, the former wrote provocative articles in his newspaper 
Muqtabas, on the impact of the Ottoman period in Syria and accused the Turks for the 
sluggishness of the Arabs. He required the national awakening of the Arabs to throw off 
this idleness. In addition, he promoted academic studies to increase the cultural awareness 
of the Arabs.313 However, the documents seized from the French consulates manifested 
                                                 
312 Djemal Pasha, Ibid., p. 200-201; Cemal Pasha, Ibid., p. 172; the same speech is 
mentioned in the memoirs of Amin Said, Izzet Darwaza and Ahmad Kadri: for details, see: 
Said, Ibid., p. 64-65; Kadri, Ahmad, Mudhakkirati an al-Thawrat al-Arabiyya al-Qubra, 
Manshurat al-Wizarat al-Thakafa, Damascus: 1993, p. 39; Darwaza, Ibid., p. 223. 
313 Hermann, Rainer, Kulturkrise und konservative Erneuerung: Muhammad Kurd Ali 
(1876-1953) und das geistige Leben in Damaskus zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts”, Peter 
Lang, Frankfurt am Main: 1989, pp. 113-124. 
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that Kurd Ali had a sincere allegiance towards the Ottoman Empire.314 Furthermore, Kurd 
Ali’s mistrust to the Great Powers and his repeated refusal of the cooperation offers of the 
foreign consuls315 and German diplomats316 provided him of being in the most immediate 
circle of Cemal Pasha, even if he was among the founders of the LCP in Syria.317 A similar 
situation came into the question for Salim Ali Salaam; he was apprehended and tried in the 
Court Martial at Aliye, but neither was hanged nor exiled as a result of that Cemal were 
informed about his negative attitude towards the intervention of the Great Powers.318 In 
such a way that, in his memoirs Cemal explains that: 
“A Mohammedan of Beirut, member of the Arab Congress which met in Paris at the 
beginning of 1913, said to Monsieur Pichon, the French Foreign Minister: Although we 
have called our congress in Paris, our only object is to obtain reforms for the Arab 
provinces from the Ottoman Government. We want neither a French occupation of Syria 
nor a French protectorate”.319 
The person mentioned in the quotation was most probably Salim Ali Salaam himself. 
Possibly, Cemal learned this by the documents seized from the French consulate and did 
not punish Salaam like the other members of Arabism. 
As a result, following the first expedition against Egypt, as expressed in the 
previous chapter, it became apparent that carrying out of the second expedition would take 
time. Taking this as an occasion, Cemal embarked upon his second task: in his words in his 
memoirs, “to maintain peace and internal order in Syria” interrupted by “great activity on 
the part of the revolutionary Arabs”. As a result, he commenced a process aiming at the 
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elimination of the Arabist movement for the sake of preventing “general disturbance in the 
country”.320 When these remarks were combined with the Unionist intentions and 
perceptions regarding the Arabs, it will be apparent that the punishment of the Arabist was 
intended by Cemal, while he took the road for Syria.  
 
 
 
2.3. The Process of Punishment: Executions and Exiles 
 
 
As explained in the previous section, when Cemal first arrived in Syria, he formed 
good relations with the prominent Arabists. He sought the friendship of the Arab notables, 
and showed hospitality to them.321 He appointed the prominent Arabist Abdurrahman 
Shahbandar as his physician.322 However, during the battles at Dardanelles, the members 
of the Arabist parties thought that, at the end of that war, the Ottoman Empire would 
collapse and Syria would be occupied by the foreign powers. Therefore, the Arabists 
planned to become organized in order to be effective in the fate of Syria and to negotiate 
with Great Britain on a plan.323 Rıza al-Sulh and Abdulkerim el-Halil held a meeting in 
Tyre and Sidon and decided to rebel against the Ottoman Empire in the case of an Ottoman 
defeat.324 It was a dangerous movement militarily for Cemal Pasha, since those places were 
far from the control of the Ottoman Government, and close to the coast. By that reason, 
they could receive assistance from the Entente Navy in case of a rebellion.325 But, after a 
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short while, their intentions were denounced to Cemal. According to Kurd Ali, even their 
meetings and the themes of those meetings were reported to Cemal by the spies.326  
According to the documents in the Ottoman Archives, Cemal began to think in the 
beginning of May 1915, to launch a process of punishment of the Arabists. In a telegram to 
Talat he explained that a movement of elimination against the Arabists was necessary to 
keep Syria undisturbed.327 As a result of this thought and his general bias towards 
Arabism, in July 1915, he started to arrest the prominent members of the Arabist parties. 
His telegram about the reasons of the apprehensions demonstrates that Cemal was reported 
all the details of the Arabist plans: 
“Accusations about those [Arabists] are very simple. Although we gratify them in many 
ways, they incorporated the Arab Caliphate into their official programs to separate 
Arabness from Turkishness. They dealt with these issues following the general amnesty. 
After we proclaimed the mobilization, they resorted to the necessary tools and warned their 
branches that the time has arrived to realize that [aim]. Finally, during the Entente’s 
campaign in Gallipoli, they assumed that the collapse of [the Ottoman] Government was 
nearing and they started to propagate in the vicinity of Sur [Tyre], Sayda [Sidon] and 
Merc-i Uyun. Then, I put my hands on their shoulders [işte o zaman onların omuzlarına 
ellerimi yapıştırdım]. I am about to complete my investigation. Their numbers are little and 
I arrested almost all of them…”328 
It is worth to mention, however, that there is no reference in the memoirs of the Arabists to 
the plans of the Arabists regarding the creation of an Arab Caliphate. Possibly, Cemal 
referred the programs of the Arabists in Egypt by this.  
At the end of the investigations, the Court Martial decided to hang 11 of the 
arrested persons. These decisions were implemented on 21st August in Beirut.329 The 
hanged persons were the prominent notables in Syria. The most outstanding person among 
them was the president of the Arabist society Munteda al-Adabi [the Literary Club]330, 
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Abdulkerim al-Halil331, who had a Shi’ite origin from Jabal ‘Amil in Lebanon.332 Upon the 
opposition of Talat, Cemal delayed “the conviction” of Abdulhamid Zahrawi.333 According 
to the report of the Austrian Consul the majority of the hanged persons were state officials 
like mayors, tax collectors etc. as well as journalists.334 The consul states in another report 
that the aim of the committee was to create an Arab caliphate.335 According to the Consul, 
Emir Abdullah, who was arrested in August 1915, from the celebrated Jazairi family of 
Damascus, had established a society called Cemiyet-i Muhammedi aiming at the transfer of 
the Caliphate from the Turks to the Arabs in the previous years of the war.336 After 
executing the death penalties, Cemal sent a delegation to Istanbul under the presidency of 
the Mufti of the Army Esad al-Shukayr, consisted of the scholars [ulema] and journalists 
from Syria, to explain the loyalty of Syrian to the Caliph and to expound that everything 
was fine in Syria.337 There were 33 people in the delegation from the various cities of 
Syria, such as Hama, Jerusalem, Damascus, Kerak and Hauran. Only two of them were 
journalists; the others were scholars.338 
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 Following those executions, Cemal extended the scale of investigations 
transforming it into a process to eliminate the Arabist movement in Syria. That time, the 
prosecutions had considerably expanded. Besides the members and sympathizers of the 
Arabist parties, their relatives and some non-Arabist notables had also been arrested 
regardless of their affiliation with the Arabist movement. There were ex-mayors, muftis, 
deputies etc. among the arrested people.339 Some of them, like Abdulghani al-Uraisi, 
Taufik al-Bisat, Arif Shahab, could escape to the desert. However, they were caught by the 
Bedouins and delivered to the authorities.340 According to the memoirs of Kurd Ali, when 
Abdulwahab al-Inglizi was about to be arrested, he was outside Syria and Talat Pasha 
suggested his escape abroad. However, being sure of him, al-Inglizi preferred to go to 
Syria.341 
 This time, the accusations were more ambiguous. In the light of the documents 
seized from the French consulate, all the members of the Arab opposition parties were 
interrogated, regardless of the degree of their active operation to provoke people against 
the Government after the proclamation of the war. They were accused to separate the Arab 
lands from the Ottoman Government, and by this way, to cooperate with the greatest 
enemies of Islam.342 At the end of the trial process, 21 leading figures of the Arabist party 
were sentenced to death on 6th May 1916. 14 of them were hanged in Beirut and the others 
were put to the gallows in Damascus.343  Besides the hangings, Cemal sent plenty of the 
members of the notable families into exile. Most of the exiles were the relatives of the 
hanged notables.344 It is worth to mention that the decree of the Ottoman Sultan, approving 
the executions of those Arabists, bears the date 14th June 1916. It means that Cemal 
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implemented those decisions before the approval of the Sultan.345 There was a special law 
that was brought into effect in the beginning of the War, enabling the Army commanders 
to approve and implement the decisions of the court martials before the confirmation of the 
Sultan. The Sultan had to approve it following its implementation.346 
 The Damascus Consul of Germany interpreted the death sentences and the aim of 
Cemal’s existence in Syria as the reconquest of Syria. After his failure to cross the Suez 
Canal, Cemal changed his decision and set that reconquest as a task for himself. In 
accordance with this aim, he established his headquarter in Damascus, the political center 
of Syria, instead of Birüssebi, the military center for the second expedition to the Canal.347 
The Consul continues that the trial of the Arabs was used as an occasion to destroy all the 
political opposition whether it had a “treasonous” aim or not.348 Cemal had not 
distinguished the Arabists as the “separatists” and the “reformists” and made all of them 
subject to the same treatment.349 It was very much appropriate to Cemal’s approach 
towards the Arabists explained in the previous section. 
 Some details given by Ali Fuad Bey, the Chief of Staff of the 4th Army, make this 
argument stronger. Before the commencement of the trial process, some members of the 
court martial were changed; when the new members of the court arrived in Damascus, they 
asked directives about their new tasks. In spite of this allegiance, at the end of the 
judgment process, they had only decided to put 3 or 4 people to death sentence. Other 
prisoners had been convicted to be interned and punished with hard labour. However, 
Cemal changed this judgment and decided to put to death all the accused persons without 
bothering the warnings of the president of the court martial, Şükrü Bey, that Cemal would 
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be responsible before history. Cemal’s answer to these warnings was meaningful: “may 
history rip up on your head” [tarih kafanda paralansın].350 It means that, even the 
president of the court martial, who decided to put the Arabists into death penalty, saw 
Cemal’s decisions as unjust.  
 When the documents confiscated from the consulates are analyzed, there was in 
fact very little thing to be considered as “treason” in the circumstances of the Ottoman 
politics of that time. First of all, before the war, the Ottoman state didn’t have full authority 
on its realm. As a result of the Capitulations, the Great Powers obtained considerable 
privileges within the Ottoman lands and they could interfere in the course of the events in 
the Ottoman domestic politics even within the boundaries of the Ottoman law. In the same 
way, they could enforce the state to make reforms in some regions of the Empire, as in the 
cases of Macedonia and Armenia. Taking the support of a Great Power was one of the 
most effective ways in the Ottoman Empire to enforce the government to make reforms. In 
this regard, in 1903, while the Young Turk movement was in opposition, Cemal himself 
had applied to a British diplomat with a Young Turk delegate to support the reforms in the 
Ottoman Empire.351 In the Unionist era, Cemal was the head of the pro-French faction in 
the CUP, and he established a Turco-French Friendship society to improve the relations 
between France and the Ottoman Empire.352 Most of the negotiations between the Arabists 
and the French consuls should be evaluated in this context. As the most influential power 
in Syria, the attitude and projects of France was crucial for the Arabists, who aimed at the 
prevention of any foreign intervention in Syria. As a matter of fact, most of the documents 
were about the Arabist interrogation about the future planning of France regarding Syria. 
The Muslim reformists of Syria, who constituted almost all of the persecuted Arabists, 
principally demanded French protection to prevent any intervention of the Ottoman central 
government in the reform process in Syria. Besides France, the reformists had also 
established relations with the British consuls. However, the British consulates had 
destroyed their documents as a measure, when they left Syria in the beginning of the 
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war.353 Moreover, the members of the reformist societies, who applied to this was limited 
to a few persons; Damascus Consul of Germany states that there was the accusation of 
only four persons “in these interesting documents”.354 Many of the death penalties were 
therefore implemented without at least such evidence.355 
 The trial was also problematical in terms of the existing Ottoman law at that time. 
In such a way that the documents referred in the decisions of the court martial in Aliye was 
belonged to the preceding years of a general amnesty, i.e. after those negotiations, in 1913, 
the Ottoman Government had proclaimed a general amnesty forgiving all the guilts to that 
date. However, the Arabist reform parties maintained their activities in Egypt in a more 
radical way against the Ottoman Empire. According to Ali Fuad Bey and the Austrian 
Consul in Beirut, the Arabists had stated that they cut their relations with Egypt after the 
general Amnesty, and therefore they thought to be left well alone.356 But, the court martial 
neither accepted this statement nor could prove that they maintain their ties with Egypt. In 
other words, Cemal punished the Arabists in Syria for the activities of the Arabists in 
Egypt.357 
 Besides the death penalties, Cemal decided to send into exile a great number of 
notable families from many Syrian provinces into Anatolian cities, which were populated 
mainly by Turks. They would be distributed in those towns for permanent settlement and 
their properties and lands would be compensated with equivalents in the towns of their 
resettlement. Cemal established a commission to determine the value of the properties that 
belonged to the exiles.  Those families would be comfortably transported to their 
permanent settlement places in a way that was worthy of the honor of the Government 
                                                 
353 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 13, Müller to Wesendonk, 29 May 1915. 
354 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 13, Loytved to Bethmann Hollweg, Damascus, 8 May 
1916. 
355 For the origins of the documents, see: Journal de Beyrouth, 6 May 1916; for the 
Turkish translation, see: Aliye Divan-ı Harb-ı Örfisinde Tetkik Olunan Mesele-i Siyasiye 
Hakkında İzahat, Tanin Matbaası, Dersaadet: 1332 [1916]. 
356 HHStA, PA 38/366, Nedwed to Burian, “Hochverratspozess gegen die Mitgleider 
des revolutionaeren Komites”, Beirut, 25 August 1915: Erden, Ibid, p. 276. 
357 Erden, Ibid., p. 276. 
101 
 
[hükümetin şanına yakışır bir şekilde]. They would never be permitted to live in misery 
and the officials, who would act against those orders, would be delivered to the court 
martial.358 
 The families that were decided to be deported from Syria were as follows: from 
Damascus: all the members of the celebrated Izzet Pasha el-Abid’s family, the family of 
Sham’i Pasha [Sham’izades], which had a great influence in Damascus in Cemal’s 
viewpoint, the family of Shukri el-Asely and Shafik el-Mueyyed; from Homs, the family 
of Izzet el-Cundi, the most “harmful” branch of the Atasi family according to Cemal, some 
other families in Homs; in Baalbek, the celebrated Mutran family and the whole of Said 
Suleiman Pasha’s family, and the whole of Haidar family, the whole of some Christian 
families. In total, the number of the households to be deported consisted of 154 
households. Cemal added that the number of the families could change in future. 359 
According to a contemporary American report, the number of the deportees was 5.000.360 
Meanwhile, in the first trial in 1915, the vast majority of the Arabists condemned in Aliye 
had migrated to Egypt during and before the war. The court martial invited them to Syria 
for trial. If they didn’t come, their assets would be confiscated.361 On the other hand, 
according to the remarks of the Austrian consul in Damascus, the exile of some Christian 
families was not due to the political considerations. Their guilt was to violate the military 
regulations such as selling alcohol to the officers. They, too, were exiled with all their 
families.362 
 The process of the deportation took place more or less in the direction of the orders 
of Cemal Pasha and many Arab families were transported to the various towns of Anatolia 
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in prosperity considering the war conditions. Cemal strictly followed whether his orders 
were properly implemented in Anatolia.363 Any request to change his decisions was 
harshly opposed by Cemal Pasha. On all occasions, he reminded to the Central 
Government that the exile of the Syrians to Anatolia were not temporary.364 They were 
dispatched there to be permanent residents. When Cemal was informed that the exiles 
changed their locations, he warned the Central Government with heavy remarks.365 Apart 
from that, they lived in good conditions in their temporary settlement places. In so much as 
that, when the Government decided to forgive their punishments and to resend them to 
Syria, some of them applied to Shakib Arslan for retention.366 All these executions and 
exiles caused considerable impact in Syrian society and significant changes in the attitude 
of the Syrians towards the Ottoman Government: 
 
 
 
2.4. Aims and Impact of the Executions and Exiles 
 
 
As is set out to demonstrate throughout this study, one part of Cemal’s aim of being 
present in Syria was to create an order there and make the Syrians ideal and loyal citizens 
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to the Empire. The most important component of this goal was his policy implemented 
towards the “adversary” components of the Muslim population of Syria, i.e. the Arabists, 
who were believed by Cemal to possess the potential to influence the Muslim population, 
which constituted the great majority of the Syrian society. Therefore, an analysis of social 
and political reflections of Cemal’s policies of terror towards those Muslim individuals of 
Syria, who were suspected of being an Arabist, will contribute to understand the reasons 
that were brought him to Syria.367 
 In the existing literature, there are two approaches regarding the aims of Cemal’s 
policy towards the Arabist movement. The first claims that Cemal aimed to Turkify Syria 
by executing and exiling the prominent Arabists.368 On the other hand, Hasan Kayalı 
highlights the possible military dangers of the Arabists with the following remarks: 
“Cemal’s actions in Syria were comparable in nature, if not in extent, to those policies 
pursued with respect to the Armenians in Eastern Anatolia. Both emanated from a fear that 
a nationalist uprising would come into being with encouragement from enemy powers. The 
threat was more perceived than real.”369 
The first argument seems only partially to be true. There is no doubt that Cemal took a 
pride in his Turkishness following his Ottomanness. As he express in his memoirs: 
“I am primarily an Ottoman, but I do not forget that I am a Turk, and nothing can shake my 
belief that the Turkish race is the foundation-stone of the Ottoman Empire. The 
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Educational and civilizing influence of the Turks cements Ottoman unity and strengthens 
the Empire, for in its origins the Ottoman Empire is a Turkish creation.”370 
However, when his policies in Syria are examined, it will be apparent that he restricted the 
turcification with the public sphere that could be evaluated as an attempt to increase of the 
Ottoman visibility in Syria. As examples in this sense, Cemal forbade the usage of Arabic 
in the government offices;371 and changed the language of instruction to Turkish in the 
Sultani school of Damascus while the teaching of Arabic continued, while there is no 
evidence that he changed the language of intstruction at the other state schools.372 It was 
made compulsory to use Turkish in the shop signboards and the other notice boards.373 All 
these actions were implemented in regard to all the languages except Turkish, for the sake 
of the fraternity of the Ottomans.374 In the same vein, some consuls were ordered to write 
their correspondence only in Turksh. The Spanish consul in Jerusalem interpreted this 
action with these remarks: “The Turkish government continues with its policy of 
humiliating us all, it has been ordered that from now on correspondence cannot be written 
in Spanish”.375 Possibly, many of these activities were applied to demonstrate the people 
that the Great Powers were no longer influential in Syria and to prove that the Ottoman 
Government was the only sovereign in Syria. In the same vein, he probably aimed a direct 
communication of the Ottoman state with its citizens in Syria via the Turkish language. 
The imposition of Turkish upon the Syrians was a part of the destruction of interlaying 
elements, like notables, between state and the Syrians. By this way, the state wouldn’t need 
any mediator to express itself to its Arab citizens. Otherwise, Cemal didn’t aim a total 
exchange of all the components of the Arab culture in Syria with that of Turkish. As will 
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be detailed in Chapter 6 Cemal undertook, to a degree, to protect the Arabic heritage of 
Syria with his restoration of the historical monuments built in the Arabic styles, and also 
opened schools instructing in Arabic, as in the case of the Salahiyya School. 
As for the military threat, as detailed in the section regarding the conscription of the 
Syrians, before the execution of the death penalties, a group of suspected Arab officers in 
the Army had been sent to other fronts. Furthermore, instead of executions, as in the case 
of the Armenians, exile could be preferred as a measure, or hanging of three or four 
persons would be enough to forestall a military danger. Meaning of the arrest of an Arabist 
senator in Istanbul and bringing him to Syria for the execution has a deeper meaning than 
the military danger. The aims of these actions can be better understood with the analysis of 
its impact. 
 From the time of Mahmut II, local notables used to be seen by the Ottoman central 
government as the obstacles of the centralization. This became even more true during the 
age of reforms and Tanzimat period. The CUP resumed the policy of centralization after 
the Young Turk revolution. In the case of Syria, many of the local notables were 
intellectual leaders of society and were struggling actively with the cultural concerns 
against the Ottomanist policies of the central government on the grounds that the 
Ottomanization process was destroying the Arab spirit of Syria. On the other hand, they 
proposed an administratively decentralized and culturally Arab Syria, as an alternative to 
the policies of the CUP and the projects of Cemal Pasha.  As explained above, they didn’t 
avoid contacting the Great Powers when necessary. In contrast, in the projected Syria of 
Cemal Pasha, the Government ought to have full independence in its internal affairs and 
the components that would cause the foreign intervention must, at least, be checked. 
Therefore, his policy towards Arabism should be evaluated as part of a whole together with 
his policies of Zionism, Christians and Lebanon.  
 On the other hand, it is apparent in the correspondence between the CUP and Sharif 
Faysal, which had begun at the end of the year 1917 about signıng a peace treaty whıch 
was expected to put an end to Sharif Hussein’s revolt. The Unionist leaders felt anxious 
during the war period that the Arabs would bring into question some demands regarding 
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the situation of Syria in the Ottoman Empire in the peace negotiations.376 Presumably, a 
demand for the autonomy of Syria, which would be demanded by the Arabist opposition, 
would pave the way for the later independence of Syria. The Ottoman experience of 
nationalism made them thought in this way. Because, all the nationalist movements had 
been resulted with the independence of their nations from the Ottoman Empire, Cemal 
thought to eradicate the Arabist movement as much as possible taking the war conditions 
as an occasion. 
 Cemal applied execution and exile as methods of solution for the Arab question. In 
his mind, the destruction of the Arabists meant the solution of the question. In a 
telegram, he revealed this idea. Upon the increase of the desertions among the Arab exiles 
in Anatolia to join Sharif Hussein, he proposed to deliver all the political exiles in Anatolia 
to the court martial and by this way to be saved from that question.377 A German report 
also states that Cemal saw the despotic measures as a method to solve the Arab 
Question.378 
As for the social impact of his draconian rule, while trying to turn the Syrians into 
good citizens for the Empire, Cemal damaged considerably the image of the Ottoman 
Government in the eyes of the common people. His justification for the punishment of the 
Arabists was to destroy the endeavors of those parties “to separate Arabness from 
Turkishness”.379 However, as inferred from the consular reports describing the reaction of 
the common people to Cemal’s actions, the biggest contribution to plant seeds of hate 
between Arabs and Turks was made by Cemal himself.  The reports in the beginning of the 
war demonstrate that the support of Syrian society for the activities of the Arabist parties 
were rather small. For example, according to the report of the Austrian Consul of 
                                                 
376 By that reason, they avoided to give Sharif written assurances about the demands put 
into word by the latter. For some examples, see: TTK Arşivi, KO Koleksiyonu 1/70, Talat 
to Tahsin, 1 Şubat 1334 [1 February 1918]; TTK Arşivi, KO Koleksiyonu 11/66, Enver to 
Cemal [Mersinli], 21 Ağustos 1334 [21 August 1918] 
377 In the same telegram, he says that he spared their lives as a beneficence [lütuf] to 
them: BOA, DH.ŞFR. 559/31, Cemal to Talat, Aleyh, 11 Temmuz 1333 [11 July 1917] 
378 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 17, Weber to Hertling, Constantinople, 26 June 1918. 
379 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 483/75, Cemal to Talat, Damascus 28 Temmuz 1331 [10 August 
1915]. 
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Damascus in the beginning of October 1914, with the outburst of the European war, the 
popularity of the Arabist movement in Damascus was considerably reduced. The great 
majority of the people began to believe that the Turkish administration would defend them 
against the foreign enemies.380 According to the report of the German journal Der Nahe 
Orient, “the worst agitators of the past” had become “ultra-patriots” after the proclamation 
of the War.381 In the same way, as described in the section on the conscription, in the 
beginning of the war, there was an overwhelming pro-Ottoman atmosphere among the 
Muslims of Syria to be nourished by the anti-imperialist propaganda. When the first 
decisions of the executions were put into action, the German Consul in Beirut expressed 
his embarrassment about the punishment of such a movement, that still didn’t have a 
massive support among the Syrians.382 
However, the implementation of the death penalties and the exiles changed this 
weather for the reverse considerably. The Beirut Consul of Austria states, even the most 
pro-Ottoman members of Syrian society thundered out, that the execution of those Arab 
notables spoiled the approach began with the war between Arabs and Turks.383 That was, 
to a large extent, due to the atmosphere of terror created by the executions and exiles over 
society.384 The common people saw the punishments as unjust, arbitrary, and therefore 
they were afraid of being captured and punished by the same methods.385 According to the 
remarks of the Austrian consul in Beirut, Cemal’s persecutions caused to form an idea 
among the Syrians that he didn’t only try to defeat the Entente powers, but also worked for 
                                                 
380 HHStA, PA 38/363, Ranzi to Berchtold, “Agitation gegen England”, Damascus, 9 
October 1914. 
381 PA-AA, Türkei 165, Bd. 41, “Die Arabische Frage”, Der Nahe Orient II, 17 January 
1917.  
382 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 12, Mutius to Bethmann Hollweg, Beirut, 25 August 1915. 
383 HHStA, PA 38/366, Nedwed to Burian, “Hochverratspozess gegen die Mitgleider 
des revolutionaeren Komités”, Beirut, 25 August 1915. 
384 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 12, Loytved to Bethmann Hollweg, Damascus 10 
December 1915. 
385 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 13, Loytved to Bethmann Hollweg, Damascus 18 April 
1916. 
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weakening and elimination of the Arab element in Syria.386  Complaining about Cemal’s 
implementations in Syria, an Austrian representative in Constantinople states that Cemal 
could have solved the Arab Question with more moderate means, and by this way the 
loyalty of the Arabs to the Ottoman Government could be increased. Acting quite 
thoughtlessly in this issue, Cemal shifted all the sympathies of the Arabs to the British and 
French rules.387  If the British forces were to achieve to invade the south of Syria, it would 
be a weak possibility to find the Ottoman Government a support among the Syrians.388 
According to an Austrian official in İstanbul, by April 1917, all the Arabs without 
exception were waiting to welcome the British troops with open arms.389 According to an 
interview held by a German official with some Arabs, with his draconian activities, Cemal 
made some groups that never acted against the State an enemy of state and alienated them 
to the Government.390  
Cemal’s despotic rule in Syria also contributed to a rapprochement between 
Muslims and Christians in Syria. According to a British intelligence report, their relations 
were excellent since both were “sick of the war and of the exaction of the Government”.391 
In a similar way, it is stated in a German report that a concord emerged between Christians 
and Muslims “never seen before”. “The hate felt against the Turkish oppressor made a 
unifying effect and the profound and numerous contrasts between the Arabs have been 
temporarily bypassed”. The consul continues that “it was a result of Djemal’s dictatorship 
and vexatious behavior” towards the Arabs.392 
                                                 
386 HHStA, PA 38/370, Kwatkowski to Czernin, “Überblick über die heutige Lage 
Syriens und Palaestinas”, Beirut, 16 March 1917. 
387 HHStA, PA 12/211, Trauttmansdorff to Czernin, “Das Regime Djemal Pashas in 
Syrien und Palaestina”, Constantinople, 14 April 1917. 
388 HHStA, PA 38/370, Kwatkowski to Czernin, “Überblick über die heutige Lage 
Syriens und Palaestinas”, Beirut, 16 March 1917. 
389 HHStA, PA 12/211, Trauttmansdorff to Czernin, “Das Regime Djemal Pashas in 
Syrien und Palaestina”, Constantinople, 14 April 1917. 
390 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 17, Weber to Hertling, Constantinople, 26 June 1918. 
391 PRO, FO 371/2777, McMahon to FO (transmitting an intelligent returned from 
Syria), Cairo, 20 May 1916. 
392 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd 17, Weber to Hertling, Constantinople, 26 June 1918. 
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His existence in Syria was so disturbing for the people that, when Cemal visited 
Istanbul at the end of the year 1916, the notables of Syria sent telegrams to the 
Governmental authorities requesting them to prevent him from returning to Syria.393 As a 
result of all these pressures, according to the report of a German official, the upper classes 
of society were, to a large extent, alienated and turned against the Ottoman Rule.394  It is 
worth to mention as a final remark that all these actions also damaged the German image 
in the eyes of the Syrians. Arabs, both Christians and Muslims, hated the Germans because 
they saw them as the supporter of the “brutal Turkish rule”.395 
 In spite of its instigating consequences of antagonism between Arabs and Turks, 
the impact of his policies demonstrate that Cemal managed, to a large extent, his objectives 
in Syria. By way of the executions and exiles, he destroyed the resistance of the Syrian 
notables against the increasing control of the state. On the other hand, he had eliminated 
any probability for the demands of autonomy or independence in future by those Arabist 
groups if the Ottoman rule over Syria would still be continuing at the end of the war. 
According to the remarks of the German physician Mühlens, who worked for a while with 
Cemal Pasha as the health superwiser of the 4th Army, there could scarcely be found a 
notable family in Syria that some of its members were not hanged or exiled by Cemal 
Pasha.396 At the end of his rule, the aims of these actions were summarized by Cemal’s 
remarks as follows:  
“The people, who were not directly affiliated to the El-Lamerkeziyye, but in close contact 
with the executive members; and those who were suspected by the administrative 
authorities to be working against the political domination of the government; and those 
who made prevalence [tagallub] and fractiousness [serkeşlik] attempting to libel the honor 
of the government in the eyes of the people [hükümet üzerinde ahalinin mevki-i 
haysiyyetini ihlal edecek derecede] were dislocated from Syria to Anatolia.  
                                                 
393 HHStA, PA 12/210, Pallavicini to Czernin, “Djemal Pasha”, Constantinople, 30 
December 1916. 
394 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 14, Mühlens to Bethmann Hollweg, Constantinople, 24 
February 1917. 
395 BA-MA, RM 5/2323, Grafen to Chef of the Admiralty of Marine, “Militaerische und 
Militaerpolitische Lage in Syrien, Palaestina, Arabien und Mezopotemien”, 
Constantinople, 26 Febrary 1918. 
396 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 14, Mühlens to Bethmann Hollweg, Constantinople, 24 
February 1917. 
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The formation of a certain organization composed of notables aiming at challenging the 
domination of the government by setting up of an equal or even by a more powerful 
structure was thus eliminated…”397 
In summary, as he aimed at, Cemal managed to destroy an interlayer between the Ottoman 
state and the Syrian society. The abolition policies of the notables, which had begun with 
Mahmud II in the Imperial realm, were completed in Syria by the draconian rule of Cemal 
Pasha.398 It is certain that Cemal estimated about the reaction of the Syrian society against 
his implementations and he was quite aware that the Syrians would take a dislike to the 
Ottoman rule as the consequence of his punishments. However, Cemal did not calculate 
that the Ottoman rule would come to an end following the WWI, and presumably 
considered that, although the Syrians were disturbed with his policies at that time, in long 
term, as a result of his measures a change in the sentiments of the Syrians towards the State 
would be managed.  
 
 
 
2.5. The Ottoman Caliphate and the Arabist Movement 
 
 
Besides the executions and exiles, Cemal used Pan-Islamist policies as means of 
struggle against Arabism. This is not only because a public justification of his actions, but 
he became concerned about the Arabists of Syria that they could support an Arab Caliph in 
future. Although they focused on the issue of reform in the Syrian provinces, and although 
they were principally against the foreign interventions, in his telegrams, Cemal assessed 
them as the collaborators of the Entente and accused them of trying to establish an Arab 
                                                 
397 Cemal to Enver, 29 Eylül 1333 [27 September 1917], in Arşiv Belgeleriyle Ermeni 
Faaliyetleri, p. 697: English translations of the text in the same book were, to a certain 
extent, benefitted: Ibid., p. 328. 
398 For an analysis of the centralizations policies, which began with Mahmud II, see: 
Hourani, Ibid. 
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Caliphate.399 By this way, they could combine with the British policy of the Caliphate. In 
such a way that, in the preceding years of the War, the Caliphate was assessed by Great 
Britain as a potential danger to its imperial rule, because of its spiritual and political claims 
addressing to all Muslims including the ones in its colonies.400 As a result of that concern, 
taking back the Caliphate to the Arabs and thus, to divide the Muslims in theory had 
become the most important aim of the British policy regarding the Ottoman Caliphate.401 
On the other hand, beginning with Abdulhamid II, the Ottoman Sultans used their title of 
Caliph as a political weapon against all the imperial powers.402 Especially in WWI, the 
Pan-Islamist propaganda created the most important tools of the Central Powers applied 
against the Entente, which had a considerable Muslim population in their colonies.403 The 
                                                 
399 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 483/75, Cemal to Talat, Damascus, 28 Temmuz 1331[11 August 
1915]. 
400 For an analysis of the British approach to the Ottoman Caliphate, see: Tufan 
Buzpınar, “The Question of Caliphate under the Ottoman Sultans”, in Ottoman Reform and 
Muslim Regeneration, Itzchak Weismann and Fruma Zachs (eds.), London: I.B. Tauris, 
2005, pp. 17-36. 
401 However, the British side didn’t want to be seen as the protector of the Arab Caliph, 
and sought to solve this question with the agreement of the Muslims. “any proposal as 
regards an Arab Khalifa should come from the Arabs themselves”: PRO, FO 371/2480, 
Clayton to Grey, “Military Operations against Turkey”, Cairo, 3 January 1915; for the 
discussions of the British officials regarding the issue of the Arab Caliphate, see: PRO, FO 
371/2482, Grey to McMahon, “Moslems and the Caliphate”, London, 14 April 1915; 
PRO, FO 371/2480, Holderness to FO, “Possible Measures for Influencing Moslem 
Opinion”, London, 15 January 1915: The French side expressed an opinion that, the new 
caliph shouldn’t have paved the way for the passion to a strong Caliph among the Muslims 
and shouldn’t have provoke the sentiment of unity among them: MAEE, Guerre 1914-
1918, 868/Turquie, Syrie et Palestine, Defrance to MAE, Cairo, 15 March 1915; for a 
study on the negotiations between Sharif Hussein and the Kemalist leaders regarding 
transfer of the Caliphate to the Arabs, see: Teitelbaum, Joshua, “‘Taking Back’ the 
Caliphate: Sharif Husayn Ibn Ali, Mustafa Kemal and the Ottoman Caliphate”, Die Welt 
des Islams, New Series, Vol: 40, Issue 3, (November 2000), pp. 412-424. 
402 For a study on the Ottoman policy of Panislamism towards the Indian Muslims 
beginning with Abdulhamid II, see: Azmi Özcan, Panislamism: the Ottomans and Britain 
(1877-1924), Leiden: Brill, 1997. 
403 Max Roloff stated in his book that the aim of the Turks in the World War I was to 
found a Caliphate state. For that aim, they excited the national sentiments of the Muslim 
peoples against the common enemy: Max Roloff, Arabien und Seine Bedeutung für die 
Erstarkung des Osmanenreiches, Veit, Leipzig: 1915, p. 6; for a study on the German and 
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Arabists had an alleged relation with Egypt and disseminated Arabist feelings among the 
Syrians, which, in Cemal’s viewpoint, could separate Arabs from Turks. Similarly, an 
uprising in Syria could terminate the Pan-Islamist propaganda of the Ottoman Caliphate. 
All these concerns were used as an argument, both to justify his actions and to prevent any 
Arab inclination towards the British propaganda of Arab Caliphate.404 Thus, Cemal would 
benefit from the anti-imperialist sentiments of the Syrians to make counter-propaganda 
against the Arab “separatists”.  
 For those reasons, the main object of Ottoman Pan-Islamist propaganda was rather 
Great Britain. With this propaganda, it is implied that, if the Muslims didn’t create a unity 
under the rule of the Ottoman Caliph, then the British occupation would be unavoidable for 
all the Muslim nations. In this regard, with the outburst of the war, the local politicians 
delivered orations harshly criticizing the British actions in Egypt. Similarly, The local 
"Club des Emigrés Africains", which had been established to awaken an anti-imperialist 
consciousness among the Algerians in Syria, propagated to create such a feeling among the 
Algerian immigrants.405 In addition, pamphlets were distributed in the cities demonstrating 
the British “atrocities” against the Muslims under their rule. For example, in a pamphlet 
prepared by Shakib Arslan distributed in Damascus with the newspaper of the vilayet, it is 
described in detail how the British Government invaded Egypt and Yemen using the 
method of playing off the Muslims against each others.406 With such pamphlets, an open 
                                                                                                                                                    
Ottoman Panislamist propaganda in the WWI, see: Lüdke Tilman, Jihad made in 
Germany, Münster: LIT Verlag, 2005. 
404 A movement in Syria against the Ottoman Caliph would terminate the policy of Pan-
Islamism. A French report proposed to provoke a revolt in Syria to remove the Pan-
Islamist danger: MAEE, Guerre 1914-1918, 867/Tuquie, Syrie et Palestine, Reffye to 
Defrance, Alexandria, 31 December 1914. 
405 It was difficult for this club to act freely in the pre-war period since the French and 
British consuls opposed to this club. After the outbreak of the war, the members of the club 
felt themselves free in their actions: HHStA, PA 38/363, Ranzi to Berchtold, “Agitation 
gegen England”, Damascus, 9 October 1914 
406 “They provoked the nationalist movement in Egypt and, by this way, wanted to fish 
in muddy waters.”: HHStA, PA 38/363, Ranzi to Berchtold, “Agitation gegen England”, 
Damascus, 9 October 1914; in response to that argument, the British side claimed in their 
pamphlets that their hostility was not directed to the Arabs, but Germany and its allies: 
PRO, FO 371/2486, Grey to India Office, London, 19 June 1915. 
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message was given that, when the Ottoman rule came to an end in Syria, the fate of the 
Syrians wouldn’t be different than that of the Egyptians, and if the “separatists” among the 
Arabs were supported and given an opportunity to perform their intentions, the result will 
be the same. According to the Austrian consul, by the impact of those activities Great 
Britain became an enemy in the eyes of the Syrians in the beginning of the war.407 
 Although it is not an activity directed against the Arabists, the illumination of the 
tomb of Saladin by the German Emperor was another activity to provoke the feelings of 
the Syrians to fight the enemies of the religion and to oppose their extentions in Syria, i.e. 
the Arabists. Saladin was the most famous Muslim commander among the Arabs, who 
fought against the Crusades. By way of Saladin’s example, the message was tried to be 
given that the Entente powers were the contemporary Crusades and it was a religious duty 
for the Muslims to resist them.408 In the circulars distributed in the cities for Panislamic 
propaganda, the Entente was frequently compared to the Crusades. In a brochure signed by 
Abdulaziz Chavish in February 1915, they were defined with the remarks “the adorers of 
the Cross” and “the descendants of the Crusades”. As understood from the diaries of the 
Spanish consul in Jerusalem, these words caused anxiety among the native Christians.409 
 The publication of newspapers was the most important part of Pan-Islamist 
propaganda in Syria as an alternative of Arabism. The foundation of al-Sharq newspaper 
can be considered a significant step in this sense. In the beginning, the newspaper was 
meant to be named as al-Islam. It was an idea of the celebrated German orientalist von 
Oppenheim, and the Germans would support the undertaking. However, Cemal opposed 
the German assistance and decided to publish it on behalf of the Government410 keeping a 
                                                 
407 For some propaganda pamphlets and brochures with these theme throughout the war, 
see: Gottfried Hagen, Die Türkei im Ersten Weltkrieg, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 
1990, p. 185, 198-199, 204-207, 210-213. 
408 HHStA, PA 38/366, Ranzi to Burian, “Feier der Übergabe der vom deutschen Kaiser 
Ufer das Grab des Sultans Salah ed Din gestifteten Ampel”, Damascus, 10 August 1915. 
409 Ballobar, Ibid, p. 51. 
410 Artuç, Ibid., p. 290-291; Kurd Ali expresses in his memoirs that Cemal warned him 
to shrink away from Oppenheim stating that he was a very dangerous man: Kurd Ali, Ibid., 
p. 147. 
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propaganda favoring the German-Ottoman alliance as one of the aim of the newspaper.411 
But, there is not any newspaper in Syria published with this name. Presumably, in the last 
minute the name of the newspaper was changed and al-Sharq was decided to be 
published.412 
The newspaper was intended by Cemal “to be the best disseminated newspaper in 
Syria”.413 According to Austrian consul in Damascus, the newspaper had two aims: for 
inland and for foreign lands. For abroad, the newspaper aimed at the propaganda of the 
Ottoman Caliphate. As for the inland, “the newspaper will be advocating the Young Turks’ 
idea of state in Arabic”. The consul continues that the aim of establishment of the 
newspaper was to save Syria from the foreign influences and to transform the political 
relations. He states that the establishment of such a newspaper in Syria was necessary, 
since all the newspapers in Syria were more or less influenced by the Arabist movement. 
Moreover, the Government had demonstrated its goodwill towards Arabness and Arab 
language by the publication of this newspaper.414 The aims of that newspaper wer declared 
with similar remarks in the program of al-Islam, the first name of that newspaper: 
“1. The principal aim of the newspaper is to struggle for the procurement of a common 
fate. It will encourage the Muslims living outside the Ottoman Empire to fight and get into 
activity for the awakening of a national consciousness and the gaining of their independent 
governments reminding them of their old liberties and their nationalities [anasır-ı kadime]. 
2. Our enemies were particularly struggling to spread [icra] poisonous inspirations in Syria 
and to make some ill-wishers [in Syria] an instrument to this vicious [alçakça] lies. The 
newspaper will demonstrate in full blast [bütün kuvvetiyle] their true nature and eliminate 
the misunderstandings. 
… 
                                                 
411 Kurd Ali, Ibid., p. 107. 
412 Artuç, Ibid, p. 290-291; in the same place, Artuç claims that there was two separate 
newspapers established by Cemal in Syria called al-Sharq and al-Islam; The chief author 
of al-Sharq, Shakib Arslan refers in his memoirs only al-Sharq newspaper. He never 
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of al-Islam. But later, the name was changed as al-Sharq. 
413 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 517/17, Cemal to Talat, Damascus, 9 Nisan 1332 [22 April 1916]. 
414 HHStA, PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian, “Gründung eines neuen arabischen 
Propagandablattes ‘Esch Schark”, Damascus, 1 May 1916. 
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4. It will struggle in full blast to rescue Egypt from the British yoke and being a part of its 
motherland protecting its autonomy [as in the past]. 
 
5. The newspaper will not only deal with politics. But also it will reserve the large part of 
its pages to the scientific, economical, and ethical studies for the training of the Syrian 
people materially and spiritually. In summary, it will strive to awaken and strengthen the 
patriotism by the Syrians and its youth. Giving the details belonging to the glorious [büyük] 
civilizational past of the Muslims [İslamların] to the people, it will invite them not to 
forget their gratifications [haz] and personalities [nefs]… Till now, everybody looked for 
their personal happiness outside the country and the wealth of the country was used by the 
foreigners. El-İslam will concentrate to disseminate the idea of the usage of the wealths of 
the country by our subjects…”415 
When the war circumstances were taken into consideration, the distribution of this 
newspaper abroad was almost impossible. Therefore, the establishment aim of the 
newspaper was presumably restricted inside the Ottoman realm. 
As for the realization of these aims in the newspaper, according to Shakib Arslan, 
when the newspaper began to be published, it was comprehensive and adequate. However, 
following the first month of its establishment, the Governmental authorities intervened in 
the issues of the newspaper and prohibited the publication of some articles. Secondly, the 
scarcity of paper reduced the numbers of pages in the newspaper. As a result, the quality 
the newspaper had in the beginning was destroyed.416 The first issues of the newspaper 
aren’t available today. However, the last issues support the claims of Arslan. The articles 
in the newspaper rather concentrated on the “treason” of Sharif Hussein,417 the liberation 
of Egypt from the British rule418, the relations between the Ottoman Empire and 
German,419 the news about the German Emperor and Germany.420 The propaganda aspect 
                                                 
415 ATASE Arşivi, Kls. 531, Ds. 2078, Fih. 2-15, 2-29, in Umar, Ömer Osman, “Cemal 
Paşa’nın Suriye’de Arap Milliyetçilerine Karşı Neşrettiği El-İslam Gazetesi ve Programı”, 
Askeri Tarih Bülteni, 2000/49, p. 133-134. 
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431, p. 1; 
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of the articles was too overt. Besides, there is much news in the newspaper praising Cemal 
Pasha.421  
After the commencement of the Sharif’s movement, the Ottoman Government 
established an Arabic Newspaper in Medina like Al-Sharq Newspaper, named “Hijaz”. 
This enterprise was brought forward by Cemal Pasha to create consciousness [most 
probably Pan-Islamic consciousness] among the people. A late professor of the Mekteb-i 
Sultani in Aleppo, who stayed in Egypt for a long time, was appointed as the editor of the 
newspaper.422 
 While propagating about the solidarity of the Muslims on the one hand, the 
persecution of the Syrian Muslims on the other, shattered the impact of the Pan-Islamist 
propaganda. Rather than convincing a life and death struggle for the Caliphate, the Syrians 
inclined to think in this process that Cemal Pasha undertook to eliminate the Arab element 
in the empire.423 The Pan-Islamist instruments applied to struggle against the Arabist 
movement became unsuccessful because of Cemal’s mistreatment of the Arabists. 
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420 For some examples, see: al-Sharq, “Sahafiyyun wa Almanya”, 1 Teşrin-i Evvel 
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dem Konflikt zwischen der Tuerkei und dem Emir von Mekka", Damascus,11 December 
1916. 
423 HHStA, PA 38/370, Kwatkowski to Czernin, “Überblick über die heutige Lage 
Syriens und Palaestinas”, Beirut, 16 March 1917. 
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2.6. Sharif Hussein’s Revolt, British Expedition and the new Moderation in the 
Policy of Arabism 
 
 
On 10th June 1916, the CUP Government encountered with an unexpected 
movement of uprising in Hijaz under the leadership of the Amir of Mecca, Sharif 
Hussein.424 Although they suspected double play of th Sharif trying to satisfy both the 
British and Ottoman sides, the CUP leaders, Cemal Pasha in the first place, didn’t expect a 
rebellion by Sharif Hussein.425 Because of that conviction, in spite of its disconnectedness 
with the Arabist movement in Syria426, the Sharifian movement was considered together 
with Cemal Pasha’s atrocities, and seen as an Arab reaction to the persecutory actions of 
                                                 
424 Some studies on the Sharifian revolt, see: Teitelbaum, Ibid; Aryeh Shumuelevitz ve 
Asher Susser, Hashemites in the Modern Arab World, (London: Routledge, 1996) ; Dawn, 
Ibid. 
425 Cemal states about Sharif’s movement that “…I could never have conceived that in a 
war, upon which the fate of the Khalifate depended, he would ally himself with the States 
which desired to thrust the Slav yoke upon the whole Mohammedan world…”: Djemal 
Pasha, Ibid., p. 211; The German Consul in Damascus advises to the German Consul in 
January 1916 to take the rumors about Sharif with a grain of salt, since those rumours 
aimed at driving a wedge between the Ottoman rule and Sharif Hussein: PA-AA, Türkei 
165, Bd. 38, Metternich to Bethmann Hollweg (Transmitting Consul Damascus), 
Constantinople, 22 January 1916; A repport of the Austrian Consul in Damascus written to 
the Germans in April 1915 describes Sharif as the true supporter of the Caliph: PA-AA, 
Türkei 165, Bd. 37, Ranzi to Burian, Damascus, 10 April 1915; The Austrian Consul in 
Damascus states that being kept Faysal in Damascus as a “hostage” provided an insurance 
to the Ottoman authorities about the attitude of Sharif: HHStA, PA 38/369,  Ranzi to 
Burian, “Nachtrag zur Vorgeschichte des Aufstandes im Heddas”, Damascus, 11 
September 1916. 
426 According to Aziz Al-Azmeh, the two movements were so different that the Sharif’s 
revolt “ought to be excised from the chronicles of Arab nationalism. It was Arab only in 
the narrow ethnological, pre-nationalist sense”. See: Aziz Al-Azmeh, “Nationalism and the 
Arabs”, in Derek Hopwood (ed.), Arab Nation Arab Nationalism, Macmillan Press, 
London: 2000, p. 69: for the discussion of the same argument in a detailed way, see: 
Dawn, Ibid. 
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Cemal.427 Therefore, the revolt of Sharif Hussein signed the beginning of a turning point in 
the Arab policy implemented by Cemal’s iron fist. 
 When the revolt broke out Cemal Pasha arrested the people in Damascus, who had 
close relations with Faysal and helped him to escape from there. All the relatives of al-
Bakri family that entertained Faysal as their guests while he was staying in Damascus and 
assisted him to run away from them, and Shukri Pasha al-Ayyubi with some other Syrian 
notables, who were suspected to have close relations with Sharif Hussein, were arrested.428 
Afterwards Umar Rafii, an advocate, his brother Abdulghanni Rafii, and Abdul Kader 
Kiwan, the preacher in the Umayyad Mosque were added to them.429  
The accusations leveled against them were to make the propaganda of the Sharif’s 
movement in Syria. In a domiciliary visit to the house of Abdulghani Rafii, the police 
found a proclamation sent from Basra in the beginning of the year 1916, containing that 
Syria, Iraq and Hijaz would be united under the kingship and caliphate of Sharif and 
                                                 
427 In a conversation with a German official, Salih Sharif al-Senussi interpreted the 
revolt as a consequence of the unskillfull policy of Cemal Pasha: PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 
13, Weber to Bethmann Hollweg, Constantinople, 7 August 1916: Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, 
an old Sadrazam, thought similar to Senussi. He expessed to a German official in Vienna 
that Sharif rebelled to the Ottoman Government because of the actions of Cemal Pasha 
towards Arabs: PA-AA, Türkei 165, Bd. 38, Tschirschky to Jagow, Vienna, 6 July 1916; 
The approaches of the German officials were not different than that. A German official in 
Constantinople attached Sharif’s rebellion to the same reasons: PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 
14, Kühlmann to Bethmann Hollweg, Constantionple, 25 April 1917: the ex-Khedive of 
Egypt was not different than them: PA-AA, Türkei 165, Bd. 39, Jacoby to Bethmann 
Hollweg, Bern, 27 July 1916. 
428 The other apprehendeds were as follows: Faris al-Khoury, the deputy of Damascus, 
Abdulhamid Pasha, the old brigadier general and the old official for the administration of 
the imperial domains: HHStA, PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian, “Der neue Hochverratsprozess 
vor dem Kriegsgerichte in Damascus”, Damascus, 20 December 1916. 
429 HHStA, PA 38/370, Ranzi to Czernin, “Kriegsgerichtliche Urteile wegen 
hochverraeterischer Umtriebe”, Damascus, 10 April 1917; A German official asserted that 
the implementation of those death penalties would increase the passive resistance of the 
Syrians against the decisions of the Government. The value of the paper money would 
decrease more. The desertions and spionage affairs to the Entente would increase. 
Cohabitation of the Turks and Arabs would be more difficult, and the feelings of the 
Syrians in the direction of seeing Sharif Hussein as their savior from the Turkish tyranny 
would grow stronger: PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 14, Zimmermann to Bethmann Hollweg, 
Damascus, 14 February 1917. 
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Cemal Pasha would be hanged. A copy of the same letter was found in the house of Shukri 
Pasha. A praising poem written by Abdul Kader Kiwan was added to the end of the 
proclamation. In a letter of Umar Rafii found in the house of Shukri Pasha, it was written 
that the trustworthy persons should have been respected while it was a must to terminate 
the rule of the tyrants. The Governor of Syria, Tahsin Bey implied in his report that Cemal 
made a mistake by the apprehension of such large number of persons. The accusations 
directed to them were the business of one or two persons, who tried to include the others to 
the society that they undertook to establish to support Sharif.430 
All the apprehended persons were accused of establishing a secret society to make 
the propaganda of the Sharif in Syria. All of them refused the accusations.431 But, the 
Shukri Pasha, Rafai brothers and Abdul Kader were sentenced to death penalty. Fouzi and 
Nassib al-Bakri together with Faysal and Abdullah, the sons of Sharif, were sentenced to 
death in absentia. This time, the process was slow and the decisions were not implemented 
for the fear of increasing the Arabs’ hate against the Ottoman Government in favor of 
Sharif Hussein.432 70 Damascene had been arrested as part of that investigation. 55 of them 
were acquitted including the deputy of Damascus Faris al-Khoury.433 Quite the opposite of 
this policy of moderation, as part of the struggle with the Sharifian movement, in the 
beginning of 1917, the mufti of Gaza, Arif, was hanged. According to the diaries of the 
                                                 
430 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 534/1, Tahsin to Talat, Damascus, 18 Eylül 1332 [1 October 1916]. 
431 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 14, Zimmermann to Bethmann Hollweg, Damascus, 14 
February 1917. 
432 HHStA, PA 38/370, Ranzi to Czernin, “Kriegsgerichtliche Urteile wegen 
hochverraeterischer Umtriebe”, Damascus, 10 April 1917; A German official asserted that 
the implementation of those death penalties would increase the passive resistance of the 
Syrians against the decisions of the Government. The value of the paper money would 
decrease more. The desertions and spionage affairs to the Entente would increase. 
Cohabitation of the Turks and Arabs would be more difficult, and the feelings of the 
Syrians in the direction of seeing Sharif Hussein as their savior from the Turkish tyranny 
would grow stronger: PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 14, Zimmermann to Bethmann Hollweg, 
Damascus, 14 February 1917. 
433 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 14, Zimmermann to Bethmann Hollweg, Damascus, 14 
February 1917. 
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Spanish consul, its social “impression wa unimaginable, since the mufti… had enormous 
influence among the Arabs, especially the Bedouins”.434 
 Apart from those, Sharif Hussein’s Revolt caused a considerable transformation in 
the policies towards the Arabists and the Arabs. In spite of the weakness of a possibility of 
revolt in Syria in favor of Sharif435, the probability of the transformation of Sharif’s 
personality to a hero, who would save the Arabs from the Turkish tyranny, compelled 
Cemal Pasha to moderate his Arab policy and to apply more moderate methods to struggle 
with Sharif in Syria by the enforcements of the Central Government.436 Furthermore, a 
disturbance combined with Sharif’s proclamation of himself as the Caliph would totally 
ruin the Ottoman general policy of War based on the idea of Jihad and the unity of the 
Muslims around the Ottoman Caliph.437 
 In this regard, following that it became apparent the impossibility of the suppress of 
Sharif’s uprising in the short term, Cemal gave priority to the policies, which would 
persuade the Syrians that Sharif Hussein was a rebellious individual betraying the cause of 
the unity of the Muslims under the Ottoman Caliph. As a significant step in this direction, 
Cemal applied to take a fatwa from the most prominent scholars of Syria, describing the 
Sharif as the traitor against the Ottoman Caliph, upon the proposal of the CUP’s Hauran 
delegate Wahji Bey Ajoubi.438 At the end of September 1916, 14 Mufti from all the Syrian 
                                                 
434 Ballobar, Ibid, pp. 129-130. 
435 PA-AA, Türkei 165, Bd. 40, Mutius to Bethmann Hollweg, Beirut, 12 October 1916 
436 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 14, Zimmermann to Bethmann Hollweg, Damascus, 14 
February 1917. 
437 A report of the Austrian Consul demonstrate that Sharif was not far from this 
possibility establishing an alliance with the members of the decentralization party in 
Egypt: HHStA, PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian, “Nachtrag zur Vorgeschichte des Aufstandes 
im Heddas”, Damascus, 11 September 1916. 
438 PA-AA, Türkei 165, Bd. 40, Mutius to Bethmann Hollweg (Transmitting 
Hoffmann), Beirut, 12 October 1916; Sharif also stroke a blow in the Ottoman propaganda 
in the international area. In an interview given by him to the French newspaper Temps, he 
expressed that Jihad that had been dictated  by the Germans to the Sheikhulislam in 
Istanbul, should be directed to the Turks, who were loyal to the Germans, rather than the 
Entente. Therefore, he must be publicly condemned as soon as possible: PA-AA, Türkei 
165, Bd. 40, Funkdienst [The Radio Service] Lyon, “Die Unabhangigkeit der Araber”, 
Lyon, 30 September 1916. 
121 
 
provinces issued a fatwa loading all the Muslims with a charge to enforce the Sharif to the 
right behavior. The text of the fatwa was as follows: 
“Question: If the Muslims pay homage to a Caliph, and If an Amir from them make a 
mistake against that [Caliph], if [Amir] intrigues against the Caliph, in collaboration with 
his enemies when he was at war, and, by this way, [The Amir] causes the disintegration and 
misdirection of the Muslims, is it the responsibility [of the Muslims] to battle against him 
[Amir] until he repent? 
Answer: Yes, it is a responsibility. Because, the word of Allah [Qur’an] says that: 
‘If one of you victimizes the other, then fight against the one that victimizes until he 
returns to the ordinance of Allah.’[Al-Hujura, 9] and, 
‘Hold firmly to the rope of Allah all together and do not become divided’ [Ali Imran 
103]...”439 
In the same way, a similar text of fatwa was issued by the non-official prominent ulema of 
Syria and Palestine. According to the Austrian Consul in Damascus, in spite of the fact that 
the fatwa was issued under the pressure of the Government, it constituted a considerable 
impact among the Muslims of Syria.440 
On the other hand, a discourse was adopted emphasizing the fraternity between the 
Turks and Arabs. In this regard, a delegation of the prominent authors arrived in Damascus 
from Istanbul to propitiate the humiliated Arabs with the exiles and executions of Cemal. 
The delegation stayed in Syria from 26 October to 24 December 1916.441 According to the 
Austrian consul in Damascus, the aim of this delegation was to demonstrate the fraternity 
between the Turks and Arabs as well as Cemal’s desire to show his good activities to make 
                                                 
439 The fatwa was signed by the Muftis from the various towns of Syria. They were as 
follows: 1. The Mufti of Jerusalem: Kamil Husseini, 2. The Mufti of Shaafiite in 
Jerusalem: Tahir Abu Saud, 3. The Mufti of Damascus : Abulsher Abedin, 4. The former 
Mufti of Damascus : Suleiman Djuhadar, 5. The Mufti of the Malekite of Damascus: 
Abdulbaki el-Hassani, 6. The former Mufti of Damascus: Salih Katana, 7. The Mufti of 
Shafiite in Damascus: Toufik al –Razzi, 8. The Mufti of Hanbalite in Damascus: Toufik 
Sujuthi, 9. The Mufti of Aleppo : Mohammed el Abisi, 10. The Mufti of Beirut : Mustafa 
Nedja, 11. The Mufti of Hamaa : Bedreddin al Kailani, 12. The Mufti of Tripolis (Syria): 
Abdulhamid Keram, 13. the Mufti of Akka : Abdullah el Djezzar, 14. the Mufti of Nablus:  
Menib Hashim.": HHStA, 38/369, Ranzi to Burian, “Die Fetwa der Syrischen Ulema 
gegen den Ex-Emir von Mekka”, Damascus, 29 September 1916. 
440 HHStA, 38/369, Ranzi to Burian, “Die Fetwa der Syrischen Ulema gegen den Ex-
Emir von Mekka”, Damascus, 29 September 1916. 
441 BA-MA, RM 5/2321, Humann to the Chef of Admiralty of Marine, 30 January 1917. 
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the Syrian realm improve.442 The delegation visited Lebanon, Beirut, Damascus, Jerusalem 
and the Ottoman troops in the Desert.443 They aimed to strengthen the religious ties 
between Arabs and Turks emphasizing the loyalty of the two peoples to the same Caliph 
and Sultan. In all the meetings organized in honor of the delegation, this basic principle 
was strongly emphasized.444 Although Cemal claims that this visit created a good 
impression in Syria,445 The Austrian Consul states that all these festivities stayed in the 
Governmental layer and the common people remained totally indifferent towards this 
organization.446 
The increasing danger of the British expedition in Palestine and the growing 
sympathy among the Syrians towards Sharif’s movement as a result of Cemal’s draconian 
actions447 caused some concerns in the Ottoman Central Government regarding the attitude 
of the Syrians. In this regard, first of all, the head of the State Council [Şura-yı Devlet] 
İbrahim Bey was secretly sent to Mecca to come an agreement with Sharif Hussein 
towards the end of the year 1916. According to the remarks of the German Ambassador, 
İbrahim was one of the most intimate friends of Sharif.448 İbrahim offered Sharif Hussein a 
broad autonomy in Hijaz and hereditary Sharifate to Hussein. However, the Sharif 
expressed that he didn’t strive for his personal benefit; rather he worked for the benefit of 
                                                 
442 For a while, Cemal wanted to show the results of his activities in the direction of the 
development of Syria to the authors in Istanbul. For a telegram in this direction, see: BOA, 
DH.ŞFR. 515/16, Cemal to Talat, Damascus, 16 Mart 1332 [29 March 1916]. 
443 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 538/11, Cemal to Talat, Damascus, 8 Teşrin-i Sani 1332 [21 
November 1916]. 
444 HHStA, PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian, “Besuche der Konstantinopler Abordnung in 
Damascus”, Damascus, 14 November 1916. 
445 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 538/11, Cemal to Talat, Damascus, 8 Teşrin-i Sani 1332 [21 
November 1916]. 
446 HHStA, PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian, “Besuche der Konstantinopler Abordnung in 
Damascus”, Damascus, 14 November 1916. 
447 For a report on the impact of Cemal’s draconian actions to the evolution of the 
attitude of Syrians towards a sympathy to Sharif and Great Britain, see: PA-AA, Türkei 
177, Bd. 14, Kühlmann to Bethmann Hollweg, Constantinople, 25 April 1917. 
448 PA-AA, Türkei 165, Bd. 41, Kühlmann to Bethmann Hollweg, Constantinople, 31 
January 1917. 
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Islam that fell into some incapable hands. Thus, Ibrahim bey returned to İstanbul empty-
handed.449 
Immediately after the failure of that undertaking, the cabinet of Talat Pasha 
inclined to change its policy towards the Arabs to dispel their frustration against the 
Government. Talat began to think the ways to persuade Cemal to return from Syria450 since 
his name was tightly associated with violence in Syria. It was thought to call him back to 
pay his attention to the works of the Marine Ministry.451 However, the opposition of the 
army staff, including the Germans, about the military risk of the replacement of the 
commander general in such a critical time with political considerations prevented such a 
step.452 V. Kress particularly requested from Enver during his visit to Syria not to dismiss 
Cemal by the abovementioned reasons.453 Thus, this thought was abandoned on grounds of 
military considerations.  
Although the idea of Cemal’s dismissal was abandoned, during those dates, the 
requests of the Arab deputies began to be heeded more. According to the memoirs of 
Shakib Arslan, after Cemal lost his popularity, it was easy for the Arab deputies to make a 
decision issued to the Cabinet for the favor of the exiled Arabs.454 In this regard, first of 
all, Shakib Arslan prevented the property exchange plan of the Arab exiles in agreement 
with Talat Pasha. At the end of 1916 the question of the return of the Arab exiles was 
brought to the agenda of the Cabinet. However, it was decided that as long as Cemal Pasha 
                                                 
449 HHStA, PA 12/210, Trauttmansdorff to Czernin, “Versuchte Verstaendigung mit 
dem Emir von Mekka”, Constantinople, 27 January 1917; PA-AA, Türkei 165, Bd. 41, 
Kühlmann to Bethmann Hollweg, Constantinople, 31 January 1917; According to Cemal’s 
memoirs, in the beginning of 1916, Sharif demanded the similar privileges from the 
Ottoman Empire. for details, see: Djemal Pasha, Ibid., p 215. 
450 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 14, Mühlens to Bethmann Hollweg, Constantinople, 24 
February 1917. 
451 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 14, Kühlmann to Bethmann Hollweg, Constantinople, 20 
February 1917. 
452 PA-AA, Türkei 165, Bd. 41, Kühlmann to Bethmann Hollweg (Transmitting v. 
Kress), Constantinople, 23 February 1917. 
453 PA-AA, Türkei 165, Bd. 41, Kühlmann to Bethmann Hollweg (Transmitting v. 
Kress), Constantinople, 4 March 1917. 
454 Arslan, Ibid., p. 202-205.  
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ruled Syria their return was impossible. Afterwards, Midhat Şükrü Bey was sent to Cemal 
Pasha following the second Ottoman victory in Gaza to persuade him about the return of 
the exiles. His undertaking was also unsuccessful.455 
When Cemal Pasha’s army was defeated in Jerusalem by the British troops, the 
process turned to the advantage of the Arab exiles. The Government considered 
presumably pleasing the Arabs, to prevent any assistance from the Syrians to the British 
troops. Regarding this, firstly the exiles, who were younger than 16 and older than 60 were 
allowed to return to their countries in Februrary 1918.456 By March 1918, upon the request 
of the Governor Tahsin bey and the new army commander Mersinli Cemal Pasha, the Porte 
issued a decision allowing the return of all the exiles except the dragomans of the enemy 
states.457 In May 1918, a general amnesty was proclaimed by the Cabinet for all the Arab 
exiles and allowing them to return to their countries.458  
 
 
 
2.7. Negotiations with Sharif Hussein and Faysal for peace 
 
 
Towards the end of the year 1917, a second attempt was made to terminate the 
hostility between the Ottomans and the Sharif. The process began with the desertion of 
Amir Abdulkadir al-Jazairi,459 the son of the ex- vice president of the Ottoman Parliament, 
                                                 
455 Arslan, Ibid., p. 190-197. 
456 BOA, DH.EUM. 19/11, 28 Şubat 1334 [28 February 1918]. 
457 HHStA, PA 38/371, Ranzi to Czernin, “Massnahmen der Regierung gegen 
verschiedene Bevölkerungselemende”, Damascus, 15 March 1918; for some examples, 
see: BOA, İ.DUİT 105/42, 4 Mayıs 1334 [4 May 1918]; İDUİT 106/40-41-42-43-44-45-
46-47-48. 
458 BOA, DH.EUM. 4.Şb 19/55, Talat to Tahsin, 12 Mayıs 1334 [12 May 1918]. 
459 In the report of the Austrian Consul, his name was given as Abdulkadir: HHStA, PA 
38/370, Ranzi to Czernin, “Die Mission des Emir Abdel Kader”, Damascus, 26 November 
1917: in a report sent by Enver Pasha while he was in Damascus, the name was given as 
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who was sent into exile to Smyrna by Cemal Pasha, to Sharif Hussein’s side.460 After a 
while, he wrote a letter to Cemal Pasha expressing that he abandoned to become a 
supporter to the Sharif and would like to take refuge with the Ottoman Empire to serve it 
on condition that his security of life would be guaranteed. According to Austrian Consul in 
Damascus, his conditions were accepted in a flash. When he arrived at Damascus in 
November 1917461, he brought with him plenty of gold supplied to him by the British 
authorities to provoke a revolt among the Druzes of Hauran. He expressed that he wanted 
to serve the Ottoman Government in return for pardoning the exiled members of his 
family. In this regard, the exile of his father Ali Pasha al-Jazairi and the internment of his 
relative Tahir al-Jazairi were forgiven. He wanted to deliver the British gold to the 
Government, but he was rewarded with it. Again in the direction of the advises of the Amir 
Abdulkadir, a general amnesty was issued for the ones, who joined the Sharif’s revolt on 
condition that they must be surrendered in 35 days after the announcement of the amnesty. 
Shukri Pasha al-Ayoubi was also pardoned in the same regard.462 
 The remarks of the Governor Tahsin Bey regarding the escape of Abdulkadir is 
quite conspicuous in terms of demonstrating the sentiments of the most of the exiled 
Arabist in regard to their allegiance to the Ottoman Empire: 
“…Abdulkadir has sent me a message from the village where he was hidden. [He] asked 
for a meeting. I gave quarter to him and accepted his appeal. He explained at some length 
                                                                                                                                                    
Said al-Jazairi.: TTK Arşivi, KO Koleksiyonu, 1/7, Enver to Talat, Damascus, 16 
November 1917; However, Tahsin Bey notes the name as Abdulkadir: BOA, DH.ŞFR. 
572/23, Tahsin to Talat, Damascus, 24 Teşrin-i Sani 1333 [24 November 1917]. 
460 Before his escape to Sharif, he wrote some letters to Cemal Pasha expressing his 
loyalty and the loyalty of his family to the state: TTK Arşivi, KO Koleksiyonu 9/141, 
Emir Said to Cemal, 6 Nisan 1332 [18 April 1916]; Cemal answered them through Enver 
that as a demonstration of condescension he spared their lives and exiled them to Brussia. 
If they insisted in their undertakings to return, Cemal would arrest them in their place of 
exile and would hang them following a “judgment” at Court Martial. He stated that their 
relations with Syria was cut ever more: TTK Arşivi, KO Koleksiyonu 13/54, Cemal to 
Enver, 27 Nisan 1333 [27 April 1917]. 
461 In Enver’s report bearing the date 16 November 1917, he writes the arrival of Amir 
Said: TTK Arşivi, KO Koleksiyonu, 1/7, Enver to Talat, Damascus, 16 November 1917 
462 HHStA, PA 38/370, Ranzi to Czernin, “Die Mission des Emir Abdel Kader”, 
Damascus, 26 November 1917; Most of these informations were also stated by Cemals 
himself: TTK Arşivi, 7/126, Cemal to Enver, 20 Teşrin-i Sani 1333 [20 November 1917]. 
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that… he was given money [by the British officials] to provoke a revolt in Damascus and 
its surrounding, and that his religious sentiments were grieved… He expounded weepingly 
that he was ready to remain at the disposal of the Government for all kinds of orders in 
favor of the Government.[hükümet lehine teklif edilen her türlü emri ifaya amade olduğunu 
ağlayarak söyledi]. Following that, he has met with his excellency the Commander Pasha 
[Cemal Pasha]. The mentioned [müşarünileyh] [Commander], too, approved his appeal…I 
observe that [he can be] trusted. In any case, I hope a benefit and service from that man by 
any means [ne ölçüde olursa olsun]… Abdulkadir is in our hands and serves us 
secretly…”463 
Upon that, Cemal charged another member of al-Jazairi family Amir Said to go to Mecca 
on behalf of the Ottoman Government to negotiate with the Sharif and guaranteed that the 
Sharif and his supporters would be forgiven by the Ottoman Sultan. He also wrote letters 
to Sharif Hussein, Faysal and the other chiefs of the revolt emphasizing the necessity of the 
unity of all the Muslims against Great Britain, which had always attacked and would attack 
Islam.464 The Prominent scholars of Syria Sheikh Kitani and Sheikh Bedreddin also wrote 
letters to Sharif Hussein.465 After that Cemal resigned from his office in Syria and the 
correspondence was maintained by Mersinli Cemal Pasha, the successor of Cemal, and the 
Governor of Syria Tahsin Bey. 
 The answer to Cemal arrived from Faysal on 26th January 1918. He placed all his 
cards on the table openly. His demands weren’t principally different from that of the 
Arabists, voiced by them before the War. Faysal was as if he was the spokesman of the 
Arabist movement, whose leadership was destroyed by Cemal’s executions. First of all, he 
expressed the loyalty of Sharif at heart to the Caliphate and Sultanate. After that he 
explained that the Sharif had to rebel against the state because of the activities of Cemal. 
After that, he explained his demands for a peace treaty. His first condition was that “each 
nation [Turks and Arabs] should know their rights. None of them should intervene in the 
rights and issues of the other. Both [nation] should strive in a body. In this way, a true 
unity of Islam should be created”. He added that the Arabs were afraid of the Turks and 
mistrusted them. If the agreement were made, then the conduct of the war would be 
                                                 
463 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 572/23, Tahsin to Talat, Damascus, 24 Teşrin-i Sani 1333 [24 
November 1917]. 
464 TTK Arşivi, KO Koleksiyonu, 1/7, Enver to Talat, Damascus, 16 Teşrin-i Sani 1333 
[16 November 1917] 
465 TTK Arşivi, 7/126, Cemal to Enver, 20 Teşrin-i Sani 1333 [20 November 1917]. 
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changed. The vendetta between the two nations would terminate and the Ottoman Empire 
would rule over from the West Africa to the Eastern Asia.466  In his note to Cemal, Tahsin 
Bey especially requested to continue the negotiations no to chuck Syria away.467 
 The answer to Tahsin’s request came from Talat allowing him to maintain the 
correspondence “without making any commitment”. He hoped to win at least Faysal in this 
process.468 However, according to the German ambassador, Talat was willing to give a 
certain autonomy to the Arabs. He was aware of the impossibility of the recapture of the 
lost Arab territories by the military means and wanted to gain them diplomatically. But a 
clique led by Cemal strongly opposed to this project unreasonably, and didn’t give consent 
for even the smallest concession.469 Presumably, due to this opposition Talat ordered 
Tahsin to continue the correspondence “without making any commitment.470 But he 
                                                 
466 TTK Arşivi, KO Arşivi 1/70, Faysal to Cemal, 26 Kanun-ı Sani 1334 [26 January 
1918].  
467 TTK Arşivi, KO Arşivi 1/70, Tahsin to Cemal, 26 Kanun-ı Sani 1334 [26 January 
1918], Examining these correspondences with the materials in the British National 
Archives, Eliezer Tauber concludes that at the end of this negotiations he replied to Cemal 
that “sword was arbiter between them” and cut the negotiations. He didn’t analyze the 
changing trend of the Ottoman policy of Arabs beginning at the end of the year 1916: 
Tauber, Ibid., p. 154; However, the Ottoman correspondences revealed in this study shows 
that he was, indeed, quite willing to make a separate peace with the Ottoman authorities. 
Another reality revealed by the comparison of Tauber’s informations with the Ottoman 
documents is that Faysal didn’t keep the British officials informed about the negotiations.  
468 TTK Arşivi, KO Arşivi 1/70, Talat to Cemal, 1 Şubat 1334 [1 February 1918].  
469 In the same telegram, the Ambassador states that, as an indication of this intolerance, 
Cemal tried to prohibit an organization of the Egyptians, when he deputized in the absence 
of Talat to the Ministry of Interior. They wanted to celebrate the anniversary of Khedive 
Abbas Hilmi’s accession to the Egyptian throne. Cemal strove to make them abandon from 
this organization, but they insisted on their programme. Furthermore, he prohibited playing 
the Egyptian anthem under the color that there was no Egyptian anthem, there was only the 
Turkish one: PA-AA, Türkei 165, Bd. 42, Bernstoff to AA, Constantinople, 19 January 
1918. 
470 This time, Faysal notified his negotiations to the British officials. However, it seems 
that he conveyed his demands to them with a considerable exaggeration. Tauber evaluates 
these two correspondences as different attempts instead of seeing them as part of the same 
process. Faysal’s real intention isn’t reflected in Tauber’s study. For details, see: Tauber, 
Ibid., p. 155-156. 
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changed his reconciliatory attitude towards the end of the war and adopted the same 
attitude with Cemal.471 
 In May 1918, Tahsin Bey and Mersinli Cemal sent Shukri Pasha Ayoubi to Faysal 
in Salt to determine a place for negotiations. They would negotiate with Faysal in full 
authority on condition that the latter would abandon the idea of independence.472 However, 
according to the German consul in Beirut the Sharif’s side didn’t trust the promises of the 
CUP leaders.473 On the other hand, the Ottoman authorities in Istanbul were quite reluctant 
to negotiate and to give some concessions to the Sharif. They were very optimistic about 
the consequences of the War and believed that they could appoint, sooner or later, Ali 
Haidar as the Amir of Mecca.474  
 In spite of these conditions, the correspondence continued till the end of the war 
around those issues. Faysal wanted a status for Arabia similar to the Bayern province of 
Germany.475 The Germans opposed the attitude of the CUP leaders, and, towards the end 
of the war, repeatedly expressed the necessity of an agreement with Sharif to be able to 
transfer troops to the Persian front.476 In the same direction, the prominent ideologue of the 
Young Turks, Ziya Gökalp, advised Talat to reorganize the Ottoman Empire similar to the 
                                                 
471 For the details of this attitude, see: PA-AA, Türkei 165, Bd. 43, Bernstoff to AA, 
Constantinople, 30 August 1918. 
472 Quite the reverse, Faysal didn’t demand independence: TTK Arşivi, KO 
Koleksiyonu 13/12, Tahsin to Enver, Damascus, 11 May 1334. 
473 PA-AA, Türkei 165, Bd. 12, Bernstoff to Hertling (transmitting consul Beirut), 
Constantinople, 19 July 1918. 
474 PA-AA, Türkei 165, Bd. 42, Oppenheim to AA, 28 July 1918; Quite the reverse of 
this attitude, Tauber implies in his book that the CUP leaders were very enthusiastic to 
agree with Faysal. Tauber, Ibid., p. 155. 
475 PA-AA, Türkei 165, Bd. 43, Von Seeckt to AA, 4 September 1918. 
476 PA-AA, Türkei 165, Bd. 43, Hintze to AA, 13 September 1918; PA-AA, Türkei 
165, Bd. 43, Berckheim to AA (Transmitting Ludendorf), Constantinople, 1 September 
1918; PA-AA, Türkei 165, Bd. 43, Berckheim to AA (Transmitting Oppenheim), 
Constantinople, 22 August 1918; PA-AA, Türkei 165, Bd. 43, Bernstoff to AA, 
Constantinople, 30 August 1918; TTK Arşivi, KO Koleksiyonu 6/91, Liman von Sanders 
to Enver, 1 June 1918.  
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Austrian-Hungary Empire giving autonomy to the Arabs.477 However, the Unionist leaders 
preferred to avoid “giving any promise, which would imply independence”,478 and to stall 
Sharif off until the absolute defeat in Syria. As a final remark, it is worth to mention that, 
immediately after the ceasefire agreement, the negotiations between the Turks and Arabs 
would restart.479 
 During his governorate in Syria, Cemal aimed with his policy towards the Arabist 
movement at the abolition of the interlayer between the state and its citizens in Syria as 
well as the elimination of the components, which were perceived as “disloyal” and could 
be used by the Great Powers in future as tools to create problems for the Ottoman 
sovereignty in Syria. However, since the reasons behind the outbreak of the Sharifian 
Revolt in Mecca were attributed to his draconian rule in Syria, that event created a turning 
point in the Arabist policies; he was prevented with the intervention of the Central 
Government in favor of the Arabists and Arabs. Thus, his projects, beginning at the end of 
1916, were retreated following that it became apparent that the Sharifian Revolt couldn’t 
be suppressed by the military means. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
477 PA-AA, Türkei 165, Bd. 43, Bernstoff to AA, Constantinople, 30 August 1918. 
478 TTK, KO Koleksiyonu 6/90, Enver to Mersinli Cemal, 11 Ağustos 1334 [11 August 
1918] 
479 For a study on the negotiations after that time, see: Çiçek, M. Talha, “Osmanlı 
Hakimiyetinin Sonu ve Türk-Arap İlişkilerinde Değişim ve Süreklilik Unsurları, İstanbul: 
Yedirenk, 2010, pp.139-161. 
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CHAPTER III  
 
ASSERTION OF THE STATE AUTHORITY ON 
SECONDARY, LOCAL AND AUTONOMOUS STRUCTURES 
 
 
 
 
Prior to the WWI, mainly due to the influence of the protecting rights of the Great 
Powers stemming from the Capitulations, some de facto autonomous communities had 
been created by the different components of Ottoman society in Syria. Indeed, before the 
increase of the Western influence, those rights had been provided by the Ottoman Millet 
system.480 However, in the modern era, the Western intervention played a considerable role 
in the protection of the privileges of non-Muslim societies. As a result of this, among those 
communities a certain sympathy towards those European powers emerged and the Ottoman 
authority was considerably weakened especially on non-Muslim societies like the Jews and 
the Christians. Jewish organizations motivated by Zionism, and the clergy of the Christian 
communities had gained considerable immunities from the state control. For that reason, 
the existence of such structures as bodies resistant to the effective control of the 
Government, created a barrier between the state and the people living under its rule 
preventing the diffusion and penetration of the state in Syrian society. By the outbreak of 
                                                 
480 For an analysis of the Ottoman Millet System, see: M. Macit Kenanoğlu, Osmanlı 
Millet Sistemi: Mit ve Gerçek, İstanbul: Klasik Yayınları, 2004. 
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the war, the administrative organization of the Zionist movement in Jewish society in 
Palestine, called by them as yishuv481, and the position of the Christian clergy for the 
Christians, especially those of the Maronites presented such a situation.  
Furthermore, the Government in Lebanon was another autonomous body, which 
was largely free from the Ottoman control, administratively, which was established and 
guaranteed by the Great Powers following the 1860 incidents.482 That Government had its 
own administrative organs, gendarmerie and tax collection system, within the frontiers of 
the Ottoman Empire. As will be indicated below, all of these were the interlayers in the 
eyes of Cemal, which had to be eliminated or checked for a proper establishment of the 
state control in Syria, similar to Arabism. In this chapter, the analysis will be focusing on 
how Cemal Pasha intended to limit the authority of those autonomous bodies to increase 
the influence of the Ottoman Government among the different peoples living in its lands, 
and to what extent, he achieved the elimination of these structures.  
 
 
 
3.1. Cemal Pasha and the Zionist Movement 
 
 
Before an analysis of Cemal’s policy of Zionism, an assessment of the existing 
literature will make the section more contextual. Historical studies on Zionism and the 
                                                 
481 The name referring Jewish settlement before the establishment of Israel. Ottoman 
period of the Zionist organization was also called as Yishuv by the Zionists. For some 
examples, see: Bar-Tal, Daniel and Yona Teichmann, Stereotypes and Prejudices in 
Conflict, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 103; Kark Ruth and Nadav 
Solomonovich, “The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 as reflected in the media of the 
Jewish community in Palestine”, in Late Ottoman Palestine: The Period of Young Turk 
Rule, Ben-Bassat, Yuval and Eyal Ginio, London: I.B. Tauris, 2011, p. 184. 
482 For a study analyzing civil conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860, see: Fawaz, 
Leila Tarazi, An Occasion for War, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994; for a 
study on the order established following 1860 incidents, see: Engin Deniz Akarlı, The 
Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861-1920, California: University of California Press, 
1993. 
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emergence of Israel constitute an enormous amount in the existing literature. The 
historians of this movement have examined the particulars of its history in great detail. 
Today, the relations between the Zionists and the Western Great Powers are well-
known.483 Similarly, the emergenge of the movement has been examined in a detailed way 
together with its historical development in different eras and in different states.484 On the 
other hand, the analysis of the reaction of the Ottoman authorities to the Zionist activities 
in Palestine as a nationalist movement aiming at the creation of a Jewish home in the 
Ottoman Realm is still not examined sufficiently, especially in reference with the Ottoman 
documents. In this sense, Fuat Dündar’s study on the CUP’s policy of settlement is an 
exception. However, as will be detailed below, his approach is hardly contextualizing 
Cemal’s policy of Zionism to explain the aims of his existence in Syria. In addition, he 
doesn’t seem to attribute any importance to the difference in the attitude of the CUP 
leaders towards the question of Zionism.485 
In contrast to what the existing literature has concentrated on, this chapter sets out 
to describe how the most powerful Ottoman authority in Palestine, i.e. Cemal Pasha, 
reacted to the Zionists there during WWI, in the context of his general policy of the 
integration of Syrian provinces within the Imperial body of the Ottoman State by 
eliminating or checking the social interlayers. First of all, the analysis will be concentrating 
on Cemal’s opinions on the Zionist Movement for a better understanding of the 
                                                 
483 For the relations between Great Britain and the Zionists and the struggle of the latter 
before the former to have a motherland in Palestine during the WWI see: Isaiah 
Friedmann, The Question of Palestine, 1914-1918, London: Routledge, 1973;  for relations 
between Germany and the Zionists, see: Isaiah Friedmann, Germany, Turkey, Zionism, 
1897-1918, London: Tansaction Publishers, 1998. 
484 For some examples, see: Nathan Rotenstreich, Zionism: Past and Present, Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 2007; Kedouire, Elie and Sylvia G. Haim (eds.), 
Zionism and Arabism in Palestine and Israel, London: Frank Cass, 2005; Feldestein, Ariel 
L., Ben-Gurion, Zionism and American Jewry, 1948-1963, Newyork: Routledge, 2006; 
Rose, John, The Myths of Zionism, London: Pluto Press, 2004; Halpern, Ben and Jehuda 
Reinharz, Zionism and the Creation of a New Society, New York: Oxford University Press, 
1998; Gans, Chaim, A Just Zionism: on the Morality of the Jewish State, New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2008; Makovsky, Michael, Churchill’s Promised Land: Zionism 
and Statecraft, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007. 
485 For the related chapter in Dündar’s study, see: Fuat Dündar, Modern Türkiye’nin 
Şifresi, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2008, pp. 358-399. 
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background of his actions, and then a detailed analysis of the preventive activities of 
Cemal Pasha and his bureaucrats against Zionism on behalf of the integration of the 
imperial lands will be made.  
The Zionist Movement, beginning from its foundation by Theodor Herzl with the 
Basel Congress, aimed at the acquisition in Palestine of a publicly-secured and legally 
assured home for the Jewish people.486  Following this decision, the Zionists commenced 
to organize the Jewish population all over the world for immigration to Palestine. 
Concordantly, with the increase of the Jewish population in Palestine, the Zionist leaders 
started out to elevate the cultural and economic level of the immigrants and commenced 
the activities to create a mutual identity among them.487 In this context, the instruction of 
the Hebrew language and the engagement of the Jewish immigrants in agriculture using 
modern techniques in Palestine can be placed on the top.488 
On the other hand, the Ottoman Empire was struggling to assert its authority on its 
subjects all over the realm for a long time. Therefore, the Zionist undertakings drew 
attention immediately after their emergence since the aim of the movement was defined by 
its leaders to expand its influence on the Jews and this was seen as detrimental to the 
Ottoman domination. Beginning from the Hamidian era, the Ottoman Government took all 
the possible precautions to discourage the Jewish immigration to Palestine.489 Following 
Abdülhamid II, the Young Turk leaders showed a hostile attitude towards the Zionist 
activities as far as they were allowed by the international power balance. It was impossible, 
however, for the Ottoman Government to prohibit the Jewish immigration entirely, due to 
the fact that the immigrants were protected by the Great Powers.490     
                                                 
486 For the explanation of the idea of a Jewish state by the founder of the movement, 
Theodor Hezl, see: Herzl, Theodor, The Jewish State, Boston: Wildside Press, 2008. 
487 For an analiysis of this process, see: Halpern and Reinharz, Ibid, p. 49-90 
488 PRO, FO 371/2482, “England and the Jewish Settlement in Palestine”, Cairo, 8 
January 1915; PA-AA, Türkei 195, Bd.8, Öttinger to AA, 20 December 1915. 
489 For a detailed analysis of Abdulhamid’s struggle with the Zionist immigration 
movement to Palestine see: Dündar, Ibid, pp. 358-362. 
490 Hartmann, Martin, Reisebriefe aus Syrien, Reimer Publication, Berlin: 1913, p. 8; 
Dündar, Ibid, p. 368. 
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The abolition of the Capitulations upon the entry of the Ottoman Empire into WWI, 
gave a free hand, to some extent, to the Ottoman authorities to restrict the Zionist 
movement in Palestine.  In this regard, considerable measures were taken by Cemal Pasha 
to check this movement and to abolish its autonomy. This section will set out to clarify 
Cemal’s actions to destroy the autonomy of that movement beginning with Cemal’s ideas 
on Zionism:491 
 
 
3.1.1. Cemal Pasha on Zionism 
 
As indicated in the previous chapter, Cemal’s aim in Syria and Palestine was to 
integrate these regions to the Ottoman Empire asserting the central authority, benefiting 
from the absence of international pressure. In this regard, he tried to eliminate or check all 
the threats, which would prevent the realization of this aim at that time and in the future. 
Therefore, Cemal Pasha was a strong opponent of the Zionist intentions like most of his 
predecessors, who tried to centralize the Ottoman Empire as much as possible. As a 
movement aiming at the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, and as a movement, 
which acquired a considerable autonomy from the Government,492 Zionism had to be 
controlled like the other opposition movements and autonomous bodies in Syria and 
Palestine to achieve the centralization of Syria. 
Fuat Dündar touches upon the aims of Cemal in his treatment of the Zionists in his 
controversial book on the design of the Modern Turkey, using mainly the Ottoman 
documents. In terms of using the Ottoman Archives he is the first to do this in the literature 
on this subject. However, interestingly enough, Dündar claims that Cemal’s attitude 
                                                 
491 Although Cemal Pasha was so harsh against the Zionists in his telegrams, in his 
memoires, the concepts “Zion”, “Zionism” or “Zionist” are never mentioned. Similarly, he 
doesn’t explain anything about his treatment against the Jews. 
492 The Jewish colonies in Palestine had established their own legal systems. Two 
collaborating Judges had been appointed in their courts, -one to interpret the Mosaic law, 
another to temper it with the modern jurisprudence. All Jewish disputes had been settled by 
these courts: Aaransohn, With Turks in Palestine, Cambridge: the Riverside Press, 1916, p. 
3. 
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against the Zionists should be evaluated as a part of the CUP’s ethnicity engineering, 
aiming at the turcification of the Ottoman realm. As will be indicated below, Cemal didn’t 
undertake any action to exile all the Jews. His only aim was to clean the interlayers 
between the state and the Jews. He restricted the exile with those, who didn’t accept the 
Ottoman citizenry or who were the leaders of Zionist organizations. The first case was 
considered an open challenge to the supremacy of the Ottoman Government in the region, 
while the second one was conceived as a block to the ottomanization of the Jews. 
Disregarding these realities, Dündar doesn’t seem to inquire the place of the strengthening 
of the Ottoman domination in Palestine in Cemal’s policies of Zionism by taking the aims 
of that movement into consideration. Yet, it is impossible to find an anti-Jewish remark 
that belongs to Cemal in his correspondences with the Central Government. All his 
concern was to block the Zionist designs regarding the separation of Palestine from the 
Ottoman Empire with the establishment of a Jewish state there. Cemal didn’t adopt a 
general policy of exile against the Jews. While disagreeing about Cemal’s aspirations, the 
only overlap of the present study with that of Dündar is that Cemal aimed at the expulsion 
of the Zionist Jews from Palestine.493  
As a centralist-integrationalist, Cemal’s opposition to Zionism stemmed from his 
adherence to the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. In Cemal’s viewpoint, as a movement 
aiming at the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, Zionism had to be checked like 
the other opposition movements in Syria and Palestine to achieve the integration of Syrian 
peoples with the Ottoman Imperial system both administratively and ideologically. In this 
context, immediately after his arrival in Syria, Cemal made an investigation about this 
movement and concluded that: 
“Those [the members of the Zionist Movement] are seriously disastrous for the land of 
Palestine [Arz-ı Filistin].  …They have extended their independence over the establishment 
of a religious court. In my opinion, as soon as possible, there is a need for a legislation and 
it should include that:  
1. From now on, none of the Jewish immigrants is going to be allowed to settle in 
Palestine, even if they accept Ottoman citizenship. 2. There will never be established a 
colony, settled exclusively by the Jews, and the existing colonies, not called as colony after 
that, will be named as village on condition that the appropriate names to be determined by 
the State. 3. The people who have foreign citizenship and their deputies will not be allowed 
to intervene in the issues of those villages and in the personal problems of those villagers. 
                                                 
493 For further details regarding his approach see: Dündar, Ibid, pp. 358-399. 
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4. All the political, social and economic societies, which had been established on the basis 
of taking Jewish immigrants to Palestine and to settle them there, are abrogated. The 
foreigners, who are the members of those societies, will not be allowed to inhabit in 
Palestine, and those, who establish such a secret society will be deported from the Ottoman 
Realm [Memalik-i Osmaniye]. 5. The philanthrophic communities, which had been 
established to settle Jewish immigrants in the Ottoman motherland, cannot have the 
authorization to employ officials in Palestine. Those, who will perform this secretly, will 
be deported from the Ottoman motherland…”494 
As can be understood from the quotation, Cemal Pasha was disturbed by the functions of 
the Zionist organization, which normally would be performed by the State. Moreover, the 
colonies were outside of the bureaucratic hierarchy of the state. By similar considerations, 
he ordered collection of all the weapons in the hands of the Jewish colonists.495 In the same 
telegraph, he stated that he would deport some of the most dangerous [azılı] Zionist 
leaders, refusing their appeal for the Ottoman citizenship. If the deportation of those 
leaders could be achieved, then the remaining Jews would easily be amenable to the 
viewpoint of the Ottoman Government.496 If Zionism was checked as he described, Cemal 
considered it easier the integration of the Jewish community into the Empire. 
 It is sufficiently clear in his draft law that Cemal’s only aim with the prevention of 
the Jewish immigration was to forestall the realization of the Zionist aims in Syria to the 
disadvantage of the dissemination of the Ottoman supremacy. What is lacking in Dündar’s 
approach is his failure to contextualize the aims of the Zionist Movement in Cemal’s 
policy of the Jewish deportations. The text quoted before clarifies that Cemal aimed at the 
control of the Zionist activities rather than planning the turcification of Palestine with a 
motivation inspired by ethnicity engineering. There was no inconvenience for Cemal in the 
existence of the Jews in Palestine as long as they remained loyal to the Ottoman authority. 
Although Talat seemed to have agreed personally, Cemal’s draft law was not approved by 
the Central Government on grounds that the international public would react to the 
Ottoman Government. However, Talat advised Cemal to struggle against the Zionist 
Movement with the available tools in his hands.497  
                                                 
494 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 465/19, Cemal to Talat, Jerusalem, 2 Mart 1331 [15 March 1915]. 
495 Aaronsohn, Ibid, p. 34. 
496 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 465/19, Ibid. 
497 Dündar, Ibid, p.373. 
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Three months later, Cemal Pasha warned again the Central Government about the 
Zionist danger, and expressed that he prepared a plan to extirpate [kökünden çözmek] this 
question without giving the details of his plan. For the implementation of this plan, he 
demanded the appointment of the Chief Rabbi of Salonika to Jerusalem as the Chief Rabbi. 
In that telegraph, he also stated his irritation that any action against the Zionist movement 
was reflected all around the World by their propaganda means as an action inimical to 
Judaism.498 Approximately one year later, he repeated his offer, again.On July 1916, the 
Gatto Levedat [?] Newspaper published an article stating that the Ottoman Empire was 
negotiating the establishment of a Jewish Republic in Palestine with the American 
Ambassador Morgenthau. The newspaper claimed that the government showed a tendency 
to the idea of the establishment of such a state. Cemal produced a strong refutation of the 
claims of the newspaper and requested again to issue a law prohibiting the Jewish 
immigration and their purchase of land in Palestine to show the opposition of the Ottoman 
Government to Zionism.499 On 27th January 1917, he repeated his proposal to issue a law 
against the Zionist activities. He suggested the prohibition of the foreigners to enter into 
the Ottoman country if they had a Zionist affiliation, and if a Zionist had been inside the 
Ottoman realm, he or she should be deported. He was of the opinion that it won’t be 
appropriate “to wait until the complete maturation of its poisonous fruits, to launch the 
struggle against Zionism”. [Siyonistlikle mücadeleye başlamak için onun zehirli 
semerelerinin muhit-i Osmaniye’de tamamıyla inkişaf etmesini intizar etmek muvafık 
olmayacağı kanaatindeyim.]500  
All his requests to draft a law against the Jews were rejected by the Central 
Government on grounds the reaction of the international public. However, when 
considered that the CUP didn’t pay attention to the international public in the issue of the 
Armenian deportations, this argument is rather weak. It seems that there was a strong 
lobby in İstanbul, who didn’t approve the actions of Cemal against Zionism and who 
prevented the issuance of such a law. Dündar’s thesis of ethnic engineering could be 
                                                 
498 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 475/9, Cemal to Talat, Jerusalem, 28 Mayıs 1331[15 May 1915]. 
499 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 529/69, Cemal to Talat, Aleppo, 10 Ağustos 1916 [24 August 
1916]. 
500 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 544/29, Cemal to Talat, 14 Kanun-ı Sani 1332 [27 January 1917]. 
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considered weak in this respect, too. He considered the CUP as of a a single mind in its 
policy of the Jews. Yet, most of the actions by Cemal were blocked by the Central 
Government.  
 In spite of the refusal of his draft laws by the Central Government, Cemal didn’t 
stop to struggle with the Zionist Movement. He increased, to a considerabl extent, the 
authority of the state over the Jewish colonies during his governorate in Syria: 
 
 
3.1.2. Taking Action against the Zionist Movement 
 
As a step to limit the power to the Zionist Movement and to increase the state 
control over the Jews in Palestine, Cemal appointed the late Kaymakam of Jafa, Bahaeddin 
Bey, as the Attache of the 4th Army for the information service. Bahaeddin had been 
charged with the struggle against the Zionist Movement by Cemal. Immediately after his 
appointment, he published an announcement in the Jewish newspaper Hacherut on 25th 
January 1915 warning all the Jews about staying away from the Zionist organization. He 
also declared that the Government decided to condemn the Zionist Movement, which 
aimed at the establishment of a Jewish state in the lands of the Ottoman State, and that 
anybody, who maintained relations with this organization secretly, would be punished. In 
the same announcement, it was highlighted that these governmental actions were only 
against Zionism, and the Jews, who were loyal to the state wouldn’t be damaged in any 
manner.501 However, Bahaeddin directed his measures towards the whole population. He 
was so harsh in his treatment of the Jewish population that he attracted the reaction of both 
German and American Ambassadors. As a consequence of their lobbying activities, in the 
beginning of February, he was recalled to İstanbul by the decision of the Cabinet to be 
charged in İstanbul.502   
                                                 
501 PA-AA, Türkei 195, Bd5, James Simon to AA, Berlin, 17 March 1915 
502 PA-AA, Türkei 195, Bd.5, Warburg to AA, 13 February 1915; Some Zionist reports 
claimed that Bahaeddin was appointed to a new post established in İstanbul to follow the 
Zionist activities. However, There is no trace in the documents that such a position was 
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However, the dismissal of Bahaeddin did not terminate the process. Cemal was 
suspicious that some Jews, who were the members of the Zionist organization, established 
a secret organization, which reached to a level violating the Ottoman authority.503 For that 
reason, the Intelligence Branch of the 4th Army, i.e. Cemal’s Army, carried out a search on 
Zionism in the Jewish quarter of Jaffa and found out some documents demonstrating that 
some services, which had to be performed by the government body such as jurisdiction, 
post services, policing and some municipal services, had been performed by the Jewish 
communities of the Jaffa district. Furthermore, they had a special flag for them. In the 
same investigation, the Army officials found some stamps circulated among them, 
indicating that the Zionist organization in Palestine gained some independence vis-à-vis 
the state authority. For that reason, the governor noted that the Army Commander was 
planning to refuse the application of the Zionist leaders for the Ottoman citizenship and to 
deport them. In the same way, the deportation of the Ottoman subjects who had a Zionist 
aspiration was among the plans of the Army Commander.504 These telegrams indicate that 
Cemal Pasha’s plans regarding Zionism were to remove their control over the Jewish 
population preventing the Ottoman Government from creating a uniform body. 
 All these statements and actions made by Cemal lead us to the conclusion that he 
didn’t have a special project of ethnic engineering against the Jews in Palestine. His only 
opposition was directed against Zionism taking root in Palestine, which aimed at the 
establishment of a home for the Jews there, out of the countenance of the Ottoman 
authority. To realize this project, he applied a series of measures against this movement. 
First of all, he expelled the Jews, who didn’t acquire Ottoman citizenship and then he 
deported the prominent Zionists from Palestine. As would be shown below in a detailed 
manner, Cemal applied all that was in his power to check Zionism in Palestine: 
                                                                                                                                                    
available. For further information about these claims see: PA-AA, Türkei 195, Bd 5, 
Ephraim Cohn to Paul Nathan, Jerusalem, 18 February 1915. 
503 Cemal to Enver, 27 Eylül 1333 [27 September 1917], Damascus, in Arşiv 
Belgeleriyle Ermeni Faaliyetleri, p. 696. 
504 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 463/9, Midhat [The Governor of Jerusalem] to Talat, Jerusalem 4 
Şubat 1330 [14 February 1915]; Cemal to Enver, 27 Eylül 1333 [27 September 1917], 
Damascus, in Arşiv Belgeleriyle Ermeni Faaliyetleri, p. 696; these remarks were also 
confirmed by Aaronsohn’s memoirs, which conveyed above: Aaransohn, Ibid., p. 3, 34. 
140 
 
 
3.1.2.1. Expulsion of the Jewish Citizens of the Entente States 
As will be expressed in Chapter 5, with the outbreak of the War, all the citizens of the 
enemy states were started to be deported. As a constituent of this process, the Jewish 
immigrants, citizens of these states, were also decided to be expulsed. As Cemal Pasha 
considered Zionism as a threat for the integrity of the Empire, and made use of this process 
as an opportunity to forestall the Zionist designs, by expelling Jews from Palestine, who 
immigrated there by the encouragement of the Zionists. However, it was not a special plan 
prepared only for the expulsion of the Jews. All the citizens of the foreign states were 
exposed to the same treatment.505  
 However, the Jews were treated in a privileged way in comparision to the other 
nationalities. This situation emergen, when the expulsion decision of the Jews from 
Jerusalem caused a great anger among the Zionist circles all around the world. They had a 
considerable international network, which could direct the international public opinion 
against the Ottoman Government. With that fear and with the pressure of the German and 
American Ambassadors, and by the impact of the pro-Zionist members of the CUP, in the 
beginning of January 1915, the Ottoman Government softened its decision and gave a 
privilege for ones who had a Jewish origin to acquire Ottoman citizenship within 10 days 
paying 40 francs as application fee.506 Those who refused the Ottoman citizenship had to 
leave the Ottoman country.507 It could be presumed that accepting them into Ottoman 
citizenship would facilitate their integration with the Empire putting them under the direct 
rule of the Empire by the way of naturalization.  
                                                 
505 BOA, DH.EUM.5.Şb 11/7, The Governor of Beirut to EUM [Emniyet-i Umumiye 
Müdiriyeti], Beirut, 18 Kanun-ı Evvel 1330 [31 October 1914]; HHStA, PA 38/366, Ranzi 
to Burian,"Entente-freundliche Ausstreuungen; Einstellung des Verkehrs auf den 
Syrischen Bahnen", Damascus, 22 June 1915.  
506 PA-AA, Türkei 195, Bd. 5, Wangenheim to Bethmann-Hollweg, Constantinople, 17 
January 1915; HHStA, PA 38/367, Jerusalem Consul to Burian, “Politisches 
Situationsbild”, Jerusalem, 7 June 1915. 
507 PA-AA, Türkei 195, Bd. 5, Wangenheim to Bethmann-Hollweg, Constantinople, 6 
February 1915. 
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 Those, who didn’t acquire Ottoman citizenship, were deported by Cemal during 
December 1914 and January 1915. 2700 Jews of the Entente states were sent to Egypt with 
Italian vessels.508 The report of the Governor of Jerusalem, Midhat Bey, clarifies how the 
Government tried to facilitate the process of acquiring Ottoman citizenship of the non-
Ottoman Jews while prosecuting the Zionist organization. With the permission of the 
Central Government, in the beginning of February, the Governor renewed the deadline for 
a second time and the application fee was abandoned to smooth the progress of the 
naturalization of the Jewish immigrants. The Governor informed Talat that, until the 
beginning of February the number of the applicants was 3.000 people.509  
This treatment of the Zionists in Palestine was considerably exaggerated by the 
German Zionists before the German Government and in the international public opinion. 
They claimed that the Ottoman high officials in Palestine started to destroy houses and 
belongings of the Jews systematically and those officials invited the Arabs to capture the 
goods of the Jews.510 However, quite the reverse of what the Zionist leaders claimed, both 
German Ambassador in İstanbul and the German Consuls in Jaffa and Jerusalem agreed 
that the Zionist claims were exaggerated, and many of the Ottoman implementations 
against Jews were not special to them, but could be applicable for all the people in the 
region emanating from the difficulties of the War.511 
                                                 
508 PA-AA, Türkei 1915, Bd. 5, Wangenheim to Bethmann Hollweg, Constantinople, 
18 January 1915; PA-AA, Türkei 195, Bd. 5, Wangenheim to Bethmann-Hollweg, 
Constantinople, 21 January 1915. 
509 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 463/9, Midhat [The Governor of Jerusalem] to Talat, Jerusalem 4 
Şubat 1330 [14 February 1915]. 
510 PA-AA, Türkei 195, Bd. 5, Bernstoff to AA (Tranmitting Lucius, a Zionist leader), 
Stockholm, 1 February 1915; PA-AA, Türkei 195, Bd. 5, Warburg (a Zionist leader) to 
Bethmann-Hollweg, Berlin, 10 February 1915; PA-AA, Türkei 195, Bd.7, Lichtheim to 
Bethmann-Hollweg, Constantinople, 22 December 1915.  
511 PA-AA, Türkei 195, Bd.5, Wangenheim to Bethmann-Hollweg, Constantinople, 8 
February 1915; PA-AA, Türkei 195, Bd.5, Wangenheim to Bethmann Hollweg 
(Transmitting Jerusalem and Jaffa Consuls), Constantinople, 10 February 1915; In 1917, 
The German Ambassador warned the local consuls that the Jewish descriptions about their 
issues could be exaggerated. Therefore, the Ambassador requested the Consuls to add their 
own opinions to the Jewish telegrammes, which was sent by the German Consulates: PA-
AA, Türkei 195, Bd.16, Bernstoff to AA, Constantinople, 25 October 1917.  
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In June 1915, some of the non-Ottomans were accepted into citizenship. 970 of the 
applicants became the Ottoman citizens and exempt from the deportation. According to 
remarks of the leader of the German Zionists, Dr. Ruppin, there was no longer a possibility 
of deportation for the Jews in Palestine.512 By the end of September 1915, the citizenship 
process for the Jews had been completed, and on 20th September, those who refused to 
accept Ottoman nationality, or whose applications were refused by the Ottoman 
Government were deported from Palestine. Their number was around 500, and the 
deportees had generally a Zionist affiliation. Most of them were Russian citizens, and were 
sent to Egypt.513  
Taking both the process of the deportation of the Jews of the Entente and Cemal’s 
reports on the Zionist Movement into consideration, it can be concluded that, at the 
beginning, Cemal Pasha wished to expulse all the Jewish population of the Entente states, 
who had Zionist affiliations for the sake of the facilitation of the imposition of the state 
authority on the Jewish communities. Moreover, at first, he thought all the Jews as part of 
the Zionist movement. However, according to the remarks of the German Consul in 
Jerusalem, in a short while, he realized the difference between Zionism and the Jewry and 
directed his attention towards the Zionists.514 As a final remark, it must again be 
highlighted that all his actions against the Jews intended to remove the Zionist barrier, as 
he saw it, between the Government and the Jews, not to terminate the Jewish existence in 
Palestine. The naturalization of the Jews aimed at putting them under the jurisprudence of 
the Ottoman law. Another aspect of his anti-Zionist policy was to exile the Zionist leaders 
on the same considerations. 
                                                 
512 PA-AA, Türkei 195, Bd.6, Wangenheim to AA (Transmitting Lichtheim), 18 June 
1915. 
513 PA-AA, Türkei 195, Bd. 5, Baumert to AA, Jaffa, 24 September 1915; BOA, 
DH.ŞFR. 485/22, Midhat to Talat, Jerusalem, 11 Eylül 1331 [24 September1915] 
514 The German Consul of Jerusalem interpreted this change as the cognizance of the 
Ottoman officials the difference between Zionism and the Jewry. Despite this evaluation, 
the Ottoman authorities were aware of this difference from the very beginning. However, 
they were convinced that the Zionist aspirations could only be forestalled with the 
expulsion of the Jewish immigrants from Palestine. For the evaluations of the German 
Consul regarding that change see: PA-AA, Türkei 195, Bd. 7, Brode to Bethmann-
Hollweg, Jaffa, 26 August 1915.  
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3.1.2.2. Prosecution of the Zionist Leaders 
For Cemal Pasha, being a Zionist leader had the same meaning with being a 
separatist, and hence an obstacle to his policy in Syria. For that reason, he had started his 
struggle against the Zionist leaders immediately after his arrival in Syria. According to 
Ephraim Cohn, the director of the schools of the German Jews Benevolent Society 
[Hilfsverein], Cemal Pasha regarded Zionism as a threat, while looking at the Jews with 
sympathy. During his short stay in Jerusalem before the first attack against Egypt, Cemal 
delivered a considerably sharp speech against the Zionist movement, and in that short span 
of time, he exiled 12 of the Zionist leaders to Galilee (Northern Palestine) on grounds that 
they were peace-breakers. There were prominent Zionists among them such as Yellin, 
Antebi, Bogratoschof and Grasowsky.515 
 Cemal’s treatment of the Zionist leaders was frequently interfered in by the 
lobbying activities of the German Government in İstanbul. In the same way, he had to 
retreat some of his decisions due to the impact of the international press where the Zionists 
had a considerable influence. Therefore, in most cases, he had to change his method of 
action to put his plans into practice. In this context, in the beginnings of his governorate in 
Syria, Cemal had decided to expel some 49 of the prominent colonists, however, with the 
German intervention, he had to withdraw his decision, and gradually implemented his 
decision expelling those people in a piecemeal way. Some of them were expelled in 
February and another group was sent to Egypt and Anatolia in March.516 In the same way, 
in Mid-August 1915, the prominent leaders of the Zionist colonies, Dr. Mossinsohn, 
Aronotiz, Rabbiner Fishmann, Ridnik, Fein and the director of the Hebrew Gymnasium in 
Jaffa, Dr. Bogratoschof had to leave Palestine. According to the interpretation of the 
Zionist representative in Berlin, with the expulsion of these people, Cemal Pasha aimed at 
                                                 
515 PA-AA, Türkei 195, Bd. 5, Ephraim Cohn to AA, Jerusalem, 20 January 1915; PA-
AA, Türkei 195, Bd. 7, Warburg to AA (Transmitting Lichtheim), Berlin, 25 August 1915. 
516 PA-AA, Türkei 195, Bd. 5, Wangenheim to AA (Transmitting Warburg), 
Constantinople, 8 February 1915: PA-AA, Türkei 195, Bd.5, Wangenheim to Bethmann-
Hollweg, Constantinople, 16 March 1915. 
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the destruction of the Hebrew school system and the Jewish colonization system, and these 
results were impending for the Jewish society.517   
 Some of the expelled Zionists were those whose applications for the Ottoman 
nationality were refused since they were perceived as a threat for the integration and 
control policies of Cemal Pasha in Syria. They were deported to Egypt with Italian and 
American ships.518 Some others had already acquired the Ottoman citizenship. Therefore, 
they were mostly arrested and taken to Damascus for the adjudication in the court martial. 
Some of them were released while some others were being sent into exile from Palestine to 
Anatolia.519  
 The most important decision made by Cemal Pasha regarding the Zionist leaders 
was the expulsion of Dr. Arthur Ruppin, the leader of the German Zionists in Palestine, 
and the most influential Zionist there. He had a German citizenship, and enjoyed a good 
reputation in the Jewish circles in America. Therefore, his existence in Palestine had a key 
importance for the continuance of the Zionist organizations in Palestine.520 
 Cemal Pasha first tried to expel Ruppin from Palestine in April 1915. He requested 
the German Ambassador in Istanbul via Damascus Consul the recall of the mentioned 
Zionist leader.521 However, his departure was forestalled with the interference of the 
German Government.522 In October 1915, he renewed his request. But, the German 
Ambassador opposed Ruppin’s recall. As a result, Cemal accepted the German 
intervention and allowed Ruppin to stay on condition that he had to hand his post over  to 
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an Ottoman citizen. Hereupon, another Zionist leader Dr. Thon, who had Austrian 
citizenship, had to apply for the Ottoman citizenship and take over the presidency of the 
German Jews in Palestine.523  
 In the middle of July 1916, Cemal’s anti-Zionist sentiments were triggered again 
with some news published in the French, English and the Neutral press. They claimed that 
the Ottoman Empire agreed on land sale in Palestine to the Jews upon the request of the 
American Ambassador. The source of the news was Morgenthau, the late American 
Ambassador in Constantinople. Cemal Pasha was furious with this news, and took it as an 
advantage to expell Ruppin from Palestine, although the claims were refuted by 
Morghentau himself.524 
 With regard to this, on 11st September 1916, Cemal Pasha called Dr. Ruppin to his 
office and requested him to leave Palestine within 10 days in a polite but certain manner. 
Ruppin asked the reason of his deportation. Cemal answered him that he was tired of 
Zionism and no longer wanted to be busy with this movement. Additionally, he advised 
Ruppin not to frustrate himself applying to secure some intervention for the cancellation of 
his decision (he meant the German intervention). Ruppin inferred from this threat that if he 
had applied to Germany for help, Cemal would choose persection of  the Zionist 
institutions under the German protection his object. For that reason, not to damage the 
Zionist organization in Palestine, he accepted Cemal’s decision without opposition and 
prevented any intervention in this decision with this fear. While he was leaving Cemal’s 
office, Ruppin expressed that he never acted against the Ottoman interests and, maybe in 
future, they could meet again to explain Cemal Pasha this issue. Cemal answered: “maybe, 
                                                 
523 PA-AA, Türkei 195, Bd.7, Neurath to AA (Transmitting Lichtheim), Constantinople, 
14 October 1915; PA-AA, Türkei 195, Bd.7, Lichtheim to Louis Brandeis, Constantinople, 
undated,  
524 The reportage had been published first in the semi-official newspaper of the French 
Government, “Gazette de Lausanne”, with the tltle of “La Palestine republique Juive” on 
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but in Germany”.525 However, instead of returning to Germany, Ruppin preferred to stay in 
İstanbul to continue his activities there. 
 After getting rid of Ruppin, Cemal looked for the ways to send his successor Thon 
and his vice-president Yellin away from Palestine. They had taken over the responsibility 
of the organization of the Zionist activities in Palestine after the exile of Ruppin. On 30th 
January 1917, Cemal called Jellin to Damascus with his family and later on 4th February, 
he ordered the appearance of Thon in Damascus. But, this time, Cemal withdrew his 
decision and gave up the idea of expelling these two leaders from Palestine, most probably 
avoiding the reaction of the international public against him.526  
 With those actions, Cemal had managed to check the Zionist activities to some 
extent, and his concern regarding Zionism entered into a new, tranquil stage till the British 
military threat against Palestine appeared. After the First Battle in Gaza, Cemal decided to 
evacuate Gaza and Jaffa. Whether this decision was taken with military considerations or 
political reasons needs to be understood for Cemal’s policy of Zionism. 
 
3.1.2.3. Evacuation of Jaffa and the Attempts to Evacuate Jerusalem 
The approach of the British threat of occupation for Palestine compelled Cemal 
Pasha to evacuate Jaffa, Jerusalem and Gaza, immediately after the First Battle of Gaza on 
28th March. First, Gaza was evacuated. But, the scarcity of the Jewish population in Gaza 
didn’t bring the issue to the international agenda. However, the concentration of the Jews 
in Jaffa and Jerusalem caused great anxiety at that time among the Jewish circles all 
around the world on the aims of the evacuations of these cities due to the impact of the 
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Zionist propaganda.527 In this section, the discussion will be focused on the aims and 
implementation of the evacuations. 
 Fuat Dündar examines the evacuation of Jaffa, and concludes that, in Cemal’s eyes, 
there was no military threat for that city at that time. He only aimed at the turcification of 
Jaffa and Jerusalem, and to make Jerusalem a center for Islam and Turkishness, taking the 
occupation threat as an opportunity. Therefore, he decided to evacuate the mentioned 
cities. It seems that Dündar rarely appreciates that the evacuation event emerged as a 
measure to defend Palestine against the British attack, although it had some political 
aspects. He discusses the issue as a deliberate movement planned by the CUP leaders long 
before, rather than as a sudden event developed as a consequence of the war 
circumstances. Indeed, his book doesn’t take the reality of the military threat into 
consideration.528 Although Cemal had political aims regarding the control of the Zionist 
Movement, an approaching military threat couldn’t be denied. In the reports that Cemal 
sent to Enver, it can easily be inferred that Cemal expected a great British expedition 
following the First Battle in Gaza. The last chapter of this study will clarify how seriously 
Cemal Pasha considered the military situation in the Palestine Front following the 
mentioned British attack. The evacuation of Jaffa was planned as a measure to a possible 
naval action of the Entente. Secondly, Dündar asserts that Cemal and the Central 
Government in İstanbul always went along well with each other. It is a fact that Cemal and 
the Central Government agreed many times regarding the Zionist policy. However, the 
cases of conflict over the issue cannot be written away. This is especially for the case, 
where both Talat’s request and Enver’s order played a crucial role in the abandonment of 
Cemal’s idea to evacuate Jerusalem.529 
 However, the relatively impartial observers did not deny the existence of a military 
danger as well as the political aims of Cemal Pasha in the evacuation. According to the 
                                                 
527 For the examples of such reports see: PRO, FO 371/3053, Dizengoff to FO, “Appeal 
to the Jewish Communities in the Ottoman Empire, 4 May 1917; PRO, FO 371/3055, 
Sykes to Graham, Cairo, 28 April 1917; PA-AA, Türkei 195, Bd. 12, Wedel to Bethmann-
Hollweg, Constantinople, 28 April 1917; 
528 Dündar, Ibid. pp. 388-396. 
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report of the German Consul in Jerusalem, it became apparent with the First Gaza War that 
the evacuation was beneficial for military regards. If Gaza had not been evacuated, the 
British siege would cause panic among the dwellers of the city, and that would make a 
negative impact among the troops. Furthermore, the people in Jaffa sympathized with the 
British. Therefore, in case of battle, there could be an affair of espionage for the “Enemy” 
by the local people of the city. Finally, he added that the British danger created a pretext 
for Cemal for carrying out his designs to ruin the Zionist organization in Palestine. The 
Jerusalem Consul of Germany, in spite of his Jewish origin and his sympathy with 
Zionism, thought that Cemal’s action of evacuation was primarily emanated from the 
military considerations.530 Germany’s military representative in Constantinople also 
emphasized that Cemal’s action was suitable for military reasons.531 Similarly, accepting 
the policital aspect of this action, the Spanish consul states in his diaries that “espionage 
must exist on a grand scale”532.After his visit to Jerusalem, General Falkenhayn was in the 
same way convinced that the evacuation was carried out for military reasons. Quite the 
reverse of Jerusalem consul and Falkenhayn, the German Ambassador in Constantinople 
insisted on the opinion that the military situation had contributed to the political aspirations 
of Cemal Pasha, and therefore, the preliminary reason of the evacuation was political.533 A 
conversation between Cemal and the Spanish consul is worth to mention here to 
understand the military reasons for the evacuation of Jaffa: 
“…I tried to get from His Excellency [Cemal Pasha] the order for the Spaniards to remain 
in Jaffa at their own risk, but he refused. I attacked the question saying to him: ‘The 
intention of the government being to avoid the death of foreigners in case of bombing, if 
they renounce all rights of reclamation against the government…’ But he cut me off 
saying, ‘That is not our objective but rather to defend ourselves in the city as we have done 
in Gaza, and how do you want us to defend ourselves between the screams and wailing of 
women and children?’ I had to capitulate unwillingly”.534 
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A closer look at the process of the evacuation will clarify the reasons behind the 
evacuation. As will be described in the last chapter, Cemal Pasha discovered the British 
preparations for an extensive attack against Palestine as a consequence of the explorations 
of the Ottoman aviators. Therefore, the possibility of a military danger cannot be denied. 
However, some implementations special to the Jews made Cemal’s intentions suspicious: 
In the beginning of the process, Cemal allowed the German citizens to stay in Jaffa, but 
exempted the Jews from this privilege. In addition, he had allowed the farmers, who would 
harvest their crops, to continue their lives in Jaffa till the end of the harvest season. As an 
exception, at the beginning, the Jewish farmers were not allowed to stay. The interview of 
the German Consul of Jerusalem made the extension of this exemption possible for the 
Jews as well. All in all, it seems that, in the beginning, the political aims prevailed against 
the military considerations, although that action cannot be deemed as a deliberate action 
planned by the CUP leaders independent from the war circumstances.535 Furthermore, the 
suspicion that rose towards the Jews should also be taken into consideration in this action.  
 Soon after the beginning of the evacuation of Jaffa, the Entente and Neutral press 
began to use this action as a propaganda measure against Cemal Pasha and the Ottoman 
Government. The news of the French Agence-Havas was the final straw in this sense. The 
news was claiming that it was only the Jews, who evacuated from Jaffa and Gazza, and 
they were not provided with transport means and left without homes. The private 
belongings of the immigrants and the Christian sanctuaries were plundered.536 Thon 
observed that the picture drawn by the Agence was very exaggerated and accusatory.537 
  Upon the mentioned news of the Entente and Neutral press, Cemal commenced 
counter propaganda. He invited the prominent Zionists and the religious leaders of the 
Christians and Jews to his office and requested them to publish proclamations in the 
European press refuting the claims of the news.  Cemal granted some money to those 
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people to perform the duties assigned by him (1.000 ltq.[lira Turk]), and to relieve the 
problems of the immigrants (3.000 ltq.).538  
Immediately after the meeting, Dr. Thon, the leader of the German Zionists, sent 
confutation telegrams to 13 Zionist Newspapers.539 Similarly, the Grand Rabbi of Istanbul 
gave an interview to the Frankfurter Zeitung and expressed that the Ottoman Government 
reserved 100.000 ltq for the provisioning of the refugees. The newspapers in Copenhagen 
published this reportage and the denial of the Ottoman Government regarding the claims of 
the mentioned press.540 Similarly, the religious leaders of the Jewish and Christian 
Communities sent the telegrams to the European press refuting the abovementioned 
news.541 
Although the news of the Entente press had exaggerated the conditions of the 
emigrants, under the impact of that press campaign, Cemal Pasha obviously changed his 
treatment of the emigrated Jaffans and provided better means for them.542 According to the 
report of Kühlmann, the German Ambassador in İstanbul, during the evacuation of Jaffa 
everything continued in its routine, except some small problems occurred as a result of the 
war circumstances.543 The Governor of Jerusalem informed to Talat that for the security of 
Jaffa, 37 guards, and 13 polices, and 33 gendarmeries were left to protect the belongings of 
the immigrated people.544 Above all, contrary to his first declaration, Cemal allowed the 
refugees to settle anywhere in Palestine except the coastal band.545  
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It can be concluded that Cemal saw Zionism as a danger for the Ottoman 
domination in Palestine and for the integration of the Jewish population with the Empire, 
and he wanted to control and eliminate this movement like the other movements that he 
considered a threat for the integrity of the empire. Although he was exposed to some 
pressure from domestic and international politics, and from Germany, he could implement 
his intentions to a considerable extent; the armed guardians of the Jewish colonies were 
abolished at the beginning of the War546 as well as their special courts.547 In addition, their 
colonies were transformed into the Ottoman villages and the chiefs of the colonies became 
the Mukhtars of the newly created Ottoman-Jewish villages.548 It is finally worth to 
mention that Cemal wanted to eliminate this movement only because of its aspirations in 
the direction of the establishment of an independent Jewish state in Palestine, not because 
he wanted to design the population of Palestine along with ethnic considerations. 
 
 
3.2. Subjugation of the Christian Clergy 
 
 
Another group, similar to the Zionists, that was exposed to Cemal’s policies of 
suppression to provide the structural unity of the State and to check the influence of the 
foreign powers was the clergy of the Christian sects, who enjoyed a broad autonomy in the 
preceding years of the WWI under the protection rights of the Great Powers provided by 
the Capitulations.549 As in the other autonomous cases, the abolition of that protection with 
the outburst of the Great War signified the beginning of the end of an autonomous clergy 
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for the Christians in the Ottoman Empire in general and in Syria in particular. In the pre-
war period, the Christians mainly sympathized with the Europeans in the competition 
between the Ottoman state and those powers for the influence in the Arab provinces. The 
agents of the European influence were, to a large extent, the Christian clergy. Therefore, 
according to the Spanish consul in Jerusalem, the abolition of the Capitulations caused a 
tremendous panic among the Christian population since they were afraid of a Christian 
massacre in the Syrian towns.550 
To eliminate the European influence on the Christian communities, Cemal 
attempted to Ottomanizate this clergy and thus, to assert the power of the state on the 
Christian population. For that purpose, during his governorate in Syria, Cemal Pasha set a 
premium on the subjugation of those autonomous clergy to the Ottoman Imperial authority 
and, thus, made a considerable effort to eliminate the foreign influence disseminated 
mostly by the clergy of those religious communities. As a result of that concern, the 
communities that were under the influence of the Entente states, especially France, were 
prosecuted and subjugated by Cemal to a broad measure. Possibly, he aimed, to some 
extent, at the secularization of the Chistian societies, and thus, the increase of the state’s 
control over its Christian citizens. 
 When the WWI broke out, the vast majority of the Christian population in Syria 
sympathized with France and Russia ,due to the impact of their clergy, and attributed their 
salvation from the Ottoman “yoke”, to the Entente victory in the war.551 According to 
Damascus Consul of Austria, Lebanon, where Maronite Christians were a majority in the 
population, was “like the French part of the East”.552  In terms of the French and Russian 
influences, the most important sects were the Greek-Orthodox and the Maronites. Cemal 
Pasha resorted to annex their clergies to the Ottoman Sultan hierarchically to break the 
French influence on them and to show their communities the strength of the State asserting 
the authority of the state on their religious leaders.  In that regard, firstly, he laid hands on 
the appointment of the Maronite Patriarch, who was not appointed by the decree of the 
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Ottoman Sultan, unlike the other Patriarchs, for about a hundred years. This difference had 
provided a large autonomy to the Patriarchate. In spite of the irritation of all the Maronite 
clergy, in the second month of his appointment as the Governor General of Syria, Cemal 
made the Patriarch a government official and ordered his appointment by the decree.553 By 
that decree, all the Patriarchs had became the public officers of the Government.554 
According to the Austrian Consul in Beirut, it would mean that, from then on, those who 
were favored by the Government as the Maronite Patriarch could be appointed in contrast 
to the request of the Patriarchate. Under these circumstances, the Patriarch applied to the 
Austrian Consul for the intervention of his Government, but his endeavor was 
inconclusive.555 
 Maronite bishops were the most influential carriers of the French influence among 
their co-religionists and in Lebanon. In addition, in case of a French occupation from the 
sea, there was a probability for some of the mentioned bishops that they would support the 
hostile states, since they propagated for the dissemination of the French influence in the 
region. Furthermore, at the beginning of the War, the Maronite Patriarch gave an interview 
to the French Newspaper Le Matin and declared that 6.000 Maronites in Beirut were ready 
to join the French army.556 Therefore, Cemal Pasha called a large group of the Maronite 
bishops to Jerusalem and Damascus for “consultations”. Some of them, who might support 
France in case of a coastal occupation, were kept as hostages. The most outstanding ones 
among them were the bishop of Cyprus, Boulos Auwad, the bishop of Beirut, Boutros 
Schebli and some priests in the immediate circle of the Maronite Patriarch. They would be 
susceptible to arrest in a naval action of the Entente from the sea.557  
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 The display of the assertion of the Ottoman authority over the Maronite Patriarch in 
public was considered necessary by Cemal Pasha to demonstrate the strength of the State 
to the Syrian public opinion in general and to the Maronite community in particular. By 
that reason, on 27th July 1915, the Patriarch paid Cemal a “visit” in his headquarters in 
Sofar of Lebanon by his forceful invitation. The Patriarch covered a long distance from his 
summer house to appear before Cemal Pasha in spite of his old age. The German Consul in 
Beirut interpreted the meaning of this event as “the demonstration to all over the World 
that the Maronite Patriarch [was] no longer the master of Lebanon, [and] he was 
subjugated to the representative of the Ottoman Government in Lebanon”. Journal de 
Beyrouth, The semi-official newspaper of the Government, conveyed this event as “the 
resurgence of deep feelings of Ottomanism”.558  
 Although the Patriarch was attached to the body of the Ottoman Empire, he was 
treated with distrust from the beginning, since he was a mainstay of the Frency policy 
before the War.559 Therefore, the beginning of the prosecutions against the members of the 
Arabist Party caused the stimulation of a similar process for the Maronite Patriarch since 
he sent a letter to French Foreign Ministry against the Ottoman Government, and that letter 
was found among the documents seized within the French Consulate in the beginning of 
the War. As a result of that process, the Patriarch was sent into exile to Adana by reason of 
his French partisanship.560 
 For Cemal, another autonomous group that had to be controlled for the sake of 
assertion of the Ottoman dominance over the Syrian peoples was the Greek-Catholic sect, 
which could be considered another important constiuent of the French influence in Syria. 
In the beginning of Cemal’s era, like the Maronite Patriarch, the Greek-Catholic 
Partriarch’s rights on his community were seized and most of his suffragan bishops were 
heavily punished (3 of his 14 suffragan bishops were sent into exile, one was sentenced 
with capital punishment, and another 2 were expelled from their own diocese). In the same 
way, the Greek-Catholic bishop of Akka was in France when the war outburst. He 
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delivered a public speech and expressed the loyalty of the Christians in Syria to France. At 
that time, this speech was published in the French press. Following the War decision of the 
Ottoman Cabinet, the bishop was sentenced to death because of his speech in France. The 
bishop, who learned this decision in the last minute, changed his route on the way to 
Egypt, and could save himself from the death penalty. Similarly, The Bishop of Baalbek 
was judged of being an accomplice of Nahle Pasha Mutran’s treason affair and sent to 
exile in Urfa. The Bishop of Tripoli, Joseph Dumani was exiled to Sivas with a similar 
condemnation. The Greek-Catholic Patriarch Kyrill VIIIth, who was supposed to stay three 
years in Syria and three years in Egypt, was residing in Egypt in the beginning of the War. 
The Ottoman Government issued a call for him to return Syria. Upon his refusal, the 
Government collected the bishops in Damascus and requested them to choose an acting-
patriarch. In spite of the smallness of the participation, the request was performed.561 
 The story of Djerasimos Messara, the Greek-Orthodox Archbishop, does not differ 
much from the others narrated above. He had to resign from his post upon the request of 
the Chairman Officer of the Conscription Commission in Beirut. The Archbishop was a 
member of the mentioned Commission. The Chairman requested him to work with more 
enthusiasm, but he resisted this request. In addition, he opposed the extension of the 
military service to the members of his community during the meeting of the Commission. 
Because of that, he was expelled from the meeting by the Chairman. The Chairman 
expressed that he would be delivered to the Court Martial, but later, as a consequence of an 
agreement between the Government and the Church, the Archbishop retired, and the 
question was solved. All the Archbishop candidates were educated either in Russia or in 
Greece. Due to that, it became impossible to find an appropriate candidate, and Michel 
İbrahim Sursock, the representative of the Beirut’s Greek-Orthodox community in the 
Parliament, was appointed as the Chairman of the local Greek-Orthodox.562 If 
secularization was the limitation of the power of the religious authority over the daily life 
and social order, and the increase of the worldly sovereign in place of it, those 
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implementations could be deemed as a step for the secularization the Christian 
communities in Syria. 
Other than the abolition of the autonomy of the sectarian hierarchies annexing them 
to the Imperial body, Cemal Pasha applied to secure the loyalties of these clergies by the 
way of giving money to the Churches. The War conditions had left some of the 
Patriarchates to twist in the wind, and in the absence of any other position, the Greek-
Orthodox Church in Jerusalem and Damascus and the Armenian Katogigos in Jerusalem 
had to apply to Cemal Pasha for help. He answered their requests positively in each time. 
Beginning from the end of 1915, he lent money to the two religious posts periodically till 
the end of his governorate on the condition of payment after the War.563 According to the 
memoirs of Kurd Ali, he persuaded Cemal that assistance to the Patriarch of Greek-
Orthodox community in Damascus would increase the sympathy for the state among both 
Muslims and the Christians, since the Patriarch was respected by both communities.564 
Cemal applied all these methods to provide a unitary structure of the Ottoman 
Empire shedding the religious interlayers between the state and the Christians. 
Furthermore, removal of the authority of the clergy from the Christian societies was, 
indeed a kind of secularization for those societies facilitating the control of the state on 
them. However, the result was in contrast to what he desired in the sense of the sentiments 
of the local people. Those policies didn’t make any contribution to the increase of the Pro-
Ottoman feelings of the local Christians, but made them further hostile to the State while 
antagonizing the Ottoman friendly circles to the Government, and increased their 
sympathy to the Entente Powers, even if the control of the Government on Christian 
communities had increased. The operations of Cemal Pasha to subjugate all the sections of 
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society made Muslims and Christians closer to each others, which they pursued different 
aspirations in the preceding years of the War.565  
Cemal did not only endeavor to remove the authority of the religious institutions 
and the authority of the civil society organizations, like that of the Zionists, from the 
Ottoman citizens, the administratively autonomous bodies were also treated in the same 
way. As the only example, the case of the abolishment of the autonomous Government in 
Lebanon is worth to analyze for further conception of the nature of Cemal’s regime in 
Syria: 
 
 
3.3. The End of “the Long Peace”: Annexation of the Mount Lebanon’s 
Government 
 
 
On the verge of the War, the autonomous rule in Lebanon [Mutasarrifiyya] enjoyed 
of having all the basic institutions of a modern governmental apparatus. The autonomous 
government in Mount Lebanon was guided by constitutional regulations. In addition, the 
Lebanese government had centralized executive, fiscal, and judicial branches as well as 
municipal administrations serving in the towns. “The entire system was financed by locally 
raised revenue and manned by experienced native personnel.”566  
 The distribution of population of Lebanon in proportion to the religious 
communities and their political tendencies played an essential role in the establishment of 
that autonomy: The Maronites enjoyed the lion’s share of numbers in the population, 
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following them the members of the Greek-Orthodox church were placed in the second 
rank, while the Druzes were the last great religious community in Lebanon. The former 
were deeply influenced by France, while the Orthodox were sympathizing with Russia, and 
according to the statement of the Governor of Beirut, the religious ties, no matter how 
weak, between the Druze and the Ottoman Empire made them pro-Ottoman at heart, 
however, they outwardly seemed to be pro-British.567 Their pro-Ottoman attitude 
throughout the whole war period confirms the assessment of the Governor.568 Besides the 
French sympathy of a considerable number of the Lebanese, the French consuls had a 
broad authority over the issues of Lebanon. The French Consul, as conveyed by Yusuf al-
Hakim, could appoint and dismiss the bureaucrats, such as Kaimakams, in Lebanon 
without the consent of the Ottoman administration.569 
 As a result of those characteristics of Lebanese Government and People, the 
outbreak of the WWI sounded the death knell for this order in Lebanon. In two weeks, 
after the commencement of the mobilization in Syria, the high-officials in Lebanon began 
to send reports about the dangers posed by the existing order in Lebanon, and advised the 
seizure of its government by the Central Ottoman Government. Bekir Sami Bey, the 
Governor of Beirut, advised to Talat, the annexation of the system in Mount Lebanon to 
the Ottoman Empire administratively with the promulgation of its protocols guaranteed by 
the Great Powers. However, the Governor didn’t ask the abolition of all the privileges of 
the Lebanese. In contrast, he proposed the continuance of the exemptions such as military 
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service, taxes etc. under the guarantee of the Ottoman Government.570 In his telegram, 
which was sent some days later, the Governor proposed to apply pressure on the Governor 
of Mount Lebanon for the dismissal of the pro-French officials in the service of its 
autonomous rule.571 In the same way, the Kaymakam of Bekaa repeated the same 
suggestions adding to them the closure of the pro-French Newspapers, which propagated 
publicly in the favor of France.572 In his subsequent proposals, The Governor of Beirut 
repeated that the recognition of the privileges of Lebanon by the Ottoman Government 
abolishing the guarantee rights of the Entente powers would destroy the distrustfulness of 
the Lebanese for the Ottoman Government.573 
 These advises were given due attention as a consequence of the problems caused by 
the commencement of the mobilization in Syria and the desire of integration of Lebanon 
with the Imperial body. Militarily, According to the remarks of the British Consul of 
Beirut, the Lebanese government gave protection to military defaulters, and opened the 
borders to horses and mules, which were frightened away by their owners to avoid their 
animals being commandeered. In the beginning of the mobilization several attempts were 
made by the Ottoman Gendarmes led by Army officers to cross into the Lebanon to arrest 
defaulters running away from them or to seize transport animals. In every case but one, 
when they were strong, the Lebanese frontier guards successfully resisted their attempts. 
Hereupon, the Governor of Beirut openly threatened to send troops to all parts of the 
Lebanon to seize defaulters and animals liable to be requisitioned. However, an agreement 
was reached between the sides.574  
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In a few days following this agreement, the Governor of Mount Lebanon was 
ordered by the commander of the 8th Army Corps to disarm inhabitants of Lebanon. 
However, the Governor refused the request demanding the order of Grand Vizier for such 
an action.575 That was presumably due to the expressions of the Maronite Patriarch, which 
were conveyed in the previous section, stating the support of their co-religionists to France, 
and asking for the victory of the mentioned country against Germany. 
 The attempts of the Ottoman Government to abolish the status of Lebanon directed 
the Lebanese to appeal to the French consulate week after week in the beginning of the 
War for the obtainment of guns and ammunitions to protect their government against an 
Ottoman invasion. However, the strivings of the Entente Governments to forestall the 
participation of the Ottomans in the War as an ally of Germany prevented them of the 
fulfillment of the demands of the Lebanese.576 Concordantly, the Lebanese in Egypt and 
Sao Paolo requested on behalf of the Syrians and the Lebanese from the French 
Government for the invasion of Lebanon by French troops.577 As was detailed in the first 
chapter, these plans couldn’t be carried into execution since the British headquarters in 
Egypt kept a defensive policy.578 
 When Cemal Pasha was appointed as the Governor General of Syria, the 
administration of Mount Lebanon was composed of the following components: The head 
of the autonomous administration in Lebanon was the governor [Mutasarrıf]. This post 
was occupied by Ohannes Kuyumcuyan. He was the chair of the Administrative Board, 
which was composed of the representatives of the religious orders. Another influential 
figure in the Lebanese Government was the Vice-President of the Administrative Board. 
This place was filled by Habib Pasha Saad, who was a prominent member of the Maronite 
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community. According to the assessment of the German Consul of Beirut, the real power 
in the administration was concentrated in the hands of the Vice-President of the 
Administrative Board. The Consul depicted the Maronite Patriarch and the Administrative 
Board, i.e., Habib Pasha Saad as the real rulers of Lebanon. In the viewpoint of the 
mentioned Consul, the Vice-Presidency was the most influential institution of the French 
influence there. Due to that, Cemal Pasha dismissed him soon after his appointment as the 
Governor General of Syria.579 He didn’t neglect to warn the Lebanese to cut their relations 
with all the Great Powers. In the visit of a Lebanese delegation to him, Cemal advised 
them to become loyalty to the Ottoman sultan and not to look for protection except for the 
Ottoman Government.580 
As a reflection of his general policy of having power over the autonomous 
structures, in a few days after his arrival in Syria, Cemal Pasha made out a declaration to 
the Lebanese, aiming at the integration of Lebanon’s autonomous structure into the 
Imperial system. In this declaration, he announced the expansion of the martial law to 
Lebanon that went into operation after the commencement of the mobilization. In addition, 
Cemal proclaimed the continuance of the old regulations of Lebanon under the protection 
of the Ottoman Government. He also ordered a battalion under the command of Colonel 
Rıza Bey to occupy the Mount Lebanon, and this action was successfully performed by the 
mentioned troops. Rıza Bey was appointed as the Commander of the Lebanese 
Detachment, and the Commander of the Lebanese Gendarmerie was subordinated to him. 
Cemal Pasha ordered Rıza Bey to punish all the assaults of the soldiers on the personal 
rights of the Lebanese as heavy as possible, and to pay the price of all the things that were 
bought for the Army. All the educational institutions, which belonged to the Entente, 
would be seized. Some of the buildings of these institutions would be used by the troops 
and the others would be transferred to the Lebanese Government. Cemal notified to the 
Central Government that he would change the existing Governor as soon as he found a 
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new candidate.581 According to a report sent by Cemal, by the occupation of Lebanon an 
obtacle was overcome preventing the unity of Syria and Palestine, and the dominance of 
the Government.582 
 Cemal didn’t plan to make Mount Lebanon as an ordinary province of the Ottoman 
Empire, and to secure the obedience of the Lebanese to the regulations implemented for all 
Ottoman citizens. Quite the reverse, he espoused the maintaining of their concession. In his 
draft law regarding the status of Lebanon, he proposed the continuance of the exemptions 
of Lebanese from the military service, the implementation of the selection of the Lebanese 
Gendarmerie from the local people and the method of tax collection as it was in the past. 
He only wanted to make the Lebanese felt that the only authority in Lebanon was the 
Ottoman Government, which could give some privileges in their country.583  
 As part of the policy of the integration of the Lebanese Government with the 
Imperial body, Cemal removed the Governor of Lebanon, Ohannes Pasha from his post in 
the fourth month of his presence in Syria as the Governor General, presumably due to his 
Frankophile attitude.584 The accountant Halim Bey was temporarily appointed to his 
post.585 Following the dismissal of the Governor, Cemal dissolved the Administrative 
Board, and some of its members were dismissed while some others were invited to 
Cemal’s Headquarters in Jerusalem for “consultations”. The elections to determine the 
members of the Administrative Board were renewed, and the new pro-Ottoman members 
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were elected for the Board. The members were elected according to the rules of the former 
electoral law. However, all the lists were examined by both the civil, and the military 
authorities, and only those who were permitted to be a candidate could participate in the 
elections. Cemal had dealt a blow to the post of the Vice-Presidency as well. It was the 
most influential post in the preceding system, and the former Vice-President played a 
crucial role in the continuance of the French influence in Mount Lebanon. This post was 
abolished in the newly-created administration of Cemal, and any of the influential persons, 
who had a close relationship with the French and the British Consuls before, couldn’t enter 
into the Administrative posts. Thus, the most important agents of the French influence in 
Lebanon could be ottomanized.586 
 Finding an appropriate candidate for the Governorship of Lebanon took a 
considerable time of Cemal Pasha. At the end, Ali Münif Bey, the undersecretary of the 
Ministry of the Interior, was appointed on 4th August 1915 as the Governor of Mount 
Lebanon.587 He was a Muslim and his appointment was unlawful, since, according to the 
constitution of Lebanon, the Governor should be a Catholic Ottoman.588 The Germans 
opposed to the appointment of a Muslim to this post, due to that the appointment of a 
Muslim to this position would increase the frustration of the Lebanese against the Ottoman 
Empire rather than strengthening the sympathies of the groups in Lebanon.589  
On his accession to the post, Ali Münif Bey delivered a speech regarding the new 
status of Lebanon, and stated that: 
“The state of which we are subjected, have abrogated the protocols arranging both the way 
of the appointment and election of the Governors and the style of its administration. In 
addıtıon, it eliminated the obstacles preventing the Lebanese to take the advantages of the 
Ottoman Constitution [Kanun-ı Esasi], which had already been provided for the other 
subjects of the Ottoman Empire. After overcoming all the foreign intervention, the State 
will act in this province with full independence in accordance with its rights of sovereignty. 
However, it is a mistake to suppose that… the state would abolish the privileges and 
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allowances of Lebanon maintaining all along, and to suppose that these privileges and 
allowances were shaped by foreign interventıons the intervention to the issues of the 
Mount, and were protected by their guarantees. On the contrary, the State deemed the 
Lebanese worthy of these allowances from the time immemorial, when no foreign 
intervention and mediation was available, and now [the state] did not think to retrieve those 
benefactions and benevolences.”590 
He wrote to Talat that the Lebanese were satisfied with his speech. However, quite the 
reverse of the optimism of the Governor, the Austrian Consul of Beirut assessed that his 
promises didn’t make any sense to the Lebanese, who had already been deprived of most 
of their privileges. Because of his lack of Arabic knowledge, it was not Ali Münif himself 
who delivered this speech, instead, the mentioned speech was only read to the Lebanese.591 
In the viewpoint of German Consul in Beirut, it seemed difficult for Ali Münif to 
win the confidence of the Lebanese in his capacity as a Muslim governor. The Maronite 
clergy saw his appointment as a countermeasure to remove their influence from Lebanon. 
Only the Druze approached the new Governor without prejudice. They would support Ali 
Münif Bey, if he was interested in their special demands. It is worth to mention in the 
sense of the decreasing influence of the foreign powers that, once and for all in Lebanon, a 
governor didn’t start with his job sending a message to the consulates regarding his 
appointment and did not endeavor to establish close relations with them. 592 
Immediately after his appointment, Ali Münif started reforms to assimilate 
Lebanon to the other provinces of the Ottoman Empire. He started with the Court 
organization, and reduced the number of Judges in the I. and II. Instance. Following that he 
appointed magistrates for the four major districts of Lebanon: Shuf, Metn, Kasrawan and 
Batrun. He appointed for each First Instance Court an investigation judge and a prosecutor. 
Thus, 24 new justice offices were created. While he was making appointments to the new 
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591 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.12, Mutius to Bethmann-Hollweg, Beirut, 2 October 1915; 
HHStA, PA 38/366, Nedwed to Burian, “Haltung des neuen Libanongouverneurs”, Beirut, 
20 October 1915. 
592 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.12, Mutius to Bethmann-Hollweg, Beirut, 2 October 1915. 
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posts, he respected the principle of the proportional consideration of the various 
confessions, and chose 16 Maronites, 3 Druzes, 2 Greek-Orthodoxes, 2 Greek-Catholics 
and 1 Matwali, a term used for the Shiite Muslims of Lebanon. The governor didn’t charge 
any of non-Lebanese to the newly-created posts.593 
In the same way, Ali Münif undertook some reforms in the administration and 
education of Lebanon, too. He endeavored to open schools on behalf of the Ottoman 
Government as well as taking some steps to develop public works and the agriculture. He 
planned to establish boys and girls high schools in the large villages. In these schools, 
according to their sizes, 4, 3 or 2 teachers would be assigned who could teach in Turkish 
and Arabic as well as a foreign language. The Governor created an inspection of the public 
schools to deal with the Problems of these educational institutions.594  
The direction of his reforms was to integrate the Lebanese system to the general 
Ottoman order. If we are to summarize in his own remarks, Ali Münif’s aim was “to 
annihilate [eser bırakmamak] the traces of the autonomous government, and to shape the 
administration of this province like other gayr-ı mülhaka provinces operating 
independently or subjected to another province till the end of the year.”595 The Gayr-ı 
Mülhaka provinces were directly annexed to the Central Government because of that they 
were exposed to a danger of foreign occupation or influence, or that their possession were 
so crucial for the policies of the Ottoman Empire. Medine, Jerusalem, Bingazi were the 
most important examples of those provinces. However, afterwards, he preferred the second 
option, and prepared a plan arranging the administration of Mount Lebanon as part of the 
Beirut province. In the new organization, the divisions of the towns and villages weren’t 
                                                 
593 BOA, DH.ŞFR.494/90, Ali Münif to Talat, Cebel-i Lübnan,12 Teşrin-i Evvel 1331 
[25 October 1915]; PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.12, Mutius to Bethmann-Hollweg, Beirut, 5 
November 1915. 
594 BOA, DH.ŞFR.494/90, Ali Münif to Talat, Cebel-i Lübnan,12 Teşrin-i Evvel 1331 
[25 October 1915]; PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.12, Mutius to Bethmann-Hollweg, Beirut, 5 
November 1915. 
595 BOA, DH.ŞFR.494/90, Ali Münif to Talat, Cebel-i Lübnan,12 Teşrin-i Evvel 1331 
[25 October 1915]. 
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designed on the basis of the confessional separations, as it was in the old regime. The new 
organization would be implemented beginning from March 1917.596 
The representation of the province in the Ottoman Parliament was considered 
another demonstration of the sovereignty in the Empire. However, Lebanon was not 
represented in the Parliament until the appointment of Ali Münif Bey. He applied to the 
Central Government for a new arrangement in this sense, and provided the representation 
of Lebanon in the Parliament with three deputies: 1 Maronite, 1 Druze and 1 Greek-
Orthodox. The Government supported Habib Pasha Saad, the old vice-president, as the 
Maronite candidate, Ibrahim Bey Al-Suad as the Greek-Orthodox candidate and Emin 
Arslan as the Druze candidate.597 However, the planned elections could be held 9 months 
later, at the end of 1916 with some change of the candidates. Different from the first draft, 
2 of the candidates were the Maronites, Reshid Rami and Emir Hares Shebab, one was 
from the Druzes, Adil Arslan from the renowned Druze family.598  
Towards the end of February 1917, Ali Münif Bey was appointed as the Minister of 
Public Affairs and left Lebanon, achieving, to a large extent, the integration of Lebanon to 
the Ottoman administrative system.599 As for the attitude of the Lebanese to the reforms by 
Ali Münif, the German Consul in Beirut described their general attitude as totally 
lukewarm. To be more specific, the Maronites, especially the clergy, assessed all of his 
reforms as the actions of the Ottoman Government to destroy the special status of 
Lebanon. The explanations of the Governor in every turn that his mission was to integrate 
Lebanon into the Imperial body increased their concerns in the mentioned direction.600 
                                                 
596 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 541/49, Ali Münif to Talat, 13 Kanun-ı Evvel 1332 [26 December 
1916].  
597 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.12, Mutius to Bethmann-Hollweg, Beirut, 15 March 1916; 
in the interim, Habib Pasha Saad and Emin Arslan would be exiled to Asia Minor on the 
account of that they had Francophile sentiments;  for details see: PA-AA, Türkei 177, 
Bd.11, Mutius to Bethmann-Hollweg, Beirut 26 April 1916. 
598 BOA, DH-İ.UM. 2-12, Ali Münif to Talat, Beirut, 17 Teşrin-i Sani 1332 [30 
November 1916]; PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.13, Mutius to Bethmann-Hollweg, Beirut, 9 
December 1916. 
599 BOA, İ.DUİT, 42/53; PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.14, Mutius to Bethmann-Hollweg, 
Beirut, 27 February 1917. 
600 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.12, Mutius to Bethmann-Hollweg, Beirut, 15 March 1916.  
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Apart from that, the unfortunate events influencing the maintenance of the daily life such 
as famine, epidemics, lawlessness in the food market made him an unsuccessful governor 
in the eyes of the Lebanese. Nonetheless, he succeeded to integrate the Lebanese 
administration to the Ottoman Administration.601 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
601 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.14, Mutius to Bethmann-Hollweg, Beirut, 27 February 
1917. 
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CHAPTER IV  
 
“FROM A DANGEROUS MULTITUDE INTO A HARMLESS 
MINORITY”: THE TREATMENT OF THE ARMENIANS IN 
SYRIA 
 
 
 
While Cemal Pasha was ruling in Syria, the deportation of the Armenians in 
Anatolia was decided. During the process of transportation, a great number of them were 
sent to Syria for resettlement. Therefore, the Syrian land has a special place in the history 
of the Armenian deportations and a detailed analysis of the policy of Syria’s de facto 
absolute ruler towards the Armenian refugees has a great importance for both to 
understand the nature of Cemal’s rule in Syria and a better understanding of discussions on 
the Armenian question. There can be found some similarities in his treatment of the 
Armenians with the policies implemented with regard to the other communities. On the 
other hand, in spite of the abundance of the academic studies on the Armenian 
deportations, the scarcity of the studies on the Syrian part of the deportation process in 
comparison to the incidents took place in the Anatolian provinces will contribute to a 
better understanding of the subject. 
As will be analyzed below, most of the academic studies on this subject either 
minimize the description of the process experienced in Syria, or misinterpret it due to 
political concerns. Therefore, before an analysis of the treatment of the Armenians in Syria 
by Cemal Pasha, this chapter will set out to evaluate the existing literature on the topic. 
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After that, the analysis will be restricted to the opinions and activities of Cemal Pasha 
regarding the resettlement of the Armenian refugees in Syria using mostly the dispatches 
of the regional Ottoman officials, the memoires and the diaries of the deportees as well as 
the reports of the local consuls. Meanwhile, it is worth to mention that telegraphs sent by 
the Ottoman officials in the region were rarely used in the studies on the Armenian 
deportation, probably due to the difficulty of their transcription. Differing from the 
available sources, this study will undertake to use these documents both to demonstrate the 
difference among the Ottoman bureaucrats regarding their attitude towards the Armenian 
deportees and to understand Cemal’s policy of the Armenians.602 
 
 
 
4.1. The Evaluation of the Existing Literature on the Armenian Question 
 
 
The deportation project of a great amount of the Armenian population from the 
various parts of Anatolia to Eastern Mesopotamia fired an ever-lasting debate because of 
the massacres during the deportation. The mainstream of the historical studies, imitating 
the German Holocaust against the Jews, claimed that it was a genocide configured by the 
CUP long before the decision of the deportation against the Armenians of the Ottoman 
Empire to “purify” the population in Anatolia.603 As summarized by Hilmar Kaiser, they 
                                                 
602 The telegraphs between DH.ŞFR. 450 and 600 of BOA includes the dispatches from 
the governorates in the countryside. I didn’t see any reference in the available studies to 
these documents. 
603 For some examples, see: Vahakn N. Dadrian, The History of the Armenian 
Genocide. Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus Providence and 
Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995. Vahakn N. Dadrian, ‘The comparative aspects of the 
Armenian and Jewish cases of genocide: a sociohistorical perspective’, in Alan S. 
Rosenbaum (ed), Is the Holocaust Unique? Perspectives on Comparative Genocide 
Boulder: Westview Press: 1996, See also Taner Akçam, A Shameful Act. The Armenian 
Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility, trans. Paul Bessemer, New York: 
Metropolitan Books, 2006. 
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assume “a thoroughly organized and thoroughly executed scheme”.604 Some others that 
can be deemed in the same category endeavored to demonstrate that the relocation of the 
Armenians was a consequence of the ethnicity engineering of the CUP. For that reason, the 
Unionists planned to evacuate Anatolia from the non-Turk elements to make it a 
motherland for the Turks.605  
Kaiser’s assessments on the problem of these studies can be applied to both of these 
approaches: 
“This paradigm treats the Ottoman Empire as a single unit with a command structure under 
CUP control. Importantly, the command structure had supposedly two layers, one official 
and one more secretive including trusted party members. The latter was used to provide for 
a degree of deception by countermanding official orders with secret ones that effectively 
annulled the former. Moreover, the government engaged in a policy to destroy 
incriminating evidence by ordering the destruction of documents deemed dangerous. At 
times, the government even ordered the production of fake reports.”606 
In addition to that, they rarely apply to the dispatches of the Ottoman officials in the 
periphery of the Empire, who displayed resistance in diverse ways to the policies of the 
Central Government. That deficiency makes their argument of the strict control by the 
Centre considerably doubtful. On the other hand, as will be shown below, Cemal’s 
distance and resistance from and to the policies implemented regarding the Armenians by 
Talaat demonstrates that an important cleavage was in question in the Ottoman Cabinet 
towards the treatments of the Armenians. Besides that, Kaiser’s debate on the first 
relocation movement of the Armenian population in Zeitun, seems quite convincing to 
understand the problem of the ethnic engineering and the prior planning theories:  
“The case of Zeitun, however, demonstrates that no prior planning existed to replace the 
local Armenians with Muslim settlers. Far from being part of a central government scheme, 
the limited settlement of Muslim refugees was the result of local initiatives. It was 
implemented without the prior consent of the central authorities, without budgetary 
allocations, and against some objections of the Ministry of Interior. The fate of the 
Armenian deportees from Zeitun and other places demonstrates an absence rather than the 
existence of preparations. Coordination and planning entered the picture in May and June 
                                                 
604 Hilmar Kaiser, “Regional resistance to central government policies: Ahmed Djemal 
Pasha, the Governors of Aleppo and Armenian Deportees in the spring and summer of 
1915”, Journal of Genocide Research (2010), 12 (3–4), September–December 2010, p. 
174. 
605 Dündar, Ibid, pp. 324-326. 
606 Kaiser, Ibid, p. 174. 
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1915. It was a response to the ensuing chaos along the deportation routes and in the 
destination areas. The incoming reports, like those from Aleppo, forced the central 
authorities to implement some degree of coordination while insisting on pushing through at 
any cost the deportation scheme, which they had now adopted.” 607 
On the other hand, many “pro-Turkish” academics, who dealt with this subject, alleged 
that the deportation of the Armenians prevented a general uprising of the Armenians in the 
rear of the Ottoman Army. As demonstrated by Kaiser, those authors interconnected the 
local uprisings of the Armenians in Van and Zeitun as directed by a revolutionary 
Armenian committee. However, at least for Zeitun, “this conspiracy theory lacks support 
from the records of the Ottoman 4th Army. No imminent rising was anticipated; people 
were deported for other reasons. The rebellion thesis ignores those.”608 
 As for Cemal’s treatment of the Armenians, the picture seems quite ambiguous in 
the existing studies.  To be more specific, even the most elaborate studies on the subject 
are predisposed to neglect Cemal’s intervention in the settlement of the Armenian 
refugees. Raymond Kévorkian, who wrote a voluminous book (1037 p.) on the Armenian 
Question, dedicated only six pages for Cemal Pasha’s activities. Half of it was spent to 
explain Cemal’s alleged plans to establish an independent state in Syria under his 
leadership. Kévorkian attributes this peculicar position of Cemal Pasha in the Armenian 
deportation process to his ambitions of independence in Syria. Cemal had to take the 
consent of the Entente to be able to achieve that goal and, therefore, he treated the 
Armenians better than the others.609 Donald Bloxham’s study summarizes the same 
allegations in three pages.610 However, those authors ignore the question why Cemal Pasha 
made many of the leading Arabs an enemy of himself with his tough policies against the 
Arabist opposition movement, which could be an important base to his alleged 
separationist policies in Syria. Cemal’s calculations on his position in the post-World War 
Empire can probably be more operative to understand the political aspect of his treatment 
of the Armenians. Another problem of these studies was their overemphasis on the year 
                                                 
607 Kaiser, Ibid, p. 208. 
608 Kaiser, Ibid. p. 175. 
609 Kévorkian, Ibid, p. 683-686. 
610 Bloxham, Ibid, p. 139-143. 
172 
 
1915, while neglecting the settlement processes of 1916 and 1917. Moreover, the 
expressions in memoirs of Cemal Pasha regarding the Armenian question don’t deal with 
these authors, at least as the study questions, which can be deemed as necessary to tackle 
for the academics, who investigate about the mentioned subject. 
 Varying from these authors, Fuat Dündar claims that Cemal had another project of 
ethnic planning. He interprets the distribution of the Armenians by the Pasha to the various 
districts of Syria as his policy of balancing Arab nationalists in Syria with the Armenian 
deportees. Aleppo, the new center of deportation, was depicted by Dündar as the center of 
the Arab nationalism, whereas the city was the weakest place in Syria regarding the 
development of the Arabist movement. In this context, he attributes Cemal’s conflict with 
the CUP leaders in Istanbul to the conflict of his population designs of Syria with designs 
of the central government regarding the population in Anatolia.611 However, Dündar is not 
able to document his claims with anything emanating from Cemal Pasha. Moreover, the 
number of the Armenians settled in Syria was too few to balance the Arabs there. As 
Cemal always repeated in his telegrams, his aim was to “transform the dangerous 
Armenian multitude [külliyet] into harmless minorities [cüziyet]”.612 The section in 
Dündar’s book regarding Cemal Pasha, like the others, is very thin, only four pages.613  
 In addition to that, as will be demonstrated below, most of the Armenians were 
resettled in the countryside. If Cemal had intended to balance Arab nationalism with the 
Armenian refugees, then he would house them to the city centers instead of sending them 
to the villages in the first place. Apart from that, this argument contradicts with Dündar’s 
general approach. He depicted the CUP in his book as a single body disseminated around 
the Ottoman realm and adopted the same policy under the leadership of Talat Pasha. While 
he assesses Cemal Pasha’s treatment of the Armenians, however, he changes his model and 
begins to advocate that Cemal Pasha and Talat Pasha had different plans of ethnic designs. 
                                                 
611 Dündar, Ibid. p. 326-327; The German Consul in Damascus also expressed the same 
argument in his reports even if he was suspicious about its possibility of success; PA-AA, 
Türkei 177, Bd. 12, Loytvet to Bethmann Hollweg, Damascus, 7 April 1916. 
612 See, BOA, DH.ŞFR. 486/118, Cemal to Talat, 30 Ağustos 1331 [12 September 
1915]; Cemal to Enver, 27 September 1917, Arşiv Belgeleriyle Ermeni Faaliyetleri VII, p. 
698 
613 Dündar, Ibid, pp. 324-328. 
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Finally, the book has a retrospective character: throughout Dündar’s book, it is implied that 
the CUP leaders were aware that, following the WWI, the Syrian provinces would be lost 
by the Ottoman Empire and Anatolia would be the motherland of the Turks.614  
 As regards to the “pro-Turkish” group, in recent years, these academics pay a 
special attention to Cemal Pasha’s treatment of the Armenians.615 The problem of this 
approach, however, lies in their effort to defend the CUP activities regarding the 
Armenians rather than setting out to investigate Cemal Pasha’s policies and intentions. As 
a result, these studies transcend the boundaries of the academic language and transform 
into a defensive one. Although they refer to the losses of the Armenians from time to time, 
when one reads these works, he or she has a general idea that the deportation movement 
took place without harming even one Armenian. Like the “pro-Armenians”, they also 
neglect the conflict and factionalism among the CUP leaders and their local representatives 
regarding the treatment of the Armenians, which would be demonstrated below in a 
detailed way. 
 
 
 
4.2. Cemal Pasha, Talat Pasha and the Armenian Deportations 
 
 
As emphasized above, similar to the aims of his policies of Zionism and the 
Christian clergy, Cemal strove for converting the Armenians to be ideal Ottomans, instead 
of abandoning them to their fate in desert. Therefore, in contradiction to so-called harmony 
with Talat regarding the measures applied for the Ottomanization of the other 
                                                 
614 For an extensive analysis of Dündar’s book, see also: Ayhan Aktar and Abdülhamit 
Kırmızı, “Bon pour l’Orient: Fuat Dündar’ın kitabını deşifre ederken…”, in Tarih ve 
Toplum Yeni Yaklaşımlar, 2009:8, pp. 157-187. 
615 For some examples, see: Artuç, Ibid, pp. 292-298; Hikmet Özdemir, Cemal Paşa ve 
Ermeni Göçmenler: 4. Ordunun İnsani Yardım Faaliyetleri, İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 
2009; Ahmet Tetik, “4. Ordu Bölgesi’nde Salgın Hastalıklarla Mücadele ve İnsani Yardım 
Çalışmaları”, Ermeni Araştırmaları Dergisi, 2008/30, 
http://www.eraren.org/index.php?Lisan=tr&Page=DergiIcerik&IcerikNo=573.  
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communities, like Arabs, Christians and Jews, he clashed with Talat on the Armenian 
policy. Thus, Cemal’s policy of the Armenians can’t be understood in its context unless an 
analysis of the similarities and differences between him and Talat and the reasons behind 
his different treatment towards the deportees is undertaken. Indeed, Cemal and Talat 
represented two different cliques within the body of the CUP regarding the treatment of the 
Armenians during the process of the deportations. Many indications can be found about the 
existence of that division. Especially, the evaluations of the German officials conveyed in 
the following sections offer many proofs regarding this varience. Similarly, the Ottoman 
and German records, which will be detailed below, make it clear that the local bureaucracy 
in Syria was also divided as “pro-Armenians” and their opponents.616  
Cemal’s contemporary remarks in the telegrams, the remarks in his memoires 
regarding the issue, and the testimony of the diaries and memoires of the other actors offer 
enough data to understand the main principles of his policy and his difference from Talat’s 
clique. In this sense, the most elaborate analyses were made in his memoirs. Defending the 
necessity of the Armenian deportations, Cemal begins his assessments analyzing the 
reasons of the deportation, and accuses the Great Powers, principally Russia, of driving a 
wedge between the Turks and the Armenians giving evidence of the good relations 
between the two nations throughout historical periods before the intervention of those 
powers in the internal issues of the Ottoman Empire.617 Following that, he claims that he 
didn’t know “on what grounds the Government saw itself to deport all Armenians” noting 
that he “neither took part in the negotiations at Constantinople” and nor was he consulted. 
                                                 
616 The liveliest description of this diversion was made by Falih Rıfkı in Zeytindağı, 
while he narrated the meeting of Halide Edib with Bahaeddin Şakir in the train: 
“In a station up from Adana, the late Bahaeddin Şakir came to our compartment. I 
introduced him to Halide Hanım… After a long discussion Baha Şakir got off the train [to 
go his destination]. Halide Hanım detained me and said: 
-  You’ve made me shaken a slaughter’s hand unwittedly. 
Baha Şakir, whom I’ve said goodby down [the train], whispered in my ears [that]: 
- The valuable young men, who would be trained like you  must be prohibited to 
communicate with this woman.”: Atay, Ibid., p. 78. 
617 For details, see: Djemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 241-277. 
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He claims that he first learned from the Government Proclamation to the vilayets informing 
“all the Armenians were provisionally to be deported to Mesopotamia, where they were to 
remain until the end of the War”.618 As the third man of the CUP and as a member of the 
acting government, it seems impossible to decide on such a crucial issue without letting 
Cemal to know about it. However, there is no evidence that he was informed. Presumably, 
before the start of decision-making, in some way they negotiated and Cemal gave his 
consent one way or the other to the deportation of the Armenians. Furthermore, the 
statements of the telegraphs sent by him, don’t make sense that he was not informed about 
the deportations. However, he didn’t approve the massacres that took place during the 
transport and always complained about the dreadful organization of the deportations.619  
 Cemal’s attitude about the deportation from Zeytun, Dörtyol, Haçin and Adana also 
demonstrate his different attitude from Talat Pasha and his clique. According to the 
conveyance of Grigoris Balakian, who was also deported to Zor, Cemal made the 
following expression about the deportations from this region to the catholicos of Cilicia, 
Sahag II, in a train station when he was returning from Istanbul to Syria: 
“During the deliberation over this matter in the council of ministers, I tried very hard to 
argue that instead of deporting and exiling the entire Armenian population only the writers, 
intellectuals, and Armenian political party leaders –say fifteen or twenty people from each 
town- should be exiled. I felt that the helpless common people should be spared, but I am 
sorry to say that I was not able to make my voice heard”.620  
When his military concerns are taken into account, this speech seems to make some sense. 
Cemal’s primary concern regarding the Armenian deportation was the emergence of “any 
interference with the line of communications” that “might have the gravest consequences 
for the Canal Expedition”. Therefore, According to his memoires, he was opposed to the 
deportation of the Armenians of Anatolia into Syria, and proposed “to settle the Armenians 
                                                 
618 Djemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 277. 
619 According to the remarks of a German official in Istanbul, Cemal was among those, 
who ashamed what the Armenians happened to: PA-AA, Türkei 183, Bd.40, Wolf-
Metternich to Bethmann-Hollweg, Constantinople, 9 December 1915, in Serdar Dinçer, 
Türk-Alman Silah Arkadaşlığı ve Ermeniler, CD Supplement, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 
2012, p. 774. 
620 Grigoris Balakian, Armenian Golgotha: A Memoir of the Armenian Genocide, 1915-
1918, Alfred A Knopf, Newyork: 2009, p. 51. 
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in the interior of the provinces of Konia, Angora, and Kastamuni than to send them to 
Mesopotamia”. However, he claims, he couldn’t oppose to an Act of Parliament.621 His 
claims regarding the military concerns seem to be true, when his meticulous attitude 
towards the Canal Expedition and his contemporary telegrams are taken into account.622 In 
the same vein, in a telegram, he urged Enver ending the deportation of the Armenians from 
Anatolia as fast as possible to keep the railroad open for the military transport.623 
 As for his attitude towards the deportation of the Armenians, Cemal’s remarks 
regarding the decision-making process in his memoires demonstrate that he was not an 
opponent of the decision to deport the Armenians: 
“If I had been in Constantinople at the time and taken part in the discussions, knowing 
what  was happening in the rear of the Army in East Anatolia, should I not have supported 
the deportations ? This question I cannot now answer. But I assume that my friends, in 
reaching such a drastic decision as this wholesale deportation which roused the indignation 
of the whole civilized world, must have been actuated by weighty reasons. I have no doubt 
that in the publications which are shortly to appear they will satisfy our doubts and 
curiosity. 
I am certainly firmly convinced that the Armenians planned insurrections which 
endangered the rear of our Army in the Caucasus and which might under certain 
circumstances have completely destroyed it. Consequently my friends held it 
moreexpedient to transfer the whole  Armenian nation to another region where they could 
do no harm, than to expose the whole  Ottoman Empire to a catastrophe which would have 
involved Russian occupation of the whole of Asia Minor.”624 
His contemporary remarks also show that he saw concentration of the Armenians 
dangerous in any region of the Empire. In a telegram sent by him to the Governor of 
Aleppo, Cemal explicitly expresses his concern about the concentration of large number of 
                                                 
621 Djemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 277. 
622 In February 1916, in Adana-Aleppo line the transfer of the Armenian refugees had to 
be interrupted due to the intensity of the military consignment: Talat to Enver, 3 Şubat 
1331 [16 February 1916], in Arşiv Belgeleriyle Ermeni Faaliyetleri 1914-1918 Vol III, 
ATASE Yayınları, Ankara: 2007, p. 554. 
623 He advised Enver to increase the number of the trains allocated to the Armenian 
refugees to complete the transport of the deportees as much as possible. For details, see: 
Cemal to Enver, Aleppo, 27 Teşrin-i Evvel 1331 [9 November 1915], in Arşiv Belgeleriyle 
Ermeni Faaliyetleri Vol IIIV, p. 475. 
624 Djemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 279-280. 
177 
 
Armenians in Marash.625 He warned the governor of Marash that the first Armenian 
uprising against the State emerged in that province and, therefore, the accumulation of 
Armenians in such a great number there, would be dangerous militarily.626  
However, Cemal was opposed to the massacres perpetrated against the Armenian 
convoys. According to Wolff-Metternich, a German official in Istanbul, Cemal expressed 
to him that the directives about the deportation of the Armenians in the beginning of the 
process were right, but later the implementation of them was badly organized.627 Cemal’s 
own statements were also in this direction. One of his telegrams regarding the transfer of 
the deportees from Aleppo to Zor, Cemal gave voice to the following concerns:  
“… The dispatch of the Armenians [accumulated] in Aleppo to Zor is impossible due to the 
provisioning and habitation concerns…if those were sent [there], a very crowded 
Armenian colony will be created in Rakka [Zor]…Therefore, there is no solution, but to 
send those Armenians to Mousul. [After that] the followıng problem will arise; the transfer 
of about 20.000 Armenians [located] in Aleppo to Re’sülayn by train in winter season, and 
to organize their transport from there to Mousul humanely [will be tough]. The needed 
trains for that must be reserved till Re’sülayn, and from Re’sülayn transport means, 
consisted of cars and pack animals [mekkari] must be prepared, and in between Re’sülayn 
and Mousul, it is a must to create places for [temporary] accommodation and to provide in 
those places provisioning and tents… I beg to ask [istirham etmek] to start the transport of 
the first convoys of the Armenians following [my] inspection that will convince my 
humble self to the completion of those preparations…”628 
Cemal regarded the Armenians as the citizens of the Ottoman Empire.629 As touched in the 
previous chapters, he ascribed great importance to create a feeling of strong state among 
the citizens. Therefore, his frustration can also be interpreted in terms of his concern to 
                                                 
625 The Governor of Aleppo to Talat, Damascus, 16 Nisan 1332 [29 April 1916], in 
Arşiv Belgeleriyle Ermeni Faaliyetleri, p. 558. 
626 Cemal to the Governor of Marash, Damascus, 31 Mart 1332 [13 April 1916], in 
Arşiv Belgeleriyle Ermeni Faaliyetleri, p. 557. 
627 PA-AA, Türkei 183, Bd. 40, Wolff-Metternich to Bethmann Hollweg, 
Constantinople, 7 December 1915, In Dinçer, Ibid. [CD], p. 772. 
628 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 541/120, Cemal to Talat, 21 Teşrin-i Sani 1332 [4 November 1916]; 
for  similar  evaluations by Cemal, see: BOA, DH. ŞFR, 528/38, Cemal to Talat, Aleppo, 
28 Temmuz 1332 [10 August 1916]; BOA, DH.ŞFR. 553/115, Cemal to Talat, Jerusalem, 
9 Mayıs 1333 [9 May 1917]. 
629 “Every Armenian is our citizen as separate persons”: Cemal to Enver, 27 September 
1917, Arşiv Belgeleriyle Ermeni Faaliyetleri VII, p. 698 
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represent the state strong in the eyes of its citizens. 
 Quite the opposite of Cemal, Talat connived at the dispatch the Armenians to the 
Desert, although he knew the dangers of it. In one of his speech at the Ottoman Parliament, 
regarding the settlement of the Muslim refugees from the Balkans to the Ottoman 
territories Talat opposed the suggestion of the Aydın deputy Emanuelidis Efendi on 
settling these people in the “empty lands from Üsküdar to Basra”. He expressed “If we had 
sprinkled those refugees sending them, as they [Emanuelidis] said, to the Desert, all of 
them would die thereabouts”.630 Judging from this speech Talat had an opinion about the 
destiny of the Armenians, when they were exiled to the south of Aleppo. 
 As for the political reasons behind Cemal’s lenient treatment of the Armenian 
deportees, it is claimed in the studies made by Bloxam and Kevorkian that Cemal Pasha 
planned to establish an independent state in Syria, and he wanted to gain sympathies of the 
Entente states. Therefore, he treated with affection towards the Armenians. As stated 
above, when considered Cemal’s activities to integrate the Syrian realm, this argument 
seems irrelevant. This claim was largely due to his way of administration in Syria. During 
his governorate in Syria, Cemal was quite independent from the Central Government. But 
his policies were somewhat concordant with those of the Center. Indeed, as the third man 
of the ruling party, the CUP, and as a member of the Cabinet, the Central Government did 
not need to check him, and supported many of his actions for the sake of the re-formation 
of the state in Syria. He enjoyed full confidence of the CUP leaders in İstanbul. However, 
it seems that, the independent character of his rule caused some debates among the Entente 
states on the persuasion of Cemal to a rebellion against the Ottoman Empire. Especially the 
documents in the British archives on this issue made some sholars think that Cemal wanted 
to establish an independent state in Syria rebelling against the Ottoman Empire.631 
According to these documents, the Entente states discussed to offer independence to Cemal 
Pasha in Syria in return for his rebellion against the Ottoman Empire.632 There are no 
                                                 
630 Dündar, Ibid, p. 257. 
631 Bloxam, Ibid, pp. 139-143; Kevorkian, Ibid, pp. 683-686. 
632 For these documents, see: PRO, FO 371/2492, Grey to Cabinet (Transmitting 
Russian Embassy in London), “Internal Situation in Turkey”, London, 29 December 1915; 
For the British refusal of the proposal, see: PRO, FO 371/2492, Grey to Buchanan, 
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remarks or documents in the mentioned files belonging to Cemal Pasha. It is rather a 
discussion of the option of Cemal’s rebellion. They negotiated the issue and decided that 
Cemal was not ideal to support for their designs in the Arab Middle East. Presumably, 
Cemal was not informed about those plans. The German officials were cognizant of those 
rumours. However, all the German officials in Syria witnessed the loyalty of Cemal Pasha 
to the Ottoman Central Government and to the ideals of the Turco-German alliance.633 
When the German Consul in Damascus showed the news of le Temps that Cemal was 
cooperating with the Entente Cemal interpreted that those rumours were deliberately 
produced to drive a wedge between the Turks and Germans and added: “should my 
countrymen and yours read them carefully and they open their eyes well”.634  The most 
reasonable explanation was made by Erden in this issue. He explained in his memoires 
that:  
“Cemal Pasha thought that the role of Enver Pasha would come into an end after the war. 
For Sadrazam Talat Pasha, he [always] said ‘he [Talat] can best be the leader of the Party’. 
Thus, the most suitable one, to be Grand Vizier, was nobody, but himself.”635 
Cemal’s memoires also supports this allegation. In such a way that Cemal devoted a 
chapter of his memoires to the Armenian Question and his activities to assist the Armenian 
deportees and published it at a time that the fate of the Empire was drawing to an end. He 
adopted a defensive language and answered the claims of Mandelstam and the American 
                                                                                                                                                    
“Internal Situation in Turkey”, London, 29 December 1915; for the refusal of the French 
Government the proposal of Cemal’s rebellion, see: PRO, FO 371/2492, Buchanan to 
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December 1915; PRO, FO 371/2767, FO to Buchanan, “Internal Situation in Turkey”, 
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633 For the remarks of Von Kress in this direction, see: PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 12, 
Metternich to Bethmann-Hollweg, Constantinople, 27 November 1915; for the opinion of 
the German Embassy in the same way, see: PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 12, Metternich to 
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635 Erden, Ibid., p. 285. 
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Ambassador Morgenthau. Although, he did not publish all the chapters of his memoires in 
foreign languages,636 he had the Armenian chapter to be translated to both English and 
German. Taking these remarks into consideration, it can be concluded that Cemal’s 
political ambition for future was to take over a significant role in the creation of the new 
Turkey. Presumably, he was quite aware during the wartime that after the conclusion of the 
hostilities the treatment of the Armenians would brought to the table both by the Germans 
and the Entente powers even if the Ottoman side won the war. Therefore, not to 
contaminate his name, Cemal showed an extra sensitivity towards the problems of the 
Armenians.  
 
 
 
4.3. Dealing with the Deportation Process 
 
 
Cemal’s attempts to ameliorate the terrible conditions of the Armenians support the 
arguments explained above. Beginning from the arrival of the first convoys to the 
boundaries of Syria, he actively intervened in the process. As will be seen below, his 
intervention was quite accordant with his general policy of re-formation of the state in 
Syria converting the Armenians into “harmless” and, thus loyal, citizens of the State, like 
the decentralist Arabs, Zionists and pro-French Christians. Before the analysis of his 
actions in that sense, a short summary of the conditions of the Armenians arrived at 
Aleppo will contribute to understand the wider picture. 
The first convoys of the Armenian deportees began to arrive at the boundary of the 
region that Cemal was responsible, during the course of July 1915. By the beginning of 
August, according to the remarks of the German Consul, there were Armenians in Aleppo 
                                                 
636 The chapter that he depicted his public works in Syria and his remarks on the Druzes 
weren’t include in the English version. 
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from all parts of Anatolia.637 The deportees had reached there in extremely terrible 
conditions due to partly the hard conditions of their travel and partly maltreatment by the 
Gendarmeries and the brigands.638  The conditions of the deportation were so terrible that 
they had to leave their children in the city centers under some rags639, or had to sell them to 
well-to-do people of the cities not to take them to a definite misery with themselves.640 
According to the remark of a Turkish lieutenant colonel to a German engineer, there were 
countless children abandoned by their parents on the roads, and those children were 
adopted by the native families of the towns. The mentioned lieutenant and his brother had 
also adopted one child.641 In the same way, the testimony of Yervant Odian, who was also 
a deportee, about the sale process is more than enough to understand the soul-shattering 
situation of the deportees: 
“I saw for the first time, the dreadful, heart-rending trade in children in the camp in Sebil. 
Arab, Turkish and Jewish women would come from Aleppo in carriages and start going 
from one tent to another, asking, “Are there any children for sale?” (“Satlik cohjuk var 
me?) 
Those parents who were wealthy would send these women away with horror, but the poor 
and the hungry hesitated. That hesitation was enough to begin the haggling.  
“Let’s let him go” the husband would say, holding his son’s hand. 
“I’ll die before I’m separated from my son,” the wife would cry.”642 
As a result the parents would be persuaded that they would, probably, die during the 
transport, and should save their children, at least, from a total destruction. The descriptions 
of the Ottoman telegraphs were confirming their fatal miseries, at the same time. The 
                                                 
637 PA-AA, Türkei 183, Bd. 38, Rössler to Bethmann Hollweg, Aleppo, 7 August 1915, 
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638 PRO, FO 371/2781, Sykes to WO, ”Information from two Arab officers recently 
arrived in England From the Caucasus [Lieutenant Shurbaji and Lieutenant Shaikha]”, 25 
September 1916. 
639 PA-AA, Türkei 183, Bd. 37, Rössler to Bethmann Hollweg, Aleppo, 17 July 1915, 
in Dincer, Ibid.[CD], p. 536. 
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Governor of Aleppo, Bekir Sami Bey, who was also one of the most important opponents 
of the deportation of the Armenians, described the situation of the Armenians with the 
following remarks:  
“Today, again, [a] convoy of the Armenians from the eastern vilayets, consisted only of the 
women and the children not older than 12 years, has arrived here. Every two days, such a 
convoy consisting of women and children turn up here their numbers changing between 
500-1000 and 3.000… As for their settlement, how and where to settle such a great number 
of the destitute, consisting only of children and women?... wretchedness, starvation and 
disaster destroy hundreds of the children. Therefore, it is impossible to think that they 
would survive for a long time…”643 
The telegram of Bekir Sami also demonstrates that the Armenians were abandoned to their 
own fate by the Central Government. While the convoys of the deportees were arriving one 
after another, as the head of the civil bureaucracy in Aleppo, the Governor didn’t know 
how many Armenians would be settled in Aleppo, as well as the number of the ones, who 
would be transported to the other destinations. Being incognizant of the Armenian policy 
of the Central Government, Bekir Sami asked for clarification of the main principles of the 
deportation.644 With the remarks of the German Consul of Aleppo in a later date, the 
Ottoman state officials didn’t have any responsibility vis-a-vis their superiors, due to the 
Armenians who couldn’t live, and these officials had the right to leave them to be 
destroyed.645 
As a result of the deteriorating conditions of the Armenians, Cemal Pasha paid a 
visit to Aleppo to inspect their situation. By Cemal’s words, the organization of the 
deportation was made badly, and the refugees had arrived at Aleppo in squalor [sefalet 
içinde].646 Therefore, Cemal applied some precautions to make their situation better. With 
regard to these amelioration activities in the beginning, upon the application of the 
Armenian Catholicos of Aleppo, Cemal ordered 5 Metelik (20 pfennig) to be paid for the 
                                                 
643 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 488/5, Bekir Sami to Talat, Aleppo, 28 Ağustos 1331 [9 September 
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adults and 4 Metelik (16 pfennig) for the children as daily allowance.647 He decided to 
resettle some families around Aleppo, in the agriculturally productive lands,648 in 
consultation with the state functionary [Eyyub Bey], who was assigned to house the 
Armenian refugees; 835 of the Armenian families in Maarre district, 990 to Bab district, 
2.250 to Muslimiye [Mesmiye?] district, on condition that the proportion of the refugees 
would not transcend 10 percent of the total population.649 But, the Aleppo Consul of 
Germany reported in February 1916 that Cemal’s arrangements in Bab were “torn down”, 
and the Armenians of Bab were sent to Der Zor,650 which was then synonymous with  
death for the Armenians.651 According to Mustafa Abdulhalık Bey, the Governor of 
Aleppo, that relocation had to be applied because of the lack of the ownerless agricultural 
lands, which would be allocated to the Armenians.652 Apart from that, Cemal also 
calculated the fund required for the solution of this question in a smooth way as 
11.035.000 qurush and demanded the dispatch of 1/4 of it as quickly as possible. In his 
telegraph to Talat, Cemal also warned the Minister of Interior to prevent the attacks against 
the Armenians of Van and Diarbekir between Diarbekir and Aleppo.653 
Cemal also applied some protective measures to detain the Armenians in the city 
centers. He employed the artisans among the deportees in the factories of the Army. He 
used this opportunity to prevent as many as Armenians from being sent to the desert. As a 
result, he conflicted with the anti-Armenian clique under his rule. In this regard, the Pasha 
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clashed with the kaymakam of Islahiye Nusret Bey about the protection of the Armenians 
and didn’t hesitate to dismiss Nusret Bey. The dismissal turned into a crisis between Cemal 
and Talat in a short while exposing the conflict between Talat and Cemal on the Armenian 
deportation. In such a way that an officer called Abdülhamid Bey was assigned by Cemal 
to organize the detainment of the Armenian craftsmen in Islahiye for the employment 
within the body of 4th Army654 together with the mentioned kaymakam. According to the 
report of Abdülhamid Nusret was acting quite inattentive [gafilane] about the Armenian 
deportees, Cemal ordered the governor of Adana to dismiss the kaymakam without giving 
information to Talat, the Minister of Interior and the head of the civil bureaucracy. He also 
didn’t give any information to the Governor of Adana about the mission of Abdülhamid. 
Sided with the kaymakam, the Governor Hakkı complained about Cemal to Talat claiming 
that Nusret was working zealously [gayretle] in the transport of the Armenians. On the 
other hand, Cemal claimed that Nusret was dismissed because of his neglectful attitude.655  
 The telegram of Şükrü Bey, the Director for the Immigrants, who was sent by Talat 
to Aleppo to organize the transport of the deported Armenians in Aleppo, makes the 
reasons of the conflict quite clear. As the man of Talat, Şükrü first states that the 
kaymakam was conducting the works of transportation with great success [gayet 
muvaffakiyetle]. On the remarks of Şükrü Bey, the officer Abdülhamid expressed that the 
kaymakam didn’t give due consideration to the issue of the deportation and didn’t want to 
work at nights; on the other hand, the kaymakam stated that Cemal’s officer intervened in 
the issues of the transportation with a boundless authority and gave directions to the 
kaymakam. He continues that the officer delayed the deportation of 8.000 Armenians from 
Islahiye on the pretext that they were artisans and would be employed within the body of 
the Army. Şükrü expressed that, with the dismissal of kaymakam Nusret Bey, the 
organization of all the works of the deportees was taken over by Cemal’s officer, and the 
continuation of this situation couldn’t be permissible. Therefore, new officials should be 
sent to Islahiye. Şükrü also wrote to the 4th Army requesting to be given information on 
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how many artisans did the Army need, most probably to prevent such actions.656 The 
remarks of Şükrü demonstrate the political polarization between Cemal and Talat on the 
Armenian deportation. The phrases in the telegraphs also clarify the difference. As can be 
comprehended from the mentioned telegraphs, Cemal, Şükrü and Talat understood 
different things from “working with an effort” on the deportation of the Armenians. It is 
something like a password, which had separate meanings for each side. Moreover, Şükrü’s 
telegraph demonstrates the distrust of the sides to each other.  
 The testimony of the Armenian deportees indicates at the same time that, during the 
transportation process, Cemal protected the Armenians under the color that he needed the 
Armenian artisans within the body of the Army. Yervant Odian narrated his registration 
with 300 other Armenians as artisans of the 4th Army with the following words: 
“… The tent we were staying in belonged to a family from Bardizg. ‘We’re going to 
Syria,’ said the head of the family, ‘just like 300 other families.’ 
‘How did you arrange that..?’ 
‘Djemal Pasha issued and order for artisans to be separated and sent to Sham (Damascus). 
As artisans we’re going there to work in government factories. They are especially looking 
for tailors, shoemakers, metalworkers, carpenters and weavers.’ 
‘Are all the three hundred families artisans?’ 
‘The majority are artisans, but there are some who’ve no trade at all, but who have 
succeeded in registering as artisans.’ 
‘How…?’ 
‘By bribery or deception’ 
Indeed many men who had registered as tailors, sat in their tents from morning till night, 
learning how to thread needles and to sew from their wives.”657 
As will be detailed below, while he was settling the Armenians in the cities of Syria, 
Cemal would again fall into dispute with some of the civil bureaucrats, who disfavored the 
improvement of the conditions of the Armenians.  
 Besides his efforts to ameliorate the conditions of the Armenians during the 
transportation, Cemal also endeavored to reduce the number of the deaths from the 
epidemics and assault of the tribes and bands. Since the spread of the epidemics carried the 
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risk of the infection of these diseases in the Army,658 Cemal made his best to forestall the 
spread of the epidemics in his territory. Secondly, as stated in the previous section, he 
avoided staining the region of the 4th Army with the rumors of the Armenian massacres. 
Instead, he intended to keep the Armenians alive and to make them ideal citizens, 
integrating them into Syrian society. Therefore, Cemal Pasha mobilized all the possible 
means to stop the spread of the epidemics among the Armenians. 
 Upon the alarming situation of the epidemic diseases among the Armenians, he first 
published an Army order to the officials under his rule in Aleppo to transport the deportees 
to their ultimate resettlement places as quickly as possible. He also required the 
investigation the Armenians before sending them to their ultimate settlement places. If they 
were sick, they must have been detained and treated in the hospitals.659 Two Armenian 
doctors, Haçik Bogosyan and Toros Ovaciyan, were assigned to this job.660 Before the 
departure of the trains, the police was carrying out a search with a doctor in the cars, and 
those who were suspected of having an epidemic weren’t allowed to travel to another place 
regardless of their ages.661 During those dates, Talat also ordered the Governor of Syria to 
be careful about the dissemination of the epidemics. However, he urged the Governor to 
transport the deportees as quickly as possible to prevent the dissemination of the diseases 
in the cities. He didn’t mention any treatment for the recovery of them.662 The fair 
difference in their approaches to handle the threat of epidemics brought about by the 
                                                 
658 For the opinions of Von Kress on the danger of epidemics accompanied by the 
deportees, see: BA-MA, RM 40/678, Aleppo Consul to Etappen-Kommando in 
Constantinople, 28 October 1915; in the existing literature, there can be found some 
studies on the struggle of Cemal Pasha with the epidemic diseases particular to the 
Armenians. However, the writers don’t make emphasis on this aspect of Cemal’s action. 
For some examples, see: Özdemir, Ibid, p. 175-184; Tetik, Ibid. 
659 ATASE Arşivi, Kls. 3253, Ds. 2, Fih. 7; Ds.5A, Fih. 1-6, Cemal to Aleppo 
Commissariat, 20 Ağustos 1331 [2 Eylül 1915], in Arşiv Belgeleriyle Ermeni Faaliyetleri 
1914-1918, Vol. VIII and in Tetik, Ibid. 
660 ATASE Arşivi, Kls. 3253, Ds. 2, Fih. 7A, The Commissariat of Aleppo to Cemal, 
19 Teşrin-i Evvel 1331 [1 November 1915].  
661 Dadrian, 19 October 1915, Ibid., p. 86-87. 
662 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 57/71, Talat to the Governor of Syria, 4 Teşrin-i Evvel 1331 [17 
Ekim 1915], see also: Arşiv Belgelerinde Ermeniler, BOA Yayınları, p. 105. 
187 
 
Armenian refugees can be interpreted as the difference between Talat and Cemal in their 
policies towards the Armenians. 
 Efforts to fight the epidemics were maintained after the settlement of the deportees, 
too. In this context, the Armenian deportees, who were resettled in the cities benefitted 
from these advantages.663 However, the situation in the villages was extremely bad. As 
depicted in the diaries of Vahram Dadrian, “It has been only three months since the 
Armenians settled here, but our [the Armenians] cemetery is much bigger than that of the 
Circassians, who have lived here for half a century.”664 Almost all of these people had died 
from the epidemic diseases. However, It was not a deliberate action of the Governmental 
authorities in Syria to cause the death of all the Armenians. As will be explained in 
Chapter 8, with the beginning of the War, the Syrian realm experienced a scarcity of 
physicians since almost all of the foreign hospitals were confiscated and their physicians 
were deported. Therefore, there was indeed no physician available to go to the villages to 
treat the sick persons, and as a result, the epidemics caused the death of a great number of 
Armenians in the villages. According to the report of the Austrian Consul, when they were 
decided to be relocated in the city centers, approximately 3/4 of them had died because of 
the epidemics and famine.665 
 Besides the struggle with the epidemics for the protection of the Armenians from a 
total destruction, Cemal also inflicted severe punishments on those, who maltreated the 
Armenians during the transportation process. The best-known of these was the execution 
of the Circassian Ahmed and his friend Halil, who killed the celebrated Armenian Deputies 
Zohrab and Vartkes Efendis. These two deputies were arrested in Istanbul and sent to 
Diarbekir to be tried in the Court-Martial. However, during their travel, they were 
assassinated by the Circassian Gang leaders Ahmed and Halil.666 The attacks took place in 
the area of 4th Army. Therefore, Cemal enthusiastically followed them. When they were 
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caught in Karahisar, Cemal sent special officers to take them to Damascus.667 As a result of 
a long process, they could be captured and brought to Damascus to be judged in the Court-
Martial. The court sentenced Ahmed to death and the verdict was implemented the next 
day.668 Halil was sentenced to ten years of imprisonment. But, Cemal refused the decision 
of the court about Halil and demanded the renewal of his trial.669 He ended up like his 
friend and was executed.670 According to Falih Rıfkı, Cemal made an effort to save the 
Armenian deputies from death. When they departed from İstanbul, Cemal requested Talat 
to send these deputies to Lebanon to make them “unharmful”. However, Talat insisted that 
they must be tried before the court martial and, by this way, they were killed.671 
 Similarly, the robbers, who assaulted the Armenian deportees, were severely 
punished when their assaults were reported to Cemal. In the report of a German official, it 
is stated that Cemal had many robbers hanged because of their attacks against the 
deportes.672 A detailed report was transmitted by the Aleppo Consul on the issue: When 
Cemal Pasha arrived at Aleppo, at the end of the year 1915 to examine the conditions of 
the Armenians, he found out that the Kurdish bands assaulted the Armenians collected in 
the concentration camp at Islahiye, and slaughtered children and women. Upon that, Cemal 
Pasha assigned 12 of his own guardsmen to capture those attackers. They energetically 
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pursued the bandits and, as a result, some of them were brought to Aleppo and hanged 
there.673 
 All in all, during the transport of the Armenian refugees Cemal wholeheartedly 
strove for the betterment of their conditions. However, it doesn’t mean that everything was 
corrected after the arrival of the Armenians to the area of the 4th Army. Considerable 
number of the Armenians continued to die after the arrival at their constant settlement 
places, mostly because of the conditions prevailing in Syria brought about by famine, 
epidemics, lack of the physicians as analyzed in a detailed way in Chapter 8. 
 
 
 
4.4. Settlement of the Armenian Deportees in the 4th Army Zone 
 
 
Besides dealing with the tremendous problems of the deportees that they faced 
during the transport, Cemal focused his main concern to the resettlement of the deportees 
in an organized way as much as he could. In this regard, he decided to send a considerable 
number of the refugees from Aleppo to Damascus to resettle them in Hauran and East 
Jordan. He marked Damascus as the second centre of distribution for the Armenians, who 
would be resettled in the 4th Army zone, after Aleppo. In this section, the analysis will 
concentrate on Cemal’s own activities of resettlement of the Armenian refugees deported 
to his territory. As will be detailed below, his main policy was to integrate the Armenians 
into Syrian society dividing them into small pieces, which then would “transform them 
from being a dangerous multitude [külliyet] into harmless minorities [cüz’iyet]”.674 
                                                 
673 PA-AA, Türkei 183, Bd. 41, Rössler to Bethmann Hollweg, Aleppo, 3 January 1916, 
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674 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 486/118, Cemal to Talat, 30 Ağustos 1331 [12 September 1915]; the 
same remarks are repeated in a document announced publicly by Cemal: Cemal to Enver, 
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that, to remove the Armenian danger, they must be transformed into harmless minorities by 
the way of the distribution of various places. For details, see: PA-AA, Türkei 183, Bd. 38, 
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In the context of the decision to relocate some deportees in the 4th Army region, the 
first two convoys reached Damascus in the third week of August 1915. According to the 
remarks of the Austrian Consul, among those deportees, there were Armenians from many 
towns of the Eastern Anatolia. While the first convoy arrived at Damascus by foot, the 
second was transferred there by trains. After a short stay in Damascus, they were sent to 
their constant settlement places, Mesmije in Hauran, Salt and Kerak in East Jordan. All of 
them were transferred to their new destinations by trains.675 According to the testimony of 
Oppenheim, most of the Armenians, who arrived in Damascus by walking, reached there 
by pack animals and carriages under the guard of the Gendarmeries.676  
 The great majority of the refugees consisted of weak men, women and children. 
The Consul estimates that they were either separated from their families and sent to 
another place or massacred because of their resistance to the decision of the deportation. 
The police didn’t allow them to communicate with the native people of Damascus. A very 
small number of them, however, could outsmart the police and took refugee with their co-
religionists.677 They were resettled in the villages entirely populated by the Muslims. 
According to the remarks of the Austrian Consul in Beirut, the children were separated 
from their families and islamized. The calls of the priests to forestall this situation 
remained inconclusive.678 The seriousness of the conversions and its meaning in the 
context of the Ottoman politics will be analyzed below separately. 
 The arrival of the refugees to Damascus continued in September, too. According to 
the report of the Austrian Consul, between 1 and 15 September, 22.000 Armenian refugees 
arrived at Damascus from Marash, Antep, Tarsus, Alexandrette, Aleppo and Adana. 
Because of the lack of the appropriate places for them in Damascus, in the viewpoint of the 
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Consul, the great majority of them were settled in Salt, Kerak and Maan.679 By January 
1916, according to the figures given by the Governor of Damascus, the number of the 
refugees distributed through Damascus was around 60.000. 20.000 of them were settled in 
Hama; 27.000 refugees were housed in Hauran; 8.500 were fixed in Kerak; 1.100 in Nebk; 
300 in Duma; 180 in Kunaytra; 150 in Baalbek; 25 in Vadiülacem districts. The remaining 
3.000 were settled in the villages of Damascus.680 It means that 1/3 of them could be 
settled in the city centers.  
Again, the great majority of them consisted of children and women. The Consul 
states that the refugees were treated in Damascus like prisoners and nobody was allowed to 
communicate with them. However, most of them were able to run away to take refugee 
with their co-religionists.681 The same restrictions were imposed by Cemal Pasha in the 
permanent resettlement places of the Armenians. They were prohibited to leave their 
places without permission as long as the War continued. They would be able to leave the 
boundaries of the kazas that they were located for a determined time only on the condition 
that a definitive excuse happened.682 However, in practice the situation was rather 
different. According to the personal accounts written by the Armenian deportees, it is clear 
that they could escape to Damascus, to make money for the subsistence of their families.683 
Cemal’s anti-interventionist attitude revealed itself in this subject, too. He was 
strongly opposed to the actions, which would gain prestige to a foreign power, being in the 
first place the intervention of the representatives of the foreign states in the issues of the 
deportees. He complained about the American Consuls in Syria to his Ambassador via 
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Minister of War and Minister of Foreign Affairs, since they were interfering with the 
internal issues of the Empire.684 According to the remarks of Cemal, the latter subsidized 
the deportees secretly, interfered in the issues of the Government and provided 
communication to them with the Eastern Anatolia.685 Taner Akçam maintains in his book 
that, the Ottoman Government didn’t organize any assistance activity to relieve the 
Armenians, and deliberately prevented the assistance requests of the foreign states.686 
However, the motives behind the prevention of the foreign states’ intervetion seem to be 
quite different; as expressed in the related chapters, in the war period, there was a general 
sensitivity in the Ottoman authorities to the activities of the foreign states including 
assistance activities, since those activities showed the Ottoman Government weaker in the 
eyes of its citizens and were seen by the Ottoman officials as the means of the 
establishment of the foreign influence, which was tried to be removed from the Ottoman 
Realm. As can be seen in Chapter 8, Cemal had also resisted the American help for 
Lebanon for a while. But, as will be demonstrated below, he would agree to the 
distribution of the American and the German assistance by the Ottoman officials. 
 In the same context, Cemal also intervened in the case of Armenian workers 
employed by the German engineers in the railway construction claiming that those workers 
were selected among the refugees and deliberately withheld by the mentioned engineers to 
protect the Armenians.687 Afterwards, Cemal had to delay their deportations within the 
framework of the order of the War Ministry, to exile those workers immediately after the 
                                                 
684 NA, RG59/867.48/199, Morgenthau to Secretary of State, Constantinople, 29 
November 1915 in Ara Sarafian, United States Official Records on the Armenian Genocide 
1915-1917, Princeton and London: Gomidas Institute, 2004, p. 388. 
685 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 492/41, Bekir Sami to Talat, Aleppo, 22 Eylül 1331 [5 October 
1915]. 
686 Akçam, Ibid, p. 306-312. 
687 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 493/62, Cemal to Talat, 30 Eylül 1331 [13 October 1915]; Ali 
Münif also warned Talat that the 90 percent of the workers of the railway in the 
commissariats between Pozantı and Aleppo were the Armenians, that was a great danger 
militarily: BOA, DH.ŞFR. 488/80, Ali Münif to Talat, 28 August 1331 [10 September 
1915]; the considerations of the Governor of Adana were in the same direction, too: BOA, 
DH.ŞFR. 503/11, Hakkı to Talat, 15 Kanun-ı Evvel 1331 [28 December 1915].  
193 
 
completion of their construction works.688 Apart from that, many Armenian craftsmen 
employed in the construction works of the railway company were sent into exile within the 
framework of the decision for the deportation of the Armenians. Upon the slowdown of the 
construction works between Pozantı and Aleppo, the construction of the Amanos and 
Taurus Tunnels, the company reclaimed these craftsmen from the Army, and the Army 
gave its consent.689 According to Von Kress, in spite of exertion all his influence in 
Istanbul to prevent the exile of those workers, Cemal was unable to prevent the decision in 
the beginning, and because of that problem, the construction of the tunnels had been 
delayed for six months.690 
When the number of the deportees reached to 200.000, Cemal demanded the 
interception of the deportation temporarily, to overcome the problems of the settled and 
unsettled Armenians in Syria. He explained in his telegraph that the available deportees 
could hardly be resettled till Winter, and advised to place the deported Armenians 
temporarily in the regions, which were nearer to the railway and easy to be supplied with 
foodstuffs. Otherwise, it would be difficult to prevent the congestion [izdiham] of the 
refugees and to protect the Army from the epidemic diseases brought by these convoys.691 
According to the report of the German Embassy on 18th December 1915, the deportations 
had been suspended because of the approach of Winter.692 For the purpose of the 
organization of the settlement issues of the already deported Armenians, on 11th November 
1915, a meeting was held by the attendance of Cemal Pasha, Şükrü Bey, İsmail Canbulat 
and the Governor of Aleppo. In this meeting, it was decided to accept 5.000 Armenians, 
which would arrive at Pozantı for permanent settlement, and to make the other refugees 
spend the winter in the appropriate places temporarily. The ones, who still were not 
expelled from their countries, would be left temporarily there. After that, there would be no 
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transfer of the deportees to the south of Aleppo.693 Upon the instructions of the 
Commander of the 4th Army to settle the Armenians before winter, or to construct 
temporary places for them to stay during winter, the Vice-Governor of Damascus 
demanded 40.000 ltq from Istanbul.694 
 As for the conditions of the Armenians in Damascus and in their permanent 
settlement places, they were exposed to countless miseries in the beginning. According to 
the report of the Austrian Consul in Damascus in 7th November 1915, the refugees were 
depraved of everything in their permanent settlement places. Until the Ottoman 
Government would deliver their estates, they would remain without occupation, cattle and 
seeds, and under no circumstances, could they begin any work. They were unprotected and 
exposed to great miseries with newly started rains. The 1 qurush daily allowance for each 
person provided by the Government was not sufficient. Starvation and epidemics were 
spreading among the deportees quickly. During their stay in Damascus, 10/1000 of them 
were dying from the epidemics daily. The Consul expressed that the great majority of the 
children were given up for adoption by their families to the Muslims, and thus, were saved 
from starvation and epidemics at the expense of changing their religions.695  
The reports of the Ottoman officials were also in the same direction. In a telegram, 
Hulusi Bey, the Governor of Syria, harshly criticized the official process [cereyan-ı 
resmiyesi] of the Armenian deportation and settlement stating “the necessity of prohibition 
of such movements that could [only] be seen in the middle ages” [bu gibi kurun-ı vusta 
harekatının men edilmesi]. He continues “if the settlement of the Armenians is left to its 
official process, humanity will not record it with appreciation since, presumably, a great 
majority of them [the refugees] will be devastated [if the process continue like this]”. With 
his remarks, Hulusi Bey implicitly accused the Government of carrying out the 
annihilation of the Armenians. The Governor added that Cemal wanted to solve the 
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problem of the Armenian refugees as quickly as possible, not to tarnish the region in the 
responsibility of the 4th Army, and to do honor to the Ottoman country. Upon the order of 
Cemal Pasha, Hulusi Bey planned a visit to Hauran and Kerak to see the state of the affairs 
and to inspect the Ottoman officials to be more attentive to their jobs. He also demanded 
money to organize the settlement.696 However, approximately one and a half month later, it 
is clearly understood from a telegraph of the Vice-Governor of Syria that most of the 
refugees were in a very destitute situation; they didn’t have any place –even a tent- to live 
and they suffered from starvation.697 The miserable conditions of Syria in the wartime 
stemming from famine must be taken into consideration at the same time, while assessing 
the situation of the Armenians. 
In spite of all these unfavorable conditions, in a short span of time, the Armenian 
deportees were able to restore their life standards in their permanent settlement places 
using the advantage of their personal skills. For example, as expressed in the diaries of 
Vahram Dadrian, immediately after their arrival at Jeresh in Hauran, the Armenians were 
able to build eight mills, created and planted fifty gardens, “forty shops where they make 
their livings as cobblers, gun smiths, comb-makers, felt-makers, farriers, iron-mongers, 
butchers etc.”. In short, they converted the little village of Jeresh to a burgeoning business 
town.698 The situation was similar in the cities, too. Yervant Odian described the situation 
in the city centre of Hama with the following remarks:  
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“Almost half the shops in the market were in the hands of Armenians. The majority of the 
Arab shops had been forced to close due to the military call up. There were Armenians 
grocers, buthchers, vegetable sellers, haberdashers and cloth sellers, as well as many 
barbers, shoe makers, carpenters, dentists, photographers, pharmacists, bakers, tailors, 
metal smiths and so on. It was the Armenians who first opened photography shops in 
Hama. The Armenians also opened, for the very first time, two restaurants.”699  
Besides their own endeavors, a considerable betterment took place in their situations by the 
humanitarian intervention of Cemal Pasha. The Consul of Austria in Damascus notes in 
February 1916 that, the Armenians were settled in the city of Damascus and its villages as 
well. These processes were completed smoothly, and at least, a place of accommodation 
was created for the refugees. The Consul states that the refugees had the opportunity to 
engage in agriculture in the villages of Damascus. The daily allowance given to them was 
raised from 1 qurush to 2 qurush, for children to 1.5 qurush. Some of the Armenians were 
employed in the labor battalions assigned to construct the Egyptian Railways. –The Consul 
reported this as an improvement in the life conditions of the refugees-. Besides this, Cemal 
also announced in all the newspapers of the country that the Government was responsible 
for the life, honor and well-being of all the Armenians. In this regard, he executed a 
Gendarmerie officer, who maltreated the refugees.700  
 In a similar way, Cemal employed the Armenians in the factories of the Army to 
protect them. For this purpose, he established six factories in Aleppo and issued 
permissions [vesika] to its workers, upon the appeal of the Armenian artisans gathered 
temporarily in Aleppo to be deported to the villages or to the desert, to manufacture 
clothing and bedding for the Army in return for one loaf of bread and a bowl of soup a day. 
Thus, they would be saved from the exposure of the devastating conditions of the desert. 
With the remarks of the American consul, “at the end of the two months, 6.500 women, 
mostly widows, 3.000 girls, and 650 men and big boys were working in the factories and 
enjoyed all the immunities thereto belonging”.701 
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 In most of the Consular reports, it is stated that the Armenians were recruited and 
sent to the labor battalions to work in the road construction.702 However, according to the 
personal accounts, the conscription of many Armenians always delayed by the orders of 
Cemal Pasha.  When they first arrived at their ultimate settlement places, the deportees 
were registered as eligible to the military service. In every six months they were collected 
from the villages and taken to the recruitment offices. But, their conscription was delayed 
in each time with an order issued by Cemal Pasha. When the news of the delay reached the 
villages, the name of Cemal was praised with bravos “and wishes that he might live a long 
life.”703 Presumably, their collections in every six months was understood by the consuls as 
their conscription. 
When the British troops started to advance from the Sinai Desert towards Syria, the 
treatment of the Armenians entered into a new phase. Upon the approach of the British 
troops, according to the Governor of Syria, many Armenians, who were not recruited in 
time, began to escape to the Mount-Druze and, from there, to join the British and Sharif’s 
army. The Governor states that keeping of the Armenians inside Damascus in that delicate 
time was ill-advised denoting that their number inside the vilayet was more than 30.000. In 
addition, the Commander of the 4th Army, Mersinli Cemal Pasha, found it necessary the 
relocation of the Armenians from Damascus to the North for the military reasons. He also 
states that many of the Armenians repeatedly applied to return to their countries because of 
the provisioning question. By virtue of all these reasons, the Governor demanded to allow 
the Armenians to return to their native countries.704 On 29th September 1918, the Austrian 
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Consul in Aleppo reported a new wave of the deportation of the Armenians due to the 
approach of the British troops towards Damascus. The Consul continues, however, that this 
time the situation was not like before. Since both the Turks and the Armenians got rid of 
the difficulties of the deportation, the deportation was performed reluctantly.705 
 A similar process started in Aleppo, too. According to the report of the Austrian 
Consul in Aleppo, the deadline for the application to return was determined as 30 
September –one day before the capture of the city by the British forces-. The refugees 
would be able to travel freely in the trains. However, the picture drawn by the Consul 
about the desire of the Armenians to return to their homes seems quite different. He states 
that very few of the Armenian families wanted to return to their countries because of two 
reasons: firstly, the fear of causing the mistrust of the Government and, secondly, the 
unwillingness to embark on a new adventure, especially for those, who obtained relative 
improvement in their economic conditions in Aleppo.706 However, according to the 
Austrian consul, the discovery of an arsenal in the city, which belonged to the Armenians, 
caused the retreat of the Government from this step in a week.707  
 
 
4.4.1. Conversion of the Armenians to Islam and Cemal Pasha 
 
While the settlement process was continuing, Cemal encouraged many of the 
Armenians to convert to Islam.708 In the cities and villages, massive movements of 
enforced conversions took place. The conversion process consisted of two components: 
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filing a petition and adoption of a Muslim name. In the viewpoint of the German 
representative in Aleppo, those were only for show, and it was a dream to islamisize the 
Armenians by these methods.709 The report of the Austrian consul bearing the date 4th 
August 1915 states that the Armenian refugees, who were dispersed around the whole 
Syrian country, were strongly pressed to change their religions. The Consul reports that 
this policy was adopted for better integration of the Armenians with the local people. He 
points out that, in the city centre of Hama, many incidents of conversion took place among 
the newly settled Armenians. Many of the deportees occupied with commerce using the 
advantage of being in the cities, and, in short, their life conditions became better. 
According to the statement of the Consul, they were threatened of being exiled to the 
villages if they didn’t change their religions.710  
 In the same direction, the existing literature interprets this action as part of the 
annihilation of the Armenian nation. For example, Taner Akçam maintains that the 
islamization process of the Armenians was strictly controlled by the Central 
Government.711 In the same direction, as will be demonstrated below, Cemal’s own 
telegraphs also make us think that he applied a total policy of conversion towards the 
Armenians. However, when the implementation of this action was traced, it will be clear 
that the reality of the event was quite different: it was, too, a part of Cemal’s struggle with 
Talaat’s enforcements regarding the Armenians, and a means to legitimize his policy of 
Armenian settlement.  
 In his telegraph to Talat bearing the date 2nd August 1916, Cemal proudly 
summarizes the essentials of his policy that he applied to resettle the Armenians in the 
Syrian provinces: 
                                                 
709 PA-AA, Türkei 183, Bd. 44, Hoffmann to the Ambassador in Istanbul, Aleppo, 29 
August 1916, in Dinçer, Ibid. [CD], p. 932. 
710 HHStA, PA 12/463, Ranzi to Burian, “Die Konversion der armenischen 
Auswanderer zum Islam”, Damascus, 4 August 1916. 
711 Akçam, Ermeni Meselesi Hallolunmuştur, p. 295-300; Dündar, Ibid, p. 300-305; 
Although he explains the sadness of the local authorities in Hama because of the 
conversion incidents applying to the accounts of the deportees, Kevorkian doesn’t evaluate 
the conversion policies as a means applied in the whole of Syria to protect Armenians from 
the destructive activities of Talat’s party. For details, see: Kevorkian, p. 677. 
200 
 
“I find it as the only solution to implement immediately the policy that I followed in Syria, 
to prevent the accumulation of the Armenians in Zor in a big number. I collected these 
Armenians transferred in a huge number to Syria in the boundaries of the desert, and 
provided their conversion to Islam by virtue of some persons that I have induced [teşvik 
etmek], and sprinkled [serpmek] at least a thousand of them to the provinces of Syria 
converting them to Islam. I paired off the widowed women with the Muslim men, and 
placed their orphans to the orphanages that I have established [to educate] them with the 
Muslim polish [terbiye]. I do not send those, who insist on their religions, to the Desert and 
to the eastern end of the Vilayet, and I do not let them anywhere to constitute a majority of 
the population. I regard it as a necessity to implement this policy in Zor,too…”712 
In the same context, Cemal states in one of his telegrams to Enver that, during June 1916, 
in Damascus, Deraa and Hama, 5450 Armenians in 945 households [hane] converted to 
Islam and 2314 in 497 households were settled and the others were provided suitable life 
conditions.713  
However, the remarks conveyed from Cemal in the memoires of Halide Edib, draw 
another picture and reflect it as an obligation to protect the Armenian children from 
destruction. His remarks were quite striking: 
“I had a conversation in the car with Djemal Pasha which was really illuminating. I said: 
“You have been as good to Armenians as it is possible to be in these hard days. Why do 
you allow Armenian children to be called by Moslem names? It looks like turning the 
Armenians into Moslems, and history some day will revenge it on the coming generation 
of Turks.” 
‘You are an idealist’ he answered gravely, ‘and like all idealists [you] lack a sense of 
reality. Do you believe that by turning a few hundred Armenian boys and girls Moslem I 
think I benefit my race? You have seen the Armenian orphanage. This is a Moslem 
orphanage, and only Moslem orphans are allowed….I cannot bear to see them die in the 
streets’. 
‘Afterward?’ I asked… 
‘After the war they will go back to their people. I hope none is too small to realize his 
race’”714 
Similar remarks were conveyed by the Spanish consul in Jerusalem: 
“… The Armenian Patriarch, Ormanian, had gone to see him complaining that, in Der’a, 
the authorities obliged the Armenian refugees there to convert to the religion of 
Muhammad. The minister told him that, from the investigations made, it turned out that 
what happened was that some Muslim religious leaders, knowing the state of poverty of the 
refugees, took advantage of it by offering land, houses, or cash on condition of converting 
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to Islam. His Excellency commented that it was propaganda, identical to what the Christian 
missionaries do…”715 
At this stage, the implementation of the conversion policies had to be analyzed more 
closely to understand which claim reflects the truth. In this context, diaries of Vahram 
Dadrian give valuable information about the facts behind the action of the conversions: 
“The committee in charge of converting Armenians to Islam arrived here yesterday 
evening. There are five of them: the Mufti of Irbit; an Armenian named Aram , who was 
formerly the president of the Ipranosian Company in Mersin, two government officials; 
and a policemen. 
They set up shop at the village hall late last night and summoned all the Armenian 
moukhtars (elders) of the village –every Armenian has a representative- and informed them 
of the government’s decision. 
The turbaned hodja of Irbit apparently made quite a long speech, emphasizing  that the 
government is doing us a great favor by converting us, ‘because when we are all faithful 
children of the same  religion and country, there will be no reason for hatred and 
resentment’. 
‘I therefore recommend that you accept the government’s proposal’ the hodja concluded. 
‘If you refuse, you should realize that it will be you who suffer in the end’.  
After this veiled threat from the Muslim clergymen, the Armenian member of the 
committee spoke, explaining that they have been visiting all the villages of the Hauran over 
the past two months, converting all the Armenians to Islam. 
‘The whole thing is nothing but a mere formality’, he said ‘Your name is changed only on 
paper. Just because you have accepted Islam, no one will ever force you to go to a mosque 
or to make your daughters marry Turks.’ 
‘If that is the case’ replied Sarko the butcher, ‘then let us give you a list of all the 
Armenians in the village and you can write in an Islamic name for each of them’ 
‘May you live long! After all, that’s what we all wanted’ exclaimed the members of the 
committee.”716 
The following pages of his diaries don’t convey anything about the problems emanated 
from the conversion to Islam. As can be understood from the diaries, it seems that 
conversions had limited effect on the Armenians as life continued in its normal course for 
them. They didn’t have to join any religious practice of the Muslims. The only exception 
was the burial of a Turkish soldier, who died from cholera. The Armenians were assigned 
to bury this soldier. After the funeral, Dadrian asked a policeman why they had applied to 
the Armenians instead of the Arabs and the Circassians to bury a Muslim. He continues: “ 
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‘What is the difference’ he [the policeman] asked, and shrugged. ‘Aren’t you Muslims?’ 
Muslims? Yes, that’s right… We had forgotten that”.717 
His remarks, however, about the conversion policies implemented in cities is quite 
different. “In Deraa, there have been cases of forced marriages, and in Damascus they 
circumcised the boys from the orphanage and took them to a mosque”. Nevertheless, he 
evaluates the process as “a great kindness to the Armenians on the part of Jemal Pasha” 
since he saved the Armenians from a total extermination on the order of Constantinople.718 
Similarly, Yervan Odian’s testimony demonstrates the existence of two cliques regarding 
the treatment of Armenians in Syria, and the local resistance requested the Armenians to 
convert in appearance to be able to protect them. It is obvious in his memoires that the 
Governor of Hama, Feruzan Bey, was ashamed of making such an offer. The Governor 
expressed to a notable Armenian, Nersesian Effendi if the Armenians “didn’t accept Islam, 
he wouldn’t be able to protect [the Armenians]” and they would probably “suffer very 
badly”.719 
As for the situation in Damascus, the Austrian consul gives some detail about the 
enforced islamizations in Damascus without touching upon the seriousness of the 
conversion practice. He states that the situation was comparatively better in the provincial 
capital, since the Ottoman officials were sensitive to the reaction of the foreign 
diplomatists. However, the Consul states that, in the first week of August 1916, all the 
refugees were arrested and those, who announced their conversion, were released; the 
others were exiled to the villages. These coercive measures were only applied to the 
Gregorians; the Catholics and the Protestants were immune to such kind of actions.720 
However, in the report of the same Consul dated 28th November 1916, it is stated that these 
policies of conversion were in a short span of time commendably abandoned. The Consul 
attaches that change to the appointment of Tahsin Bey as the Governor of Syria, and notes 
that it is clearly an activity of Tahsin Bey. In this context, those, who were sent to the 
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villages were recalled and resettled to the city centers. As stated before, it was a systematic 
change on the Armenian policy.721 Quite the reverse of what the consul states, as will be 
detailed below, the amelioration was to a large extent, due to the liberation of the 
Armenian settlement from those who tried to prevent the betterment of the conditions of 
the Armenians with new organization of Cemal Pasha within the body of his Army. 
 The report of the German Consul makes the issue clearer. The Consul expresses the 
conflict between Talat and Cemal on the relocation of the Armenians. According to the 
conveyance of the German Consul in Damascus from Hüseyin Kazım, who was appointed 
as the head of the Armenian relief committee established by Cemal Pasha, The 
Government wanted to destroy the Armenians by sending them to the desert areas. On the 
other hand, the consul states, Cemal wanted to protect them. However, the consul 
continues that Cemal couldn’t resist the anti-Armenian members of the CUP and the anti-
Armenian air of Istanbul.722 Most probably, as quoted by Halide Edib, Cemal didn’t 
believe that the conversions would change anything in the opinions of the Armenians. His 
measures in this direction and his telegram above were rather a pretext to prevent anti-
Armenian actions of the CUP clique formed around Talat Pasha. 
 The fiercest impact of the conversions occurred on the young girls, who were 
forcibly married with Muslims. A German report in 1919 cabled from Aleppo the 
following remarks about the soul-shattering conditions of those girls: 
“The two thousand Armenian girls, who were detained in the Turkish harems during the 
hostilities, have been found by the American Red Cross in recent months. The young girls 
have lost every hope of emancipation, who lived a harem life for months… Most of these 
girls have not still reached 16 years, and they are so pitiful that they must be treated in a 
clinic before they are sent to their dormitories…”723 
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4.4.2. The Special Committee for the Relief of the Armenians 
 
Due to the resistance of the anti-Armenian clique in the Syrian bureaucracy 
preventing Cemal from having full authority on the issues of the Armenians, in the second 
half of March 1916, Cemal established a special commission under the chairmanship of 
Hüseyin Kazim [Kadri]724, an old offended member of the CUP and the old Governor of 
Salonika and Aleppo, who preferred a secluded life in Beirut before the War after his 
dispute with the CUP leaders. The other members of the commission were two retired 
bureaucrats and the Vice-Governor of Damascus. The German consul states that all the 
members of the commission were renowned with their sound character-wise 
personalities.725 As stated in the memoirs of Hasan Bey the Circassian, who was appointed 
as the successor of Hüseyin Kazım, the aim of the commission was to resettle the 
Armenians from villages of Hauran to the city centers. Since they subsisted their lives with 
artisanship, Cemal considered that they couldn’t live in the villages, and, therefore, 
decided to transfer them into cities.726 The German Consul in Damascus interpreted the 
distribution of the Armenians to the villages as a measure to balance the Arabs with the 
Armenians.727 As explained above, Fuad Dündar has similar claims. However, the numbers 
of the Armenians settled in the Syrian realm was too little for balancing the Arab 
population. Therefore, the distribution of the Armenians to the villages as a balance against 
the Arabs doesn’t stand to reason.  
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Apart from that, as part of his new mission, in April 1916 Hüseyin Kazım paid a 
visit to Hauran and its south, where the Armenians were settled. In Der’a, first, he had 
bread distributed to the Armenians and made a place for bathing and cleansing of the 
pediculos in the Hospital. After cleansing their bodies in the hospital, the deportees were 
transported to the various cities that they could find job. In this way, according to the 
report of Damascus consul of Germany, around 700 widows and orphans were relocated to 
the city center of Hama. They were employed in a weaving factory there.728 
 However, the resistance of the bureaucracy compelled Hüseyin Kazim to resign in 
a short while. In his conversation with the Damascus consul of Germany, he stated that he 
became unfunctional in his job; his measures were not only paid no attention, but also the 
official authorities worked to ruin his ameliorations. The deportees that he transported 
from Der’a to Damascus in accordance with the aim of the commission had been re-sent to 
their old places by the governmental authorities in Damascus. Finally, the Government 
didn’t give Hüseyin Kazım enough money for the relocation of the Armenians. He 
explained to the German consul that he didn’t believe in the sincerity of the Ottoman 
government to ameliorate the conditions of the deportees. Rather, he was afraid that the 
authorities, most probably he meant Talat’s faction, wanted to exterminate the Armenians 
systematically.729 It is worth to mention here that the resistance of the bureaucrats didn’t 
only arise from their anti-Armenian feelings, but also from the difficult conditions of life 
brought about by the war compelled them to oppose new settlements in their cities. As in 
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the case of Azmi Bey, some officials refused to accept the Armenians to their cities 
because of the provisioning problems emerged as a result of famine.730 
 After the resignation of Hüseyin Kazım, Cemal appointed Çerkes Hasan Bey, who 
was also an opponent of the CUP, in his place.731 Hasan Bey arrived at Aleppo on 27th 
August 1916, and, in a few days, he started his job. In the beginning, Cemal subordinated 
Hasan to the CUP organization in Syria, which he created under the presidency of Neşet 
Bey, the CUP inspector in Syria.732 Within the framework of the same body, Ali Kemal 
Bey, the prosecutor in Homs, was assigned with the same mission for Homs. The name of 
the organization was Heyet-i Mahsusa [the Special Board].733 Neşet was also responsible 
for the conversion of the Armenians into Islam and the provisioning of the converts.734 
This time, the transport of the Armenian deportees was put in order: the widows and 
orphans were given the first priority. They would be resettled in the orphanages and 
widows’ houses.735 
 Similar to Hüseyin Kazım, Hasan Bey entered into conflict with some civil 
bureaucrats of Syria and met with resistance in his implementations. Like Hüseyin Kazım, 
he started to visit the villages and collect the Armenians to transport to the cities. However, 
in short, some disagreements emerged between Hasan Bey and his superiors.736 Hence, he 
complained about Neşet Bey’s board to Cemal Pasha. Thereupon, Cemal Pasha dismissed 
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Neşet, and subordinated Hasan Bey to the Governor of Syria, Tahsin Bey [Uzer].737 
However, according to the remarks of Hasan Bey, Tahsin was an anti-Armenian, too. 
Therefore, he subjected Hasan to Abdülkadir Bey, the Sub-Governor of Hauran. The 
former couldn’t be in accord with Abdülkadir, and, applied to Cemal as a second time.738 
This time, Cemal directly attached him to the Army publishing the following Army order 
on 20th October 1916: 
“1. I regard the wealth, settlement and subsistence of the Armenian community [millet] as 
the national honor. 
2. Hasan Bey in Hauran and Kemal Bey in Homs have been appointed for this job. Since 
the deportees in Hauran are artisans and since the neighborhood of Hauran doesn’t suit to 
subsist the artisans, those [people] will be transported in closer areas to the cities, towns 
and kazas in Syria and Beirut. This transportation will be conducted in Hauran by Hasan 
Bey, and will be completed in three months…”.739 
Thus, the organization of the Armenian relocation was directly attached to Cemal Pasha. 
As a result, the following months brought about further betterment in the conditions of the 
Armenians. According to the report of the Austrian Consul, by the end of November 1916, 
a systematic change took place in the treatment of the Armenians. The refugees, who were 
sent to the villages in Hauran and Kerak, were transferred to the cities of Syria if they were 
not still settled there. The Consul states that 3/4 of the Armenians settled in Hauran and 
Kerak had died from starvation and epidemics. The remaining ones were at least saved 
from ending up the same fate. In Damascus, many houses commandeered by the 
Government before were allocated to the Armenian families. By the remarks of the Consul, 
the officials paid attention to their subsistence. In the same vein, a daily allowance was 
granted to them and badly needed clothes were provided to them. The adult males and the 
women were offered an employment opportunity and the children were provided 
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opportunity to go to schools. The trustable people were deployed for the services of these 
works.740  
4.4.3. Orphanages for the Deportees 
 
As stated before, a great number of Armenian children were left orphans as a result 
of the atrocities, which were perpetrated by the Gendarmeries and the Kurdish and Arab 
tribes throughout the deportation. Therefore, the care of those children emerged as a vital 
question. For this purpose, Cemal established orphanages in various cities of Syria. 
However, most of these orphanages were founded for the Muslim children. Regarding the 
aims of these orphanages, Taner Akçam maintains that they were established to bring up 
children in compliance with the Islamic principles. Thus, the process of the annihilation of 
the Armenians would be completed.741 When analyzed the process in Syria comparing it to 
these generalizing remarks, it will be realized that the process was rather more complex 
than what Akçam argues the case was. 
It is clear in the Ottoman documents that both Enver and Talat attributed special 
attention to the Armenian children. A correspondence between Enver and Cemal on the 
Armenian orphans demonstrates that the former wanted the mixture of the Armenian 
orphans with the Muslim children. When Cemal informed him that he was about to 
establish orphanages in Homs and Hama for the Armenian orphans, Enver “especially 
requested” him that these orphanages should be mixed.742 During those dates, Talat also 
ordered the vilayets that “the children, who weren’t older than 12 years, must be 
distributed to our [Muslim] orphanages”. If there was no place in the orphanages, then they 
would be given to the well-to-do people to learn the local customs. 743 Since he distributed 
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the Armenians to the cities and villages and made them “harmless minorities”, presumably, 
Cemal didn’t attribute any meaning to the conversion of Children. The testimony of Halide 
Edib quoted above also indicates that Cemal didn’t expect any benefit from the 
islamization of a few hundred Armenian children for his nation. In any case, a great many 
of the Armenians had died during the transportation and in its aftermath. Therefore, even if 
we think all the Armenians in Syria, the remaining number of them in Syria was a drop in 
the ocean when compared to the total population of Syria.  
Beginning from the arrival of the first convoys to Aleppo, the great numbers of the 
orphans among the deportees made the placement of the Armenian orphans compulsory. 
With the remarks of the American consul in Aleppo, “Thousands of them were running in 
the streets, or were with relatives and friends in a half starved condition”.744 With the 
description of Beatrice Rohner, a Swiss Missionary assigned by Cemal to open an 
orphanage in Aleppo, the children and women were begging in the camp Mamouret 
“Hanum, [Lady] bread!, Hanum, I am hungry, we did not eat anything today and 
yesterday”.745 At the end of the year 1915, Cemal allowed Swiss missionaries Beatrice 
Rohner and Paula Schafer to open orphanages for the settlement of these Armenian 
Children. While Shafer was in charge of providing shelter to the orphans along the 
Osmaniye-Islahiye railway line, Rohner took over Aleppo and its surroundings.746 These 
two sisters travelled to the villages and concentration camps that the Armenians were 
settled, and collected the orphans there.747 
 As a result of their efforts, by March 1916, 1250 children could be collected in 
Aleppo. An Armenian priest, Haron Shiraciyan, cared for 400 of them, while 250 children 
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were settled in the Gregorian Church. Rohner’s orphanage hosted 600 of the orphans.748 
German and American Consulates also secretly contributed to the establishment and 
furnishing and maintenance of the orphanage in Aleppo.749 However, Rohner’s orphanage 
was attached by Cemal Pasha to the Ottoman Government.750 He provided provisioning of 
the institution, although it was not always sufficient to supply the required amount. When 
the orphanage established, Cemal guaranteed that the administration of the institution 
would stay in the hands of Rohner.751  
 Rohner maintained her activites till March 1917. However, beginning from the 
middle of the year 1916, the Sublime Porte adopted a policy of the ottomanization of the 
foreign orphanages.752 In August 1916, an inspector was appointed for this job in 
Aleppo.753 Although her orphanage was attached to the Ottoman Government, Rohner’s 
institution was also closed in the beginning of March 1917.754 It is worth to mention that, 
even in December 1915, Mustafa Abdulhalık Bey, the Governor of Aleppo appointed by 
Talat to replace, Bekir Sami Bey, the prominent opponent to the Armenian deportations, 
reported to Talat that it was not permissible to sustain two institutions in Aleppo as the 
Armenian orphanage, and advised to transport these orphans to Constantinople or 
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Anatolia.755 In accordance with his early proposal, the children protected in this orphanage, 
some of them were sent to Lebanon, while some others were transported to the various 
cities of Anatolia. Rohner continued to her relief works in Aleppo under the protection of 
Colonel Kemal Bey, the head of the Ottoman Commissariat in Aleppo to organize the 
urgent assistance issues. According to the remarks of the German representative in Aleppo, 
Kemal strove wholeheartedly to ease the miseries of the deportees, and, by the employment 
of Rohner, he aimed at the usage of the money in the hands of Rohner, presumably 
provided by the American and German Consuls, for the benefit of the Armenian women 
and children.756  
As for Cemal’s attitude to these implementations, his telegrams indicate that he 
supported the process. However, a report sent by the German Consul in Damascus clearly 
demonstrate that Cemal supported foreigners’ assistance activities, surreptitiously. When 
the German Consul intended to construct a soup kitchen, an orphanage and a bathroom 
under the presidency of a German missioner, Hanauer, he went to Cemal Pasha for 
permission. The conversation between the two was conveyed by the Consul as follows:  
“I informed Cemal Pasha about the plan. He told me under the pledge of secrecy that, he 
personally wants to ease the fate of the Armenians, but he received precise orders from 
Constantinople requesting the prevention of every kind of American and German 
assistance for the Armenians… Upon my request to him to do something personally, he 
ordered the mayor of Damascus in my presence to hire a house and to settle the Armenian 
children there. Cemal Pasha stated that he is ready to accept money from me, and to 
distribute it by the Turkish officials, who gained my trust” 757 
 
The German official Metternich interpreted this decision that the Sublime Porte refused all 
kinds of foreign assistance regardless of their source.758 
                                                 
755 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 503/91, Mustafa to Talat, Aleppo, 4 Kanun-ı Evvel 1331 [17 
December 1915]. 
756 PA-AA, Türkei 183, Bd. 47, Rössler to Bethmann Hollweg, Aleppo, 16 March 1917, 
in Dinçer, Ibid. [CD], p. 1012-1013. 
757 PA-AA, Türkei 183, Bd. 42, Metternich to Bethmann Hollweg (Transmitting Consul 
Damascus), Constantinople, 29 March 1916, in Dinçer, Ibid. [CD], p. 882. 
758 PA-AA, Türkei 183, Bd. 42, Metternich to Bethmann Hollweg, Constantinople, 29 
March 1916, in Dinçer, Ibid. [CD], p. 882. 
212 
 
 After that Cemal undertook to establish orphanages for the Armenian children. In a 
telegram to Enver, he stated that he was about to complete the opening of two orphanages 
in Hama and Homs for the Armenians.759 Another orphanage was commenced to service in 
Damascus.760 The best-known orphanage opened by Cemal was the Ayntorah orphanage 
that was put under the presidency of the celebrated Halide Edib after a while of its 
establishment. The Armenian orphans deported to Syria and the Turkish orphans 
immigrated from Erzurum was housed.761 A closer look at this institution will more or less 
clarify the situation at the Ottoman orphanages. 
 As understood from the memoirs of Halide Edib, the nature of the education in 
Ayntura didn’t intend to give a religious consciousness to the children. The activities in the 
institution were quite secular. Halide Edib doesn’t describe any religious ceremony acted 
in the orphanage. Rather, it is obvious in the memoirs that the children were aware of their 
own national and religious identities. She mentioned the creation of a music band, the 
amendment of the physical conditions of the orphanage and the treatment of the sick 
children among the activities performed in Ayntura. They weren’t taken, for example, to 
the mosque, or weren’t circumcised etc. The only act of islamization affecting those 
children was to be renamed with Muslim names. There is no evidence for, say, 
circumcision in the other Ottoman orphanages in Syria, either. If such an action had been 
undertaken, the consuls, who reported almost all the details of the treatment of the 
Armenians, would send reports about it. Similarly, the diaries and memoirs that were dealt 
with, didn’t convey anything about it. The only exception of this is the rumors that came to 
Dadrian’s ears about the cicumcision and taking to a mosque of the orphans in 
Damascus.762 However, if such an action had taken place, it would presumably be reported 
by a consul from the provincial capital of Syria. Therefore, it is a doubtful claim that those 
                                                 
759 TTK Arşivi, KO Koleksiyonu 10/21, Cemal to Enver, 23 Mayıs 1332 [5 June 1916]. 
760 Cemal to Enver, 27 Eylül 1333 [27 September 1917], in Arşiv Belgleriyle Ermeni 
Faaliyetleri VII, p. 698. 
761 Cemal to Enver, 27 Eylül 1333 [27 September 1917], in Arşiv Belgleriyle Ermeni 
Faaliyetleri VII, p. 698. 
762 Dadrian, 4 September 1916, Ibid., p. 165. 
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orphanages really aimed at the conversion of the Armenian orphans to the ideal believers 
of Islam.  
 It is reasonable to conclude from all these activities that Cemal’s ultimate aim 
regarding the Armenian deportees was to integrate them to the Syrian society dispersing 
them in various districts as the “harmless minorities”. By this way, they would be ideal 
citizens of the Ottoman state and wouldn’t be dangerous for the formation of a unitary and 
fully-authorized governmental apparatus in the Ottoman realm. During both the 
deportation and settlement, he actively interfered with the process and relieved the 
conditions of the Armenians. In this process, he conflicted with Talat Pasha, who adopted a 
policy of deliberate ignorance towards the Armenian refugees. Cemal opened new 
orphanages for the Armenian children and encouraged them to “convert” to Islam to 
protect them from the wrath of the “anti-Armenian” factions within the CUP.    
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CHAPTER V 
STRUGGLING FOREIGN INFLUENCE FOR “FULL 
INDEPENDENCE” 
 
 
 
As part of Cemal’s policy to reinforce the Ottoman state authority on Syria, the 
struggle with the influence of the foreign powers created one of the most crucial aspect of 
his policy of Syria. As noted above, considerable cultural investments of the Great Powers 
there, especially those of France showed the Ottoman Government weak in the eyes of its 
subjects in Syria throughout the whole 19th Century. During this century, the Ottomans had 
to compete with those Powers for the allegiance of its Syrian citizens, because of the 
privileges provided by the Capitulations. Therefore, besides the struggle with the internal 
“threats” for the Ottoman supremacy in Syria narrated in the previous chapters, Cemal 
endeavored to give an end to the Ottoman-European competition replacing that of the 
European states with the “loyalty to Ottomanness”, which would transform the Syrians to 
the citizens similar to ones in the modern nation-states. 
The relations between the Ottomans and the Great Powers as a multidimensional 
issue constitute a long history. Beginning from the end of the 18th century, the Great 
Powers enjoyed a great influence in the Ottoman realm in general, in Syria in particular, 
which included political, economic and cultural aspects created with the privileges 
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provided by the Capitulations.763 The dissemination of the foreign influence with the long 
experience of the Capitulations throughout the 19th century created a negative attitude in 
the minds of the Ottoman statesmen against the Great Powers, which, in their view, 
prevented the integration, independence and development of the Imperial realm. The 
resentment against the political interventions of that Powers had so increased that, at the 
beginning of WWI, even the German soldiers under the service of the Ottoman Army were 
assessed as forces of occupation by the people and the officials.764  
 In the period preceding the WWI, the Great Powers of Europe enjoyed a 
considerably privileged position in the Ottoman Empire within the framework of the 
Capitulations to intervene in the internal issues of the Ottoman Empire from politics to 
jurisdiction. Those who were protected by those states were almost totally exempted from 
the governmental and legal control of the Empire. Besides their political influence, these 
Powers had considerable cultural and economic influence on the Ottoman Country and its 
Syrian Provinces, provided by their schools, missionaries, hospitals etc.765 
In terms of cultural penetration, as the consequence of its great investments in this 
area, France received the lion’s share in the Syrian realm, although it was weakened by the 
increasing impact of Germany with the Weltpolitik, and by the competition of the Greek-
Orthodox community acting with the support of Russia.766 Towards the end of the 19th 
                                                 
763 For some studies on the relations between the Ottoman Empire and the Great 
Powers, see: For British Policy, see: Joseph Heller, British Policy towards the Ottoman 
Empire, 1908-1914, London, Frank Cass, 1983; for British Policy towards Syria and 
Palestine, see: Rashid Khalidi, British Policy towards Syria and Palestine, Oxford: Middle 
East Center for St. Antonius’s College, 1980; A.L. Tibawi, Anglo-Arab Relations and the 
Question of Palestine, London: Luzac & Co.ltd., 1977; For French Policy in Syria, see: 
William I. Shorrock, French Imperialism in the Middle East, 1900-1914, Madison: The 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1976; for a study on the German influence in the Ottoman 
Empire, see: İlber Ortaylı, Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Alman Nüfuzu, İstanbul: İletişim, 
2000;  for a general study on the relations between the Great Powers and the Ottoman 
Empire: Kent, Ibid. 
764 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 13, Deutsche Palaestina Bank Beirut to von Rosenberg, 
“Bericht für das Jahr 1915, Beirut, 29 April 1916. 
765 For a study, examining the place of the Capitulations in the Ottoman legal system, 
see: Maurits H. Van den Boogert, The Capitulations in the Ottoman Legal System, Leiden: 
Brill, 2005. 
766 L. Bruce Fulton, “France and the End of the Ottoman Empire”, in Kent, Ibid, p. 137. 
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century, there was an intense competition between Germany, Russia and France in Syria 
on seizing areas of influence. Economically, France was again in the first line taking the 
advantage of the operating rights of the many railroads and ports in Syria. As for politics, 
because of its influence over the various sects of the Syrian Christianity, France prevailed 
against the other Powers in spite of its failure to gain the sympathy of the Muslims. 
Altough the British had some influence over the Muslim population, it is mainly due to the 
inclination of the Muslims to benefit from the British tolerance in case of an imposed 
preference between France and Great Britain. Therefore, as will be analyzed in detail 
below, the largest struggle was performed against the French penetration during the 
governorate of Cemal Pasha. Russia’s impact on some other Christian sects and the British 
popularity among the Muslims bestowed on them a voice in Syria following France.767   
This situation prevented the Ottoman Empire for years from having a full authority 
over its lands and compelled it to a competition with the Great Powers.768 However, the 
announcement of the hostility with the Entente states gave a golden opportunity to the 
Ottoman Government to assert their authority in the country.769 As the Governor General 
of Syria, Cemal Pasha did his best in his area of administration to replace the foreign 
influence with that of the Ottomans both politically and culturally. On the other hand, he 
was struggling with the endeavors of the allies of the Ottoman Empire to replace the 
Entente influence with theirs. This chapter examines how Cemal Pasha struggled with all 
kinds of the foreign penetration in Syrian provinces during his governorate.770  
 
 
  
                                                 
767 Shorrock, Ibid, p. 7. 
768 For the analysis of the Ottoman-European competition, see: Fawaz, “Foreign 
Presence and the Perception of the Ottoman Rule in Beirut”, pp. 93-104; Philipp, Ibid, pp. 
77-92. 
769 For a study on the abolition of the Capitulations, see: Külünk, Ibid. 
770 For the details of the extensions of the penetration of the Great Powers into the 
Ottoman Realm see the articles in: Kent, Ibid. 
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5.1.Countering the French Influence 
 
 
As briefly stated before, on the verge of the WWI, although it was unsuccessful to gain 
the sympathy of the majority of the Syrians, France enjoyed of having the greatest 
influence in Syria among the other great powers, both economically and culturally. The 
spread of the French culture and language had been tolerated, and even sometimes 
promoted by the Ottoman Government till the beginning of the War since it was perceived 
as a component of the modernization. In all the governmental high schools, there was at 
least one lecturer of the French, who taught the language of the Ottoman modernization. 
However, the outbreak of the War provoked an extensive struggle with the French 
influence. In this regard, Cemal Pasha had conducted one of the most influential battles, if 
not the most influential, against the French existence in the Syrian realm.771  
The Ottoman Government initiated its struggle in the economic realm. In the 
beginning of the War, to eliminate the economic existence of France, all the railroads and 
ports in Syria, which had been administered and operated by that state, were confiscated, 
and their operating rights were delivered to the Hijaz Railroad Company, the national 
company of the Ottoman Empire. In that regard, Damascus, Hama, Jaffa and Jerusalem 
Chemin-de-fer Companies and the port administrations of Beirut were ottomanized and 
delivered to the Hijaz Railroad Company.772 As will be explained below, when Cemal 
Pasha decided to detain the Entente citizens in Syria as hostages, the directors and the 
officials of the late French Railroads and Ports were not excluded from this 
implementation; they were paid a salary of prisoner from the funds of the Army.773 It was 
                                                 
771 HHStA, PA 12/377, Brawer to Burian, “Die Förderung unseres kulturellen 
Einflusses in der Türkei”, Constantinople, 24 March 1916: for further information about 
the extent of the French cultural influence before the War from an archival source see: 
HHStA, PA 12/314, “Umfang und Art der Ausübung des französischen 
Kultusprotektorates”, The Writer and date aren’t specified. 
772 BOA, BEO 4347/326022, Sadaret to Evkaf Ministry, 23 Mart 1331 [5 April 1915]. 
773 BOA, BEO 4367/327519, Sadaret to Ministry of Interior, 23 Temmuz 1331 [5 
August 1915]; BOA, BEO 4372/327845, Sadaret to Başkumandanlık, 30 Ağustos 1331 [12 
September 1915]. 
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relatively easy for the Ottoman Government to abolish the French economic existence 
applying the method of nationalization. However, erasing the cultural influence would not 
be as easy as that of the economic influence: 
 
 
5.1.1. Deportation and Exile of the Agents of the French Influence from Syria 
 
As the first part of the policy of elimination of the French influence, the citizens 
and religious men of that state, who made the French visible in the Syrian Provinces with 
their religious, cultural and educational activities, were commenced to be deported together 
with the citizens of the other Entente states. Most of the deportees were the priests and the 
sisters, who could influence the public opinion of the Syrian Christians, and who became 
for years the transmitters of the French cultural influence in the provinces under the 
study.774  
When decided to deport the French citizens from Syria, some citizens of the 
Entente states were excepted for the deportation order, especially for those who could be 
beneficial for the Army in the war circumstances; the sisters of the French Hospital in 
Damascus continued their services for a while upon the request of the Commander of the 
4th Army by virtue of military considerations, whereas the priests of the hospital 
deported.775 In May 1916, those sisters were driven out and compelled to leave their 
uniforms behind and adopt native women’s dress. The hospital was occupied by the 
Ottoman Government.776 Besides that, some priests in the confiscated cloisters and 
                                                 
774 MAEE, Guerre 1914-1918, 867/Turquie, Syrie et Palestine, Reffye to Defrance, 
Alexanria, 20 November 1914 
775 BOA, DH.EUM. 5. Şb. 5/57, Enver to Talat, 20 Teşrin-i Sani 1330 [3 December 
1914]. 
776 PRO, FO 371/2777, McMahon to FO (Transmitting an intelligent returned from 
Syria), Cairo, 20 May 1916. 
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orphanages were allowed to stay in the Ottoman country by naturalizing themselves to the 
Ottoman citizenship.777   
When the deportation order was first issued, all the citizens of the Entente were 
contained within the scope of it. However, while the process of deportation were 
continuing in its normal routine, upon the death of the civil people in the bombardment of 
the Syrian coasts by the Entente’s warships, the deportation was stopped on 12th December 
by the Governor in compliance with the Army Commander to keep them as hostage for 
threatening the Entente states in case of the repeat of the same incident; Firstly Zeki 
Pasha778, the predecessor of Cemal, and later Cemal Pasha threatened the Entente states via 
Italian and American diplomats, and by the proclamations in the newspapers expressing 
that the citizens of the Entente were detained as hostages in Damascus and Jerusalem, and 
would be killed in groups of three for each Ottoman killed in the allied bombardment.779 In 
addition, the material damages would be compensated from the income of the French and 
the British institutions in the Ottoman Country.780 On 19th December that prohibition was 
invalidated, and the detained were allowed to exit from the country till 28th December; one 
day later, upon the British bombardment of Alexandretta Cemal cancelled the permission 
again; On 26th December, some Entente citizens, who were deemed appropriate to be 
deported–most of them from the clergy class from France- were driven out of the country 
                                                 
777 HHStA, PA 12/463, Pallavicini to Burian(Transmitting Consul Beirut), 
Constantinople, 7 November 1915.  
778 For Zeki Pasha’s proclamation in the newspapers of Beirut see: BOA, 
DH.EUM.5.Şb. 3/22, The Governor of Syria to Ministry of Interior, 27 Teşrin-i Evvel 
1330 [9 November 1914];MAEE, Guerre 1914-1918, 867/Turquie, Syrie et Palestine, 
Reffye to Defrance, Alexanria, 20 November 1914; PRO, FO 371/2141, Rodd to Grey, 
Rome, 24 November 1914. 
779 The British subject interned at Damascus were informed by Cemal Pasha that if any 
bombardment took place, he would be obliged, though to immediately retaliate on them: 
PRO, FO 371/2483, Chief of Staff of Sir John Jackson Oliver [Limited] to the British 
Gun-Boat at Alexandretta, Damascus, 20 December 1914; for a description of the situation 
of the Entente citizens in Jerusalem by a deported priest see: MAEE, Guerre 1914-1918, 
868/Turquie, Syrie et Palestine, Apostolic Missionary Amédéé de Merone to Cote, 17 
February 1915. 
780 BOA, DH.EUM. 5.Şb. 10/41, 2 Mart 1331 [15 March 1915]. 
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till 2nd January.781 Meanwhile, Talat warned Cemal that killing 3 three people in return for 
each Ottoman citizen, above all touching the clergy, would mean the proclamation of war 
against the whole Christian world. Cemal answered that he used that threat only as a trump 
to prevent further bombardment of the Syrian coasts.782  
Although Cemal prevented the deportation of the ordinary citizens of the Entente 
states, he didn’t suspend the process for the clergy since their deportation and exile would 
also be meaning the abolition of the French cultural investment in Syria and the 
elimination of the potential of these clerics to influence the local people.783 In two days 
after Cemal’s declaration of deportation, 53 priests and sisters left Beirut with an Italian 
vessel. Similarly two days later, 212 French, 44 Russian, 4 Belgian priests and 90 French 
sisters were deported.784 According to the information given by the deportees from 
Jerusalem, to the French representative in Alexandria, firstly, they were interned in the 
barracks, and then deported by the order of Cemal Pasha. Most probably, that practice was 
applied to prevent the leaking of information. On the other hand, the ordinary British and 
French citizens were kept in the hotels and barracks as hostages.785 However, the military 
authorities encouraged the sisters and some physicians of the Entente to stay in the 
hospitals instead of returning to their home.786 In return for the treatment of Cemal Pasha, 
                                                 
781 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 11, Mutius to Bethmann-Hollweg, Beirut, 26 January 1915. 
782 BOA, DH.EUM. 5.Şb. 6/54, Talat to Cemal, Cemal to Talat, 8 Kanun-ı Evvel 1330 
[21 December 1914]. 
783 At that time, the Governor of Jerusalem was complaining about the potentials of 
those religious men to influence the local people; BOA, DH.ŞFR. 450/67, The Governor of 
Jerusalem to Talat, Jerusalem, 13 Teşrin-i Sani 1330 [26 November 1914] 
784 BOA, DH.EUM. 5.Şb. 11/7, the Governor of Beirut to Ministry of Interior, 18 
Kanun-ı Evvel 1330 [30 December 1914] 
785 MAEE, Guerre 1914-1918, 867/Turquie, Syrie et Palestine, Reffye to Defrance, 
Port-Said, 6 January 1915. 
786 The head physician of the Rothschild Austrian Hospital and another physician, who 
had French nationality are allowed to stay there: BOA, DH.EUM. 5.Şb. 6/35, Ministry of 
Interior to The Governor of Jerusalem, 12 Kanun-ı Evvel 1330 [25 December 1914]; 900 
of the pro-French religious men were deported from Jerusalem to the expressions of the 
French deportees. For details of their remarks see: MAEE, Guerre 1914-1918, 
867/Turquie, Syrie et Palestine, Reffye to Defrance, Alexandria, 2 January 1915.  
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France considered a military operation against Syria, but due to the British opposition they 
had to abandon that action.787 
All the other clerics, who were not allowed to leave the country, were exiled to 
Damascus and Urfa.788 In addition, considering that the detainment of the Entente citizens 
in Syria, especially in the coastal regions, could induce some espionage incidents, Cemal 
exiled them to the interior. A German diplomat in Damascus reported the difficulty of the 
isolation of the Entente citizens stating that they could easily be mixing up in the daily life. 
The Austrian Consul of Damascus, in a similar way, agreed that the citizens of the Entente 
states –most of whom were of French nationality- played a considerable role in the 
dissemination of the pro-Entente leaflets among the people, which sometimes created 
panic among the local people.789 As a result of all these factors, Cemal expelled all the 
French, British and Russian citizens, living in the Syrian Provinces to Asia Minor, giving a 
priority to those who settled in the coastal towns, unless who were ill and whose health 
conditions were unsuitable for travel.790 Regarding the place of the resettlement for the 
exiles, a German Military official conveyed from Enver Pasha that, in the beginning, 
Cemal was contemplating to resettle those people in the desert. However, taking the 
difficulty of adaptation to the weather of the desert for them into consideration, he 
abandoned this idea.791  
                                                 
787 For an example of such considerations see: MAEE, Guerre 1914-1918, 867/Turquie, 
Syrie et Palestine, Cote to MAE, Port-Said, 9 January 1915.  
788 Ballobar, Ibid, p. 37. 
789 HHStA, PA 38/366, Ranzi to Burian, “Entente-freundliche Ausstreuungen; 
Einstellung des Verkehrs auf den Syrischen Bahnen”, Damascus, 22 June 1915; With 
similar regards, a few months later, the Governor of Beirut demanded the expulsion of the 
protestants from the coastal regions into the internal regions. For details see: BOA, 
DH.ŞFR. 489/9, Bekir Sami to Talat, 31 Ağustos 1331 [13 September 1915] 
790 BOA, DH.EUM. 5.Şb. 14/24, Enver to Talat [Transmitting Cemal], 9 Haziran 1331 
[22 June 1915]; BOA, DH. EUM. 5.Şb. 11/11, The Governor of Beirut to Ministry of 
Interior, Beirut, 15 Mart 1331 [28 March 1915]; PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 11, Padel to 
Bethmann-Hollweg, Damascus 20 February 1915; BOA, DH.EUM. 5.Şb. 11/16, The 
Governor of Aleppo to Ministry of Interior, 19 Mart 1331 [2 April 1915]. 
791 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.11, Wangenheim to Bethmann-Hollweg (Transmitting 
Humann), Constantinople, 18 March 1915; Quite the reverse, all the Entente citizens 
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Cemal Pasha followed the same policy with similar considerations towards the 
Muslim citizens of the Entente who had Algerian and Indian origins claiming that they 
were paid salaries by the French and the British Governments via the American consulate, 
and thus, their existence in Damascus was deemed as dangerous both militarily and 
politically. As a result, 49 of the Algerians and 13 of Indians, all of them Muslims, were 
banished to inner Anatolia with their families by Cemal’s order.792 After that, money 
distribution to the former Entente citizens –most of whom were the Jewish immigrants 
who subsisted with the foreign aids- via American Consulates had to be presented to the 
approval of the Governor of the related city in a list, and then paid to the persons.793  
Besides the French citizens, the Algerian Ottomans, who immigrated in Syria after 
the French occupation of Algeria, were a most influenced community by France, and 
Cemal watched out for their actions throughout the War. A considerable number of people, 
who had an Algerian origin was banished to Anatolia throughout the War period within the 
framework of the policy adopted for the abolishment of the French influence in the Syrian 
provinces.794 As analyzed in Chapter 2, some prominent Algerian leaders from al-Jazairi 
family were either sentenced to death penalty or exiled to Anatolia with the same reason. 
Cemal Pasha also commenced a process of expulsion for ones, who were thought to 
become the agents of the French influence in Syria before the War, consisting mostly of 
                                                                                                                                                    
settled at Zor were expelled to Konia by the order of Cemal Pasha: BOA, DH.ŞFR. 
543/35, Kamil to Talat, 5 Teşrin-i Evvel 1332 [18 October 1916].  
792 BOA, DH.EUM. 5.Şb. 36/30, Cemal to Talat, Damascus, 4 September 1915; In 
another document Cemal gave the number as 64: TTK Arşivi, KO Koleksiyonu 3/33, 
Cemal to Enver, 12 Mart 1332;From a document regarding putting the Algerian 
Muhammed Utbe on a salary, it is stated that he was daily paid 7 gurush by the 
Government. It seems clear that those exiles were salaried by the Government in the place 
of resettlement: BOA, DH.EUM. 4.Şb. 7/1, Security General Directorate to the 
Governorate of Ankara, 19 Haziran 1332 [2 July 1916]. 
793 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 565/91, Azmi to Talat, 16 Eylül 1333, Beirut, [16 September 1917]. 
794 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 60/9, Talat to the Governor of Syria, 2 Kanun-ı Sani 1331 [15 
January 1915]; BOA, DH.ŞFR. 60/93, Ministry of Interior to the Governor of Sivas, 10 
Kanun-ı Sani 1331 [23 January 1915]; Some unfortunate incidents also took place in that 
process. For example A French citizen from Algeria, who came Damascus to go to Mecca 
for pilgrimage, was arrested and banished to Ankara as prisoner of war with his family 
consisting of 27 persons: BOA, DH.EUM. 4.Şb. 6/25, The Governor of Ankara to Ministry 
of Interior, 1 Nisan 1332 [14 April 1915]. 
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the prominent Christian families of Beirut and Lebanon. In Cemal’s viewpoint, those 
people were dangerous both militarily as a source of intelligence and politically as the 
continuance of French penetration. As a result of these considerations, Cemal commenced 
a process of banishment for some prominent Christian families of Beirut to Asia Minor, 
who became distinguished with the Francophile feelings. In the first quarter of 1916, 
according to Beirut Consul of Germany, he expelled a group of people with their familites, 
consisted mainly of the Christian merchants. Their numbers were reaching to 70 men. 
They were decided to be expelled by the denouncement of the confidants of the 
Government without any judgment process.795 
With the same regards, a number of the outstanding Lebanese were arrested and 
expelled to Anatolia, who were accused with disloyalty to the state. Among them the old 
vice-president of the Administrative Board of the autonomous Lebanese regime, Habib 
Pasha Saad,796 the old President of the Administrative Board of the autonomous Lebanon,  
and the most influential supporter of the French penetration in Lebanon, the old 
Kaymakam of Metn district, Faik (Faiz?) Shehab,797 the Kaymakam of Shuf district, Emin 
Tewfik Arslan and his brother Emin Fuad Arslan, the old Commander of the autonomous 
Lebanese troops and the brother of the old Minister of Agriculture, Suleiman al-Bostani, 
Said Bey al-Bostani798 and some other Lebanese notables.799 Approximately one month 
before this decision, Emin Arslan and Habib Pasha Saad had been nominated as the deputy 
                                                 
795 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.11, Mutius to Bethmann-Hollweg, Beirut 26 April 1916; 
Changing their place of resettlement was dependent on the permission of the Ministry of 
Interior: BOA, DH.EUM. 5.Şb. 29/4. 
796 For his decision of expulsion to Ankara, see: BOA, DH.EUM. 4.Şb. 7/51, Ministry 
of Interior to the Governor of Syria, 12 Temmuz 1332 [25 July 1916]. 
797 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 543/117, The Governor of Bolu to Ministry of Interior, 11 Kanun-ı 
Sani 1332: Faiz Şihab’ın Bolu Kıbrıscık’ta nahiye müdiri olarak bulunduğu, önde gelen 
dürzi eşrafından 
798 Said Bey firstly expelled to Ankara. But, to the contrary of the general policy of the 
prohibition of the exiles to change their locations, he was allowed to resettle in Istanbul: 
BOA, BEO 4444/333253, Ministry of Interior to War Ministry, 26 Teşrin-i Sani 1332 [9 
December 1916]. 
799 BOA, DH.EUM. 4.Şb. 7/51, Ministry of Interior to the Governor of Syria, 12 
Temmuz 1332 [25 July 1916]. 
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candidates of Lebanon by Ali Münif.800 But later, they were abandoned and exiled.801 As 
expressed in the third chapter, the Maronite Patriarch had also been banished to Adana 
with the same reasons. All of them were exiled without any judgment, like previous exiles. 
According to the German Consul of Beirut, some of them were banished since they were 
the adherents of the French and British propagations, but some others became victims of 
personal ambitions and hates of the confidants of the Government.802  
Cemal was rather strict about the issue of the return of those exiles to their homes. 
Similar to his treatment of the Muslim exiles to Anatolia, he never accepted the return of 
them to Syria. Even the request of the American Ambassador and the mediation of Talat 
Pasha for the return of some people were refused by the absolute ruler of Syria. The 
German Consul stated that those operations of the Government make the contrast sharper 
between the Turkish rule and the Arabs, and caused some eyebrows to be raised even 
among the pro-Ottoman sections of the Syrian society.803 However, when Cemal’s long 
term policies were taken into consideration, he rather aimed at the transformation of the 
social structure than a satisfaction of the people with the moderate Ottoman policies.  
 
 
                                                 
800 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.12, Mutius to Bethmann-Hollweg, Beirut, 15 March 1916 
801 BOA, DH-İ.UM. 2-12, Ali Münif to Talat, Beirut, 17 Teşrin-i Sani 1332 [30 
November 1916]; PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.13, Mutius to Bethmann-Hollweg, Beirut, 9 
December 1916. 
802 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.11, Mutius to Bethmann-Hollweg, Beirut 26 April 1916; 
For the exile of the Maronite Patriarch due to his Francophile attitude see: BOA, HR.SYS. 
2267/34, Ministry of Interior to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 9 Temmuz 1332 [22 July 
1916].  
803 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.11, Mutius to Bethmann-Hollweg, Beirut 26 April 1916. 
Cemal Pasha’s anti-French attitude caused the interpretations by the British officials 
describing him as Germanophile.  There was almost no comment by the British and French 
officials interpreting Cemal’s actions in Syria as the centralization of those lands: PRO, 
FO 371/2777, McMahon to FO (Transmitting an intelligent returned from Syria), Cairo, 20 
May 1916; The request of the American Ambassador and the mediation of Talat Pasha to 
stop the banishment of the interpreter of the American Consulate and his family didn’t help 
the return of the process: BOA, DH.EUM. 5.Şb. 36/30, Talat to Midhat, 1 Teşrin-i Sani 
1332 [14 November 1916], Midhat to Talat, 2 Teşrin-i Sani 1332 [15 November 1916]. 
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5.1.2. Ottomanization of the French Cultural Institutions  
 
The commencement of the Ottoman struggle in Syria against the French institutions 
predates even the arrival of Cemal Pasha. It was not a policy adopted for only Syria, but a 
strategy of nationalization of all the French institutions was adopted all over the Ottoman 
country.804 After the ex parte abolition of the Capitulations, the Ottoman authorities firstly 
commenced a process of pacification for all kinds of tools providing communication to the 
French cultural institutions with the abroad, and to those, which were protected by France 
with the regulations of the Capitulations.805 In this sense, first of all, the wireless telegraph 
machines of those institutions were removed, and the post offices of the foreign states, 
which were beyond the Governmental control, were closed.806 The post offices of the 
Allies of the Empire were not given an exception from this implementation.807 Especially 
the Jesuit priests, who were corresponding intensively with the French warships patrolling 
around the Syrian coasts, were deprived of that communication.808 In the same vein, with 
the Ottoman declaration of war against the Entente states, the buildings of the French and 
                                                 
804 For the closure of the French institutions in Brussa and the expulsion of its staff, see: 
BOA, DH.EUM. 5.Şb. 4/27, 11 Teşrin-i Sani 1330 [24 November 1914]; The same action 
was held in Siwas as well: BOA, DH.EUM. 5.Şb. 37/22A, 7 Şubat 1332 [20 February 
1917]; for Samsun, see: BOA, DH.EUM. 5.Şb. 33/4, 17 Kanun-ı Sani 1332 [30 January 
1917]. 
805 For the details of the implementations applied to the institutions protected by France, 
see: BOA, DH.EUM. 5.Şb. 8/2, 27 Teşrin-i Evvel 1331 [9 November 1915].  
806 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 47/181, Ministry of Interior to the Governor of Syria, 13 Teşrin-i 
Sani 1330 [26 November 1914]; BOA, DH.ŞFR. 438/101, The Governor of Beirut to 
Ministry of Interior, Beirut, 14 Ağustos 1330 [27 August 1914]; BOA, DH.ŞFR. 440/76, 
The Governor of Beirut to Ministry of Interior, 31 Ağustos 1330 [13 August 1914]; BOA, 
DH.EUM. 5.Şb. 6/6, Macid to Ministry of Interior, Jerusalem, 30 Teşrin-i Sani 1330 [13 
December 1914]; there was no telegraph machine in the Vilayet of Syria [not the Greater 
Syria] and Hijaz to confiscate; BOA, DH.ŞFR. 450/79, Hulusi to Talat, Damascus, 13 
Teşrin-i Sani 1330 [26 November 1914]; BOA, DH.ŞFR. 456/64, Vehib to Talat, 22 
Kanun-ı Evvel 1330 [4 January 1915]. 
807 BOA, DH.EUM. 5.Şb. 5/46, 26 Teşrin-i Sani 1330 [9 December 1914]. 
808 HHStA, PA 38/363, Ranzi to Berchtold, Damascus, 10 September 1914; for the 
closure of the post offices see: PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.11, Mutius to Bethmann Hollweg, 
Beirut, 15 October 1914.  
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the British consulates in Beirut, Jerusalem and Damascus were subjected to a search.809 
The Ottoman police didn’t manage to seize the British documents; however, the French 
files in Beirut and Damascus were confiscated.810 Afterwards, those documents would be 
used as evidence to punish the leaders of the Arabist Movement. 
After the decision of the Ottoman Cabinet to confiscate all the Entente institutions 
and convert them into Ottoman ownership, a process of relentless prosecution was initiated 
against the French religious, sanitary and educational institutions. In this regard, all of the 
French institutions, -schools, hospitals, orphanages, etc.- were seized811 and their priests 
and sisters were first deposed and, following that, enforced to move out of the buildings of 
those institutions;812 the police carried out a search in the houses of the priests in various 
cities, and in the French colony of Beirut. In Damascus and Jerusalem, the buildings of the 
priest and sister schools, and some of the churches under the French protection were 
transformed into military barracks.813 The rest was decided by the Cabinet to continue their 
educational activities as Sultani Schools or Teacher’s Schools [Darü’l-Muallimin] under 
the control of the Ottoman Government.814 The appeal of the Apostolic See to take the 
                                                 
809 For the search in Jerusalem, see: BOA, DH.ŞFR.452/15, The Governor of Jerusalem 
to Talat, Jerusalem, 22 Teşrin-i Sani 1330 [5 December 1914]; for Beirut, see: BOA, 
DH.ŞFR. 508/101, The Governor of Beirut to Talat, Beirut, 28 Kanun-ı Sani 1331 [10 
February 1915]; for Damascus, see: BOA, DH.ŞFR. 479/4, Cemal to Talat, Damascus, 23 
Haziran 1331 [6 July 1331]; also see, Arslan, Ibid, p. 133. 
810 BOA, DH. ŞFR, 510/88,  Azmi to Ministry of Interior,10 Şubat 1331 [23 February 
1915]; 
811 BOA, MF.MKT. 1202/60, The Governor of Beirut to the Minister of Education in 
Beirut, 1 Teşrin-i Sani 1330 [14 November 1914]. 
812 BOA, MF.MKT. 1202/60, The Minister of Education to the Director of Education in 
Beirut, 23 Nisan 1331 [6 April 1915]; For some references to the deposed priests and 
seized properties see: MAEE, Guerre 1914-1918, 867/Turquie, Syrie et Palestine, Reffye 
to Defrance, Alexandria, 7 January 1915. 
813 For the implementations in Lebanon and Syria see: MAEE, Guerre 1914-1918, 
867/Turquie, Syrie et Palestine, Reffye to Defrance, Alexanria, 20 November 1914; for the 
events in Zahle see: PRO, FO 371/2480, Eliot to Grey, “Situation in the Lebanon”, 
Athens, 31 December 1914; for Palestine see: MAEE, Guerre 1914-1918, 867/Turquie, 
Syrie et Palestine, Reffye to Defrance, Alexanria, 2 January 1914 
814 BOA, MF.MKT. 1202/60, The Minister of Interior to the Governor of Syria, 29 
Teşrin-i Evvel 1330 [11 November 1914]. 
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Catholic institutions under its protection remained inconclusive.815 The German Consul in 
Aleppo reported six months later about the result of these actions that, with the closure of 
the French school and the abolition of its protection over the Catholics, the dissemination 
of the French culture by education was noticeably hampered.816 
As for the Ottomanization of the French institutions, following the confiscation of 
them, the Ottoman Government commenced the process of transformation of them into the 
Ottoman institutions continuing till the middle of the War period. As was expressed above, 
some of them had been occupied by the Army for military use. However, some others 
maintained to render their services as the Ottoman educational institutions. A dispatch of 
the Minister of Education to the director of Education in Beirut shows the conduct of the 
Ottoman Government about the Ottomanization of those institutions. The former requested 
the change of the teaching staff, when those institutions were confiscated; otherwise, they 
would change only in name.817  
In this regard, as examined earlier, some seminary rooms belonging to the St. Anna 
Church were transformed into a Muslim religious and law school, and called with a 
symbolic name: Salahaddin-i Eyyubi Külliyesi. Salahaddin was the sultan of the Ayyubids 
who recaptured Jerusalem from the Crusades in 1187.818 Similarly, the Freres des Ecoles 
Chretiennes was occupied and transformed into an Ottoman Sultani School.819 All its staff 
was decided to deport from the Ottoman country by reason of their potentiality to 
                                                 
815 The Apostolic See was complaining about the treatment of the Ottoman Government 
all the institutions protected by France as the French institutions: BOA, DH. EUM. 5. Şb. 
8/2, Ministry of Interior to Foreign Ministry, 27 Teşrin-i Sani 1330 [10 December 1914]; 
PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.11, Löytvet to Bethmann-Hollweg. Damascus, 18 December 
1914.  
816 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.12, Rössler to Bethmann-Hollweg, Aleppo, 8 May 1915. 
817 BOA, MF.MKT. 1202/60, The Minister of Interior to the Director of Education in 
Beirut, 23 Nisan 1331 [6 April 1915]. 
818 For further information see: Martin Strohmeier, Al-Kulliya as-Salahiya in 
Jerusalem: Arabismus, Osmanismus und Panislamismus im Ersten Weltkrieg, Stutgard: 
Kommissionsverlag Franz Steiner, 1991, pp 2–3. 
819 BOA, DH.EUM. 5.Şb. 6/6, Macid to Ministry of Interior, Jerusalem, 30 Teşrin-i 
Sani 1330 [13 December 1914]. 
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manipulate the local public opinion.820 At Jubeil, Tripoli and Junie, after the 
Ottomanization of the French schools, the Government changed the teachers with Turkish 
and Arab teachers. The crosses over the doors of these religious institutions were broken 
down and replaced by crescents.821  
A similar implementation was conducted by Ali Münif Bey in Lebanon in April 
1916. Since Lebanon had an autonomous government before the War, the Ottomanization 
of the French institutions there were slower than the other districts of Syria. The Governor 
of Lebanon issued a declaration “to the monks, priests, brothers and sisters, who [were] in 
the Ottoman Lebanon and who [were] the members of foreign congregations”, and 
requested those religious men, who had already acquired an Ottoman citizenship, to cut all 
their ties with the foreign congregations and religious orders. If these religious men wanted 
to continue their monastic lives, they had to take the approval of the heads of their local 
communities, Maronites, Greek-Catholics or Greek-Orthodox. With this declaration all the 
churches, schools and other institutions belonging to the institutions under the French 
protection in Lebanon before the War were confiscated. The German Consul of Beirut 
emphasized that the main goal of these implementation was to break the French influence, 
which became so effective in the Lebanon.822 
The Ottomanization of the orphanages and the schools were paid a special 
attention, since the children were of vital importance in the processes of identity-building. 
According to the remarks of the Ottoman Minister of Education, the ultimate aim was to 
Islamize those institutions removing the adjective “foreign” in front of their names.823 By 
                                                 
820 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 450/67, The Governor of Jerusalem to Talat, Jerusalem, 13 Teşrin-i 
Sani 1330 [26 November 1914]; HHStA, PA 38/367, The Consul of Jerusalem to Burian, 
“Politisches Situationsbild”, Jerusalem, 7 June 1915. 
821 PRO, FO 371/2777, McMahon to FO (Transmitting an intelligent returned from 
Syria), Cairo, 20 May 1916. 
822 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.13, Mutius to Bethmann-Hollweg, Beirut, 12 April 1916; 
Similar remarks are also available in a British document. However, the teller doesn’t 
define the place and time, and some exaggerations are available: PRO, FO 371/2777, 
McMahon to FO (Transmitting an intelligent returned from Syria), Cairo, 20 May 1916. 
823 BOA, MF.MKT. 1202/60, The Minister of Interior to the Director of Education in 
Beirut, 28 Nisan 1331 [11 April 1915]; For the Ottomanization of the French Orphanage in 
Damascus (50 children) and the settlement of the Muslim children there, see: BOA, 
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that reason, in the French Orphanage of Beirut, after the deposition of the sisters, 151 
women were needed for the maintenance of the routine of the institution. 824 In the same 
vein, the Christian children, who were submitted by their parents to be trained as priests 
and sisters, were required to be returned to their families. In the same direction, in a short 
span of time, the Christian trainers and officials would be changed with that of the 
Muslims.825 Different from Beirut, in Damascus the care of the Christian orphans would be 
entrusted to the new Muslim tutoresses, instead of the dispersion of those children.826 
However, the Orphanage in Damascus was released from the confiscation with the 
intervention of Cemal Pasha.827 
A closer look at the situation of an Ottomanized orphanage in Beirut with the 
testimony of a nurse, Felizitas Taux, working in such an orphanage in Beirut, will clarify 
the extent of the transformation. After the seizure of the French orphanages in Beirut, 
consisted of a central house used as school for the education of the Orphans and the other 
students (for 800 students), an orphan boy house (for 145 boys), an orphan girl house (275 
girls) and a hospital, the governor of Beirut appointed a Turkish director for those 
institutions, named Kudret Bey. Firstly, the director appointed the German nurses of the 
orphanages, whose numbers were only two and worked under French protection before the 
War, as Cashiers in different Orphanages, instead of employment them in the care of the 
children. That was convenient to the order of the Central Government, allowing their stay 
                                                                                                                                                    
MF.MKT. 1202/60, The Director of Education in Syria to Ministry of Education, 
Damascus, 26 Nisan 1331 [9 May 1915]. 
824 BOA, MF.MKT. 1202/60, The Director of Education in Beirut to Ministry of 
Education, 26 Nisan 1331 [9 April 1915]; 
825 BOA, MF.MKT. 1202/60, The Minister of Interior to the Director of Education in 
Beirut, 28 Nisan 1331 [11 April 1915]; For the Ottomanization of the French Orphanage in 
Damascus (50 children) and the settlement of the Muslim children there, see: BOA, 
MF.MKT. 1202/60, The Director of Education in Syria to Ministry of Education, 
Damascus, 26 Nisan 1331 [9 April 1915]. 
826 BOA, MF.MKT. 1202/60, The Director of Education in Syria to Ministry of 
Education, Damascus, 3 Mayıs 1331 [16 May 1915]. 
827 BOA, MF.MKT. 1202/60, The Minister of Interior to the Director of Education in 
Damascus, 10 Haziran 1331 [23 April 1915]. 
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in Syria unless they worked as teachers.828 It is worth to mention that Kudret Bey was 
dismissed from this office because of his lack of capability to conduct this institution.829 
  In addition, the director brought 25 Mussulman orphans to the Orphanages and 
ordered that, from then on, those children would be cared there. He also ordered that the 
Mussulman children should not be taken to the Church, and ceased all the statues of the 
sacred figures of the Christianity (Mother Marry, Joseph Antonius, Vincens and the Cross) 
in the hospital and the Orphanages, although the German nurses opposed him with a 
resignation threat.830 Similarly, the Chapelle of the Jesuit School in Beirut was transformed 
into a conference hall removing all the [sacred] property inside the building.831  
Another question for Cemal Pasha in Syria regarding the people employed in the 
French religious institutions was the issue of the German and the Austrian citizens, who 
were in the service of those institutions, or who were protected by France. For Cemal the 
toleration of their activities would mean the maintenance of the foreign influence in a 
different way, i.e. the replacement of the French influence with those of the Germans or 
Austrians, that was the most important goal followed by those states in Syria throughout 
                                                 
828 The nurse wanted to convey his letter to the Catholic Cardinal of Köln in Germany 
via the Austrian Consul of Beirut. However, being afraid of a diplomatic crisis between the 
Ottoman Empire and his Government, the Consul transmitted the letter to the Austrian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Burian. For the original of the letter and the comment of the 
Consul see: HHStA, PA 38/369, Nedwed to Burian, “Barmherzige Schwestern in Beirut 
Weilterleitung  eines Briefes”, Beirut, 8 August 1916; for the order of the Ottoman 
Government about the employment of the Germans and Austrians, who worked in the 
French institutions before the War see: BOA, EUM. 5.Şb. 9/55A, The Governor of Syria to 
Ministry of Interior, 10 Teşrin-i Sani 1330 [23 November 1914], Ministry of Interior to the 
Governor of Syria, 11 Teşrin-i Sani 1330 [24 November 1914]. 
829 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 531/86, Azmi to Talat, Beirut, 28 August 1916 [10 September 1916] 
830 HHStA, PA 38/369, Nedwed to Burian, “Barmherzige Schwestern in Beirut 
Weilterleitung  eines Briefes”, Beirut, 8 August 1916: Some Ottoman documents also 
shows that the Muslim children were settled in the confiscated orphanages: BOA, MF. 
MKT. 1202/60, Ministry of Interior to the Governorates, 30 Mart 1331 [11 April 1915]. 
831 BOA, MF.MKT. 1202/60, The Minister of Interior to the Governor of Beirut, 7 
Haziran 1331 [20 June 1915]; BOA, MF.MKT. 1202/60, The Director of Education in 
Beirut to Ministry of Education, 10 Haziran 1331 [23 June 1915] 
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the War.832 With these considerations, the German and Austrian Consuls made an 
application to the Governor of Syria requesting the maintenance of those institutions to 
their activities same as before. Becoming aware of their aims833, the Ottoman Government 
allowed their stay in Syria on condition that they wouldn’t work as teachers in the schools 
and monasteries.834 
At the expense of the ruin of the structure of those institutions and scattering their 
human capital, Cemal Pasha and the Bureaucracy under his rule managed to a large extent 
the Ottomanization of the French institutions in Syria, by which the mentioned states were 
able to have a great influence there, and an ability to intervene the internal issues of Syria 
on the pretext of the problems of those institutions and colonies. By this way, Cemal made 
a crucial stride for the full independence of the Ottoman Empire from the interventions of 
the foreign powers in the Syrian realm, most probably taking the situation in the post-war 
period into consideration. 
As for Cemal policy against Great Britain, because of the difference of the British 
imperial tradition and their relative indifference about Syria, they didn’t have much 
influence in Syria, which necessitated a struggle, similar to that conducted against France. 
Rather, they preferred a policy aiming at the alienation of the urban and Bedouin Syrians 
from the Ottoman Caliph, i.e. counter-propaganda against the Ottoman Policy of Pan-
Islamism. Therefore, Cemal struggled with that state by different methods. Since Cemal’s 
policy of Pan-Islamism can’t be considered a strategy in the framework of the struggle 
with foreign influence, this subject has been analyzed under the second chapter examining 
Pan-Islamism policies. 
                                                 
832 The details of those policies will be explained in the related title. However, for the 
examles of such intentions see: PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.12, Rössler to Bethmann-Hollweg, 
Aleppo, 8 May 1915; HHStA, PA 12/377, Brawer to Burian, “Die Förderung unseres 
kulturellen Einflusses in der Türkei”, Constantinople, 24 March 1916. 
833 As will be explained in details below, in a report that was sent to Talat, it is obvious 
that the Ottoman Empire were aware of the strivings of those states and struggling with 
them: BOA, DH.EUM 5.Şb 30/38, Mehmet Ali [Inspector of Education] to Ministry of 
Interior, 20 Teşrin-i Evvel 1332 [2 Kasım 1916]. 
834 BOA, EUM. 5.Şb. 9/55A, The Governor of Syria to Ministry of Interior, 10 Teşrin-i 
Sani 1330 [23 November 1914], Ministry of Interior to the Governor of Syria, 11 Teşrin-i 
Sani 1330 [24 November 1914]. 
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5.2. Checking German and Austrian Influence in Syria 
 
 
The German enterprises to have an influence in the Syrian territories predates the 
accession of Wilhelm II to the throne835, and on the eve of the War, German colonization 
had already reached to a considerable level in Syria,836 although it was not compatible to  
that of France.837 When Cemal Pasha arrived in Syria, it was a widely known phenomenon 
that Germany aimed to deepen its penetration there, taking the advantage of the War.838 In 
spite of its backwardness in comparison to Germany, the Austrian-Hungary Empire also 
undertook to assert its influence taking the advantage of the War circumstances, at least 
among the Catholics of the Province to fill the gap left by France.839 
                                                 
835 The first German colony had been established in Palaestine, in 1868, as an 
independent Christian colony: Arthur Ruppin, Syrien als Wirtschaftsgebiet, Kolonial-
Wirtschaftliches Komitee Verlag, Berlin: 1917. 
836 For further knowledge about the history of the German penetration in Syria, see: 
Ulrich Trumpener, “Germany and the End of the Ottoman Empire”, in Kent, Ibid. pp. 107-
136; the population of two German colonies, Wilhelma and Sarona, which became the 
basis of the German influence in Syria was reaching to 3.000: PRO, FO 371/2482, 
Norman Bethwich to FO, “England and the Jewish Settlement in Palestine”, undated. 
837 For some comparisons between German and French investments in Syria see: 
Fulton, Ibid. 
838 HHStA, PA 12/209, Ranzi to Burian, Damascus, 28 January 1915;  
839 For the advises of the Austrian Ambassador in this direction see: HHStA, PA 
12/210, Pallavicini to Burian, “Deutsche kulturelle Aktion in Damascus”, Constantinople, 
9 December 1916; for a German report about this subject, see: PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 
16, Brode to AA, Jerusalem, 24 October 1917; for warning of the Ottoman authorities to 
their colleagues in Syria about the Austrian undertakings in this direction, see: BOA, 
DH.EUM 5.Şb 30/38, Mehmet Ali [Inspector of Education] to Ministry of Interior, 20 
Teşrin-i Evvel 1332 [2 Kasım 1916]. 
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 As defined in the beginning of the chapter, Cemal Pasha had appeared as the 
Governor General of Syria to integrate those lands into the Imperial body and to assure in 
these provinces the independence from the foreign intervention. Therefore, he had to 
struggle, at the same time, with the undertakings of the allies of the Empire in Syria aiming 
at gaining an area of influence there as well as the elimination of the influence of the 
enemies of the Ottomans. However, as will be explained below, he didn’t hesitate to have 
recourse to the German technical and scientific experience in the development of Syria, 
but, determined by the Germans themselves, too, in Cemal’s mind, their role in this 
process was no more than an advisor.840 
 
 
5.2.1. The German Activities in Syria and Reaction by the Turks and the 
Arabs 
 
With the outbreak of the War, Germany had its eyes on Syria as a sphere of 
influence and an area of colonization. With that aim, first of all, the quality and number of 
the German officials in Syria was enlarged.  Before the War, Germany was represented in 
Damascus with a Vice-Consulate; the director of the Palaestina-Bank, Mr. Karl Schiefer 
was acting as the consular administrator there. However, after the commencement of the 
War, as a consequence of the increasing importance of Syria and Arabs for Germany, Dr. 
Löytvet, a physician on psychology and an important diplomat, was sent to Damascus with 
broad authority. According to the Austrian Consul in Damascus, in a short span of time, he 
created a considerable influence on the Ottoman officials of Syria and Cemal Pasha.841 
Besides Dr. Löytvet, from officers to engineers, all the German officials employed in Syria 
worked to increase the German presence in Syria.842 The Spanish Consul in Jerusalem 
                                                 
840 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.12, Metternich to Bethmann-Hollweg, Constantinople, 21 
January 1916 
841 HHStA, PA 12/209, Ranzi to Burian, “Die Chancen der egyptischen Expedition-
Deutsche Herrscht in Syrien”, Damascus, 28 January 1915. 
842 HHStA, PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian, “Die Gründung eines deutsche-ottomanischen 
Vereines”, Damascus, 31 January 1916. 
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described the Germanization of Jerusalem with the following words: “For the rest, 
Jerusalem is rapidly Germanizing: The new military governor is a German general that 
they call Bach Pasha. In addition, the Chief of the Military Staff, the Military Cencor, etc. 
are German.”843 
 First of all, Germany considered implementing a policy of Syria, which would 
create the infrastructure of a future colony for them in the post-war era. Some publications, 
which were issued in Germany throughout the War period, made those intentions clearer, 
which openly investigated about the value of Syria and its neighborhood as a colony for 
Germany.844 In the same regard, throughout the War period, Germany made a considerable 
effort to obtain the operating rights of the railways, which seized from France. Moreover, 
some German officials considered demanding those rights from France as war indemnity at 
the end of the War.845  
Besides these, the Germans also struggled for the obtainment of the administration 
of the Hijaz Railroad on the pretext of its maladministration by the Turks. The German 
officials in Syria repeatedly complained about the defects of the administration of that 
railway company claiming that the misrule prevented the proper organization of the 
military issues in Syria. After that complaint, the mentioned officials alleged that if the 
administration of the Hijaz Railroad were assigned to the hands of the Germans, then the 
                                                 
843 Ballobar, Ibid, p. 42. 
844 For some examples of those publications see: E. Brandenburg, Bericht über Eine 
Reise in Syrien und Palaestina, Gesellschaft für Palaestina-Forschung, Berlin:1914; Emil 
Zimmermann, Kann uns Mesopotamien eigene kolonien ersetzen?, Kolonial-
Wirtschaftliches Komittee Verlag, Berlin: 1917; S. Killermann, Die Blumen des heiligen 
Landes:Botanische Auslese einer Frühlingsfahrt durch Syrien und Palaestina, 
Hinrichs’sche Buchhandlung, Leipzig:1917. 
845 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.12, Rössler to Bethmann-Hollweg, Aleppo, 8 May 1915. 
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services would be improved.846 The acquirement of the Hijaz Railroad would also mean 
taking over the extraction rights of the mines given to this Railroad Company.847 
Similarly, they planned to work out the mines in the neighborhood of the future 
French railways, and to establish agricultural colonies in various places of Syria.848 For the 
purpose of the establishment of the agricultural colonies in Syria, the Germans strove to 
persuade Abd al-Rahman Pasha al-Yusuf, a pro-Ottoman notable and a senator in the 
Ottoman Parliament, to get his admission for the introduction of the intensive methods in 
his large agricultural estates (100.000 ha), spreading in various districts of Syria. Due to 
the negative attitude of the Ottoman Government vis-à-vis the foreign investments, they 
calculated to make an Ottoman company a partner of this undertaking. Thus, with 
mechanization of agriculture, the orders of the agricultural machines would flow into the 
German industry. The demonstration of what the German industry wrought would increase 
the similar demands in the region. All this information was conveyed to Berlin upon the 
visit of the Pasha there for this purpose.849 However, the defeat of Germany in the WWI 
made it impossible to realize this project.  
                                                 
846 For some examples, see: PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.11, Mutius to Bethmann-Hollweg, 
Beirut, 1 May 1915; PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.16, Bernstoff AA; (Trasmitting Graf 
Schdenburg, Damascus), Constantinople, 21 November 1917; BA-MA, RM 40/678, Busse 
to Chef des Admiralstab, "Bericht des Korvettenkapitaens Busse über 
Küstennachrichtenwesen in Syrien", 7 February 1916; PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.12, Rössler 
to Bethmann Hollweg, Aleppo, 8 May 1915.  
847 For some examples of the mines under the possession of the Hijaz Railroad 
Company, see: BOA, BEO 4321/324968, Evkaf Ministry to Ministry of Commerce, 27 
Teşrin-i Evvel 1330 [10 November 1914]. 
848 BA-MA, RM 40/678, Busse to Chef des Admiralstab,"Bericht des 
Korvettenkapitaens Busse über Küstennachrichtenwesen in Syrien". 7 February 1916; PA-
AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 17, Grobba to AA,  “über die wirtschaftliche Lage Syriens und 
Palaestinas, ihre Entwickelungsmöglichkeiten und die Methode ihrer Entwicklung” 
Jerusalem, 23 July 1917. 
849 Short before the outbreak of the War, Abdurrahman Pasha was about to agree with a 
French-Belgian Company for the modernization of the agriculture in his lands, but the 
commencement of the War caused the failure of the project. After that, the Germans 
interested in his estates; PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.18, Brode to Hertling, Damascus, 12 
September 1918. 
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The Germans competed at the same time with Austria for both mines and the 
agricultural lands in Syria; The German officials were disturbed with the possible 
exploitation of the agricultural abundance of Syria by Austria, which would be obtained in 
return for the German blood.850 A similar conflict occurred in the issue of the mines. When 
Austria undertook to obtain the operating rights of the mines around Heraklea, The 
German government didn’t abstain from issuing a warning to them.851 
On the other hand, Cemal had knowledge about the German aims, and struggled as 
much as possible to prevent those designs. We understand from a telegram, sent by the 
Sheikhulislam, Hayri Efendi, to Cemal Pasha, it seems that the Ottoman Government had 
the knowledge of almost everything about the German intentions to take hold of the 
operation rights of the Hijaz Railway, and to work out the mines around that railway. 
Conveying these informations to Cemal, Hayri requested him to be careful about the 
German activities in this direction.852 Cemal would guarantee to the Sheikhulislam that he 
would protect the Hijaz Railway from the German ambitions.853 For the same purpose, the 
mines in the various cities of Lebanon and coal deposits in Tripoli were annexed by the 
Hijaz Railway Company to work out.854 
In the reports of Austrian, American and the Ottoman officials, Cemal was 
cognizant about the importance of the economic independence for full realization of the 
Ottoman authority in Syria, and he didn’t allow the Germans to go beyond an advisory role 
in Syria throughout his governorate there. Similarly, Most of the Turkish staff and soldiers 
                                                 
850 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.18, Brode to Hertling, Damascus, 12 September 1918. 
851 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 14, Graf Wedel to Bethmann-Hollweg, Vienna, 7 May 
1916. 
852 Sheikhulsislam conveyed these informations from Petternich (Metternich?), the 
German manager of the third Chemin-de-fer branch of the Ottoman General Staff: BOA, 
DH.ŞFR. 52/10, Sheikhulislam to Cemal, 13 Nisan 1331 [26 April 1915]. 
853 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 52/189, Sheikhulislam to Cemal, 19 Nisan 1331[1 May 1915].  
854 BOA, A.MTZ.CL. 7/295, Sadaret to Ministries of Commerce, Evkaf and 
Agriculture, 28 Mayıs 1331 [10 June 1331] 
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in Syria detested the Germans considering that Germany was planning to establish a 
protectorate in the Ottoman realm and Syria.855  
There was an ongoing clash between the German and Turkish soldiers in Syria 
throughout the War, stemming mainly from the German condescending attitudes against 
the Turks and Arabs, and the colonizatory intentions of Germany.856 Towards the end of 
the War, the frustration of the Turks employed in Syria had so increased that a German-
hostile placard, which was written in Turkish, was hanged in the most central streets of 
Damascus. The Austrian Consul estimates that, due to the language of the placard, it was 
the action of the Turkish soldiers who detested the Germans. The contents of the placard 
makes clear the reason of the Turkish detestment of the German soldiers: 
“It must be known that we are going to save our country from the Germans, who invaded 
it, step-by-step. The German troops from Istanbul to Palestine consists of 3 battalions. We 
warn our people before this number increase more. It must be noted that in Gallipoli and 
Kutulamare, we conducted the War alone. Look how our soldiers are fed. The German 
soldiers eats three times more than our soldiers…”857 
As for the local people, a similar reaction against the Germans could be seen in a 
widespread manner among the Syrians, both Christians and Muslims. According to a 
German military official, they blamed Germany for the disasters concomitant to the War 
like famine, inflation, military requisitions etc.858 In this sense, according to the German 
consul in Beirut, the Syrians blamed the excessive German consumption for the increase of 
                                                 
855 HHStA, PA 38/366, Dandini to Burian, “Deutsche-türkische Beziehungen”, Aleppo, 
27 September 1915; HHStA, PA 38/366, Dandini to Czernin, “Abreise de Major 
Gravenstein”, Aleppo, 9 August 1917; PRO, FO 371/3058, Grahame to FO, 
“Memorandum of Conversation with Mr. Samuel Edelman, late United States Consul at 
Damascus”, Paris, 10 June 1917; BOA, DH.ŞFR. 461/84, Hulusi to Talat, Damascus, 3 
Şıbat 1330 [16 February 1915]. 
856 BA-MA, RM 5/2320, Mühlens to Chef of the Admiralstab of Marine, Jerusalem, 22 
June 1915; HHStA, PA 38/367, The Jerusalem Consul to Burian, “Politisches 
Situationsbild”, Jerusalem, 7 June 1915; BOA, DH.ŞFR. 572/2, Azmi to Talat, Beirut, 22 
Teşrin-i Sani 1333 [22 November 1917]; HHStA, PA 12/209, Dandini to Pallavicini, 
“Haltung der Deutschen in Aleppo”, Aleppo, 3 January 1915. 
857 HHStA, PA 38/371, Ranzi to Burian, “Deutschefeindliche Plakate”, Damascus, 25 
February 1918. 
858 BA-MA, RM 5/2321, Humann to Marine-Attache, 29 November 1916. 
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the food prices.859 Another German official in Syria conveyed that, in the minds of the 
Arabs, if Turkey had not entered into the War thanks to Germany, those disasters pestering 
the Syrians would not happen. In the same way, the atrocities implemented by Cemal 
Pasha, such as executions and exiles, was billed to the Germans by the Christian and 
Muslim Syrians, who thought that the Germans were capable to forestall those incidents as 
was done by the Consuls before the War.860 Such kind of considerations paved the way for 
the increase of the Entente popularity among the local people,861 and made the Muslims 
and the Christians closer than ever before to each other.862 
 The German attempts to create an area of influence in Syria could not succeed to 
win popular support because of their failure to persuade the Turks of their goodwill, and to 
make believe the Arabs, both Muslims and Christians, about their innocence in the 
disastrous incidents occurred in Syria throughout the War. In other words, they were 
unsuccessful to obtain the support of both the people and the elites, although the reasons 
were different. The popularity of the French culture among both the Turks and the Arabs 
could be mentioned as another reason in the German failure. As will be shown shortly, 
their attempts to introduce their cultural and political influence into Syria, to a large extent, 
would meet with the resistance of the local and central Ottoman authorities, who were 
suspicious about the German intentions: 
 
 
5.2.2. Prevention of the Foreign Intervention  
 
                                                 
859 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 17, Mutius to Hertling, Beirut, 15 March 1918. 
860 BA-MA, RM 5/2323, Grafen to the Chef of the Admiralstabs of Marine, 
“Militaerische und Militaerpolitische Lage in Syrien, Palaestina, Arabien und 
Mezopotemien”, Constantinople, 26 February 1918; PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 17, Weber to 
Hertling, Constantinople, 26 June 1918;  
861 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.13, Stotzingen to AA, 17 November 1916. 
862 PRO, FO 371/2777, McMahon to FO (transmitting an intelligent returned from 
Syria), Cairo, 20 May 1916. . 
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Cemal Pasha stood firm concerning the political and administrative independence 
of the Ottoman officials from foreign intervention. He always sided with the full authority 
of the Ottoman officials in their territory. Therefore, in his opinion, all the non-Ottoman 
interventions in the Ottoman administrative mechanisms had to be prevented as much as 
possible. On all occasions, he laid stress on the abolition of the Capitulations and the lack 
of venue for the Consuls to intervene in the activities of the Ottoman Government. As 
conveyed by Dr. Ruppin, the head of the German Zionist organization in Palestine, in a 
meeting attended by all the consuls in Jerusalem, Cemal despised them describing their 
places in the country as “distinguished foreigners”.863 Similarly, the Spanish consul 
reported about the treatment of the consuls that “the [Ottoman] authorities treat us consuls 
with such indifference and animosity that it seems like we are more of an enemy than the 
Allies themselves”.864 According to Ruppin, The Consuls of Germany in Haifa, Jaffa and 
Jerusalem did not play any role in the reconciliation of the conflicts between his 
community and the Government. Furthermore, the Zionist leader described Cemal Pasha as 
a sneaky adversary of the German influence in Syria.865 
 The German and the Austrian diplomats also agreed with Ruppin on the issue of 
Cemal’s sensitivity about the interference of the foreign consuls in the Governmental 
                                                 
863 PA-AA, Türkei 195, Bd.9, Ruppin to Zionist Central Bureau in Berlin. 
Constantinople, 12 October 1916; the remarks of the Spanish consuls about the treatment 
of Cemal to the consuls confirms Dr. Ruppin. A conversation conveyed by the consul 
between him and Cemal worthy to attention in terms of the new position of the consuls: 
“Last night the mutasarrif received us in ‘his house’, that is, in the former Italian 
consulate. In the garden there were little tables where my colleagues and I had some 
appetizers while waiting for the arrival of Djemal Pasha. Whe he appeared, he greeted us, 
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Brode –the new German consul- Kraus [the Austrian Consul], Rapael [the Greek Consul], 
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burden of the conversation, and Djemal announced, joking, that he had it in mind to hang 
me, publishing ‘compromising documents’ that he had about my conduct and that, of 
course, did not refer to my lack of neutrality”: Ballobar, Ibid, p. 97. 
864 Ballobar, Ibid, 133. 
865 PA-AA, Türkei 195, Bd.9, Ruppin to Zionist Central Bureau in Berlin. 
Constantinople, 12 October 1916; The intelligence report reached to the British officials 
gave similar informations about Cemal’s relations with Germans: PRO, 371/2477, The 
Marquess of Crewe to Bertie, 3 July 1915. 
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issues of the Empire.866 The Austrian Consul of Aleppo reported that, after the abolition of 
the Capitulations, the whole authority in the provinces concentrated in the hands of the 
Governors. The natural consequence of that was the decrease of the popularity of the 
Consuls among the people. Before the abolition of the Capitulations, the Consuls of the 
Great Powers were the centers both militarily and politically. However, in the aftermath of 
the abrogation, as a result of some unsuccessful ventures by the German, Austrian and 
American Consuls to canalize the Governmental practices made their influence damaged 
among the local people, and even some scoffing urban legends underestimating their 
powers did emerge.867 Similarly, their relations with the Arab notables were worsened in 
the post-Capitulations era; in the past years, according to the Aleppo consul of Austria, the 
local notables were both an intermediary between Government and the Consuls, and a 
valuable source of information for them. But, after the annulment of the rights of the 
Consuls, the notables who had a relation with those diplomatic missions were deemed as 
doubtful and prosecuted by the Government.868 According to the diaries of the Spanish 
consul, “to clinch the suppression of the Capitulations”, beginning from 13th February 
1917, the Government would “not recognize either the functions or the name of dragoman, 
nor that of cavas”. They would “be called secretaries and servants respectively”. The 
consul guessed that the Ottomans would “soon suppress the cavas uniform”.869 
 Cemal didn’t hesitate to warn the consuls, when he needed, to mind their own 
businesses instead of being busy with the internal issues of the Empire. In October 1916, 
                                                 
866 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.16, Bernstoff to AA (Transmitting Consul Jerusalem), 
Constantinople, 21 November 1917; PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.13, Deutsche Palaestina 
Bank Beirut to von Rosenberg, “Bericht für das Jahr 1915”, Beirut, 29 April 1916.  
867 Sometimes any foreign intervention could make the situation worse. In the issue of 
the Zionist leader Ruppin’s expulsion from Palestine, the German Ambassador requested 
from Berlin to avoid any intervention since it would cause more frustration of Cemal 
Pasha, and would make negative impact on his situation: PA-AA, Türkei 195, Bd.11, 
Kühlmann to AA, Constantinople, 16 February 1917; Similarly, Ruppin’s himself repeated 
the same request in another issue to the Zionists in Germany: PA-AA, Türkei 195, Bd.8, 
Neurath to AA (Transmitting Lichtheim), Constantinople, 26 January 1916. 
868 HHStA, PA 38/369, Dandini to Burian, "Beziehungen der hiesigen Berufskonsuln 
zu den Lokalbehörden", Aleppo, 12 October 1916.  
869 Ballobar, Ibid, p. 133-134. 
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he sent a message to the consuls of commerce acting in the Syrian provinces, requesting 
them to be concerned with the commercial issues rather than political issues of the Empire. 
The Austrian Consul of Aleppo didn’t find that warning surprising, since, from the 
beginning of the War, he and his bureaucrats were striving to abolish the influences of the 
foreign representatives, i.e., Cemal was struggling for the “full independence” of the 
Ottoman Empire from the foreign intervention.870 
 The absolute ruler of Syria was so stringent about the independence of the 
governmental authorities that he didn’t refrain from the severest sanctions against the 
representatives of the foreign states, when he thought that they exceeded their 
authorizations. The most outstanding event in this sense was the incident that took place 
between Mr. Schabinger, the German Dragoman of Jaffa and the Governor of Jerusalem, 
Munir Bey, because of the evacuation of the German Jews from Jaffa. When Jaffa was 
decided to be evacuated, the citizens of the allied states had been exempted from this 
decision. However, as expressed in Chapter 3, this was not valid for the German Jews. 
Upon the requests of the Jews under his protection, Schabinger visited the Governor of 
Jerusalem and demanded the extension of this decision to the German Jews as well. During 
the discussion, the Dragoman compared the evacuation with the Jewish pogroms of 
Russia871 as well as criticizing harshly Cemal Pasha’s actions about the evacuation of 
Jaffa.872 
 Thereupon, the Governor applied to Cemal Pasha conveying the words of the 
Dragoman to him.873 It was at Palm Sunday, and Cemal Pasha immediately requested the 
                                                 
870 HHStA, PA 38/369, Dandini to Burian, "Beziehungen der hiesigen Berufskonsuln 
zu den Lokalbehörden", Aleppo, 12 October 1916.  
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872 BOA, BEO, 4463/334661, Cemal to Ministry of Interior, 22 Nisan 1333 [22 April 
1917]; PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 15, Schabinger to Bethmann-Hollweg, Jaffa, 14 May 
1917. 
873 BOA, BEO, 4463/334661, Cemal to Ministry of Interior, 22 Nisan 1333 [22 April 
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Jerusalem Consul of Germany to visit himself. After narrating the incident, Cemal stated to 
the Consul that his representative in Jaffa made a serious mistake, and added: If Mr. 
Schabinger did not apologize, Cemal intended to take him to Jerusalem and deliver him to 
the Court Martial. Upon the answer of the Consul that it was a serious threat, Cemal stated 
that “ce n’est pas une menace. Je le ferai” [This is not a threat I will]. Moreover, in regard 
to that incident Cemal Pasha prevented the telegraphic cipher communication and the 
censor free post of the Dragoman.874 He also repeated the same things to the Governor of 
Jerusalem to implement against the Consul, if the latter didn’t retreat.875  
 At the end, the issue was solved with the mediation of the Jerusalem Consul.  On 
the basis of Cemal’s order, the Governor had given a deadline -in the afternoon of the next 
day- to Schabinger to come to the office of the Governor and to apologize due to his 
actions. While Schabinger was going to the Governor for apology, the Consul of Jerusalem 
made Cemal Pasha abandon his idea. The next day, the prohibitions of telegraphic 
communication and censor free postal service were removed. In the same day, Cemal 
visited Jaffa and the Dragoman visited him to apologize. During the conversation, Cemal 
interrupted him and said that “L’homme est compose de nerfs” [man is composed of 
nerves]. Thus the problem had been solved almost completely at Cemal’s will.876  
 A similar incident happened to the Spanish Consul of Jerusalem, Graf Ballobar, 
towards the capture of Jerusalem by the British forces. In the beginning of the War, an 
Italian hospital was confiscated by the Ottoman Army. Then, a Chappel inside the building 
of the hospital had been protected, deemed as a cultural object. With the heat of the battles 
in Palestine Front, the Ottoman officials requested the Spanish Consul, in his capacity as 
the protector of the Italian interests, to permit the usage of the Chappel by the Army. The 
                                                 
874 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 15, Brode to Bethmann-Hollweg, Jerusalem, 30 June 1917; 
for the notice of the Governor of Jerusalem in this issue, see: PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 15, 
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875 BOA, BEO, 4463/334661, Cemal to Ministry of Interior, 22 Nisan 1333 [22 April 
1917] 
876 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 15, Schabinger to Bethmann-Hollweg, Jaffa, 14 May 1917; 
PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 15, Brode to Bethmann-Hollweg, Jerusalem, 30 June 1917; for 
the notice of the Governor of Jerusalem in this issue, see: PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 15, 
Ahmed Münir to Schabinger, Jaffa, 1 Nisan 1333 [1 April 1917]. 
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Consul, who was on good terms with Cemal Pasha, requested to visit him. However, The 
Governor didn’t issue him a travel permission to go to Damascus and put him under police 
surveillance. Thereupon, Count Ballobar applied to Cemal Pasha to visit him. Cemal stated 
that he would be happy with the Consul’s visit, requesting him not to come to his 
headquarter to make a complaint about the Governor, since the consuls didn’t have a right 
to complain about the Governors.877 
 The Governor and Count Ballobar confronted again, while the Christian and Jewish 
clergy were removed from Jerusalem on the orders of Cemal Pasha. The Spanish Consul 
opposed this order for the Latin patriarch demanded his stay in Jerusalem. But, the 
Governor rejected his request. Upon his further complaints, Cemal issued an order 
requesting him to leave the Ottoman country. The Governor of Jerusalem similarly applied 
to the Ottoman Central Government with the same request, as well as claiming that his 
only job was to hinder the works of the Government there. The result didn’t change and the 
Latin Patriarch was removed from Jerusalem.878 
 Towards the end of his governorate in Syria, Cemal Pasha had an issue with the 
German consul of Jaffa for the second time. Shortly before the British capture of 
Jerusalem, The Consul visited Haifa and called the people to leave the city informing them 
about the arrival of the British troops, and caused a panic and fear among the people in and 
around Haifa. Thereupon, the Consul was raped to Damascus, and the German 
Ambassador was requested for his dismissal.879 
                                                 
877 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 15, Brode to Waldburg, Jerusalem, 25 August 1917. 
Ballobar, slightly touches upon this issue in his diaris: Ballobar, Ibid, pp. 165-166; It is 
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excessively dangerous”: Ballobar, Ibid, p. 80. 
878 TTK Arşivi, KO Koleksiyonu 5/51, Cemal to Enver (Transmitting the Governor of 
Jerusalem), 23/11/1333; BOA, DH.ŞFR. 572/92, İzzet to Talat, Jerusalem, 2 Kanun-ı Sani 
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 Besides the Consuls, Cemal Pasha didn’t allow any of the German officers under 
his command to act independent from his authority. In his treatment of the German 
officers, Cemal showed his mistrust to those people. On 18th April 1917, He caught Von 
Kress, while he was corresponding personally with the German Officer Feldman in 
İstanbul, in the telegraph office. Thereupon, Cemal immediately interdicted 
communication, and sent a telegram responsively to Feldman notifying the necessity for 
the officers employed in the Headquarters to call the Chief of the Admiralty to the head of 
the telegraph machine when they needed to be present there personally. Additionally, he 
sent a telegram to Enver Pasha, and requested the issuance of a decree prohibiting such 
kind of actions for the protection of the order.880  
When the Ottoman and German Headquarters bypassed himself, and 
communicated with the German officers in his headquarters, Cemal showed an 
exaggerated response to them and emphasized that the only authority in Syria was himself, 
therefore the Headquarters had to communicate with him in the issues of the Army.881 In a 
similar vein, when the German officers under his command showed a tendency to act 
independently, Cemal felt it necessary to make them remember that they were a member of 
the Ottoman Army rather than a representative of the German Army.882 
 As was shown above, in the conflicts between the Ottoman local authorities and the 
German officials in Syria, Cemal was always on the side of the Ottoman bureaucrats. Such 
a conflict took place after the US’s entry to the WWI. The Germans wanted to confiscate 
the American Observatory (Giles?) in Beirut. However, the Governor of Beirut, didn’t 
allow them for this operation. Thereupon, the Germans commenced to lobbying activities 
in Constantinople to acquire the possession of the observatory. Being informed about the 
German attempts, Cemal sent a telegram to Enver, and requested the forestallment of the 
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May 1917]; Cemal also advised Enver not to allow the German Headquarter in Berlin to 
correspondence directly with the German Military Mission in Istanbul skipping Envers 
himself in his capacity as the Commander-in-Chef of the Ottoman Armies: TTK Arşivi, 
KO Koleksiyonu 9/23  Enver To Cemal, 8 Nisan 1331  
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endeavor on the account that: “if they become successful in the obtainment of their 
demands, then the Governor will feel humiliated against the local people, and they think 
that the German influence is prevalent over the Ottoman authority”.883 Enver guaranteed 
that nothing would be done for the Observatory. If to be done, it would be in the direction 
of Cemal’s opinions.884 
 
 
5.2.3. Cemal Pasha and the German and Austrian Cultural Propaganda in 
Syria 
 
While Cemal was trying to assert the full independence of the Ottoman Empire in 
Syria on the one hand, the prevention of the German propaganda in the provinces under 
Cemal’s rule emerged as a crucial issue, on the other. Besides Cemal Pasha, the Ottoman 
officials in the district were quite aware of the German intentions regarding Syria, and 
acted tocounter their activities. In 1916, the Governor of Aleppo reminded the Ministry of 
Interior that the Germans aimed in Syria to replace the old place of France. Therefore, their 
undertakings to open schools and hospitals had to be checked for the integrity of the 
Empire, as it was done untill that time.885  
As expressed in Chapter 2, the most important tool for this aim was the issuance of 
a newspaper with the title of Al-Islam to propagate the gathering the Muslims around the 
flag of the Ottoman Caliph, which was the most important aim of the Jihad policy and the 
German Weltpolitik. However, both Cemal Pasha and Hulusi Bey, the Governor of Syria, 
opposed this idea by the reason that the newspaper would contribute to the expansion of 
the German influence in Syria. As a result, the idea came to nothing.886  
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Similarly, Cemal didn’t approve the German enterprise to publish a German-
friendly newspaper in Medina. Several attempt of the latter in this direction, remained 
inconclusive, and ultimately, they had to abandon this undertaking. Moreover, the person 
(Said Mehmed Me’mun), who would publish the newspaper in Medina, was considered by 
the Ottoman authorities as a German spy.887 The same enterprise was held by Cemal Pasha 
after the commencement of the Sharif’s movement. The Ottoman Government established 
an Arabic Newspaper in Medina like Al-Sharq Newspaper, named “Hijaz”. This enterprise 
was brought forward by Cemal Pasha to create consciousness [most probably Pan-Islamic 
consciousness] among the people. A late professor of the Mekteb-i Sultani in Aleppo, who 
stayed in Egypt for a long time, was appointed as the editor of the newspaper.888 
 Besides the newspapers, the Germans opened saloons to disseminate German 
influence in the prominent cities of Syria. The aim of these saloons was to increase the 
interest of the people on Germany informing them about the level of the development of 
that state. Through the local people employed in these saloons the Germans had the 
opportunity to diffuse information about how the German capital and the German labor 
could make beneficial investments there. Similarly, they could contact with the local 
people. The Germans established cinematographic equipments in these saloons to display 
films. However, they could only show a few war films, which seemed uninteresting and 
weak to the people.889 The German managers of those saloons complained about the lack 
of the films on nature and the German industry, which would enable them to introduce the 
German capability to the Syrians.890 On the other hand, the Ottoman officials were too 
careful about such kind of propaganda means. In May 1916, An Austrian, called 
Goldsmidt, made a trip in Anatolia with the cinematographic equipments to propagate for 
                                                 
887 PA-AA, Türkei 165, Bd. 39, Metternich to Bethmann-Hollweg, Constantinople, 20 
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888 HHStA, PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian,"Die Politik der mittelarabischen Fürsten in 
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1916. 
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the Central powers showing the War films from the Austrian Fronts. The Ottoman Central 
Government requested the Governors to monitor his actions891 in every place that he 
visited, and when he acted somewhat doubtful, Goldshmidt was recalled to Istanbul.892 
 Another instrument of the dissemination of the influence of a Great Power in the 
Ottoman Empire was to teach the language of the related state in the schools. In this sense, 
the German Empire had to make a long struggle in Syria during Cemal’s governorate. In 
the beginning of 1915, when the position of the French language was shaken in the 
curriculum of the Ottoman schools, the replacement of it with German was not achieved; 
instead, in Damascus, two courses were opened to teach German.893 According to Austrian 
Consul of Damascus, it was impossible to take the former place of the French language by 
another foreign language, since the national awareness of the Turkish officials had been 
considerably increased.894 Introduction of the German language as a mandatory course in 
the Sultani School of Damascus was achieved as late as 14th March 1916. The Germans 
had made a great effort against Cemal Pasha to arrange this change in the curriculum of the 
most distinguished school of Syria.895 In spite of the intense German undertakings, Cemal 
prevented the opening of a German school in Syria. According to the Austrian Consul in 
Damascus, Although Cemal Pasha treated the Germans with kindness outwardly; in fact, 
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he was struggling against the increase of the German influence.896 However, Cemal didn’t 
insist on Turkish education for the technical schools, which required the German 
knowledge for course supplements, and they were allowed to teach in German.897 
Similarly, the Austrians couldn’t venture to open a hospital in Damascus that would spread 
the Austrian influence there for fear of the ruler of Syria; Instead, they preferred to send 
the Austrian sisters to the Ottoman hospitals, to transfer them into an Austrian hospital 
which would be opened after the War.898  
 Together with their undertakings to win the hearts of the city-dwellers, the 
Germans endeavored to make contact with the Bedouin Chiefs of Syria. For this purpose, 
some of the Germans employed in Syria visited those Chiefs and promised them some 
medals. Finding out the German enterprises in this direction, Enver Pasha delivered a 
complaint to the German Ambassador in Istanbul on the account of the fact that, after the 
abolition of the Capitulations, the aim of the Ottoman Government was the prevention of 
all the foreign powers from the assertion of their influence over the local people.899 
 Although Cemal was so distrustful about the Germans, and struggled to prevent 
their endeavors to create an area of influence –maybe a colony in the future-, he didn’t 
abstain from applying the German experience in the development projects of Syria. He 
thought that the Germans should contribute as supervisors in the reorganization of the 
Ottoman Army and the Navy as well as the administrative, financial and education 
systems, and the agriculture and industry generally in the Ottoman Empire, particularly in 
Syria.900 In accordance with these considerations, Cemal employed many Germans in the 
service of the 4th Army. The most prominent of them was the railway constructor Meissner 
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Vereins”, Damascus, 31 January 1916. 
897 HHStA, PA 38/370, Ranzi to Czernin,"Gründung zweier Fachschulen unter 
deutscher Leitung", Damascus, 18 January 1917. 
898 HHStA, PA 12/210, Pallavicini to Burian, “Deutsche kulturelle Aktion in 
Damascus”, Constantinople, 9 December 1916 
899 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 52/176, Talat to the Governor of Syria, 13 Nisan 1331 [26 April 
1915]. 
900 For a letter conveying these remarks from Cemal, see: PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 12, 
Metternich to Bethmann-Hollweg, 21 January 1916. 
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Pasha, as described in Chapter 1, who was assigned to construct the Egyptian branch of the 
Hijaz Railroad for the conquest of Egypt.901 For the development of the Syrian cities in a 
modern way, he recruited Prof. Zürcher as supervisor. Similarly, for the restoration of the 
historical monuments of Syria, he benefitted from Theodor Wiegand as superviser.902 
 Cemal’s policy to employ the Germans in the development of the public works in 
Syria was generally misinterpreted by the Entente states, and, in their documents, 
belonging to that period, the Entente officials reported the activities of the German 
supervisors as the transformation of the Syrian lands to a German colony, and accused 
Cemal Pasha of being a Germanophile.903 One of the British memorandums, written by Sir 
Mark Sykes, defined the Ottoman Empire as “the last colony of Germany”.904 However, 
As was rightfully determined by Von Kress, Cemal was neither Entente-friendly nor 
German-friendly, but he was a Turk, trying to establish the Ottoman authority in Syria; his 
Francophile attitude of the pre-war years, didn’t make an impact on his actions in Syria.905 
In tandem with the elimination of the social interlayers and the struggle with the foreign 
influence, Cemal launched a process towards the Syrians through conscription and 
education, which would facilitate an Ottoman identity-building there, as part of the same 
policy. In the same way, he undertook some construction works in the Syrian cities to 
make the state’s penetration easier: 
 
 
                                                 
901 Pick, Ibid, p.181. 
902 For his activities in Syria, see: Wiegand, Theodor, Halbmond im Letzten Viertel: 
Archaeologische Reiseberichte, Bruckmann München, München: 1970. 
903 PRO, FO 371/2770, The Chairman of the War Trade Intelligence Department to FO, 
“German Colonisation in Syria”, Switzerland, 15 September 1916. 
904 PRO, FO 371/2774, Sykes to FO, “The Problem of the Near East”, 20 June 1916. 
905 Freiherr Von Kress, “Ahmed Djemal Pascha”, Zwischen Kaukasus and Sinai, Band 
3, Jahrbuch des Bundes der Asienkaempfer, Deutsche Orientbuchhandlung 
Mulzer&Cleimann, 1923, p.14; the contemporary witnesses of the German officials proves 
that Cemal was very careful about the German activities in Syria: BA-MA, RM 5/2323, 
Grafen to the Chef of the Admiralstabs of Marine, “Militaerische und Militaerpolitische 
Lage in Syrien, Palaestina, Arabien und Mezopotamien”, Constantinople, 26 Febrary 1918. 
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CHAPTER VI  
 
IN THE PURSUIT OF IDEAL CITIES AND CITIZENS 
 
 
 
 
“Greater social complexity brought a greater deployment 
of authority. People had to be ‘coached’, as it were, for the 
tasks created by the more populous society and the claims 
which it made on its citizens… a start was made on 
educating people to a discipline of work and frugality and 
on changing the spiritual, moral and psychological make-
up of political, military and economic man”.906 
Concordant to checking or eliminating the regional intermediaries preventing the 
penetration of the state into the Syrian realm and besides the struggle with the foreign 
influence, Cemal headed towards the policies, which would produce physically and 
mentally ideal citizens for the Ottoman Empire. Especially his cultural and educational 
activities, which, from time to time, tended to protect and maintain the Arab cultural and 
intelectual legacy, may urge the academics, who repeatedly write about the Turkification 
policies of the CUP, to reconsider their arguments.907 As will be clarified below, he 
                                                 
906 Gerhard Oestreich, Neo-Stocism and the Early Modern State, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983, p. 157 quoted in Gordon, Ibid, p. 13. 
907 Focusing only the Armenian policy of the CUP, Taner Akçam claimed in his last 
book that they pursued a turkifiation of the Ottoman Land: Taner Akçam, The Young 
Turks’ Crime againt Humanity, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2012. Fuat 
Dündar approximately claimed the same thing with a broader perspective: Dündar, Ibid. 
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concentrated his main interest on the increase of the loyalties of the Syrians giving them a 
consciousness of Ottomanness. In the same context, he made essential interventions to the 
urban space to create visible modern cities, which would facilitate the surveillance of the 
state in the Syrian cities after the removal of the impact of the social interlayers. All of 
these activities can be considered some steps to increase the “legibility”908 of state in its 
territories.  
To be more specific, the Syrians were introduced to the state through their 
responsibilities towards the State and through their civil rights vis-a-vis it. In this regard, 
the first encounter of the Syrians with the duties of the citizenship was the further extention 
of the compulsory military service to the Arabs with the outbreak of the war, which would 
be one of the most hassling processes of that period for the Arab citizens. In parallel with 
ruling over their bodies, a project of the Ottomanization of the minds of the Syrians were 
put into practice. Almost all the foreign educational institutions were either confiscated or 
closed as part of this goal. It is worth to mention, however, that, from the beginning of the 
modernization, which can be dated back to the reign of Mahmut II, there were educational 
institutions aiming to create a sense of Ottomannes among the subjects of the Empire. The 
characteristic that makes this period special was the absence of any foreign competition. 
Finally, some works of constructions were undertaken to make the Syrian cities more 
“penetrable”.909  
Although the conscription and the educational activities are hardly explored yet, the 
construction works undertaken by Cemal are more or less analyzed in the existing 
literature. Hasan Kayalı has made a study summarizing the public works held by Cemal 
Pasha in Syria. He emphasizes that Cemal’s activities in this sense cannot be separated 
from the Ottoman imperial policy in that period aiming at the integration of the Imperial 
                                                 
908 I borrow this term from James C. Scott, who describes the activities of state to know 
more about its territories as the increase of the legibility of state in these territories. For the 
details, see: James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State, London: Yale University Press, 1998.  
909 By this word, I mean the transformation of the cities in a way that enabling the state 
to make “surveillance” to the city-dwellers. According to Michel Foucault, by the 
transformation of the dead-end streets into the boulevards and avenues, the authority of the 
state over the cities and its dwellers were obtained. By this way, they would feel the 
existense of the state more closely. For further detail, see: Michel Foucault, Discipline and 
Punish: the Birth of the Prison, London: Penguin Books, 1991. 
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realm vis-a-vis the grave internal and external challenges.910 Following this study, a 
discussion of the characteristics of Cemal’s ideology as reflected in these public works will 
be made in this section. Together with the recruitment and educational and cultural 
policies, Cemal’s works of construction enable us to understand his aim of existence in 
Syria. 
 
 
 
6.1.“Aux Armes, citoyens!”: Conscripting the Ottomans in Syria for the Ottoman 
Army 
 
 
“Unfortunately, it has not still developed sufficiently in 
our country to lay down one’s life for the peace of the 
fatherland [vatan] and to assume it an honorable duty. It 
cannot be denied that [this sentiment] had not progress in 
some part of people due to the ignorance and inaptitude 
[marifetsizlik] that they exposed to, but, sorrowfully, the 
majority of those, who grew up in a scholarly and trained 
environment, preferred to serve at the dangerless and more 
comfortable rear guard rather than doing virtual battle in 
war 
It is understood that, in our intellectual and national 
education, the high-feelings, like devotion to the 
fatherland and its love, and the necessity to forget 
everything for it, could not constitute the purpose of life 
[gaye-i âmâl]. ”911 
With the emergence of the modern states, defending the country against the “enemy” 
became one of the most important responsibility of the citizens. In this regard, beginning 
with Mahmud II, the Ottoman Empire obliged its citizens to do compulsory military 
                                                 
910 Hasan Kayalı, “Wartime Regional and Imperial Integration of Greater Syria during 
World War I”, in  Thomas Philipp and Birgit Schaebler (eds.): The Syrian Land: Processes 
of Integration and Fragmentation: Bilad al-Sham from the 18th to the 20th Century, Franz 
Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart: 1998 
911 Nuri Conker, Zabit ve Kumandan, İstanbul, 1913, quoted in Gültekin Yıldız, Neferin 
Adı Yok: Zorunlu Askerliğe Geçiş Sürecinde Osmanlı Devleti’nde Siyaset, Ordu ve Toplum 
(1826-1839), İstanbul: Kitabevi Yayınları, 2009, p. 307. 
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service.912 However, the Arabs of Syria were generally exempted from the conscription 
until the outbreak of the WWI. During the War, the Syrian realm experienced the largest 
scale of conscription in its history under the Ottoman Rule. According to the figures 
estimated by Elisabeth Thompson, 
“By late 1916 the Ottomans were conscripting men aged 17 to 55, both Muslims and 
Christians (except those in Mount Lebanon), in an army that recruited 2.85 million troops. 
About three-fourths of all adult men were mobilized. Casualties neared one million. 
Figuers on battlefield deaths vary between 325.000 and 600.000 men. In addition, about 
240.000 soldiers died of disease, and 250.000 others were listed as missing or as enemy 
prisoners by war’s end.”913 
In this section, the process of recruitment in Syria and its reaction by the Syrians will be 
analyzed as one of the most important requirement of citizenship: 
 
6.1.1. Mobilization for the Conquest of Egypt 
 
Immediately after the proclamation of the mobilization in the beginning of August 
1914, with the drums and the shrill pipes [Ebvak], all of those, who were liable to the 
military service between 20 and 40 years old, were required to apply to the Recruitment 
Offices for the registration. Placards were hanged on the walls in the cities with the title of 
Seferberlik [Mobilization] announcing the martial law and the requirement of all the liable 
persons to register with the Recruitment Offices and threatening them that any delay would 
be tried in the military courts and heavily punished. The Recruitment Offices held tight the 
issue of registration. The soldiers were patrolling in the streets of the cities and would be 
warning the conscripts to take their registration certificate for the military service. 
Otherwise, they would be arrested after a week. The registration was tightly implemented 
in the villages, too. The authorities sent mounted police to the Mukhtars to deliver the 
                                                 
912 For some studies on the compulsory military service in the Ottoman Empire, see: 
Yıldız, Ibid; Tobias Heinzelmann, Cihaddan Vatan Savunmasına: Osmanlı 
İmparatorluğu’nda Genel Askerlik Yükümlülüğü, 1826-1856, İstanbul: Kitap Yayınları, 
2009. 
913 Elisabeth Thompson, , Colonial Citizens, Newyork: Columbia University Press, 
2000. 
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mentioned placards them to meet the case. Following that, a campaign of intimidation was 
put into practice in the villages and cities of Syria to demonstrate the seriousness of the 
attitude of the Government.914 Meanwhile, it is worth to mention that all these orders were 
valid for the Christians as well.915 However, as the mistrusted citizens, they were usually 
employed in the labor battalions to clean the streets and undertake heavy-duty road and 
railroad construction.916 The only exceptions had to be provided by Cemal Pasha for the 
Druzes and the Lebanese to prevent any rebellion of them against the Ottoman 
Government and provide their satisfaction.917 As expressed in the chapter four, another 
exemption was made by Cemal for the Armenian refugees to facilitate their conditions in 
the following years of the war. In addition, Hijaz, Yemen and Asir, mainly populated by 
the Bedouin tribes, were immune to the mobilization.918  
 As a result of that process, the people applied to the Recruitment Offices in a week 
leaving all their works aside, to be able to show their registration documents to the soldiers 
patrolling everywhere to arrest the liable persons who didn’t register yet. The ones 
between 20 and 25 were registered as regular soldier, while the others between 25 and 40, 
were counted as the auxiliaries. The state officials had also to be registered. However, after 
                                                 
914 Darwaza, Ibid, p. 216-217; Expressing the recruitment process with similar remarks, 
the Austrian Consul reports that the age range of the conscription were in between 20 and 
45 and gives the deadline as 8 days : HHStA, PA 38/363, Ranzi to Berchtold, Damascus, 
10 August 1914; in his later reports he corrected that the ones over 40 years old were given 
discharge papers: HHStA, Ranzi to Berchtold, Damascus, 3 September 1914; The 
Governor of Jerusalem also cabled to Talat that he announced the order of the mobilization 
in the city center and all its administrative appendages [mülhakat], and all the liables and 
the pack animals were summoned in rapid succession:.BOA, DH.İ.UM.EK.71/93, Macid 
to Talat, 29 Temmuz 1330 [11 August 1914]. 
915 HHStA, PA 38/363, Ranzi to Berchtold, Damascus, 10 August 1914; MAEE, 
Guerre 1914-1918, 868/Turquie, Syrie et Palestine, Töhmeh to Defrance, Cairo, 7 April 
1915. 
916 Tamari, Ibid, p. 45. 
917 As a matter of fact, they rejected the demands of the Government in this direction in 
the beginning of the War; HHStA, PA 38/363, Ranzi to Berchtold, Damascus, 18 August 
1914. 
918 BOA, DH.SYS. 123-08/13, Ministry of Interior to Ministry of War, 19 Ağustos 
1330 [1 September 1914]. 
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a week, the Central Government ordered the exemption of the employees of the post and 
telegraph offices, policemen, teachers and the judges.919  The ones between 16 and 25, and 
older than 45, who were somewhat exempted from the military service, were registered to 
the labor battalions and enforced to work in the farmlands.920 However, the sons and 
relatives of the ones, who were closer to the Government or who were able to influence the 
decision of the military authorities regarding the place of the appointment of the recruited 
men, were employed in their hometowns with an easier job. But later, Cemal Pasha issued 
an order prohibiting the soldiers of performing military service in their native countries.921 
The recruitment process was so successful that, according to the report of the 
Austrian Consul in Damascus, in the eighteenth day of the mobilization, the number of the 
conscripted Syrians had reached to 52.000. They were distributed to the various regions of 
Syria, most probably as a caution to the possibility of an Entente debarkment.922 As for the 
social reflections of that process, the wide extent of the conscription on the one hand, and 
after it became apparent that the Ottomans would enter into the War, on the other, created 
a panic among the people in the cities and villages.923 According to the Austrian Consul, in 
the coastal regions, this fear was due to the possibility of being massacred in a 
bombardment by the Entente in the case of the declaration of war. The Christians were 
anxious about a massacre to be directed against them by the Muslims. By these concerns, 
many families in Beirut, both Muslims and Christians, left the city and drew back to Mount 
Lebanon. The local government applied some measures to prevent this mass escape and 
tried to control the voyages to Lebanon district.924  
                                                 
919 Darwaza, Ibid, p. 217; Some people in Beirut fleed to the mountains even in the 
beginning of the conscription not to be recruited: MAEE, Guerre, 1914-1918, 
867/Turquie, Syrie et Palestine, Picot to Delcasse, Beirut, 7 October 1914. 
920 BOA, DH.EUM.MTK. 54/26, Talat to Governorates, 6 Teşrin-i Evvel 1330 [18 
October 1914]. 
921 Tamari, Ibid, 15 September 1915, p. 134-135. 
922 HHStA, PA 38/363, Ranzi to Berchtold, Damascus, 18 August 1914. 
923 Darwaza, Ibid, p. 216-218; in his memoirs, Yusuf al-Hakim repeats similar  
924 HHStA, PA 12/462, Nedwed to Berchtold, "Beunruhigung unter der hiesigen 
Bevölkerung", Beirut, 1 October 1914; Similar remarks can be found in the French repots: 
MAEE, Guerre 1914-1918, 867/Turquie, Syrie et Palestine, Defrance to Delcasee, Cairo, 
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It is not easy to claim that, in the beginning, the Arabs were disposed to do the 
compulsory military service. The disciplining character of the military life induced them to 
apply every means to avoid conscription since they were not acquainted with it. Alexander 
Aaransohn, who was conscripted together with the Arabs, described the hard conditions of 
the newly conscripted Syrians in the beginning of the process, making references to their 
alienation to be disciplined: 
“…To those wild people the protracted discipline of military training is simply a purgatory, 
and for weeks before the recruiting officers are due, they those themselves with powerful 
herbs and physics and fast, and nurse sores into being until they are in a really deplorable 
condition. Some of them go so far at to cut off a finger or two. The officers, however, have 
learned to see beyond these little tricks, and few Arabs succeeded in wriggling through 
their drag-net. I have watched dozens of Arabs being brought in to the recruiting office on 
camels or horses, so weak were they, and welcomed into the service with a severe beating 
–the sick and the shammers sharing the same fate. Thus it often happens that some of the 
new recruits die after their first day of garrison life”925 
 
The situation during the training of the soldiers was not familiar and easily adaptable for 
the Arabs. However, once they were trained, their performance as soldiers was 
satisfactory. Aaransohn describes the process of training with the following remarks: 
“…From morning till night, it was drill, drill and again drill.… Whole weeks were spent in 
grinding into the Arabs the names of the different parts of the rifle; weeks more went to 
teaching them to clean it –although it must be said that, once they had mastered these 
technicalities, they were excellent shots. Their efficiency would have been considerably 
greater if there had been more target-shooting. From the very first, however, we felt that 
there was a scarcity of ammunition. This shortage the drill-masters, in a spirit of 
compensation, attempted to make up by abundant severity. The whip of soft, flexible, 
stinging leather, which seldom leaves the Turkish officer’s hand, was never idle…”926  
 
In spite of those problems, the propaganda means provided by the Egyptian Campaign 
facilitated the work of the Ottoman authorities and Cemal Pasha as its head both to 
motivate the newly conscripted soldiers and to calm the panic of the public. They applied 
to the propaganda that they were strong enough to overcome the Entente’s threat and to 
conquer Egypt, to appease the fear of the people and to provide their trust towards their 
Government. Firstly, the Unionist papers organized a campaign aiming to “prove that 
                                                                                                                                                    
16 October 1914; Similar remarks are repeated in the memoirs of al-Hakim for Beirut and 
Lebanon. For details, see: al-Hakim, Ibid, pp. 131-133.  
925 Aaransohn, Ibid, p. 7. 
926 Aaransohn, Ibid, p. 13. 
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Europe, in the past, obtained from Turkey large concessions through threats only, much 
more than that was got through war. They reminded the Moslems of the case of 
Adrianople, which they would have lost if they had listened to European threats -it is now 
a Turkish City.”927 For the same purpose, they circulated rumours assuring the Syrians that 
thousands in Egypt would join the Islamic cause as soon as the war begins. The way they 
caused these rumours to be circulated is this- “The Vali and Senior Officers would talk 
about it to some natives, who are asked to keep it as a secret. These latter circulate it at 
once "secretly" to reassure Mohammedans, and so on”.928 In a similar way, the fear of the 
Syrian public regarding a possible invasion from the coast was eliminated by Turkish 
officers by way of a convincing propaganda expressing the people that the Entente navy 
could only occupy the coasts. In the interior, the Ottomans were better prepared and better 
armed, and able to defeat the invaders.929 
The great majority of the soldiers, who would participate in the Canal Expedition, 
consisted of the newly conscripted Arab soldiers. Aaransohn estimates that the number of 
the soldiers in Syria consisted of about one hundred and fifty thousand men. Of these only 
20.000 were the Anatolians. The others had been recruited from Syria.930 Therefore, it was 
a must for Cemal Pasha to motivate them for their new job.  As for the propaganda among 
the soldiers, to increase their motivation to the military service and to the War, Cemal 
Pasha applied both the Holy War propaganda and the argument of the readiness of the 
Egyptians for revolt against the British Rule. He employed many Arab scholars within the 
body of the Army before and during the first attack against Egypt to preach the Arab 
soldiers on horseback. They strolled around all the camps and delivered vehement speechs 
to the Arab soldiers. Their orations were so influential for the common Arab soldiers that 
                                                 
927 PRO, FO 141/802, Clayton to Grey, “Note on the Turkish Attitude in the European 
War and the Possibility of Arab Revolts, by an Ottoman Mohammedan”, Cairo, 18 
October 1914.  
928 PRO, FO 141/802, Clayton to Grey, Ibid. 
929 PRO, FO 141/802, Clayton to Grey, Ibid. 
930 Aaransohn, Ibid, p. 39. 
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some of them had a fit of hysterics by the excitement of preaching.931 Furthermore, Cemal 
motivated soldiers by the readiness of the Egyptians to a rebellion; the remarks of the two 
Arab officers, who joined the Canal Expedition and later deserted to the Entente side while 
they were fighting at the Caucasus front, may tell something about the state of minds of the 
soldiers and officers who were fascinated with idea of Egyptian conquest: 
“The soldiers were cheered up by the assurance that there would be hardly any fighting in 
Egypt, and that as soon as they reached the Suez Canal the Egyptians would rise against 
the English and welcome the Turkish Army with open arms. The troops would be treated 
royally in Egypt, and live on the fat of the land. At that time the troops were well fed, well 
clothed and paid regularly, even two or three months in advance. There seemed to be 
plenty of gold and silver coins then.” 932  
 
These remarks demonstrate that, pillage [ganimet], a traditional Ottoman means of 
motivation for war, was applied for the increase of the enthusiasms of the soldiers to the 
expedition. Cemal also applied to the prominent historical figures of Islam to motivate the 
Arabs into the Holy War. He distributed the patriotic leaflets singing the praises of the 
historical heroes like Tarek ben Ziad.933  
 The conscription of the Christians and Jews was also used as propaganda to gain 
the support of the Muslim population. After the recruitment, they mostly served in the 
labor battalions, and in the underserving works of the cities such as garbage collectors, 
road sweepers etc. Most of them were teachers, constructors, artists etc.934 Aaronsohn 
depicted the purpose of this action with these remarks:  
                                                 
931 Even the German soldiers, who didn’t understand Arabic were influenced by these 
orations: Von Kressenstein, Ibid, p. 88. 
932 PRO, FO 371/2781Sykes to WO. “Information from two Arab officers recently 
arrived in England From the Caucasus”, London, 25 September 1916; Aaransohn depicted 
opinions of the persuaded common soldiers with these words; “The ideas of the common 
soldiers on this subject were amusing. Some of them declared that the Canal was to be 
filled up by the sandbags which had been prepared in great quantities. Others held that 
thousands of camels would be kept without water for many days preceding the attack; then 
the thirsty animals, when released, would rush into the Canal in such numbers that the 
troops could march to victory over the packed masses of drowned bodies.”: Aaransohn, 
Ibid, p. 38-39. 
933 Tamari, Ibid, 28 April 1915, p. 113. 
934 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 13, Stotzingen to AA, 17 November 1916; The number of 
the Muslims in thesee battalions were very rare. Ihsan Turjman gave this number in his 
memoires as 20 men: Tamari, Ibid, 22 April 1915, p. 106. 
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“The final blow came one morning when all the Jewish and Christian soldiers of our 
regiment were called out and told that henceforth they were to serve in the taboor amlieh 
(sic.), or working corps. The object of this action, plainly enough, was to conciliate and 
flatter the Mohammedan population, and at the same time to put the Jews and Christians, 
who for the most part favored the cause of the Allies, in a position where they would be 
least dangerous. We were disarmed; our uniforms were taken away, and we became hard-
driven “gangsters”. I shall never forget the humiliation of that day when we, who, after all, 
were the best-disciplined troops of the lot, were first herded to our work of pushing 
wheelbarrows and handling spades, by grinning Arabs, rifle on shoulder. We were set to 
building the road between Saffed and Tiberias, on the of Galilee –a link in the military 
highway from Damascus to the coast, which would be used for the movement of troops in 
case the railroad should be cut off.”935 
In the similar vein, Khalil Sakakini, the Palestinian Christian, Arab Orthodox, educator, 
scholar, poet and one of the prominent Arab Nationalists,936 described in his diaries the 
jobs of the non-Muslims under the military service with those remarks:  
“Today a large number of Christians were recruited as garbage collectors to Bethlehem and 
Bait Jala. Each was given a broom, a shovel, and a bucket and they were distributed in the 
alleys of the town. Conscripts would shout at each home they passed, ‘send us your 
garbage.’ The women of Bethlehem looked out from their windows and wept. No doubt 
this is the ultimate humiliation. We have gone back to the days of bondage in Roman and 
Assyrian days.”937 
Especially, the older conscripts of these groups were employed in these works. A Muslim 
soldier Ihsan Turjman narrated the difficult job of these soldiers and his frustration against 
this practice as follows: 
“Rumors abounded today indicating that our military command was to form a battalion 
made up mainly of Christian and Jewish citizens to clean the city.11 This morning while 
walking to my work at the Commissariat I came across several Jewish citizens, almost all 
above 40 years of age, holding brooms and cleaning the streets. I was horrified by this 
scene. Every few minutes a conscript would stand aside breathing from fatigue. How cruel 
can their commanders be? Wouldn’t it be better if the military had hired a number of 
younger cleaners through the municipal services and solved the problem of these sods?”938 
As a result of all this propaganda, according to the Report of the British Official Clayton, 
with the help of the Holy War propaganda against Eygpt, “the constant association of 
                                                 
935 Aaransohn, Ibid, 23-24. 
936 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khalil_al-Sakakini 
937 Sakakini Khalil, Ibid, 28 March 1915, p. 158-159; see for the English translation, 
Tamari, Ibid, p. 45. 
938 Tamari, Ibid, 9 April 1915, p. 97. 
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Turkish Governors and officers with Syrian Mohammedans had a net result of gaining the 
sympathies of the Mohammedan Syrian public”, and achieved to gain the wholehearted 
support of the Muslim people and soldiers associating them with the cause of saving Egypt 
from the yoke of the infidels prior to the first attack against Egypt.939 The process of the 
persuasion of the Arabs for the Holy war was depicted by Aaransohn as follows: 
“[in the beginning of the Ottoman declaration of War against the Entente] The Arabs made 
many bitter remarks against Germany. ‘Why didn’t she help us against the Italians during 
the war for Tripoli?’ they said. ‘Now that she is in trouble she is drawing us into the fight’. 
Their opinions, however, soon underwent a change. In the first place, they came to realize 
that Turkey had taken up arms against Russia; and Russia is considered first and foremost 
the arch-enemy. German reports of German successes also had a powerful effect on them. 
They began to grow boastful, arrogant; and the sight of the plundering of Egyptian, Jews, 
and Christians convinced them that a very desirable regime was setting in.”940 
He also depicted the sentiments of the people in the street before the Canal Expedition with 
striking remarks:  
“A few weeks before the advance on Suez, I was in Jaffa, where the enthusiasm and 
excitement had been at feverpitch. Parades and celebrations of all kinds in anticipation of 
the triumphal march into Egypt were taking place, and one day a camel, a dog, and a bull, 
decorated respectively with the flags of Russia, France and England, were driven through 
the streets. The poor animals were horribly maltreated by the natives, who rained blows 
and flung filth upon them by way of giving concrete expression to their contempt for the 
Allies. “941 
On the other hand, it can be inferred from the diaries of Khalil Sakakini that, not all the 
Christians were against the Ottoman Empire. As conveyed by Adel Manna, in his article 
on Sakakini’s diaries, the latter felt himself on the Ottoman side. He feared that the 
Ottoman state would be defeated by the British forces in the Canal. Sakakini defines the 
Ottoman army in his diaries with the remarks “our army”, and describes the British army 
as “the enemy”. He was afraid of the defeat of the Ottoman armies due to tiredness, 
thirstiness and hungriness in the desert against Great Britain.942 
 
                                                 
939 PRO, FO 14/802, Clayton to Grey, Ibid. 
940 Aaransohn, Ibid, p. 23. 
941 Aaransohn, Ibid, p. 44-45. 
942 Adel Manna, “Between Jerusalem and Damascus: The End of Ottoman Rule as Seen 
by a Palestinian Modernist”, in Jerusalem Quarterly, Fall and Winter 2005/22-23, p. 117. 
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6.1.2. Loss of Motivation, Burden of Discipline, Desertion and Banditry 
 
In spite of gaining such a wide support in Syria to the Ottoman Army before the 
first attempt, the failure of the expedition against Egypt and changing direction of Cemal 
Pasha’s policies after the first expedition and caused a loss of motivation among the 
soldiers.943 Especially his despotic implementations against the Arabs from all sections of 
society and the hard conditions of the military service, which the Arabs were 
unaccustomed to, made an increasing effect on the dissatisfaction of the Arab soldiers in 
Cemal’s Army944 and probably made the aims of the military service declared in the 
beginning of the War meaningless for them. The changing attitude of the Arab soldiers 
after the Canal Expedition was depicted in the memoires of Aaronsohn with the following 
remarks:  
“ Now, However, all was changed. The Arabs, who take defeat badly, turned against the 
authorities who had got them into such trouble. Rumors circulated that Djemal Pasha had 
been bought by the English and that the defeat at Suez had been planned by him, and 
persons keeping an ear close to the ground began to hear muttering of a general massacre 
of Germans. In fact, things came within an ace of a bloody outbreak. I knew some 
Germans in Jaffa and Haifa who firmly believed that it was all over with them…”945 
Furthermore, the contradictory actions of the Turkish junior officers to the Islamic 
prohibitions, like drinking alcohol a lot, caused the questioning of the Arab soldiers to 
themselves how they could be led in a Holy War by these Officers who disregarded the 
                                                 
943 PRO, FO 371/2781, Sykes to WO. “Information from two Arab officers recently 
arrived in England From the Caucasus” [Lieutenant Shurbaji and Lieutenant Shaikha], 
London, 25 September 1916; Aaransohn states that, after the first expedition against the 
Canal, hundreds of the soldiers were straggling in disorder, many of them on leave but 
many deserting. Soon after the defeat at the Canal several thousand soldiers deserted…”, 
Aaransohn, Ibid, p. 47. 
944 Tamari, Ibid, p. 32,46.  
945 Aaransohn, Ibid, p. 45. 
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Koranic precepts.946 According to the diaries of Ihsan Turjman, the Army Command was 
distributing circulars everyday “warning soldiers and officers frequenting the cafés and the 
beer halls [bira-khanate], upon threat of imprisonment and expulsion from the service”.947 
Similarly, as inferred from the same source, the splendid celebrations of Cemal Pasha with 
alcohol caused the reaction of the Arab soldiers.948 
 The loss of the motivation, hardening of the conditions in the military barracks949 
and the Arab alienation with the discipline of the soldiership caused the maintenance of the 
conscription of the Arabs after the First Attack against Egypt by force. An experience of a 
newly recruited soldier, Ihsan Turjman, demonstrates the Arab unfamiliarity with the 
military discipline. One day, Turjman wanted to buy a pair of new white shoes. He so 
fancied with his new shoes that, with his remarks, when he went to bed and slept, he 
dreamed of his new shoes, and could hardly wait for sunrise so that he could put them 
on.950 The next day, when he went to the Head Quarter, the reactions against his new shoes 
were as follows: 
“Everybody at HQ kept reminding me, “Soldiers are not allowed to wear white shoes.” 
Before lunchtime the aghlokomandati [work commander] [sic.] Muhammad Nahhas 
Effendi said to me, “Who told you that you can wear these shoes? I had never seen a 
common soldier wearing a pair of white shoes until you showed up. I strongly advise you 
to take them off immediately. If Ruşen Bey or Nihad Bey or any other officer sees you, he 
will deduct it from your salary and give you a hefty fine.” In the midst of the chaos we 
were in, I doubted that any of them would notice, even if I wore them for the rest of my 
miserable life. Nevertheless when I went to have lunch. I changed my shoes to put an end 
to this ridiculous tirade.”951 
 
                                                 
946 PRO, FO 141/801, Storrs to FO, “Further Report on the Proposed Turkish Invasion 
of Egypt”, Cairo, 7 January 1915; In some cases, the Turkish Officers were even dying of 
drinking much alcohol; SHD, GR 7 N 2136, Saint-Quentin to MG, Cairo, 15 August 1916. 
947 Tamari, Ibid, 25 April 1915, p. 109-110. 
948 Tamari, Ibid, 27 April 1915, p. 112. 
949 Ihsan Turjman, an Arab soldier in Jerusalem, described the situation of the soldiers 
as follows: “What is a soldier supposed to do? The army pays each soldier 85 piasters a 
month and expects him to survive on it. Even then, most soldiers have not been paid one 
matleek since the General Call [November 1914].”; Tamari, Ibid, p. 94. 
950 Tamari, Ibid, 13 April 1915, p. 98. 
951 Tamari, Ibid, 14 April 1915, p. 99. 
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The disciplining character of the military service and the lack of any other motivation 
paved the way for the Arabs hate of the conscription.952 According to the remarks of a 
German Officer, following the operation against Egypt, both Muslims and Christians hated 
the military service. By that reason, they were conscripted by force. It was usual to see the 
enchained conscripted men taken to the military barracks in the streets of Damascus, 
Jerusalem and Aleppo. As a result of that, most of the Arabs saw the Army as the 
oppressor and the exploiter of them, and therefore, resisted the recruitment. Once they 
were conscripted for the military service, they would meet there with poor salary, 
malnutrition and bad treatment. The daily ration of a soldier in the Army was half a bread 
and a citron. When they stayed back because of their tiredness, they were beaten 
mercilessly by their Turkish Officers.953 Because of those reasons, in a detachment 
subordinated to the mentioned German Officer, % 10 of the soldier had deserted during the 
removal from one place to another.954  
 The majority of the Arab soldiers in Syria and their dissatisfaction with the 
conditions of the military service concerned Cemal Pasha about the likelihood of a 
rebellion among the soldiers guided by the presumed pro-Entente officers. Therefore, in 
summer 1915, according to the remarks of the two Arab officers deserted to the British 
side and his Chief of staff Ali Fuad Erden, Cemal decided to send some Arab officers and 
troops to Gallipoli. The decision, however, was kept secret and the troops were told that 
orders had come from Constantinople to send them to Mount Lebanon. At Aleppo, a 
proclamation was read to the troops that the Sultan, informed of the brilliant deeds of those 
troops in the Canal fighting, was very anxious to see the troops and confer honors upon 
them, and that they would be charged with the defense of Constantinople. Meanwhile, 
                                                 
952 Ihsan Turjman evaluates that “Soldiery is nothing but a school for debasement and 
slavishness.”: Tamari, Ibid, 29 April 1915, p. 114. 
953 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 13, Stotzingen to AA, 17 November 1916; some other 
cases of desertions had been occurred because of the maltreatment of the Turkish officers 
to the Arab soldiers. In the beginning of 1915, some 150 of the soldiers, assigned for the 
protection of the Tarsus coasts left their place of duty for that reason: BOA, DH.ŞFR. 
459/35, Hulusi to Talat, Damascus, 13 Kanun-ı Sani 1330 [26 January 1915]. 
954 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 13, Stotzingen to AA, 17 November 1916. 
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between Damascus and Aleppo, 20 men deserted throwing themselves out of the carriage 
windows of the train at night, which was going very slowly.955  
 The transfer of the soldiers from Syria to the other fronts was the most unbearable 
thing for them and their families. While the military trains were passing through the 
stations, the families of those soldiers were storming to the train stations. Halide Edib 
describes the view in those stations in his memoires as such: 
“A hundred voices, mostly women, called shrill and guttural, Ya Mohammed, Ya 
Abdurrahman, Ya Abdullah.” Then a few men’s voices joined in graver tones, “Ya 
Oummi” (O mother)…The women whose husbands and sons were in the army had come to 
the station because a military train was passing and there was a chance of meeting their 
men. They were wringing their hands and calling in inexpressible excitement to the 
soldiers in the cars. Some had found their men, and there was kissing and love-making 
going on in its naivest and warmest form.”956 
 
As a result, during the transportation, most of them were finding a way to escape from the 
trains. The conversation of Halide Edib with a Turkish sergeant, during one of her travels 
indicates the vastness of the deserters while they were transferring from one front to 
another. Halide Edib warned the sergeant due to his harsh treatment of the Arab soldiers 
telling him “they are as weak as women. Don’t strike him.” The answer of the sergeant 
was indicative about the results of the transfer and range of the desertion: 
“I start with two hundred, and by the time they reach the next station, they become less 
than forty. They have no endurance, and they give one no end of trouble. I do not like it. 
They are always after their women; they would rather be shot as deserters than fight; and I 
would rather go to the firing-line than transport Arabs.”957 
The difficulties because of the communication problems, the nature of the military life and 
the lack of motivation made the military life more difficult for the Arab soldiers. 
According to a German Officer again, the forceful conscription of the Arabs and the lack 
                                                 
955 PRO, FO 371/2781, Sykes to WO. “Information from two Arab officers recently 
arrived in England From the Caucasus” [Lieutenant Shurbaji and Lieutenant Shaikha], 
London, 25 September 1916; Erden, however, notes that these Arab officers didn’t do any 
reaction against the Government throughout the War. Erden, Ibid, p. 63-65. 
956 Adivar, Ibid. p. 398. 
957 Adivar, Halide Edib, Memoires of Halide Edib, London, Gorgias Press: 2005, p. 
411; The Turkish translation of the passage is somewhat different than the English version. 
The writer subtracted the sentence beginning with “They would rather be shot…” from the 
text. See: Adıvar, Halide Edib, Mor Salkımlı Ev, İstanbul:2000, Özgür Yayınları, p. 238.  
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of the patriotic feelings among them made the things difficult in the Syrian Army.958 
Sometimes, the situation became so depressing for them because of the hardships of the 
military life that they could seriously consider committing suicide.959 They had to be held 
together with the iron fist of Cemal Pasha. Furthermore, the soldiers under the command of 
Cemal Pasha had to understand the orders of their officers in a foreign language, i.e. 
Turkish. Similarly, the Turkish officers were so far from perceiving the mentality of the 
Arabs under their command.960  
Taking all these reasons into consideration, the recruitment became a nightmare for 
the Arabs, liable to the military service. According to the report of a German official 
employed in Syria, The Arab conscripts explored every avenue not to perform the military 
service. It was impossible to find any member of the well-to-do families in the Army. They 
paid the exoneration tax and thus, were exempted from the military service. Many the 
others strove to find a job providing exemption from the military service, such as working 
in the railroad administration. Very few of the Arab soldiers deserted to Egypt, and some 
of them were hidden in Lebanon. Quite a few of the Arab soldiers joined the Sharif’s 
troops following their approach to Syria.961  
 Besides that a considerable number of the Arab soldiers deserted into the 
mountainous regions of Syria. Some of them created the brigandage bands in the 
mountains, while some others were hidden in the Bedouin and the Druze villages. The 
brigands were dispersed almost all around Syria and attacked the soldiers and railway 
stations causing important losses. Firstly, the deserted brigands were gathered at the rocky 
Ledjah Highlands located above Hauran, which was almost unsettled. Although their exact 
                                                 
958 PA-AA, Türkei 165, Bd.40, Neufeld to Wesendock, Berlin, 23 December 1916. 
959 Tamari, Ibid, 21 September 1915, p. 136; “pproximately after a year, the same 
soldier, Ihsan Turjman  were praying for the death, although he had a desk-jop in the 
Commissariat at Jerusalem: “They say that July is the best month of the year, since it 
witnessed the liberation of nations. For me it has been the ugliest and vilest of months. I 
have not seen more difficult days in my life. I have thought often of taking my life. I even 
have begun praying to God to take me away from this world, so that I will be freed from 
the miserable life of soldiering.”: Tamari, Ibid, 17 August 1916, p. 156. 
960 PA-AA, Türkei 165, Bd.40, Neufeld to Wesendock, Berlin, 23 December 1916. 
961 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 17, Weber to Hertling, 26 June 1918. 
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numbers were undefined, on September 1915, i.e. at the end of the first year of the 
mobilization, they reached to the proportion that would make it necessary an operation to 
capture them. Before the operation, Cemal Pasha’s troops pretended to be parading near 
Ledjah, consisted of 8.000 men supported with the artillery and suddenly made an 
operation against the mentioned places. Because of the mountainous character of the 
district and the hostility of the Bedouins and the Druzes in the nearer regions this operation 
caused some losses for Cemal’s troops.962 However, the operation was completed at a short 
notice. The deserters didn’t resist the troops. A small number of the Bedouins supporting 
them was captured with their families and brought as hostages to Damascus.963 After the 
conclusion of the uprising, they were sent into exile to Sivas.964 However, that operation 
was not totally able to terminate the existence of the deserters there. As explained in detail 
before, the deserters provided a considerable support to the rebellion of the Bedouins in 
Hauran, which created great disturbance there.965  
 However, the operations against the deserters didn’t stop the desertion of the 
soldiers and give an end to their actions of banditry actions. Many telegrams can be found 
in the Ottoman Archives from the Governors about the abundance of the desertion cases 
and their authority-violating activities. The capture of them didn’t solve the problem. 
When they were captured, the deserter could easily escape from the hands of the Army. In 
May 1917, the Kaymakam of Cizre was complaining about the negligence of the 
recruitment offices to prevent the soldiers from desertions.966 Similarly, in November 
1917, the Ministry of War requested the Ministry of Interior to warn the civil officials in 
Janin, Akka and Taberiye to follow the absentees and the deserters with more significant 
                                                 
962 HHStA, PA 38/366, Ranzi to Burian, “Die militaerische Expedition nach dem 
Ledjah”, Damascus, 10 September 1915. 
963 HHStA, PA 38/366, Ranzi to Burian, “Die militaerische Expedition nach dem 
Ledjah”, Damascus, 18 September 1915. 
964 According to the cable of the Governor of Sivas, their number was 621. For details, 
see: BOA, DH.ŞFR. 496/23, The Governor of Sivas to Talat, Sivas, 22 Teşrin-i Evvel 
1331 [5 November 1915] 
965 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 534/74, Tahsin to Talat, Deraa, 24 Eylül 1332[7 October 1916]. 
966 BOA, DH.İ.UM.EK. 34/13, The Kaymakam of Cizre to Talat, 28 Mayıs 1333 [28 
May 1917]. 
268 
 
means emphasizing the capture of the deserters for the maintenance of discipline in the 
body of the Army.967 Four months later, the Governor of Beirut expressed in his response, 
on behalf of the local authorities, that most of the absentees and deserters were captured as 
a result of the efforts of the local authorities.968 The situation was not different in Zor 
district; only 87 of 2973 deserters could be captured according to the statistics sent to 
İstanbul in July 1917.969In an attack by the 14 deserters to the gendarmerie battalions of 
Bikaü’l-Aziz on 23rd November 1916, 2 of them were captured as wounded.970 
There were also bands created by the political opponents in and around Baalbek. 
Some members of the Aseli, Shahab, Haidar and Melhame families, who were decided to 
be exiled by Cemal Pasha because of their relations with the Arabist Movement, created a 
gang  in Baalbek. Most of them were also liable to the military service.971 With the 
remarks of the Governor Tahsin Bey, they killed 7 soldiers and wounded 4 of them. Tahsin 
Bey created a Circassian voluntary unit to struggle them. He didn’t prefer the Gendarmerie 
regiments since most of them was consisted of the native Arabs. For a more energetic 
intervention against these gangs, the Governor dismissed the kaymakam of Baalbek, and 
the appointment of a more active one was demanded.972 After the negotiations, most of 
them abandoned brigandage, and the decision about them was removed by Cemal Pasha.973 
                                                 
967 BOA, DH.EUM.6.Şb. 28/68, Ministry of War to Ministry of Interior, 4 Teşrin-i Sani 
1333 [4 November 1917]. 
968 BOA, DH.EUM.6.Şb. 28/68, The Governor of Beirut to Ministry of Interior, Beirut 
9 Şubat 1333 [9 February 1917]. 
969 BOA, DH.EUM.6.Şb. 17/28, the Governor of Zor to Ministry of Interior, 2 Temmuz 
1333 [2 July 1917]. 
970 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 595/38, The Defterdar of Syria to Talat, Damascus, 10 Teşrin-i Sani 
1332 [23 November 1916]. 
971 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 536/112, Tahsin to Talat, Damascus, 25 Teşrin-i Evvel 1332 [7 
October 1916]. 
972 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 536/30, Tahsin to Talat, Humus, 16 Teşrin-i Evvel 1332 [29 
October 1916]. 
973 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 538/3, Tahsin to Talat, Damascus, 8 Teşrin-i Sani 1332 [21 
November 1916]. 
269 
 
In May 1918, the Brigandage incidents again increased around Baalbek. In between 
Bekaa and Rayak, the Matwali Gangs under the leadership of Kasım Melham started 
banditry.974 Thereupon, the Army troops and the Gendarmeries in the region carried out an 
operation to punish these groups. According to the remarks of Tahsin Bey, for a long 
while, the Matwalis were disturbing the movement of the Army and causing disorder in the 
region. The operation was made with two artillery pieces and a great deal of the troops 
because of the largeness of the bandit groups.975 The aviators made the exploration flights 
to define the places of the bandit groups. As a result of the operation the bandit groups 
were dispersed in Baalbek and Lebanon.976  
Towards the end of the War, the incidents caused by the brigandage became 
frequent by the impact of the hard condition of life. In August 1918, in and around Saida, 
Sur and Merciun, the deserters had been organized by a machine gun officer, and were 
equipped with the bombs and rifles. According to the claims of the Governor of Lebanon, 
they provoked the opinions of the people around there against the Government. Those 
brigands were under the auspices of Kamil Bey el-Esad, the Beirut Deputy in the 
Parliament, and his brother Abdulkadir Bey el-Esad. Upon some documents found on the 
brigands, The Esad brothers were invited to the Governors Office for interrogation.977 
Besides the military operations against the deserted soldiers, Cemal Pasha also 
applied some other measures. In the beginning, he preferred to give them heavy 
punishments, to dissuade the soldiers from new desertions. In this regard, at the end of 
March 1915, two soldiers were hanged at the Gates of Jaffa.978 Similarly, two others were 
sentenced to death penalty in Damascus. The Damascene deserters were also the members 
                                                 
974BOA, DH.ŞFR. 585/105, Tahsin to Ministry of Interior, Damascus, 28 Mayıs1334 
[28  May 1918].  
975 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 585/166, Tahsin to Ministry of Interior, Damascus, 31 Mayıs 1334 
[31 May 1918]. 
976 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 586/85, Tahsin Ministry of Interior, Baalbek, 6 Haziran 1918 [6 
June 1918]. 
977 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 591/109, İsmail Hakkı to Ministry of Interior, Beirut, 8 Ağustos 
1334 [8 August 1918]. 
978 Tamari, Ibid, p. 94. 
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of the Arabist Party. Therefore, the Austrian Consul in Damascus thought that they were 
hanged because of their political misdemeanor.979 
Another measure, which was taken to prevent the desertions to the Entente or 
Sharif’s troops, was to send the family of the deserted soldier into the exile to Anatolia. 
When a soldier joined to the Entente or Sharif’s troops all his family was expelled from 
Syria.980 In addition, Cemal sent the ones who encouraged the soldiers to desert into 
exile.981 He also applied to the religious instruments to persuade the soldiers to the virtues 
of defending the country. For that purpose, in Friday Prayers, the preachers admonished 
the soldiers to avoid from desertion.982 
When the Ottoman rule came to a close in Jerusalem, one of the most rejoiced 
group was the Arab conscripts who had got rid of the burdens of the military service. 
According to the diaries of the Palestinian Musician Wasif Jawhariyeh, “Many of the Arab 
young men, both Muslim and Christian, the majority of whom were conscripted for the 
Turkish army in Jerusalem, had changed their army uniforms into civilian clothes in a 
funny way”983, Although they continue to wear some parts of their Army clothes, most 
probably, due to the lack of civil clothes at that time. Wasif expressed his situation with 
these words, when he threw off the military service: “The new situation put our minds at 
ease and things improved for us. We had got rid of the Turks and, thank God, we were free 
from army service.”984 
As for the political affiliation of these deserters, although some of the soldiers took 
their lots with Sharif Hussein, it can hardly be demonstrated that those soldiers had 
nationalist aspirations. First, the great majority of the Arab conscripts were illiterate. 
                                                 
979 HHStA, PA 38/366, Ranzi to Burian, “Die Lokalerereignisse der letzten Woche. 
Hinrichtung der Brüder Zreik aus Tripolis; die Syrische Deputation nach den 
Dardanellen”, Damascus, 1 October 1915. 
980 BOA, DH.EUM.4.Şb 11/23, 9 Mayıs 1333 [9 May 1917] 
981 BOA, DH.EUM.1.Şb 6/16, 2 Ağustos 1332 [15 August 1915]. 
982 Tamari, Ibid, 14 May 1915, p. 124. 
983 Jawhariyyeh, Wasif, “My Last Days as an Ottoman Subject: Selections from Wasif 
Jawhariyyeh’s Memoirs”, Jerusalem Quarterly, Summer 2000/9, p. 31. 
984 Jawhariyyeh, “My Last Days…”, p. 33. 
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Second, they were very ignorant about both the Ottoman politics and the general World 
politics. Aaransohn’s witnesses about their discussion on the politics reveal this reality 
very clearly: 
“Politicts, of which they have amazing ideas, also came in discussion. Napoleon Bonaparte 
and Queen Victoria are still living figures to them; but (significantly enough) they 
considered the Kaiser king of all the kings of this world, with the exception of the Sultan, 
whom they admitted to equality.”985 
Even the most politically dissident ones, like Ihsan Turjman, mentioned the things 
belonging to the Ottoman Empire as “ours”, although he was frustrated by the 
implementation of the Wartime measures.986 The conscription of the eligible persons to the 
military service, however, emerged as a considerably influential factor in Syria during the 
War period giving a new form to the relations between the Ottoman state and its citizens in 
the Syrian realm. In the beginning of the War, by the impact of the Pan-Islamist 
propaganda, the majority of the Syrian Muslims supported the military mobilization. 
However, later on, the Syrians began to resist the recruitment due to the slowdown of the 
preparations for a second expedition, the worsening conditions of the soldiers, the 
alienation of the Arabs to the military life, and the increasing impact of Cemal Pasha’s 
despotic rules over Syria. All in all, the amount of the deserted soldiers considerably 
increased. As defined above, they created the gangs and supported the Bedouins revolt 
against the military requisitions. However, when considered their knowledge about the 
politics, it can be hardly claimed that these soldiers had an Arab nationalist motivation, and 
deserted by that reason. On the other hand, when Cemal Pasha’s long-term plans on Syria 
were taken into consideration, he did not ascribe importance to the short-term alienation of 
the Syrians to the Ottoman state.  
                                                 
985 Aaransohn, Ibid, p. 15; at least till April 1913, most of the Arab officers didn’t have 
nationalist aspirations. In a letter sent by the son of Izzed al-Jundi’s uncle to him, the 
former complained the lack of the ideal of the motherland [Vatan] among the Arab officers 
accusing them of being in a state of atrocity against their motherlands serving the brigand 
gangs –he meant by this the CUP-, who were striving to remove the Arab nation and 
language from the level of existence [alem-i vücud].BOA, DH.EUM.4.Şb. 1/51, 
Damascus, 7 Nisan 1329 [20 April 1913]. 
986 For the examples, see, Tamari, Ibid, (our army) p. 105, (our statesmen) p. 105, (our 
planes) p.106, (our officers) p. 108, 112, (Cemal Pasha, our great leader) p. 110, (our 
Sultan) p. 112, (our ships) p. 117. 
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6.2.The Ottomanization of Education in Syria 
 
 
Another tool used by Cemal Pasha to create the ideal citizen in Syria was the mass 
education. As is known, with the development of of the modern state control over its 
citizens, mass education became one of the most instrumental means to orientate the 
feelings and behaviors of the citizens towards the new rules of the modern life and towards 
the state within the framework of a new self-identity mainly inspired by the national 
characteristics of the intended community. Beginning with Mahmud II, the Ottoman 
Empire also applied the educational means to create a new Ottoman identity embracing all 
the Muslim and non-Muslim Ottomans in an equal level modeling newly emerging 
Western national states.987 In this process, the Ottoman authorities had to struggle with the 
educational institutions of the Great Powers, who intended to create areas of influences for 
themselves in the territories of the Empire. As detailed in Chapter 5, especially, non-
Muslim and non-Turkish provinces of the Ottoman Empire were seen by those Powers as 
potential colonies in the future. In this regard, Great Britain, Russia and France made 
educational investments in various regions of the Empire, being Syria in the first place, to 
increase their penetrations among the mentioned peoples. By the commencement of the 
War, the foreign educational institutions had reached a considerable amount in Syria. With 
the outbreak of the War, the Ottoman Empire confiscated all these institutions of its 
hostiles. With the expulsion of the staff of these institutions, most of them had to be closed. 
Instead of them, new enterprises to inoculate the Syrians with the Ottoman identity were 
                                                 
987 For studies on the modernization of the Ottoman education in the 19th century, see: 
Benjamin C. Fortna, Imperial Classroom: Islam,  the state and education in the late 
Ottoman Empire, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003; S. Akşin Somel, The 
Modernization of public education in the Ottoman Empire: 1839-1908, Islamization, 
autocracy and discipline, Leiden: Brill, 2001. 
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commenced by Cemal Pasha. As a continuation of Chapter 5, this section sets out to 
describe this efforts.  
By these motivations, the Syrian provinces witnessed a mobilization for the 
Ottomanization of the education there in Cemal Pasha’s era. The statistics of education for 
the beginning of the year 1915 shows these efforts. The report of the Educational Director 
in Jerusalem for the schooling activities of the year 1915, gives many details in this regard. 
In the beginning of the school year for 1915, a boarding school of Teacher’s Training 
College for Boys [Darülmuallimin] started education with 29 students in Jerusalem. The 
director notes that, when the school started to study with full capacity the number of the 
students would rise to 200 boys. In the city centers of Jerusalem and Jaffa, 5 classrooms 
[Dershane] and 2 infant schools with teachers [muallimli iki ana mektebi] were opened. the 
Director continues that these institutions gained a wide popularity among the local people, 
and the number of their students reached 150 in a short while; 29 primary schools were 
established in the villages annexed administratively to Jerusalem, Halilürrahman, Gaza and 
Jaffa. The total number of their students changed between 100 and 150. The primary 
schools, which were established before, were disciplined [intizam] by the appointment of 
the new teachers. The teachers of the Turkish language were appointed to the three private 
schools opened by non-Muslims “with the purpose of the dissemination of the usage of the 
Ottoman Language”. Their salaries were paid by the Governorate of Jerusalem. A model 
school with 10 classrooms [Tatbikat Mekteb-i İbtidaisi], which was commenced to be 
constructed in 1913, completed. A primary school was started to be constructed in the 
Kobab Village annexed to Jerusalem. Finally, the buildings of the Primary School of 
Ramleh for boys and the Primary School of Jerusalem for Girls were repaired.988 
 
 
6.2.1. The Selahaddin-i Eyyubi Complex in Jerusalem 
 
                                                 
988 BOA, DH. UMVM. 143/21, Educational Director in Jerusalem to Talat, 25 Şubat 
1331 [10 March 1916]. 
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Cemal Pasha also made activities of education aiming at training new scholars for 
the strengthening of the loyalties of the Syrian people towards the Caliphate, and for the 
propaganda of the Ottoman Caliph in the other parts of the Ottoman Empire and in the 
foreign countries. At that time, the allegiance to the Caliph also meant a hostility towards 
the “enemies of the religion”, i.e. the Entente states. For this aim, immediately after his 
arrival in Syria, the Pasha pioneered the establishment of a religious university in 
Jerusalem called Selahaddin-i Eyyubi Külliyesi, and the building of St. Anna Church, 
which was controlled by the French Jesuits, was confiscated for the Külliye,989 which was 
symbolically very meaningful. The Church was built by the Crusades in the 12th Century 
during their domination in Jerusalem and now it was being turned into a Muslim religious 
establishment under the name of the most famous Muslim commander, who fought against 
the Crusades. However, the administration of the church inside the building was delivered 
to the Greek-Catholic Church.990 In the beginning of 1915, Cemal commandeered some 
parts of this building and transformed it into a religious school. However, a small part was 
left as Church. According to Strohmeier, who wrote a detailed article on the Külliye, the 
denomination of the Külliye with the name of Muslim commander, Selahaddin-i Eyyubi 
demonstrates that Cemal attached himself to the tradition of the Muslim conquerors.991 
On 28th January 1915, in the birthday of the Prophet Muhammed [Mevlid Kandili], 
the Külliye was opened with a brilliant ceremony in the presence of the Commander-in-
Chief of the Ottoman Armies, Enver Pasha and Cemal Pasha. A large mass of the people 
attended to the ceremony as well as the prominent ulema and bureaucrats of the Syria and 
Palestine. The crowd firstly appeared in the Aksa Mosque for pray, and then walked to the 
                                                 
989 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 49/66, Şeyhülislam to the Governor of Jerusalem, 5 Kanun-ı Sani 
1330 [18 January 1915]. 
990 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 49/44, Cemal to Şeyhülislam, Jerusalem, 3 Kanun-ı Sani 1330 [16 
January 1915]. 
991 Strohmeier, Ibid, p. 2-5; Infact, a detailed project of the establishment of such a 
Külliye in Istanbul was proposed in a report by the Egyptians to Enver Pasha immediately 
before the War. The informations in their reports were very similar to the practice of the 
Külliye. For the whole of the mentioned report see: TTK Arşivi, EP Tasnifi 4/54, Undated.  
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Külliye. Before the opening ceremony all the symbols in the building, which belongs to the 
Christianity, had been removed.992 
The prominent Egyptian Pan-Islamist Abdulaziz Chavish993 was appointed as the 
director of the school. Indeed, Cemal Pasha was opposed to that appointment since he was 
acting independently. He insistently requested Talat to dismiss Chavish from this office 
claiming that Chavish speak about his independence from Cemal Pasha on the street 
[sağda solda konuşmak], and by this way, he violated Cemal’s personal dignity and 
prestige in Syria.994 However, Enver and Talat, most probably taking the Pan-Islamist aims 
of the establishment of the Külliye into consideration, supported the appointment of 
Chavish claiming that the action was carried out before Cemal’s opposition. The sentences 
of the apology in Talat’s telegraph were so exaggerated that, he requested Chavish’s stay 
in his office from Cemal Pasha with the phrase “I request that [appointment] kissing your 
                                                 
992 Strohmeier, Ibid, p. 6. 
993 Abdulaziz Chavish was born in Alexandria in 1876. His father was from Tunusia. He 
graduated from al-Azhar (1892) and Dar al-Ulum (1897). During his education, he got in 
touch with Muhammed Abduh. For further education, he went to Great Britain. In 1901, 
He started to work as inspector in the Ministry of Education in Egypt. But, the same year, 
he returned to Great Britain and took office in Oxford University as Arabic Teacher. In 
1905, he joined to the 14th Congress of the orientalists in Algeria as the member of the 
Egyptian delegation. In 1906, he returned to Egypt, and joined to the Movement of the 
Wataniyya [patriotism] organized by Mustafa Kamil and Muhammed Farid. In 1908, he 
became the chief redacteur of el-Liva newspaper, the newspaper of the Wataniyya 
movement. He transformed this newspaper to a platform to spread his pro-Ottoman and 
pan-Islamic ideas. He was also among the publishers of  El-A’lam and El-Sha’b, and El-
Hidaye Journal. With these publications, he created a considerable influence among the 
Egyptians. Therefore, he was expelled from Egypt with the excuse of causing tension 
between the Muslims and the Copts. In 1912, he settled down to Istanbul. During his stay 
in Istanbul, he published the newspaper El-Hilal el-Osmani and the journal El-Alemü’l-
Islami. In 1915, he was accused with the organization of the suicide against the Khedive 
Abbas Hilmi in Istanbul, and therefore, had to live in Berlin fpr a month. At the end of the 
War, he went to Berlin and stayed there till 1923. At that year, he returned to Egypt and 
died there in 1927: Strohmeier, Ibid, p. 37. 
994 BOA, DH.ŞFR.467/44, Cemal to Talat, Jerusalem, 26 Mart 1331 [8 April 1915]; 
BOA, DH.ŞFR. 467/46, Cemal to Talat, Jerusalem, 27 Mart 1331 [9 April 1915]; 
Sheikhulislam also supported Cemal in this issue: BOA, DH.ŞFR. 49/77, Şeyhülislam to 
Cemal, 6 Kanun-ı Sani 1330. 
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hands”.995 As a matter of fact, Chavish would leave the directorate in a short while, most 
probably due to his disagreement with Cemal Pasha.996 
The principal aim of the school was to break the influence of Al-Azhar in Egypt 
and Aligarh College in India in the Muslim World, which were under the British influence. 
The Scholars, who would be trained in this University, were to propagate a Pan-Islamist 
union under the leadership of the Ottoman Caliph. For that aim, the most prominent 
scholars in Istanbul were sent to Jerusalem to be employed in this school.997 On the other 
hand, as expressed on several occasions throughout this study, one aim of Cemal’s 
existence in Syria was to obliterate the psychology of dependency of the Syrians stemming 
from the idea that Egypt was more improved than Syria. The Külliye would serve to this 
goal, too. 
Besides the celebrated scholars of Istanbul, the members of the prominent Arab 
families and the well-known Arabists, who were sentenced by Cemal Pasha later, were 
among the professors of the Külliye. The diversity of the teachers employed in that Külliye 
also shows the complexity of the late Ottoman Arab society in terms of ideological 
affiliation. Among them Ahmed Tabbara was the founder of İttihad-ı Osmani [Union of 
the Ottomans] in 1908. Later, He worked actively in the Cemiyyet al Islahiyya, a 
decentralist Arabist society. In 1916, he was put by Cemal Pasha into death sentence.998 
Rustum Haydar, from the prominent Palestinian Family al-Nashashibi, was again the 
member of the Arabist party and was among the founders of the Arabist society El-Fetat in 
1911. In 1909, He wrote a Ph.D dissertation in Sorbonne University praising the Mehmed 
Ali’s period of rule in Syria. He worked as the director of the Beirut Sultani School. He 
was appointed to an important office in the Külliye Course Superintendant [Ders Nazırı], 
                                                 
995 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 51/230, Talat to Cemal, 26 Mart 1331 [8 April 1915]. 
996 A Graduate of the Law School [Mekteb-i Hukuk], Cemil Bey was appointed instead 
of him: BOA, DH.ŞFR. 50/130, Şeyhülislam to Cemal Pasha, 15 Şubat 1330 [28 February 
1915]. 
997 This aim was openly stated in the German newspaper Nachrichtstelle für den Orient 
(30.6.1915). For the  quotation of this newspaper, see: Strohmeier, Ibid, p. 16. 
998 Strohmeier, Ibid, p. 29. 
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and delivered the lectures on history and economics there.999 The French teacher Subhi 
Bey El-Hadra was an alumni of the Ottoman Military School [Harbiye]. Following a short 
employment at the Külliye, he participated to the Ottoman forces in the Canal, and was 
taken prisoner by the British troops there. Afterwards, he joined to the Sharif’s troops.1000 
Rafiq al-Tamimi was also one of the founders of the El-Fetat Society.1001 In summary, It 
will not be an exaggeration to claim that the Külliye had been established as a result of the 
alliance of the opposition groups with the Government against Great Britain. 
As for the courses taught in the Külliye, both religious and modern sciences were 
included in the curriculum as well as the eastern and the western language courses. From 
the religious courses, Fıkıh, Tefsir, Hadis, Kelam, the History of Relgions and Tasavvuf 
were among the outstanding courses. Both Turkish and Arabic were in the course 
programme. The students were required to register at least one eastern (Persian, Urdu and 
Tatar), and one western (German, French, English, Russian) language. They were taught 
the history of Arabs, and the Ottoman and Turkish History as well as the political history 
of the contemporary age [Asr-ı Hazır Tarih-i Siyasisi]. The outstanding modern sciences 
taught in the Külliye were Geography, Economics, Law, Natural Sciences and 
Astronomy.1002 
The Külliye was quite attractive for the Syrians; therefore, in the year 1916, only 
1/4 of the applicants could be accepted as students. There was a quota of 10 persons for the 
                                                 
999 Strohmeier, Ibid, p. 39; one of his relatives, Salih Bey Haidar, ex-Mayor of Baalbek, 
was hanged by Cemal in 1915: HHStA, PA 387366, Ranzi to Burian, “Das Urteil des 
Kriegsgerichtes in Aleh”, Damascus, 26 August 1915; After the executions of 1916, all the 
Haidar family was exiled to Anatolia: BOA, DH.ŞFR. 504/65, Cemal to Talat, 26 Kanun-ı 
Evvel 1331 [8 January 1916]; However, there is no special record that he was either exiled 
or exempted from this action. 
1000 Strohmeier, Ibid, p. 42. 
1001 Strohmeier, Ibid, p. 54; He was also the co-author of the book Beyrut Vilayeti, 
written by the request of the Governor Azmi Bey, to know better the geography and 
population of Beirut: al-Tamimi, Rafik and Muhammed Behcet, Beyrut Vilayeti, Vilayet 
Matbaası, Beyrut: 1333 [1916]. 
1002 Strohmeier, Ibid, p. 86-87; Approximately the same curriculum had been proposed 
to Enver Pasha in the abovementioned project of opening a religious school in İstanbul to 
educate Muslim missionaries. For details, see : TTK Arşivi,  EP Koleksiyonu, 4/54, 
Undated. 
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students, who would register to the school from abroad. It was distributed among the 
countries as such: Egypt: 4, Sudan and Etiopia: 2, Tripoli and Benghazi: 2, Tunisia: 1, 
Algeria, Morocco and South Africa: 1, Java and the Philippinnes: 3, China: 3, India: 5, 
Afghanistan: 2, Belucistan: 1, Iran: 2, Turkistan (Bukhara, Hiva, Tashkent, Semerkant): 5, 
Caucasus, Astrahan, Kazan, Crimea and Poland: 6. However, those quotas couldn’t fill 
most probably due to the bad conditions of the War, and great majority of the Students 
were registered from Syria, Anatolia and Palestine: Damascus: 30, Aleppo: 25, Beirut: 25, 
Jerusalem: 20.1003  
In spite of the political and economic traumas, which deeply influenced the daily 
life in Palestine, the Külliye maintained its educational activities till November 1917, one 
month before of the British invasion. After the invasion, it was relocated to Damascus. 
There is not enough information on the Külliye after its relocation.1004 
A similar undertaking was attempted in Medina after the commencement of the 
Sharifian Revolt in Mecca. For that aim, in the beginning of the year 1917, the Evkaf 
Minister İbrahim Bey, paid a visit there. The aim of this religious school was to educate 
young imams and preachers, who would make counter propaganda to weaken the Sharif’s 
movement. However, the problems of communication and the worsening of the military 
conditions caused the failure of that project.1005 
 
 
6.2.2. Halide Edib as the Supervisor of Cemal Pasha for Education  
 
As analyzed earlier, the Ottomans were competing with the Europeans, especially 
with France, on the allegiance of the Syrians. As expressed in Chapter 5, taking the war 
circumstances as an occasion, Cemal first ottomanized the French institutions in Syria and 
then endeavoured to reorganize the public education in Syria in a way that would enable 
                                                 
1003 Strohmeier, Ibid, p. 23-24. 
1004 Strohmeier, Ibid, p. 68. 
1005 HHStA, PA 38/370, Ranzi to Czernin, “Der Besuch des Vakufministers in 
Medina”, Damascus, 26 January 1917. 
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him to make the Syrians more loyal to the ideals of the Ottoman unity, and more 
“conscious” about the aims of the Great Powers. For those purposes, towards the end of the 
year 1916, Cemal wanted to regulate mass education in Syria in a more systematic way 
under the supervision of Halide Edib. The aims of Cemal’s project were explained by 
Halide Edib with the following remarks: 
“After the extreme measures he had taken to put down the conspiracy in Syria1006, he was 
anxious to create a good government and an efficient system of public education. He had 
seen the strong inclination of the Arabs toward the French, based on the educational efforts 
of the French, and he was desirous of copying their methods in a less religious and more 
liberal sense.”1007 
For that purpose, he applied to Halide Edib at the beginning of the year 1916 to come to 
Syria to be his supervisor for the educational issues. He sent a letter with Falih Rıfkı 
stating that: 
“He had been obliged to close the French schools and monasteries, which used to give 
education to the Arabs, on political grounds. The schools opened by the department of 
public instruction were not sufficient. The local governments in Syria, with the aid of the 
army, had decided to establish a series of schools.”1008  
After that description, Cemal invited Halide Edib to Syria to organize the school system or 
to send teachers there for that aim. Halide Edib’s sister Nigiar went to Beirut voluntarily, 
and established a primary school there. In the summer of 1916, Cemal sent another letter to 
Halide asking to travel Syria and study the situation to draw up a plan for a larger number 
of schools in Damascus, Beirut and Lebanon. This time, Halide Edib accepted his request 
and travelled to Syria.1009 
Following a visit of exploration, she returned to Istanbul in mid-September, 1916. 
However, Cemal didn’t give up following her. Towards the end of the year 1916, he again 
requested Halide Edib to undertake the organization of the schools in Syria. In the very 
                                                 
1006 By the word “conspiracy”, Halide Edib means Cemal Pasha’s punishment of the 
Arabists.  
1007 Halide Edib, Ibid, p. 400; Falih Rıfkı assesses similarly the aims of  Cemal Pasha 
with the opening of these schools. He also added that the Ottomanization of Syria would 
be succeeded by these schools: Atay,Ibid, p. 77. 
1008 Halide Edib, Ibid, p. 390-391; in his book Zeytindağı, Falih Rıfkı confirms these 
correspondences. Atay, Ibid, p. 79. 
1009 Halide Edib, Ibid, p. 391. 
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beginning of the year 1917, she accepted Cemal’s offer and took the road for Syria with 
some 50 women teachers.1010 In her letter to Cavid Bey, the Minister of Finance, that she 
sent a few months later, Halide Edib stated that she loved Syria and the Syrians very much 
and worked hard to contribute to the development of that country.1011 
With the closure of the French institutions, the education of the girls had emerged 
as an urgent question for Cemal Pasha. After the confiscation of the French schools, there 
was only one secondary school in the whole of Syria for girls. For that reason, Halide Edib 
began to work for the opening of the girl schools. According to the remarks of the Austrian 
Consul, the teachers, who came with Halide Edib from İstanbul, would disperse around the 
different regions of Syria. In the places that they would serve, these teachers were to work 
with the Arab teachers. There were 7 Turkish and 6 Arab women teachers in the model girl 
school that was established in Damascus immediately after the arrival of Halide Edib.1012 
Towards the end of the year 1917, the Villa of the late Ziver Pasha [Ziver Paşa Konağı] in 
Salihiye Street were expropriated as the building of the School.1013 Interestingly enough, 
this school was called as Cemal Pasha İnas Mektebi [Cemal Pasha Girls High School].1014 
As a result of the intense work of Halide Edib and her retinue, in the beginning of 
the year 1917, three girls high schools started education in Beirut, Damascus and Lebanon 
with the cooperation of the Governors of those cities.1015 Although Halide Edib did not 
                                                 
1010 Halide Edib, Ibid, p. 431-437; The Austrian Consul in Damascus gives the number 
of the teachers who had come with Halide Edib as 47: HHStA, PA 38/370, Ranzi to 
Czernin, “Die Gründung staatlicher Maedchenliceen in Syrien”, Damascus, 19 February 
1917.  
1011 Halide Edib to Cavid Bey, 1 March 1917, Beirut, in Murat Bardakçı, Talat Paşa’nın 
Evrak-ı Metrukesi, İstanbul: Everest Yayınları, 2009, p. 149-151. 
1012 HHStA, PA 38/370, Ranzi to Czernin, “Die Gründung staatlicher Maedchenliceen 
in Syrien”, Damascus, 19 February 1917. 
1013 BOA, DH.İ.UM.EK. 43/48, Talat to Tahsin, 5 Kanun-ı Evvel 1333 [] 
1014 For a reference with this name, see: BOA, DH.UMVM 22/4, Fuad [on behalf of the 
Governor of Syria] to Talat, Damascus, 22 Şubat 1334 [22 February 1918].  
1015 Halide Edib, Ibid, p. 440: In Beirut, the girls high school was established in a 
building confiscated by the French institutions. There was a church inside the building. In 
spite of the opposition of Cemal Pasha, he didn’t close the Church. For further details see: 
Halide Edib, Ibid, p. 440; Atay, Ibid, p. 79. 
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mention it, a Girls School was established in Aleppo at that time.1016 In addition, a teachers 
school and a primary school for girls were established in Beirut. Halide Edib was 
employed within the body of the 4th Army and the finance of the mentioned schools were 
provided by the provincial budgets.1017 Towards the end of the War, when the governors 
were unable to compensate the provisioning needs of the schools, the Army supplied the 
necessary food for the needs of these institutions.1018 The entrance exams were held both in 
Turkish and Arabic. With the remarks of Halide Edib, in the new schools, the teaching of 
Arabic was taken very seriously. As for the students of those schools, “Lebanon Mostly 
sent Christians, Beirut sent both Moslems and Christians, while the Damascus students 
were all Moslems”.1019 According to the report of the Austrian consul, another sub-aim of 
these new schools were to provide the linguistic centralization teaching the new Arab 
students the official language of the Ottoman Empire, i.e. Turkish.1020 Besides the Arabs, 
Cemal Pasha pressed the Turkish officials in Syria to send their girls to these schools.1021 
Upon the deterioration of the military and provisional conditions in the Syrian provinces, 
                                                 
1016 HHStA, PA 38/370, Dandini to Czernin, “Fortschritte in der türkischen 
Verwaltung”, Aleppo, 16 February 1917. 
1017 Cemal to Enver, 27 September 1917, Arşiv Belgeleriyle Ermeni Faaliyetleri, 
ATASE Yayınları, Ankara: 2007, p. 698. 
1018 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 596/5, İsmail Hakkı to Ministry of Interior, Beirut, 13 Ağustos 
1334 [13 August 1918].  
1019 Halide Edib, Ibid, p. 440; Martin Strohmeier notes in his article on the Salahiyya 
that Cemal Pasha supported the education of the Christians and Muslims together, and 
therefore promoted a mixture of the students from both religions in the Girls School of 
Beirut. For details, see: Strohmeier, Ibid, p. 6. 
1020 HHStA, PA 38/370, Ranzi to Czernin, “Die Gründung staatlicher Maedchenliceen 
in Syrien”, Damascus, 19 February 1917; by this aim, the language of the Imperial School 
in Damascus [Şam Mekteb-i Sultanisi] were converted from Arabic to Turkish: HHStA, 
PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian, “Einführung des deutschen Sprachunterrichtes in der hiesigen 
Sultanieshule”, Damascus, 21 March 1916. 
1021 Münevver Ayaşlı was one of the Turkish students who were sent to the newly 
opened state school in Beirut. However, he is very unsatisfied with the education in these 
schools.  But, it seems that his evaluations were rather subjective. For his further 
assessments on Halide Edib and his schools  see: Ayaşlı, Münevver, İşittiklerim, 
Gördüklerim, Bildiklerim, Boğaziçi Yayınları, İstanbul: 1990, p. 80-81. 
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most of the teachers, who came to Syria with Halide Edib, returned to Istanbul in March 
1918.1022 
The aim for the establishment of these schools is a matter of debate in the existing 
literature. The following remarks that Halide Edib used while describing the aim of this 
schools caused some discussions:  
“Arabic nationalism so far had been in Syria a political instrument in foreign hands. 
Nationalism used for political purposes is an ideal turned into a monstrosity. Turkey must 
help the Arabs to develop a national spirit and personality, teach them to love their own 
national culture more than any foreign one; and when the time came for the Arab to have 
his independence, he would geographically and economically see that he had more 
common ties and interests with the Turks that with the foreigners.”1023 
Interpreting these remarks, Makdisi put into words about the aim of Halide Edib in Syria 
the following claims:  
“Her goal was to open and run several Ottoman schools to educate Arab women, to teach 
them Turkish, and most important to ensure their loyalty to the Ottoman state. Despite her 
own best efforts to encourage a more empathetic view of the Arabs, her understanding of 
her own mission was startlingly revealing of the imperial dimension of Ottoman 
modernity: she considered Arabs a ‘minority’ who had to be taught to love their Turkish 
government and who, after a suitable period of education and uplift, would be allowed self-
determination. ‘Turkey’ she wrote, ‘must help the Arabs to develop a national spirit and 
personality, teach them to love her own national culture more than any foreign one [by 
which she meant the French]’.”1024  
When Edib’s words quoted above are evaluated at its face value, Makqisi seems right. 
However, like Cemal Pasha, Halide Edib also classifies the Arabs, as nationalists and the 
others. In his view, the nationalist Arabs were “a political instrument in foreign hands”, 
and therefore, could not be trusted. She implicitly accepts the “developedness” of the 
nationalist Arabs and put them in a higher category. If those nationalist Arabs teaches the 
common Arabs their Arabness, they would be sympathized to the foreign powers instead 
of their own states. Therefore, it was the Turks who would teach the Arabness to the 
Arabs. As for the “self-determination”, it is almost impossible to claim that Halide Edib 
                                                 
1022 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 85/86, Talat to the Director of the Health in Adana, 11 Mart 1334 
[11 March 1918]. 
1023 Halide Edib, Memoirs, p. 402. 
1024 Makdisi, Ibid, p. 793. 
283 
 
considered the “self-determination” for the Arabs during the Ottoman time. Presumably, 
she meant the time when the memoirs were written. By “time for independence” for the 
Arabs, Edib meant a date in future that the Arabs would be liberated from the French 
mandate. A comparison with the Turkish version will make this idea stronger.1025 
 As emphasized several times throughout the present study, Cemal intended to make 
the Syrians loyal Ottomans modelling the nation-state structure of Europe. Therefore, his 
educational activities could not be thought separate from this general aim. Makdisi is right 
that Cemal aimed to replace the French sympathy with that of the Ottoman. But the 
difference between the two states is ignored by Makdisi. While Ottomans were the legal 
authority, who had the right to rule Syria, France was a foreign power. Cemal demanded 
from the Syrians to sympathize with their own state instead of a foreign one. On the other 
hand, giving priority to teach Turkish was connected with his general policy of Syria. 
Following the elimination of the intermediaries that described in the previous chapters, 
Turkish was deliberated as the official language, which would provide the communication 
between the state and its citizens.  
 
 
6.2.3. The Other Educational Undertakings for the Modernization of Syria 
 
Besides those, Ranzi points out that Cemal opened agricultural, industrial and 
commercial schools to provide the improvement of the country and to break its 
dependency to the Great Powers.1026 Towards the end of the year 1916, Cemal established 
a school of agriculture in Tanail (at the Bikaa district in the province of Damascus) under 
the supervision of the German experts. The land of the school had been confiscated from 
the Jesuits in the beginning of the War. Before the War, the Jesuits had a boarding school 
and a wine garden there. In the lands of schools, which reached to 5.000 decare width, 
Cemal established this school with an agricultural model farm to provide the practicing 
                                                 
1025 Halide Edib, Mor Salkımlı Ev, p. 234. 
1026 HHStA, PA 38/370, Ranzi to Czernin, “Die Gründung staatlicher Maedchenliceen 
in Syrien”, Damascus, 19 February 1917. 
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ability to the students. The students of the school were registered from all regions of Syria. 
Similarly, he established a technical and industrial school in Damascus under the 
leadership of the German expert Prof. Stöckle.1027 This school would be concentrating on 
these branches: engineering, road construction and applied arts. The teaching of the 
German language made compulsory in these two schools, and the lectures were partly 
delivered in German. According to the Austrian Consul in Damascus, the resistance of the 
Turkish authorities against the German language was assuaged by the need of the 
employment of the foreign experts.1028 In addition, according to Von Kiesling, a German 
expert employed by Cemal Pasha, the students in this technical school were taught the 
traditional Arabic handworks such as faiance painting, plaster window manufacturing, 
tissue knotting. By this way, the traditional arts would have been saved from getting 
lost.1029 In a similar way, According to the Spanish consul, Cemal was planning to found a 
shool of arts and trades in Birüssebi, “having contracted specialized proferssors, trusting 
the direction of the school to the Military Administration of the Desert… Courses in 
Turkish, Arabic, music, drawing and other subjects will be imparted there…”.1030 
 His endeavors to ottomanize the religious and non-religious education were also 
appreciated by the Germans. The replacement of the foreign domination on the education 
of the Arab population with that of the Ottomans would also give a free hand to Cemal 
Pasha to solve the Arab question in an easier way. After denoting the necessity of opening 
a University in Medina to eliminate the foreign influence, the German academic Franz 
Stuhlmann explained the importance of spread of the Ottoman schools with these words in 
his study:  
                                                 
1027 Von Kiesling, Hans, Damascus Altes und Neues aus Syrien, Dieterich’siche 
Verlagsbuchhandlung, Leipzig: 1919, p. 80; indeed, the preparations for the establishment 
of a school of agriculture in Damascus had begun in May 1915. 25.000 qurush had been 
added to the budget of the Syrian Province for the year 1915. For details, see: BOA, 
DH.UMVM 132/35, Ministry of Interior to Sadaret,12 Temmuz 1331 [25 Temmuz 1331]. 
1028 HHStA, PA 38/370, Ranzi to Czernin, “Die Gründung zweier Fachschulen under 
deutsher Leitung”, Damascus, 18 January 1917. 
1029 Kiesling, Ibid. p. 79-80. 
1030 Ballobar, Ibid, p. 143. 
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“'This foundation should be followed by similar foundations in Baghdad, Damascus, and 
the Yemen, which should not only disseminate purely Islamic knowledge, but strive to 
make western learning subverse their purposes. In this way it will be possible to form an 
educated element in the country from which efficient officials, doctors, etc. can be 
recruited, and as soon as education has penetrated into these lands they will be able under 
the Turkish Crescent to form autonomous states, a confederation of states, and so bring 
about a happy solution of the difficult Arabian question. A strong Turkey can afford to 
make concessions in the Arabian question.”1031 
Towards the end of his governorate in Syria, Cemal reached an agreement with the Orient 
Mission of Austria on having the Syrian young boys education in that country.1032 
According to that agreement, the students must have completed the first five years of their 
educations in the public schools in Syria. It means that the age range of the students would 
be between 12 and 15. The age average was determined as 15 years old for the applicants. 
The Mission would provide scholarships to the students to carry out their lives in Austria. 
The students would firstly stay in a boarding stay in the lower Austria dividing them into 
smaller groups consisted of 12 children. A professor would be assigned for each group, 
whose only job was to take care of these children. In the first year, the students would be 
placed into the preparations classes to learn the German language. After that they would 
continue their educations.1033 
 At the end of that year, the students would be placed to the appropriate professional 
schools or the industrial schools. They would be able to acquire professions there such as 
factory director, machine engineer, electric master, textile and metal engineers etc. Besides 
that the students would be able to register to schools of commerce or to schools of 
agriculture to master on agriculture, forestry etc. After the completion of their professional 
education, they would be able to continue their education at faculties like Medicine, 
Veterinary Medicine, Law etc.1034  
                                                 
1031 PRO, FO 371/2783, Holderness to FO, “Germany, Turkey, England and Arabia, 
Dr. Franz Stuhlmann's recently published book”, 2 November 1916. 
1032 HHStA, PA 38/370, Ranzi to Czernin, “Abreise der mohammedanischen Jünglinge 
zur Ausbildung in der Monarchie”, Damascus, 22 November 1917. 
1033 HHStA, PA 12 462, K.K. Österreichische Orient-und Überseegesellschaft, 
“Normen der Schuleraktion”, undated. 
1034 HHStA, PA 12/462, K.K. Österreichische Orient-und Überseegesellschaft, 
“Normen der Schuleraktion”, undated. 
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 The Secretary of the Orient Mission paid a visit to the Syrian provinces to register 
students to that project. The Secretary visited Aleppo, Damascus, Beirut, Haifa and 
Jerusalem. All the applicants were the children of the prominent families of these 
provinces. During the visits, Cemal Pasha and the other officials pulled out all the stops to 
facilitate the work of the mission.1035 The interest of the people was considerable. From the 
200 applicants, the first 15 were selected according to the success rating. Before them, a 
group of the Christian Orphans was sent to Austria for education. There were also the 
children and relatives of the prominent bureaucrats among the scholarshipped students; the 
nephew of the Governor of Syria, the son of the Commander of the 8th Army Corps, the 
sons of the Judges and other prominent bureaucrats as well as the notables of Syria. To the 
contrary of the agreement, the students were older than 15 years since the youngers would 
have problems to adapt the new conditions of a foreign country.1036 For Austria it was a 
golden opportunity to increase its influence in Syria. In Cemal Pasha’s words, possibly, the 
students would be the operating pioneers of the elimination of the foreign dependency in 
these lands.1037 
 Another remarkable project of Cemal Pasha in the field of education was to 
establish an oriental library in Damascus. In a report presented to him in French in May 
1917, the aims of the establishment of this library were summarized.1038 By this library, 
firstly, Cemal aimed at having “at least an institution which every enlightened man could 
draw its intellectual nourishment he can not find elsewhere.”1039 Secondly, the riches of the 
                                                 
1035 HHStA, PA 12/462, The Secretary of the Orientmission to Czernin, “Ausbildung 
50-60 türkischer Schüler in Konvikten”, Damascus, 24 January 1918. 
1036 HHStA, PA 38/370, Ranzi to Czernin, “Abreise der mohammedanischen Jünglinge 
zur Ausbildung in der Monarchie”, Damascus, 22 November 1917. 
1037 HHStA, PA 12/462, The Secretary of the Orientmission to Czernin, “Ausbildung 
50-60 türkischer Schüler in Konvikten”, Damascus, 24 January 1918. 
1038 “Expose sur la Fondation d’une Bibliotheque Orientale Generale a Damas” par son 
excellence Ahmed Djemal Pacha, Commandant de la IV., Armee et Ministre de la Marine, 
Damas, May 1333. From the wording of the text, it is inferred that the report was prepared 
by an Ottoman citizen, who can’t speak Turkish, most probably by an Arab, if it was not 
translated to French for the use of the Germans [I found the document in the 
Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, MTÇ] 
1039 Expose, p. 1. 
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East, which were spoiled by the West for centuries, had to be kept in their places. 
Therefore, this library must have protected the old manuscrits of their move to the western 
countries. By the collection of these valuable books the Eastern academics wouldn’t have 
to visit the Western countries to study about their cultures and languages, the flow was 
intended to make an inversion. by this process, the East would regain its former glory and 
his riches, and again would be “the center of attraction for those who wanted to study and 
know thoroughly.” 1040 Damascus was determined as the place for the library since this city 
was less influenced by the European culture and, in the ancient times, was a center of 
libraries and scholars. the right should be left to Damascus to continue to be, as in the past, 
the source of the Eastern spiritual life. Besides that, the youngmen should know about the 
wealth of ancient and modern Turkish Literature. In addition, the Library must compensate 
the need of the Turkish book of the school children, who were taught Turkish in the 
schools. by this, it will make a great patriotic service and complement the purpose of the 
educational implementations, which had begun at school. As a result of the realization of 
this project, the city Damascus would reach his fame that it once had as “the Paradise of 
the Orient.” 1041 The report summarizes the character of the projected library as such: 
“The library must contain: 1. The Most significant works of the Arab and Muslim literature 
in all their branches, 2. Language works (grammars, dictionaries, language studies etc..) 
And classics of Semitic languages, 3. Great books about the East in general (languages, 
religions, history, customs, arts, geography, travel and more.,) and Arabic literature and 
Islam in particular, in all different languages., 4. A rich collection of ancient and modern 
Turkish literature, as well as new publications (books, journals, periodicals, etc..,) In that 
language, 5. Great books about Turkey in all different languages.”1042 
For this purpose, Cemal assigned the prominent Zionist and Orientalist Dr. Jehlin to 
prepare a catalog of the Islamic Library in Damascus. During this work, Dr. Jehlin 
determined large numbers of unknown manuscripts.1043 Apart from that, the project 
couldn’t put into practice, most probably, because of the difficulties arisen by the state of 
the War. However, the project is crucial in terms of indicating Cemal’s desire to make the 
                                                 
1040 Expose, p. 2. 
1041 Expose, p. 3-4. 
1042 Expose, p. 4-5. 
1043 Wiegand to His Wife, 7 May 1917, Ibid, p. 248. 
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Ottoman realm independent intellectually from the West, and in terms of its appreciation 
the importance of the knowledge in the issue of independence. Secondly, the emphasis on 
the necessity of the old Arab intellectual culture and the references to the glories of the 
ancient times, i.e. the glories of the history of the Arabs, makes it problematical to identify 
Cemal Pasha as a Turkifier in Syria. 
All in all, throughout his governorate in Syria, Cemal Pasha strove with his policy of 
education to make the Syrians the proper citizens loyal to the Empire. In summary, his 
undertakings in the field of both religious and the public educations aimed at the 
replacement of the foreign education institutions with their Ottoman equals, and to annex 
the new citizens to the ideals of the Ottomanism.  In the viewpoint of the Austrian 
Consul in Damascus, the aim of Cemal Pasha’s educational reforms was to create an 
alternative centre for the Arab World in Syria against Al-Azhar of Egypt. By this way, he 
tried to make the Muslim students abandon from travelling Egypt with the educational 
reasons. Another aim of these reforms was to raise awareness of the Syrians about how 
their Government was progressive. He also opened the agricultural and commercial 
schools to reduce the foreign-source dependency for the development of the country.1044  
 
 
 
6.3.Public Works under Cemal Pasha in Syria 
 
 
Besides the activities to make the bodies and minds of the Syrians suitable for being 
ideal citizens of the Ottoman Empire, Cemal also provided considerable alterations in the 
urban space of the Syrian cities as to convert them into a convenient structure for the 
“surveillance” of the state over its citizens as well as some undertakings to develop the 
Syrian district economically. “His background and the positions had held before the war 
                                                 
1044 HHStA, PA 38/371, Ranzi to Czernin, “Der Abschied Djemal Pasha’s von Syrien”, 
Damascus, 17 February 1918: throughout the War, Cemal had to apply the foreign advisors 
to make the development prejects for Syria. The opening of the new schools, most 
probably, aimed at the break of this dependency. 
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particularly predisposed him to engage in such a comprehensive venture”.1045 As will be 
analyzed below, those activities aimed both to save Syria from the foreign dependency and 
to increase the penetration of the Ottoman Government in the Syrian provinces by giving 
them a modern and penetrable shape in the Foucaldian sense.  
 
 
6.3.1. “Penetrating” the Cities of Syria 
 
With the appointment of Cemal Pasha as the Governor General, an outstanding 
improvement emerged in appearance of the Syrian provinces. With the remarks of the 
Austrian Consul in Damascus on 23rd May 1915, many of the narrower streets there, were 
systematically enlarged in a short period of time. In addition, some streets were repaired 
and embellished. All of this was succeeded with a very small cost presumably due to the 
employment of the labor battalions in these works.1046 Hulusi Bey, the first Governor of 
Syria under Cemal’s Rule, made a special contribution to the enlargement of the streets, 
and having a modern appearance of the cities in Syria as an engineer, who knew these 
works very well. According to the Austrian Consul in Damascus, due to his contribution to 
the public works, when Hulusi was dismissed upon his request, “all the circles of the civil 
service and people agreed that he was the best general governor that was appointed in 
Syria for many years. His dismissal caused a sincere sorrow among the Syrian people.”1047 
Besides the increase of the Governmental control over the cities, by these construction 
                                                 
1045 Accoding to Hasan Kayalı, “he had a close awareness of the important uses of 
communications owing to the experience he had gained in his early military career (prior 
to the Young Turk Rovolution) as inspector of Rumelian railroads. Several years later, in 
the Said Halim Pasha cabinet, he had been entrusted with the portfolio of the ministry of 
public works”. Kayalı, Hasan, Ibid, p.296. 
1046 HHStA, PA 38/366, Ranzi to Burian, “Die Staedtische Verwaltung waehrend des 
Kriegs”, Damascus. 23 May 1915. 
1047 HHStA, PA 38/366, Ranzi to Burian, “Wechsel des hiesigen Generalgoverneurs”, 
Damascus, 21 October 1915. 
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works, Cemal aimed at gaining the sympathy of the Syrians for the Ottoman Empire.1048 
According to the Austrian consul, by these works, Cemal aimed at making Syria as 
developed as Egypt in the eyes of th Syrians.1049 
 Throughout the year 1915, besides the enlargement of the old streets of Damascus, 
Cemal Pasha also opened a new great boulevard called Cemal Pasha Boulevard from the 
center of the city to provide a modern appearance there as well as constructing a public 
garden and again called it with his name.1050 Some houses, shops and warehouses were 
expropriated and demolished to penetrate the dead end streets. A commission was 
established to confiscate and pull down these buildings purchasing them from their owners 
with a value defined by the same commission. The owners took a payment record 
(mazbata) from the Governorate for the payment of the price of their estates.1051 In the 
same year, Cemal constructed a boulevard in Jaffa, which was 800 m. in length and 35 m. 
in width.1052 Cemal reported to Enver that Birüssebi was transformed into a town with all 
its buildings,1053 which was built by Abdülhamid II as an entirely modern city to control 
the Bedouins in the region. The name of the main park in that city was changed as Cemal 
Pasha Parkı after the arrival of the Pasha at Syria.1054 Similarly, to set his own seal on 
                                                 
1048 According to the unpublished memoirs of an architect, Mehmet Nihat Nigisberk, 
who worked under Cemal in Syria, it was a government policy to gain the sympathy of the 
Arabs by the construction works. For details, see: Cengizkan, Ali, “Mehmet Nihat 
Nigisberk’in Katkıları, Evkaf İdaresi ve Mimar Kemalettin”, in Cengizkan, Ali, Mimar 
Kemalettin ve Çağı, Ankara: TMMOB, 2009. 
1049 HHStA, PA 38/371, Ranzi to Czernin, “Der Abschied Djemal Pasha’s von Syrien”, 
Damascus, 17 February 1918. 
1050 Cemal to Enver, 27 September 1917, Arşiv Belgeleriyle Ermeni Faaliyetleri, 
ATASE Yayınları, Ankara: 2007, p. 698; PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 13, Deutsche Palaestina 
Bank Beirut to von Rosenberg, “Bericht für das Jahr 1915”, Beirut, 29 April 1916. 
1051 For its implementation in Beirut, see: PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 13, Deutsche 
Palaestina Bank Beirut to von Rosenberg, “Bericht für das Jahr 1915”, Beirut, 29 April 
1916; for the reflections in the whole of the Syrian provinces, see: Ruppin, Ibid, p. 339. 
1052 Cemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 229. 
1053 Cemal to Enver, 27 September 1917, Arşiv Belgeleriyle Ermeni Faaliyetleri, 
ATASE Yayınları, Ankara: 2007, p. 698. 
1054 Luz Nimrod, “The Re-making of Beersheba: Winds of Modernization in the Late 
Ottoman Sultanate”, in Ottoman Reform and the Muslim Regeneration: Studies in Honor 
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Syria, Cemal ordered the troops, who built fountains in the context of the preparations for 
the conquest of Egypt, to write that tablet: “Voyager! It is Cemal Pasha the Great and the 
Pious who built this fountain with the help of Allah to quench your thirst”.1055 By these 
enterprises, he wanted to be mentioned as the founder of the modern Syria, similar to the 
position of Mustafa Kemal in Turkey. 
 However, during the construction works some problems occurred between the 
Government and the owners of the expropriated buildings. The appreciated values of these 
properties by the commission were, indeed, far lower than their real worth. The owners 
were paid their money with a period of delay, reaching sometimes to one year. Because of 
the devaluation of the paper money, the owners had to sell off their payment records 
[mazbata] in underrated value reaching to the proportion of 20, 50 and even 55 percent. 
When considered the hiring incomes of these buildings, according to the report of the 
German Palestinian Bank in Beirut for the year 1915, their economic losses could not be 
easily reparable.1056 In September 1916, Talat had to warn Azmi Bey, the Governor of 
Beirut, to obey the regulations of the Constitution while performing the expropriations, to 
pay the prices of the properties in advance.1057 Similarly, in October 1917, the reports of 
the inspectors stated “the Governor of Beirut Azmi Bey made many depredations and 
destructions in defiance of the law of expropriation to construct streets”. According to 
                                                                                                                                                    
of Butrus Abu-Manneh, Itzchak Weissmann and Fruma Zachs (eds.), I.B. Tauris, London 
and Newyork: 2005, p. 196. 
1055 Von Kressenstein, Ibid, p. 109. 
1056 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 13, Deutsche Palaestina Bank Beirut to von Rosenberg, 
“Bericht für das Jahr 1915”, Beirut, 29 April 1916; the Spanish consul in Jerusalem wrote 
these remarks in his diaries regarding the way that the construction works were conducted: 
“Yesterday Raphael [his dragoman] and I visited the new major of Jerusalem, Mr. 
Ertogrul, who showed us, with an air of triumph, the plans for a new road stretching from 
the Jaffa gate to el Haram al-Sharif, from the next to the walls of Mount Zion and for the 
asphalting of Jaffa road. The good man told us that he now has 2.000 Turkish Pounds to 
begin. But what idea must this man have of what it takes to do works like that? The road 
alone will cost more than three million Pesetas. It could be, however, that the mayor is 
right if the Turkish system of not paying the expropriations, nor the workers, nor anything 
all, continues. So if you have to knock down a house? Well, knock it down and do not pay 
a cent to the owners”: Ballobar, Ibid, p. 70. 
1057 BOA, DH.İ.UM.EK. 21/39, Talat to Azmi, 12 Eylül 1332 [25 September 1916]. 
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these reports Talat had to issue a warning to Azmi Bey, and repeated his warning about the 
obedience of the law during the expropriations.1058 
The situation was not different in the other cities.1059 In Damascus, during the 
works to widen the available roads in 1917, three buildings of a Damascene were deemed 
as one building, and paid hereunder [buna göre] by the Provincial Consul [Vilayet Meclisi]. 
However, upon the petition of the property owner,1060 this judgement was reversed by the 
Council of the State [Şura-yı Devlet], and each building was evaluated separately.1061  
Similar cases occurred in Aleppo, too. In that city, the state officials and urban notables 
founded a company called Terakkiyat-ı Nafia-yı Umraniye [the Development of the 
Civilizatory Public Works] to expropriate the properties for the construction of the city in 
return for participating receipt. It is clearly understood from the telegram of the Governor 
of Aleppo that the property owners demanded from the Central Government in Istanbul to 
relief their victimhood emerged by these activities.1062 Apart from that, the economic life 
in the town was considerably influenced in a negative way. Those expropriations also 
contributed to the increase of the shop rents. As a result, a series of small merchants had to 
clear out their shops, and transferred their goods to their houses, and thus, they had to 
accept a hardly acceptable economic damage.1063  
   In the beginning of the year 1916, the process of the modernization of the Syrian 
cities came to a more systematic state with the employment of the foreign academics, who 
were expert on restoration and architecture by Cemal Pasha. In this sense, firstly, he 
                                                 
1058 It is worth to mention that Azmi Bey was not unique, the Governors of many cities 
were punised because of their violation of the expropriation law. For details, see: BOA, 
DH.İ.UM.EK. 39/96, Talat to the Governorates, 12 Eylül 1332 [25 September 1916]. 
1059 Ruppin writes that the similar situations came into question [söz konusu olmak] for 
the other provinces Ruppin, Ibid, p. 339. 
1060 BOA, ŞD. 2321/9, Ministry of Interior to Sadaret, 16 Mayıs 1332 [29 May 1916]. 
1061 BOA, BEO. 4474/335482, Sadaret to Ministry of Interior, 10 Haziran 1333 [10 
June 1917]. 
1062 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 574/100, Bedri to Talat, Aleppo, 28 Kanun-ı Evvel 1333 [28 
December 1917]. 
1063 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 13, Deutsche Palaestina Bank Beirut to von Rosenberg, 
“Bericht für das Jahr 1915”, Beirut, 29 April 1916. 
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imported the Swiss academics Maximilian Zürcher, the old director of the German Fine 
Arts Academy in Rome, as The General Director of the Public Works [İnşaat Umum 
Müdürü] to the body of Cemal’s Arrmy.1064 He woud prepare elaborate plans to construct 
and renew the principal Syrian provinces “with the emphasis on imparting a sense of 
grandeur to the Ottoman precinct of Damascus”.1065 
 Within the framework of his plan, a new boulevard was constructed in the Western 
suburb [Vorstadt] of Damascus, and was denominated as Cemal Pasha Boulevard. By 
pulling down the older buildings around the boulevard, an 800 m. long promenade was 
created on both sides of the pavement of this boulevard 20 m. in width for both sides, 
which was decorated with the central plantation, the tailored boskets, water basins.1066 The 
Hijaz Railroad station was located at the west end of the boulevard. Cemal asked the 
German architect Wulzinger to prepare  
“a detailed design based on a sketch conceived by the Pasha for the square in front of the 
station: a fabulous fountain centerpiece ‘which  should be complete with cascades and 
lions, one with a paw resting on a Turkish flag’. Poor Wulzinger produced a design that 
failed to provide these essential details and the project was never realized.”1067 
In April 1916, in Jerusalem, the highway between Ramla and Jerusalem was excellently 
cared for. The edge of town was embellished with a new Cemal Pasha avenue and new 
demolitions were made in the squares, although, according to the Spanish consul, some 
arbitrary acts were committed in making of these improvements.1068 In the beginning of 
July, Cemal mentioned to Ballobar, the Spanish consul, that he was planning to build a 
park on Mount Zion tearing down the houses and to make an avenue from the Franciscan 
School to the Damascus Gate.1069 
                                                 
1064 Cemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 229; Erden, Ibid, p. 143; it is worth to mention that, in the 
English edition of his memoires, Cemal didn’t write anything about activities of his public 
works in Syria. 
1065 Burns, Ross, Damascus A History, Routledge, London and Newyork:2005, p. 265. 
1066 Von Kiesling, Hans, Ibid, p. 93; for a reference to the confiscation of these 
buildings, see. BOA, DH. UMVM. 102/52, Tahsin to Talat, 5 Mayıs 1334 [5 May 1918]. 
1067 Burns, Ibid, p. 265. 
1068 Ballobar, Ibid, p. 93. 
1069 Ballobar, Ibid, p. 102. 
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Besides the works to enhance the penetrability of the cities, Cemal dealt with the 
development of the countryside at the same time. He stated one of his reports to Enver that, 
his activities of construction in the Sinai Desert, which was explained in details in Chapter 
1 on the Canal Expedition, didn’t only aimed the military considerations, the public 
improvements of those regions were also intended and achieved.1070 In the same vein, 
towards the end of the year 1916, he launched the ferry traffic across the Dead Sea, which 
facilitated the grain traffic from the agricultural areas in the east of the Dead Sea.1071 The 
ships were carrying 100-150 tones of goods and foodstuffs daily from the east shore to the 
west.1072 Meanwhile, the biggest ship on the Dead Sea was called “Büyük Cemal” [Cemal 
the Great]. In January 1917, Cemal charged a German officer to investigate about how the 
potential of the Dead Sea for transportation could be improved. He proposed to use the 
small boats in a more effective way and the construction of the convenient seaports, which 
would make the bigger ship transportation more productive. The boats, which would travel 
there, would be fabricated partly in Jaffa, Alexandretta, Haifa and Djerablus and partly in 
Jideida and Jerusalem. According to the remarks of this officer, with the betterment of the 
ship transportation on the Dead Sea, the travel between the south-east of the Dead Sea and 
its North would be considerably facilitated, shortening to 3.5 hours.1073 Apart from that, 
Cemal also dealt with the improvement of agriculture in the region. In that regard, in 
February 1917, Cemal demanded hydraulic engineers from German Foreign Ministry to 
construct water channels for the increase of the agricultural productivity in Jordan Valley 
and in the fruitful plains of Bekaa.1074 
                                                 
1070 Cemal to Enver, 27 September 1917, Arşiv Belgeleriyle Ermeni Faaliyetleri, 
ATASE Yayınları, Ankara: 2007, p. 698. 
1071 Tamari, Salim, “Jerusalem’s Ottoman Modernity: The Times and Lives of Wasif 
Jawhariyyeh”, in Jerusalem Quarterly, 2000/9, p. 23. 
1072 Cemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 232; Wasıf Jawhari was among the soldiers who was assigned 
as the Ottoman soldier to serve in  grain transportation between the east and west shores of 
the Dead Sea. For details, see: Tamari, Salim, “Jerusalem…”, p. 23. 
1073 BA-MA, RM 5/2322, Krumbolz to Chef des Admiralstabs der Marine, “Bericht 
über die Einrichtung des Wasserverkehrs auf dem Toten Meer zwischen Jideida und Ghor 
el-Mazra”, Jerusalem, 5 February 1917. 
1074 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 14, Loytved to Bethmann-Hollweg, Damascus, 3 February 
1917. 
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6.3.2. Restoration of the Historical Monuments 
 
Another remarkable activity carried out by Cemal was the restoration of the 
monuments. Towards the end of the year 1916, he launched an initiative for the restoration 
of the monuments in Syria from the Byzantine, Islam and Turkish (pre-Ottoman and 
Ottoman) periods. According to Wiegand, Cemal was aiming by the undertaking to 
awaken an understanding of past among the people.1075 For this purpose, he assigned 
Theodor Wiegand, a German Officer and an expert on the monuments, as the head of the 
Command for Monument Protection [Denkmaelschutzkommando], which was created to 
unearth, protect and restore the mentioned monuments.1076 The aims of the undertaking 
were described by Cemal Pasha with the following words: 
“1. The creation of a reliable inspection agency for the preservation of the monuments; 2. 
The pull-down of the new buildings inside and around the old buildings, cleansing the 
ruins, and to prohibit people to use the ruins as the building materials; 3. The betterment of 
the access roads to the ruin sites and the creation of the suitable accommodation to 
facilitate the visit of the domestic and foreign [tourists].”1077 
Wiegand made an inventory work with his team about the monuments of Syria. They 
prepared two albums. The first one was published in Berlin by the support of Cemal Pasha 
from the budget of the Army.1078 Besides that, in 1920, another publication was made 
                                                 
1075 Wiegand, Ibid, p. 198-202; see also: Kayalı, “Wartime Regional Integration”, p. 
304. 
1076 Wiegand to His Wife, 1 November 1916, in Wiegand, Theodor, Halbmond in die 
letzten Viertel: Archaelologische Reiseberichte, Verlag Bruckann, München: 1970, p. 198; 
Von Kress didn’t join in this meeting. However, according to his memoires, he persuaded 
Cemal suggesting him to employ the scholars like Wiegand in his retinue [maiyet], as was 
done by Napoleon during his campaign against Egypt: Von Kressenstein, Ibid, p. 198. 
1077 Ahmed Cemal Pasha, “İfade-i Meram”, Teşrin-i Evvel 1333; “Vorwort”, October 
1917, in Suriye ve Filistin ve Garbi Arabistan Abidat-ı Atikası / Alte Denkmaeler aus 
Syrien, Palastina und Westarabien, Verlag von Georg Reimer, Berlin: 1918.  
1078 Suriye ve Filistin ve Garbi Arabistan Abidat-ı Atikası / Alte Denkmaeler aus Syrien, 
Palastina und Westarabien, Verlag von Georg Reimer, Berlin: 1918; there is no name of 
write on the cover page of the book. However, Cemal Pasha’s name is written as the 
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about the activities of this command in Berlin and Leipzig with the foreword of Von 
Kress.1079 These books not only include informations about the monuments, but also give 
some details about the geography of the region, the structure of the valleys and mountains 
etc. The first inventory book can be evaluated as an attempt by Cemal Pasha to increase the 
“legibility” of these lands that he was ruling, most probably to penetrate it in a more 
sophisticated way, and to prevent the illegal trafficking of the monuments to Europe.1080 
 Besides those inventory works, the Command for the Monument Protection made 
some restorations of the monuments from the Byzantine, Arabic and Turkish times. The 
interventions of Zürcher and Wiegand’s team saved the ruins from the Byzantine times 
from a total destruction.1081 Similarly, the measures taken by Cemal Pasha forestalled the 
decay of the Lodge [Tekke] and Mosque of Sinanie, which is an example of the harmony of 
the Arab and Turkish ideas of art.1082 Selimiye Mosque in Damascus, one of the most 
outstanding examples of the Ottoman architecture, again mixed with the Arab style, was 
also restored by the initiative of Cemal Pasha.1083 The Vakıf Ministry sent money for the 
restoration of Selimiye Mosque and Süleymaniye Almshouse [imarethane].1084 
                                                                                                                                                    
sponsor of the book, but the study was prepared by Wiegand and his friends; Cemal Pasha; 
Ibid, p. 235. 
1079 Wiegand, Kressenstein, Schubart, Watzinger, Werth and Wulzinger, 
Wissenschaftliche Veröffentlichungen des Deutsch-Türkischen Denkmalschutz-
kommandos, Walter de Gruyter&Co., Berlin and Leibzig: 1920. 
1080 Kiesling praises Cemal Pasha in his book that he prevented the illegal trafficking of 
the valuable stones belonging to the monuments of the Islamic period. For details, see: 
Von Kiesling, Ibid, p. 66.  
1081 Kiesling, Ibid, p. 36. 
1082 Kiesling, Ibid. p. 45; Ross Burns notes that the Mosque and Tekkie Sinanie was 
built by the renowned Ottoman architect Mimar Sinan, stating that many elements were 
borrowed from the local Syrian repertoire. For details, see: Burns, Ross, The Monuments of 
Syria: A Guide, I.B. Tauris, London and Newyork: 2009, p. 130. 
1083 Kiesling, Ibid, p. 78; Ross Burns writes in his guide that “Its style, though more 
distinctly Syrian, blends well with Sinan’s work”. See: Burns, Monuments, p. 131. 
1084 6.000 ltq. was sent by the Vakuf Ministry to Cemal Pasha for the restoration of the 
Selimiye Mosque and Süleymaniye : BOA, DH.ŞFR. 63/296, Şeyhülislam to Cemal Pasha, 
28 Eylül 1332 [11 October 1916]. 
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During the wartime, a French newspaper Journal de Genéve attacked Cemal of 
leaving the monuments of the Islam-Arab period to ruin.1085 However, according to Von 
Kiesling, who wrote a book on the restoration activities in Syria during the War, “it is a 
pity that the influence of Cemal Pasha didn’t reach that Islamic example of architecture, 
which belonged to the pre-Turkish period”. He continues that nobody cared before about 
the cleavages on the roof and between the Walls of the monuments belonging the pre-
Turkish Islamic period. Similarly, if Cemal hadn’t intervene in these buildings, their tile 
decorations on the inner walls would be sold by the antiquity merchants with tremendous 
prices.1086 It is understood from an Ottoman document that Cemal Pasha confiscated the 
buildings around the Umayyad Mosque and the Aziziye Mosque. The Vakıf Ministry sent 
100.000 qurush for this work to Cemal.1087 It was most probably to clean the surroundings 
of these historical buildings.  
Cemal Pasha’s projects regarding the transformation of the structures of the cities 
and the restoration of the monuments in Syria also indicates that he didn’t make such a 
separation. Rather he strove to increase the existence of state in Syria with its buildings. He 
summarizes his plans in this sense as follows: 
“[in] Jerusalem: 1. cleaning the walls of the Aqsa Mosque from some outbuildings, 
spoiling the old magnificence of it and, removing the whitewashes covering the perfect 
stone walls [of the Mosque]; 2. Repairing the citadel of Jerusalem [Tower of David]1088 
preservıng its authenticity [aslına uygun olarak] to transform as a local museum; 3. 
Construction of a Government building and a small palace juxtaposed to the citadel, and 
building of a terrace adjacent to the citadel; 4. Drying of the big puddle [burka] in 
Jerusalem polluting the air of the town and transforming of it into a perfect market hall; 5. 
Transforming of the squares and drains to their authentic situations. 
                                                 
1085 Wiegand, Halbmond, p. 237. 
1086 Kiesling, Ibid, p. 66. 
1087 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 63/298, Şeyhülislam to Cemal Pasha, 28 Nisan 1332 [11 May 
1916].  
1088 Built to strengthen a strategically weak point in the Old City's defenses, the citadel 
that stands today was constructed during the 2nd century BC and subsequently destroyed 
and rebuilt by, in succession, the Christian, Muslim, Mamluk, and Ottoman conquerors of 
Jerusalem. Finally, it was rebuilt by the Ottomans between 1537 and 1541 and added a 
minaret. The name "Tower of David" is due to Byzantine Christians who believed the site 
to be the palace of King David. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tower_of_David. 
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[in] Damascus: 1. The protection of the citadel of Damascus1089 of being ruined and the 
transformation of its inner square into a promenade, the reconstruction of its external 
drains; 2. The extension of the boulevard constructed by my order… to the Circa 
meadowland and the construction of a public garden.1090 
He also made it prepared the detailed plans of the buildings, which was thought to build on 
this boulevard, such as a public bathroom [hamam], an hotel, the governmental buildings 
such as courthouse, post and telegraph office and municipality etc. Finally, the 
construction of fountains, cascades and terraces for the park.1091 
[in] Beirut: 1. perfect stairs to come up directly from the Beirut port to the Government 
Office; 2. A palace, which would be constructed in Re’s-i Beyrut; 3. Post and Telegraph 
Office 
[in] Aleppo: 1. A perfect project to save the citadel1092 of being ruined and restoration of 
some parts of it; 2. [the Construction of] Aleppo Government Office; 3 [and] a Post and 
Telegraph Office”1093 
It can be inferred from these projects that, one of the most important aims of Cemal Pasha 
in Syria was to enhance the sense of the existence of the state authority among the Syrian 
citizens of the Empire by the way of the increase of the visibility of the Government in the 
urban spaces of the towns. On the other hand, looking at his restoration plans and 
activities, it can be concluded that Cemal Pasha endeavored to make the historical legacy 
visible in the cities belonging to the Byzantine, Islam-Arab and the Ottoman times, which 
can be interpreted as the essential parts of the identities of the Syrian peoples.  
                                                 
1089 The location of the current citadel was first fortified in 1076 by the Turkman 
warlord Atsiz bin Uvak, although it is possible but not proven that a citadel stood on this 
place in the Hellenistic and Roman periods. After the assassination of Atsiz bin Uvak, the 
project was finished by the Seljuq ruler Tutush I. The emirs of the subsequent Burid and 
Zengid dynasties carried out modifications and added new structures to it. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Citadel_of_Damascus 
1090 Cemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 230. 
1091 Cemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 230-231. 
1092 It is considered to be one of the oldest and largest castles in the world. Usage of the 
Citadel hill dates back at least to the middle of the 3rd millennium BC. Subsequently 
occupied by many civilizations including the Greeks, Byzantines, Ayyubids and Mamluks, 
the majority of the construction as it stands today is thought to originate from the Ayyubid 
period. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Citadel_of_Aleppo. 
1093 Cemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 231. 
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 The Austrian Consul in Damascus interpreted the aims of Cemal Pasha public 
works and restorations in the Syrian cities as an attempt to elevate these lands to the level 
of Egypt. He tried to demonstrate to the Syrians that their Government was as capable as 
that of Great Britain in terms of civilizatory respect, and the Ottoman Government was 
able to achieve in Syria what Great Britain did in Egypt to improve it. However, the 
Consul added, since his program of construction didn’t continue, a deep division emerged 
between newly constructed parts of the cities and the old ones.1094 
Cemal’s projects for the structural embellishment of the Syrian cities and the 
restoration of the old buildings required huge funds and extensive demolition of the 
buildings. Ali Fuad Erden, his Chief of General Staff, thought that those works could only 
be done in times of peace, not during the War and they didn’t make any contribution to the 
defense of the country.1095 Similarly, a German Officer under Cemal’s command thought it 
as his duty to report his commander’s waste of expenditure for the public works under 
Zürcher’s supervision in the middle of the War.1096 In addition, as explained above, the 
owners of the demolished buildings resented Cemal. As a result, all these projects created 
dissatisfaction among his bureaucrats and the property owners rather than gaining 
sympathy.1097 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1094 HHStA, PA 38/371, Ranzi to Czernin, “Der Abschied Djemal Pasha’s von Syrien”, 
Damascus, 17 February 1918. 
1095 Erden, Ibid.  
1096 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 13, Köppen to the War Ministry, Damascus, 26 September 
1916. 
1097 HHStA, PA 38/370, Ranzi to Czernin, “Zwei Reformaktionen Djemal Pashas”, 
Damascus, 5 September 1917. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
THE DRUZE AND THE BEDOUIN UNDER CEMAL 
PASHA’S REGIME 
 
 
 
Quite the reverse of the city-dwellers of Syria we analyzed in the previous chapters, 
unsettled and nomadic components of Syrian society enjoyed a particular freedom under 
the regime of Cemal Pasha. Yet, with the beginning of the Tanzimat reforms, the Ottoman 
Government had endeavored to annex the Bedouins and the Druzes to the Ottoman 
administration and, by the outbreak of the World War I, some improvements had been 
obtained in this sense, although the Bedouin and the Druze communities protected their 
distinctive structures to a considerable extent.1098 However, Cemal didn’t maintain this 
policy, feeling anxiety about their rebellion, which would put him in a difficult position 
                                                 
1098 For a detailed analysis of the Ottoman policy of centralization towards the Bedouin 
and the Druze of Syria in the Tanzimat era, see: Ma’oz, Moshe, Ottoman Reform in Syria 
and Palestine, 1840-1861, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968, pp. 108-150; For an 
analysis of the Ottoman policy of the Bedouin tribes from 1850 to the end of the Ottoman 
rule in the case of Transjordan, see: Rogan, Eugene L., Frontiers of the State in the Late 
Ottoman Empire,1850-1921, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999; Abdulhamid 
II endeavored to increase the allegiance of the Bedouin tribes by the way of Education. For 
that purpose, he opened a school called Aşiret Mektebi for them. For an analysis of this 
school, see: Rogan, Eugene L., “Aşiret Mektebi: Abdulhamid II’s School for Tribes (1892-
1907)”, IJMES 28/1, February, 1996, p. 83-107. 
302 
 
militarily in the war circumstances, and thus, implemented the traditional imperial policy 
permitting them a large freedom of action in return for their loyalty.  
Although the Ottoman tribal policy of Syria in the pre-war period is more or less 
analyzed1099, the Ottoman policy of the Bedouin and the Druze during Cemal’s rule in 
Syria is not examined deservingly. The only exception of this is some summaries in the 
study of Rogan regarding the policy of Cemal Pasha before and after the outbreak of the 
Sharif’s revolt for the tribes in Transjordan. In this chapter, however, Cemal’s policy 
toward these two significant non-urban elements of Syrian society will be analyzed in the 
light of the documents from the various Western and Ottoman Archives. In this regards, 
the reasons and consequences of Cemal’s policy of the Druze will be discussed; Following 
that the relations between the Bedouin tribes and tribal dynasties, and the Ottoman Empire 
will be dealt with: 
 
 
 
7.1.The Druze: Freedom of Action in Return for Loyalty 
 
 
Being one of the biggest tribal communities in Syria, the Druze community in Syria 
belonged to the Shiite order of Islam, it was formed during the first half of the 5th century 
of Hijra, the 11th A.D. It came into existence as a result of the religious call from Cairo in 
the reign of the sixth Fatimid Caliph, Al-Hakim Bi-Amr Allah.1100 From the very early 
                                                 
1099 For a detailed analysis of the Ottoman policy of centralization towards the Bedouin 
and the Druze of Syria in the Tanzimat era, see: Ma’oz,Ibid; For an analysis of the 
Ottoman policy of the Bedouin tribes from 1850 to the end of the Ottoman rule in the case 
of Transjordan, see: Rogan, Eugene L., Frontiers of the State in the Late Ottoman 
Empire,1850-1921; Abdulhamid II endeavored to increase the allegiance of the Bedouin 
tribes by the way of Education. For that purpose, he opened a school called Aşiret Mektebi 
fort hem. For an analysis of this school, see: Rogan, Eugene L., “Aşiret Mektebi: 
Abdulhamid II’s School for Tribes (1892-1907)”, IJMES 28/1, February, 1996, p. 83-107. 
1100 Abu-Izzeddin, Nejla M., The Druzes: A New Study of Their History, Faith and 
Society, Leiden:Brill, 1984, p.1; for further information about the Druze religion also see: 
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times of their emergence, the Druzes subsisted their lives with agriculture dispersed 
between impenetrable mountainous areas of Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria.1101 Their 
lifestyle and religion considerably differed from the Muslims of Syria. Because of their 
productive agriculture, during the WWI, they played a crucial role for the provisioning of 
both the civil population and the Army. Therefore, gaining the support of the Druze 
showed a crucial importance during the wartime. 
As explained in Chapter 3, in the beginning of the war, especially among the 
Lebanese Druze, some tendencies favoring Great Britain prevailed, since their interests in 
the Lebanese autonomous system had been upheld by that power against the Maronite 
majority for half a century.1102 However, according to the report of the Governor of Beirut, 
the Druze sympathy to Great Britain was rather outwardly, but at heart they were 
sympathizing with the Ottoman Government because of the religious ties between the 
two.1103 Another factor, which probably relieved the Ottoman authorities about the Druzes, 
was their politically pragmatist character. According to the assessment of the 
representative of German Consul in Syria, the Druzes could change their loyalty easily 
from one authority to another when the dominant power over their lands changed, on 
condition that their freedom would be guaranteed.1104 It can be inferred from this 
evaluation that if Cemal Pasha had restricted their freedom, the Druzes would be more 
open to the British propaganda throughout the War. 
                                                                                                                                                    
Hogarth, D.G. and Gertrude L. Bell, Note on Druses, Cairo: 1918, Government Press, 
pp.2-8. 
1101 Abu-Izzeddin, Ibid, p. 3; The Druzes were distributed into three isolated groups, of 
which the most numerous inhabits Jebel Druze, east of Jordan (about 55.000); the second, 
the towns of Shuf and Ment in Lebanon (about 50.000); the third, the towns of Hasbeya, 
Rasheya, Wadi al-Ajem, Homs, Hamadiyeh and Salimiyah in Anti-Lebanon and Hermon 
(about 45.000). for details see: Hogarth, D.G. and Gertrude L. Bell, Note on Druses, Cairo: 
1918, Government Press, p. 1.  
1102 PRO, FO 371/2143, Cumberbatch to Mallet, Beirut. 15 September 1914. 
1103 BOA, DH.EUM.4.Şb. 1/4, Bekir Sami to Talat, 20 Ağustos 1330 [2 September 
1914] 
1104 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.17, Ziemke to Hertling, Damascus, 17 May 1918. 
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Because of the difficult character of the Druze to discipline, the Druze community 
had been exempted even in the preceding years of the war from many obligations of the 
Ottoman subjects in comparison to the other communities in the region. The outbreak of 
the war didn’t change the situation in this sense; first of all, they were exempted from the 
military service in the Ottoman Army, although there were 30.000 men in the Druze 
Community fit to bear arms. Moreover, they didn’t pay tithe from their harvests. They 
weren’t a nomadic society, but a farmer society producing wheat, barley, lens and some 
summer fruits.1105 
At this delicate time of War, the Druze societies had to be treated carefully due to 
the fact that they were warriors by birth in character1106, and a rebellion organized or 
supported by them could put the Government militarily in a very difficult position.1107 
Therefore, throughout the whole period of war, both Cemal Pasha and his predecessors 
were very careful about not frustratinig the Druze community. The Governmental activities 
towards them focused on two points: to give them a generous freedom when compared to 
the other religious or tribal communities, and to benefit from their produce, like food and 
animals for the provisioning needs of the Army and the civil population, avoiding any 
action of inducement while dealing with them. 
Indeed, the Government planned to recruit the Druze into the armed service in the 
beginning of the mobilization, both considering the warrior character of that society and 
planning to make them familiar with the State. However, the Druze didn’t accept this 
request, and instead, proposed to be exempted from the military service by payment and to 
provide food for the provisioning of the troops. The Government considered applying 
some coercive measures, but their offers had to be approved for the fear of a Druze 
rebellion.1108 In the same way, the leader of the Druze community in Cebel-i Druze, Yahya 
                                                 
1105 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.17, Ziemke to Hertling, Damascus, 17 May 1918. 
1106 Arslan, Ibid, p. 141; PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.16, Oppenheim to Göppert, 12 
December 1917. 
1107 HHStA, PA 38/363, Ranzi to Berchtold, Damascus, 10 August 1914. 
1108 HHStA, PA 38/363, Ranzi to Berchtold, Damascus, 18 August 1914; PRO, FO 
371/2777, McMahon to FO (transmitting an intelligent returned from Syria), Cairo. 20 
May 1916; Hogarth and Bell, Ibid, p.17-19. 
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Bey el-Atrash came to Damascus with his nephew Nasib to pay court to the Ottoman 
Government on behalf of all the Druzes.1109 Although the Government approached their 
statement of loyalty with suspicion, they had to accept it as such, even if for practical 
reasons.1110  
Similarly, in early September 1914, the highest governmental authorities in Syria –
the Army Commander Zeki Pasha, the Governor of Syria, Hulusi Bey, The Commander of 
the 8th Army Corps, Mersinli Cemal Pasha, the Senator Abdurrahman Bey and Amir Ali 
Pasha, the Vice-President of the Ottoman Parliament, and his son from the celebrated Al-
Jazairi Family- paid a visit to the Druze Sheikhs in Hauran, Deraa and Maan, where the 
Druzes were settled, to gain their support in case of hostility against the “infidels”. The 
leader of the Druzes, Yahya Bey al-Atrash accompanied them throughout the journey. Zeki 
Pasha addressed them as children of the Sultan who would rely upon their loyalty to 
defend their country in case His Majesty’s troops became involved in the war. In this visit, 
a sword of honour, a gold watch inscribed with His Majesty’s name, and a robe of honour, 
were presented to Yahya Bey Atrash and to other Druzes, swords, medals, and robes of 
honours according to each Sheikh’s position and importance. During the visit,  Hulusi Bey 
announced that the Goverment were pleased with the Druzes, and they should henceforth 
be exempt from military service, as forming a Volunteer Corps, to come nobly forward in 
time of need.1111  
In the same visit, the mentioned Governmental authorities visited the Bedouins in 
the neighbourhoods of the Druze and conciliated the feuds between the Druze and those 
Bedouins. In the viewpoint of the Austrian Consul in Damascus, in spite of this 
reconciliation, the Government intended to manipulate the population of the region to use 
them against each others, since they were suspicious about a rebellion of the Druze. 
Therefore, the Government were encouraging the Bedouins hovering between the south of 
                                                 
1109 BOA, DH.EUM.EMN 91/19, Hulusi to Talat, Damascus, 12 Ağustos 1330 [25 
August 1914]. 
1110 HHStA, PA 38/363, Ranzi to Berchtold, Damascus, 3 September 1914; According  
to Hogarth and Bell, The Ottoman Government were prone to believe every report about 
the rising of the Druzes: Hogarth and Bell, Ibid, p. 21. 
1111 PRO, FO 195/2460, Cumberbatch to Mallet, Damascus. 10 September 1914; 
HHStA, PA 38/363, Ranzi to Berchtold, Damascus, 10 September 1914. 
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Syria and Inner Arabia to return to their pastures in southern Syria to use them as a 
counterbalance against the Druze in the event of a Druze uprising. Similarly, the consul 
continues that the Government calculated to balance the Christians of Lebanon with the 
Druzes of Hebron District in the event of their rebellion.1112 
The policy of handling the Druzes with kid gloves didn’t change with the 
appointment of Cemal Pasha as the Governor General of Syria. When Cemal Pasha arrived 
in Syria every fraction of the Muslims in Syria advised him to strike a blow to the Druzes 
to settle them down during the War. Nevertheles, Cemal acted differently considering that 
it would be a mistake to antagonize that warrior people towards the Government. Cemal 
evaluated his army as capable to suppres any Druze revolt in Lebanon, but a similar revolt 
in Hauran could result with serious damage to his military situation in Syria. Therefore, 
Cemal preferred to make them as free as possible from the Governmental tasks.1113 For 
example, the Government made it obligatory for the other tribal and settled farmes to give 
1/8 of their harvests as tithe, and to sell 2/8 of it to the Army for the needs of the army. 
This implementation was not expanded to the Druze. As a practice, which inherited from 
the times of Ayan in the 18th century, the Government delivered the right of tax collection 
to the Druze chiefs, who collected a fraction of the real amount. The Druze farmers could 
sell their produce to the efficient tradesmen with only gold money bidding the highest 
price. Besides that, Cemal Pasha disbursed plenty of gold to the Druze Sheikhs to gain 
their support. Like his predecessor, in early times of his governorate, Cemal Pasha tried to 
take military support from the Druzes. For that reason, he welcomed the fatwa of the 
Babü’l-Meshihat regarding the Druze as members of Islam. But, he abandoned this project 
because of their reluctance for this job.1114 
                                                 
1112 PRO, FO 195/2460, Cumberbatch to Mallet, Damascus. 10 September 1914. 
1113 The English version of Cemal’s memoires doesn’t include a sectionon the Druzes. 
For further information about his evaluations on Druzes see the Turkish version: Cemal 
Paşa, Ibid, p.177-180. 
1114 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 515/14, Cemal to Talat,15 Mart 1332[28 March 1916]; HHStA, PA 
38/366, Ransiz to Burian, Damascus, 15 February 1915; PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.17, 
Ziemke to Hertling, Damascus, 17 May 1918; However, Cemal Pasha denies his intention 
of benefaction from the Druzes militarily, and states that he never considered to use them 
as a military force. For further information see : Cemal Paşa, Ibid., p.177. 
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He tried to make the Druze community come near the state as much as possible 
with the smoother methods in comparison to that implemented against the urban 
population. For this aim, they employed the Druze volunteers in the Army. As was 
expounded before, in his visit to the Druze district, the Governor Hulusi Bey had requested 
from the Druzes to create volunteer troops. They accepted this offer, and sent a brigade of 
150 men to Damascus.1115 As a privilege provided to them, the Druzes of Hauran were the 
only volunteers group in Cemal Pasha’s Army. In the viewpoint of the Austrian Consul, by 
this way, the Government aimed at the rehabilitation of the relations between the Druze 
and the State.1116  
Cemal was quite tolerant to the Druze even when he found open demonstrations 
proving the unfaithfulness of them, which could be evaluated as the most sensitive issue 
for him in Syria. For example, when the documents in the French Consulates were 
confiscated, a proof of “treason” for the Druze leader Yahya el-Atrash had been found. 
That was a commitment letter, and in that document the leader of the Druzes had promised 
to support France in case of its occupation of Syria. Indeed, this document was prepared 
when El-Atrash was in Exile in Rhodes, and he had to sign the mentioned document 
reluctantly in return for his release from Rhodes, when Italy invaded the island. Although 
Cemal Pasha didn’t know about the truth of the commitment letter, he didn’t highlight this 
document, not to arise the reactions of the Druzes.1117  
The outbreak of the Sharifian revolt made Cemal Pasha more careful about his 
treatment of the Druze community. His visit to the Druze region in Hauran in the middle of 
1916, after the outbreak of the Sharif’s revolt in Mecca, could be deemed one of the most 
important actions to gain the sympathy of the Druzes on behalf of the Ottoman Empire. 
With this visit, for first time in the history of the Empire, an Ottoman minister visited the 
Druzes. He was well-accepted by the Druze chiefs, and the most prominent Druze Sheikhs 
accompanied him throughout this journey.1118 With this visit, he aimed at the prevention of 
                                                 
1115 HHStA, PA 38/366, Ransiz to Burian, Damascus, 6 February 1915. 
1116 HHStA, PA 38/366, Ransiz to Burian, Damascus, 15 February 1915. 
1117 Arslan, Ibid, p. 46. 
1118 HHStA, PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian, “Der Besuch des Oberkommandierenden 
Djemal Pasha im Druzengebirge”, Damascus, 15 August 1916. 
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any provocation of Great Britain and Sharif’s men to incorporate the Druze into Sharif’s 
movement. For that reason, Cemal Pasha delivered plenty of gold, decoration, honor gifts 
and rifles. With the remarks of Cemal, he “prevented with this visit the designs of the 
seditionists, who applied every means to make the Druzes revolt, for years.”1119  
In the same way, Cemal Pasha demanded the appointment of powerful and capable 
kaymakams to the Druze towns for an effective struggle with the British and Sharifian 
propaganda. By the same token, he requested the appointment of the prominent and trusted 
Syrians, who had influence over the Druzes, as the mudirs of the Druze nahiyes provided 
that to be dismissed after the War.1120 It can be inferred from the telegram of the Governor 
of Syria, which was sent approximately one year after Cemal’s application to Istanbul for 
the mentioned appointments, that the requested kaymakams weren’t sent to the Druze 
towns yet.1121  
Applying educational tools was another method implemented by Cemal to gain the 
Druze community for the Ottoman. Becoming very well aware of the transforming nature 
of education, Cemal Pasha sent the sons of the prominent Druze chiefs to Istanbul for 
education. By this way, he aimed at gaining the loyalty of the Druze community. Besides 
that, it was not difficult for Cemal to estimate that the graduation of the sons of the 
mentioned chiefs in Istanbul would make the next generation of the Druze chiefs pro-
Ottoman and would contribute to the integration of the Druze with the Imperial system. In 
the viewpoint of the Austrian Consul of Damascus, that was the reason preventing the 
Druze society from cooperation with the Bedouins in the rebellion of Hauran, which was 
commenced in October 1916 as a reaction to the military requisitions.1122 
After the arrival of Faysal’s troops in southern Syria and the deployment of the 
British troops around Gaza, the situation of the Druzes became more of a crucial issue for 
                                                 
1119 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 528/52, Cemal to Talat, 30 Temmuz 1332 [11 August 1916]. 
1120 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 528/52, Cemal to Talat, 30 Temmuz 1332 [11 August 1916]. 
1121 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 558/50, Tahsin to Talat, Damascus. 28 Haziran 1333 [28 June 
1917]. 
1122 HHStA, PA 38/369, From Ranzi to Burian,"Beendigung des Aufruhrs im Hauran", 
Damascus. 1 November 1916; HHStA,PA 38/371, Ranzi to Burian, “Die Haltung der 
Drüsen”, Damascus, 6 June 1918; BOA, DH.ŞFR. 528/64, Cemal to Talat, 21 Temmuz 
1332 [3 August 1916]. 
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the progress of the battles in Palestine. In the middle of 1917, Sharif’s men came to the 
Druze district to persuade their chiefs for the organization of a general rebellion with the 
Bedouin tribes in the region against the Ottoman Government. However, according to the 
report of the Governor of Damascus, Tahsin Bey, both the Druze chiefs and most of the 
leading tribes in the region remained loyal to the Ottoman Empire in the highest degree.1123 
Following that, a British mission with 200 Indian cavalry came to the leader of the 
Druze, Selim el-Atrash, through Basra-Najaf-Djof-Kaf, and offered 200.000 Lst and 
100.000 rifles provided that he rebelled against the Ottomans. The Druze chiefs held a 
meeting to discuss this issue. Selim el-Atrash and most of the Druze chiefs advocated that 
being with the Ottoman Empire would be more beneficial for the Druzes, and the other 
choice would deteriorate their situation. Few others championed taking side with the 
British, but their ideas weren’t welcome among the Druze chiefs. Selim el-Atrash, son of 
Yahya, had informed Cemal Pasha at the same time about the event. Hereupon, Selim was 
invited to Damascus, and honored by Cemal Pasha with the title of Pasha.1124 
Cemal’s policy of the Druze was maintained by his successors after his departure 
from Syria. Especially following the British capture of Jerusalem, sustaining good relations 
with the Druze community giving them a large freedom appeared one of the most 
important objectives of the Ottoman policy of Syria since the region populated by the 
Druze became the frontier between the British, Sharif and the Ottomans. Therefore, each 
side of the Battle was aware that a Druze revolt against the Ottoman Empire could make 
decisive impact on the course of events in Palestine front.1125 
 The Sharif’s men continued to repeat their offers to the Druze chiefs regularly to 
change their side and to join the rebellion. But, they were refused by the latter in every 
turn. In June 1918, the grand son of Sharif Hussein, Ali undertook to obtain the Druzes for 
their cause via the Damascene Notable Nasib el-Bakri, who offered a great amount of 
British gold in return for their support. His offer was refused by the leader of the Druze, 
                                                 
1123 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 557/92, Tahsin to Talat, Beirut, 22 Haziran 1333[22 June 1917]. 
1124 PA-AA, Türkei 165, Bd.41, Waldburg to AA (Transmitting Consul Damascus), 
Constantinople, 20 July 1917. 
1125 HHStA, PA 38/371, Ranzi to Burian, “Die Haltung der Drüsen”, Damascus, 6 June 
1918. 
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Selim el-Atrash with a letter stating the loyalty of the Druze to the Sultan-Caliph and 
declaring Sharif as their enemies. Whereupon, el-Atrash was honored with the High 
Ottoman Medal and the German Iron Cross Medal.1126 
 Towards the end of the war in Syria, some Druze sheikhs commenced to trade with 
the districts in the British control and with Sharif Ali, and they applied to the British 
demand for food as a factor to increase the prices of the cereals that they sold. Similarly, 
the karawan trade between the two district continued through the Druze district. However, 
the Druze chiefs didn’t change essentially their attitude of the loyalty to the Ottoman 
Government.1127 
 With the beginning of the final British attack against Damascus on 19th September, 
the Ottoman front was severely damaged. Therefore, the Government was afraid of a 
changing of the sides by the Druzes.1128 Following the commencement of the British 
advance against Damascus, the Druze chiefs came there, and declared again their loyalty to 
the Ottoman Government. While the Ottoman troops were retreating towards Damascus, 
the Druzes chiefs came to Liman von Sanders and stated their allegiance to him and their 
readiness for war against the British forces if they were provided with guns and 
ammunition. Liman couldn’t give a positive answer to them because of the deficiencies of 
the Army.1129 All in all, they stayed loyal to the Ottoman Empire till the very end of the 
Ottoman Rule in Syria.1130 
  In return for their political support to the Ottoman Government, Cemal Pasha 
provided them a large administrative and financial autonomy. When the taxes and 
                                                 
1126 HHStA, PA 38/371, Ranzi to Burian, “Die Haltung der Drüsen”, Damascus, 6 June 
1918. 
1127 ATASE Arşivi, Kls. 3215, Ds. 19, Fih. 1, Cemal[Mersinli] to Cemal, 27 Aralık 
1333 [27 December 1917]; PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 18, Brode to Bernstoff, Damascus, 22 
August 1918. 
1128 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 596/3, İsmail Hakkı to Ministry of Interior, Beirut, 21 Eylül 1334 
[21 September 1918]. 
1129 Liman von Sanders, Ibid, p. 363. 
1130 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 596/47, Rıfat to Ministry of Interior, Damascus, 24 Eylül 1334 [24 
September 1918]; BOA, DH. ŞFR. 597/9, Tahsin to Ministry of Interior, Aleppo, 1 Teşrin-
i Evvel 1334 [1 October 1918]. 
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confiscations for the Army were estimated in the Syrian Provinces, the produciton of the 
Druze district was left out of the expected amount because of their immunities. However, it 
never meant that the Druzes didn’t contribute for the provisioning of the Army. During the 
war period, they provided considerable amount of cereals for the troops in Syria in the 
critical times in spite of the deficiency of the transport means. More importantly, the Druze 
farmers played a crucial role in the provisioning of Damascus. Towards the end of every 
year in war period, the reserves of cereals in the Druze districts prevented the emergence 
of a famine at that city, although they acted like a bull market speculator in those critical 
times to provide the maximum advantage. The Government avoided to apply provocative 
offensive methods against them to facilitate the purchase of cereals, and that method 
produced satisfactory results in terms of the food supply.1131  
Their immunity from the military service and the requisitions for the Army 
prevented the Druzes from having disinclination to work that the Syrian farmers suffered 
during the war. As would be analyzed below, the agricultural production in Syria had 
largely been damaged by the lack of manpower and pack animals as a consequence of the 
recruitment of the people and the requisitioning of the pack animals by the Army. 
Immunity of these two obligations provided the Druzes with a cereal surplus in every year 
of the War.1132 Furthermore, the cereal surplus of the Druze farmers attracted the Syrians 
who escaped from the starvation and poverty as well as the deserters and those farmers 
who climbed out of the military requisioning. According to the information given by a 
British report on the Druze, Djebel-i Druze was harbouring at least 10.000 refugees.1133 
The Druze didn’t avoid to feed them, strove for the betterment of the life conditions of the 
people, who took refuge with them. Thus, they contributed indirectly to the provisioning of 
Syrian society.1134 
 Besides their financial autonomy, the Druze region, to a large extent, stayed out of 
the Ottoman bureaucratic hierarcy. According to the remarks of a German working in 
                                                 
1131 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.17, Ziemke to Hertling, Damascus, 17 May 1918. 
1132 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.16, Oppenheim to Göppert, 12 December 1917; PA-AA, 
Türkei 177, Bd.17, Ziemke to Hertling, Damascus, 17 May 1918. 
1133 Hogarth and Bell, Ibid, p. 19. 
1134 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.17, Ziemke to Hertling, Damascus, 17 May 1918. 
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Damascus consulate, the authority of the Ottoman government in the Druze district was 
next to zero. This district was annexed to Hauran administratively, and there was a 
kaymakam there. The mentioned German official stated that the role of that Kaymakam 
was no more than a diplomatic agent or a consul of the Ottoman Government in that 
region. In Sueyda, where mostly populated by the Druzes, there was only a group of 20 
gendarmerie and was no actual state authority.1135 
 It is reasonable by all these policies to conclude that Cemal Pasha’s policy of 
Druzes aimed at securing their loyalty giving them a broad autonomy in the war 
circumstances. As a result of the difficulties, which made controlling them impossible in 
another way, Cemal applied the mentioned policy of autonomy. At the heart of the War, it 
was inconceivable to implement a different method. Otherwise, he would have to struggle 
against the Druze with military methods, which would put him in a difficult position in his 
war against Great Britain in Sinai Front, and would make the Druze keen to the British 
policies. A similar policy was applied to the Bedouin tribes in Syria and Arabia, which 
produced similar results with that of the Druze. 
 
 
7.2.Cemal Pasha and the Bedouins: Cooperation under the flag of the Caliph 
 
 
Cemal’s policy towards the Bedouin tribes was not different very much from his policy 
of the Druze in essence. He didn’t undertake any action of the ottomanization towards the 
the Bedouin tribes. However, they weren’t as autonomous as the Druze communities. For 
example, the nomadic tribes were exposed to some harsh requisitions of the Army as well 
as some extra taxes. The government was further free in its treatment of some Bedouin 
tribes till the outbreak of the Sharifian Revolt, especially for ones, who were nearer to the 
Ottoman administrative areas. As in the policy of the city-dwellers, Sharif’s movement 
                                                 
1135 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.17, Ziemke to Hertling, Damascus, 17 May 1918. 
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created an extra-moderation in Cemal’s tribal policy and caused some extra costs for him. 
On the other hand, that rebellion provided more freedom to the tribes from the control of 
the government. In addition, the policy of balance that those tribes applied especially 
towards the end of the War and Ottoman success to keep many of them, at least, neutral till 
the very end of the War demonstrate that the Sharif’s rebellion could not be called a Pan-
Arab, or all-Arab movement. 
 
 
7.2.1. Cemal Pasha’s Policy of Tribes to the Outbreak of the Sharifian Revolt  
 
On the verge of the WWI, a considerable amount of the population in Syria, 
Palestine, and Arabia belonged to large and small Bedouin tribes. For centuries, it was 
difficult for the states ruled in the region to take them under governmental control because 
of their nomadic lifestyle. They were fond of their liberty, and an intervention in their 
freedom could cause a rebellion against the Government. Therefore, under the 
circumstances of the war, the administration of those tribes appeared as an issue for Cemal 
Pasha. 
Although some improvements had been provided in the settlement of those tribes in 
the pre-war years,1136 when it came to the commencement of the War, as would be shown 
below, they still had considerable autonomy and manpower to be able to resist the 
governmental control, or to support its military activities. As was expressed in the first 
Chapter, in the beginning of the mobilization, the Government requested their military and 
political support. Almost all the small and large tribes in Syria accepted the call of the 
Caliph to cooperate under his flag.1137 But, Cemal Pasha abandoned to use the Bedouin 
troops in the military operations since they were irregular troops and couldn’t become 
                                                 
1136 For a detailed analysis of the Ottoman activities to settle and control these tribal 
groups see; Rogan, Ibid. 
1137 PRO, FO 371/2777, McMahon to FO (transmitting an intelligent returned from 
Syria), Cairo, 20 May 1916.  
314 
 
effective against the regular armies.1138 Instead, he employed some Bedouin and Druze 
volunteers in the army with political considerations, sometimes as hostages and sometimes 
to honor them.1139 It was more of an issue for Cemal Pasha to gain their political support, 
and thus to prevent their rebellion against the Ottoman authority by the change of their 
sides. In addition, the tribal support showed great importance for the supply of pack 
animals and, in some places, for the provisioning needs of the Army.   
In a speech delivered in Lebanon after the fall of Jerusalem and in his memoires, 
Cemal Pasha attributed his failure of the Egyptian Expedition to the lack of the support of 
the tribal chiefs and Sharif Hussein. In other words, if those two had supported him, he 
would save Egypt from the “British yoke”.1140 Similarly, the Turkish official history-
writing blames the ‘urban and tribal Arabs’ for the Ottoman defeat in Syria.1141 An analysis 
of Cemal’s relations with the tribal chiefs, therefore, will clarify the truth of those claims 
as well. Both to examine his claims and to check the ‘treason’ thesis of the official Turkish 
history-writing regarding Arabs, that section will shed light on Cemal Pasha’s policy of 
tribes taking more its political aspect into consideration since the tribal contribution to the 
mobilization movement has already been analyzed in the first chapter. 
 Throughout the WWI, Cemal Pasha and his predecessors struggled with Great 
Britain for the loyalty and support of the Bedouins dispersed between southern Palestine 
and the Persian Gulf. Immediately prior to and after the outbreak of war in Europe, the 
                                                 
1138 HHStA, PA 38/366, Ranzi to Berchtold, “Berufung des Fürsten Nuri Schalan nach 
Damaskus”, Damascus, 6 February 1915; Arslan, Ibid, p. 140-141. 
1139 Cemal Pasha’s insistent request from Sharif Hussein to send a division under the 
command of his son Faysal to join the Canal Expedition was because of his intention to 
keep Faysal as hostage in Damascus in return for Sharif’s loyalty: HHStA, PA 38/369, 
Ranzi to Burian, Damascus, 10 June 1916; Similarly, After the outbreak of the Sharifian 
Revolt, Cemal requested Nuri Shalan to send a brigade of 300 men to the service of the 
Government to prevent him joining Sharif Hussein; HHStA, PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian, 
"Die Abreise des neuen Grossscherifs nach Medina", Damascus, 7 August 1916; The 
Druze brigade in the army was employed to honor them and to increase their loyalty; 
HHStA, PA 38/366, Ranzi to Burian, Damascus, 6 February 1915. 
1140 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.17, From Mutius to Hertling, Beirut. 20 December 1917. 
1141 For an analysis of the Turkish perception of the Sharif’s revolt, see: Çiçek, M. 
Talha, “Erken Cumhuriyet Dönemi Ders Kitapları Çerçevesinde Türk-Ulus Kimliği İnşası 
ve ‘Arap ihaneti’”, Divan, 2012/1, cilt: 17, sayı: 32, pp. 169-188.  
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Ottoman authorities visited all the prominent Bedouin chiefs in Syria and Arabia, and 
achieved to guarantee their support in case of the emergence of any hostility between the 
Caliph of Islam and any other foreign power.1142 In return for their loyalty, the Bedouin 
chiefs were awarded with considerable amount of gifts and decorations.1143 Moreover, 
most of them were paid high salaries by Cemal Pasha.1144 In cases, if their active assistance 
was not possible, the Ottoman authorities came to an agreement with those chiefs, at least 
on their friendly neutrality. They applied to the support of the Bedouins within the 
framework of a general Pan-Islamic movement.1145  
 On the other hand, the British contemplated to reconciliate the Bedouin chiefs and 
gain their support highlighting the issue of the Arab Caliphate. It would be counter 
propaganda against the Pan-Islamic policies of the Ottoman side. However, they didn’t 
contemplate any direct intervention in the issue of the organization of an Arab rebellion 
around the Arab Caliph against the Ottoman Empire, not to make the Arab population 
think that the movement was a British design, and that would increase the credit of the 
Ottomans among the Arabs. Rather they preferred to develop the anti-Turkish sentiments 
that already existed, with the internal dynamics of the Arabs. It is worth to note that all the 
                                                 
1142 ATASE Arşivi. Kls.159, Ds.705/23, Zeki to Başkumandanlık Ministry. Damascus, 
14 September 1914 [1 Eylül 1330]. ATASE Arşivi. Kls.159, Ds.705, Fih. 23, Zeki to 
Başkumandanlık Ministry, Damascus, 14 September 1914 [1 Eylül 1330]; MAEE. Guerre 
1914-1918, 868/Turquie, Syrie et Palestine, Maucops to MAE 
1143 HHStA, PA 38/363, Ranzi to Berchtold, Damascus,10 September 1914. 
1144 For example, to the tribes on the Hijaz Railway in North-Western Arabia -Huweitat, 
Beni Atije and El-Fukara- were paid 10.000 ltq. in gold till August 1916 in return for their 
loyalty. For details see: HHStA, PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian, "Die Abreise des neuen 
Grossscherifs nach Medina", Damascus, 7 August 1916; similarly, Nuri Shalan, chief of 
the one of the largest tribes of the Northern Syria, was salaried with 3.000 ltq. in gold 
yearly; BOA, DH. EUM. 2. Şb. 32/27, Enver to Dahiliye, 30 Kanun-ı Sani 1332; HHStA, 
PA 38/371, Ranzi to Burian, “Der Abfall des Ruelafürsten Emir Nuri Schaalan”, 
Damascus, 13 September 1918. 
1145 PRO, FO 371/2140, Chatham to Grey, “Apreciation of Situation in Arabia”, Cairo, 
6 September 1914. 
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British experts on the region accepted the convenience of the Sharif of Mecca for the post 
of the Arab Caliphate.1146 
There were three tribal dynasties, which were subjected to competition between the 
Ottoman Empire and Great Britain for their loyalty, dispersed between Mesopotamia, 
Southern Syria and Inner Arabia competing for supremacy in the region, Ibn Rashid in 
Hail, Nuri Shalaan in Djof, and Bin Saud in Najd. As for their personalities at that time, 
According to the British Official Wingate, Ibn Rashid was a young man of 25, of no great 
force of Character. Nuri Shalaan was an old man of 70, but had a son, Nawwaf, at 40, who 
was an energetic and capable man. Finally, Ibn Saud was a fine type of Arab about 43 
years of age, with great ambitions, and was clearly anxious to increase his resources and 
prestige by every means that came to his hand.1147 
Regarding their attitude towards the Ottoman Empire and Great Britain in the 
beginning of the War, the picture was in favor of the Ottoman Empire, and, as will be 
detailed below, stayed in this manner to the end of the War. The most fragile one for the 
Empire among those chiefs was Ibn Saud. He was pacified with a treaty signed before the 
commencement of the War, in May 1914, recognizing his autonomy in Najd district and 
appointing him as the Ottoman Governor of Najd.1148 After the proclamation of the War, 
the Government renewed its treaty with Ibn Saud and declared him as the Ottoman 
                                                 
1146 PRO, FO 371/2480, McMahon to FO, Paris, 31 December 1914; PRO, FO 
371/2480, Holderness to FO, London, 15 January 1915. 
1147 PRO, FO 371/3389, Wingate to FO, “Position of Ibn Rashid, Emir of Hail, in his 
relations to Other Arab Potentates”, Cairo, 17 January 1918. 
1148 This document captured by the British forces invading Basra. An English 
translation of this agreement is available at PRO, FO 371/2769, Holderness to FO, “Treaty 
between Bin Saud and the Turks dated 15 May 1914”, Basra, 22 November 1916; for the 
details of the negotiations between the Ottoman Officials in the region and Ibn Saud and 
the Arabic version of the treaty see: ATASE Arşivi, Kls. 1714, Ds. 36, F. 1-72, Ömer 
Fevzi to War Ministry, Basra, 22 Nisan 1330 [5 May 1914]; ATASE Arşivi, Kls. 1714, 
Ds. 36, F. 1-134, Refik [Engineer in Medain Salih] to Captain Aziz Bey, Medain Salih, 11 
Mayıs 1330 [24 May 1914]; ATASE Arşivi, Kls. 1714, Ds. 36, F. 1-103, Captain Aziz 
Bey to War Ministry, Medain Salih, 30 Nisan 1330 [13 May 1914]; ATASE Arşivi, Kls. 
1714, Ds. 36, F. 1-72, Ömer Fevzi to War Ministry, Basra, 26 Kanun-ı Sani 1329 [8 
February 1914]; for the Arabic version of the treaty see: ATASE Arşivi, Kls.1714, Ds. 36, 
Fih. 1-97,98, Major Ömer Fevzi to War Ministry, 28 Nisan 1330. 
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governor and the commander of Najd.1149 However, as a result of the historical antagonism 
and sectarian differences between the two sides1150, Bin Saud was always suspicious of the 
Ottoman Government1151, and never cut all his ties with Great Britain throughout the War. 
As for Ibn Rashid, his policies were not different from that of Ibn Saud, although, from the 
very beginning, he was a loyal supporter of the Ottoman Empire. In early days of the War, 
he wanted to eliminate his mortal enemy Ibn Saud by the help of the Ottoman Empire, and 
therefore depicted himself as the representative of the Ottoman Empire, and contextualized 
his struggle with Ibn Saud within the framework of general policy of Jihad against Great 
Britain.1152 Similarly, Nuri Shalan answered the call of the Government to support the 
mobilization in a good light, and notified his readiness at any moment for service with his 
2.000 men.1153 However, Due to his pro-Druze attitude in the last Druze Rebellion of 1911, 
Nuri was regarded as unrelaiable by the Government1154, and the Ottoman surveillance 
over his actions continued throughout the whole period of War, although he didn’t change 
definitely his side almost till the finalization of the battles in Syria.1155  
                                                 
1149 ATASE Arşivi, Kls. 6, Ds. 32, Fih. 4-20, 4th Army to Enver, 5 Şubat 1330 [18 
February 1915]. 
1150 Bin Saud was defending a methodology that invokes the literal interpretation of 
religious texts, and the return to the early tradition of the pious companions of the Prophet, 
and defining most of the Ottoman religious implementations as Bid’a, which was added to 
the religion in the aftermath of the Prophet. Therefore, There was a tension between him 
and the Government. For further details see: Al-Rasheed, Madawi, Contesting the Saudi 
State: New Voices from a New Generation, Cambridge: 2007, Cambridge University Press, 
p. 2-3. 
1151 PRO, FO 371/2140, Ryan to Mallet, Cairo, 22 September 1914. 
1152 For an example of it, see: ATASE Arşivi, Kls.6, Ds. 32, Fih. 4-39,4-40, Ibn Rashid 
to Cemal, 15 Rebiülahir 1333 [2 March 1915]; in his another letter to Enver Pasha, Ibn 
Rashid expressed that “he and his goods belongs to the State”,i.e., the Ottoman Empire: 
ATASE Arşivi, Kls. 6, Ds. 32, Fih. 8, Ibn Rashid to Enver, 25 Eylül 1330 [8 October 
1914]. 
1153 ATASE Arşivi, Kls.159, Ds. 703, Fih. 4-1, Zeki to Enver, Damascus, 10 Ağustos 
1330 [24 August 1914]. 
1154 HHStA, PA 38/366, Ranzi to Burian, “Die Besitzeergreifung Ibn Reschids von der 
Landschaft Djof”, Damascus, 26 July 1915. 
1155 Towards the end of 1917 he started to approach Sharif Faysal. For details see: PRO, 
WO 158/634, Arbur to General Bagdad, Cairo. 1 October 1917; ATASE Arşivi, Kls. 
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As for the relations between those tribes, the picture didn’t seem convenient for the 
policies of the Ottoman Empire. There were conflicts between Ibn Saud and Ibn Rashid, 
and Ibn Rashid and Nuri Shalan, preventing the implementation of the Pan-Islamic policy 
of the Government, which required a reconciliation and alliance of those tribes against the 
common enemy, at least temporarily. Therefore, both Cemal Pasha and the Ottoman 
Central Government tried to solve the problems among the tribal dynasties both to 
motivate them for Jihad policy and to prevent any approach in their attitudes to Great 
Britain, which could be stemmed from the problems of them with each others.1156 
The first issue before the Ottoman Government regarding those tribal dynasties 
after the proclamation of Jihad to be overcome was the hostility between Ibn Saud and Ibn 
Rashid dating back to long before the period under study, to the birth of the Rashidis. 
According to the information given by Wingate, the Rashidi dynasty of Hail began as the 
Agents Generals [Wakil] of the Saudi Dynasty, towards the middle of the nineteenth 
century. When Muhammed Ali of Egypt’s son Tosun Pasha invaded Hijaz and compelled 
Bin Saud to take refuge in Kuwait, the Rashid family of Hail became independent of their 
chiefs, and invaded their centre Riyadh. In 1902, Ibn Saud restored his power, and expelled 
the Rashidi Governor from Riyadh. He occupied all the South-Eastern Provinces that for 
30 years had been under the control of Ibn Rashid. In that year, Ibn Saud advanced north-
westward into Kassim, but was forced to retire by a Turkish force sent to co-operate with 
Ibn Rashid. However, in 1906 he returned to Kassim, and held that district to tribute ever 
since. After that, Ibn Saud aspired to the reversion of Hail which formed part of his 
forebear’s dominions, and which only became independent in the year 1847.1157  
                                                                                                                                                    
3208, Ds. 18, Fih. 28, Yıldırım to Enver, 22 Ağustos 1333 [22 August 1333]; About one 
month before the finalization of the battles, he fixed his side in favor of Faysal; HHStA, 
PA 38/371, From Ranzi to Burian,"Der Abfall des Ruelafürsten Emir Nuri Schaalan", 
Damascus. 13 September 1918. 
1156 ATASE Arşivi, Kls. 6, Ds. 32, Fih. 3-8, War Ministry to 4th Army, 12 Teşrin-i 
Evvel 1330[25 October 1914]; ATASE Arşivi, Kls. 6, Ds. 32, Fih. 1-13, Major Aziz Bey 
to War Ministry, Medain Salih, 25 Eylül 1330 [8 October 1914]. 
1157 PRO, FO 371/3389, Wingate to FO, “Position of Ibn Rashid, Emir of Hail, in his 
relations to Other Arab Potentates”, Cairo, 17 January 1918. 
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In retaliation to this hostility, early in 1915 Ibn Rashid advanced into Ibn Saud’s 
county, north-west of Riyadh, a battle was fought, in which Ibn Rashid won a striking 
victory. The Governor of Syria, Hulusi Bey, claimed that the reason of the fighting was the 
rivalry between Ibn Subhan, the vizier of Ibn Rashid, and the members of the Rashidi 
Family, who took refuge with Ibn Saud.1158 Similarly, in a letter sent by Ibn Rashid to Ibn 
Saud, the Former blames Ibn Subhan as the reason of the fightings between them.1159 In 
that battle, Ibn Saud lost a considerable number of troops, 1500 killed and 1200 wounded. 
The British representative with Ibn Saud, Shakespeare was captured dead by Ibn Rashid 
with three other British officials. Morever, According to Dr. Prüfer, a German official in 
Jerusalem, two sons and three relatives of Ibn Saud were killed.1160 Ibn Rashid wanted to 
exhibit the heads of the British deads in a square of Damascus, but because of the treaty 
between the Empire and Ibn Saud, the action was not approved by the Government.1161 At 
the end of this battle, Ibn Rashid recaptured the disputed district Kassim,1162 and plundered 
the goods of all the villages in Kassim.1163 The British sources claim that Ibn Rashid was 
spurred by the Turks.1164 However, the Ottoman records indicate that the Ottomans left no 
                                                 
1158 In the viewpoint of the Governor, Ibn Rashid was too young to rule the Rashidi 
dynasty, and therefore all his administrative works was performing by his Vizier Ibn 
Subhan. The Vizier started to get the potential rivals of Ibn Rashid killed to consolidate his 
authority over the tribe. Therefore, some of the member of the Family taken refugee to Ibn 
Saud to save themselves. The reason of that fighting was the struggle of Ibn Subhan to 
secure his authority. For further details see: BOA, DH.ŞFR. 461/55, Hulusi to Talat, 1 
Şubat 1330 [14 February 1915] 
1159 PRO, FO 371/3057, Ibn Rashid to Ibn Saud, Hail, 7 May 1917. 
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1915. 
1161 ATASE Arşivi, Kls. 6, Ds. 32, Fih. 4-20, 4th Army to Enver, 5 Şubat 1330 [18 
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1162 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 489/29, Basri to Talat, Medine, 3 Eylül 1331 [16 September 1915]. 
1163 BOA, DH.ŞFR, Basri to Talat, Medine, 23 Ağustos 1331 [5 September 1915]. 
1164 PRO, FO 371/3389, Wingate to FO, “Position of Ibn Rashid, Emir of Hail, in his 
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Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to FO, Basra. 27 November 1916. PRO, FO 
371/2479, General Force 'D' to General Officer Commanding, Egypt, Basra. 20 December 
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avenue unexplored to prevent this battle partly fearing the defeat of their loyal confederate 
Ibn Rashid and partly as a requirement of their reconciliatory policy of Pan-Islamism1165, 
although Ibn Rashid submitted the letters of Ibn Saud offering him cooperation against the 
Ottoman Government.1166 
In contrast to the British claims, soon after the battle the Ottoman Government 
requested the restoration of peace between the two tribes. However, the reluctance of Ibn 
Rashid for the negotiations1167 made it compulsory the mediation of a delegate with the 
intervention of the Ottoman Government in consultation with Cemal Pasha, to finish the 
hostility upon the request of Ibn Saud.1168 The mediation delegation consisted of the 
prominent figures of the Arabs, among them the most outstanding ones were Sharif Faysal 
and Salih Sharif al-Tunusi. According to the report of the Austrian Consul of Damascus, 
with this peace, it was aimed to secure the allegiance of all the Muslim leaders to the 
Caliphate, giving special reference to Ibn Saud, who was known for his Wahhabi opinions 
opposing the legitimacy of the Ottoman Caliph. Moreover, the Ottoman Government 
planned to apply the support of these two chiefs in the Mesopotamian War Theatre.1169 
As a consequence of the pressure of the Ottoman Government, in July 1915, Ibn 
Rashid gave his consent to a peace with Ibn Saud. The former didn’t want to contradict 
with his allegiance to the Ottoman Caliph preventing the establishment of peace in the 
region. With the treaty signed between the two chiefs, they accepted to return to the status 
                                                 
1165 ATASE Arşivi, Kls. 6, Ds. 32, Fih. 3-8, War Ministry to 4th Army, 12 Teşrin-i 
Evvel 1330 [25 October 1914]; ATASE Arşivi, Kls. 6, Ds. 32, Fih.4-5, Fourth Army to 
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PA38/366, Ranzi to Burian, “Eine offizielle türkische Friedensmission  für Arabien”, 
Damascus, 5 June 1915. 
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1168 ATASE Arşivi, Kls. 6, Ds. 32, Fih. 4-38, Enver to Cemal, 4 Mart 1331 [17 March 
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quo ante-bellum. The success of the Ottoman Government to bring about peace increased 
both its prestige and authority over those tribes, and the problem was solved in the 
direction of Cemal Pasha’s policy of tribes.1170 Another reason causing the Ottoman 
Empire to step in for the mediation was its concern regarding the Sharif of Mecca. Sharif 
Abdullah’s movement from Taif with some troops towards Kasim and Najd caused a 
suspicion about him. Probably, the Government considered that Abdullah would establish 
the peace among the chiefs, and that would arise Sharif’s prestige in the region.1171 
Another problem among the tribal chiefs was that of Nuri Shalan, the leader of the 
Ruela Tribe, and Ibn Rashid on the ownership of Djof territory. While the Government 
was trying to establish peace between Ibn Rashid and Ibn Saud, to prevent the 
commencement of another hostility between Nuri Shalan and Ibn Rashid, Cemal Pasha 
entertained Nuri Shalan together with his son Nawwaf and his 40 men as his guest in 
Damascus for about 9 months. He was welcomed with a great military honor by the 
authorities. Nuri expressed to the Austrian Consul about his retention that he was departed 
from his land and people because of his hostility between him and the Shammar Tribe of 
Ibn Rashid on the possession of Djof territory. He also notified that his peace proposal was 
not accepted by Ibn Rashid.1172 According to the remarks of the Austrian Consul, made 6 
moths after Nuri’s arrival in Damascus, when the peace was restored between Ibn Saud 
and Ibn Rashid, the permission would be issued for the return of the chief of the Ruela 
Tribe.1173 
The return of Kassim Territory to Ibn Saud obligated the Government to 
compensate for the loss of its loyal supporter Ibn Rashid with another land. By that reason, 
he easily occupied Djof Territory in the absence of Nuri and Nawwaf with the permission 
                                                 
1170 HHStA, PA 38/366, Ranzi to Burian, “Friedensschluss zwischen Ibn Reschid und 
Ibn Saud”, Damascus, 21 July 1915. 
1171 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 489/29, Basri to Talat, Medine, 3 Eylül 1915 [15 September 1915]. 
1172 HHStA, PA 38/366, Ranzi to Berchtold, “Berufung des Fürsten Nuri Schalan nach 
Damaskus”, Damascus, 6 February 1915. 
1173 HHStA, PA 38/366, Ranzi to Burian, “Friedensschluss zwischen Ibn Reschid und 
Ibn Saud”, Damascus, 21 July 1915. 
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and the approval of the Government. With that operation the Government antagonized the 
Ruela Tribe to itself and that could create problems for its goals in the region.1174  
 Meanwhile, Ibn Rashid broke the peace again with Ibn Saud in the second month of 
its restoration, which was hardly established by the Government, occupying Kassim 
territory for the second time. Although he withdrew from there later, that action both 
damaged the peace and the Governmental authority in the region. Furthermore, Ibn Rashid 
captured a caravan in Kassim consisted of 900 camels, which belonged to Tawfik Siuffi 
who procured goods for the account of the Ottoman Army. The request of the Government 
for the reclamation was delayed by some excuses. All these events caused a resentment of 
the authorities against Ibn Rashid, while bringing about a restoration in the relations 
between Nuri Shalan and the Government. Thereupon, the Government allowed Nawwaf 
to return and recapture the Djof territory. Moreover, an official message arrived approving 
Nuri’s appointment as the Kaymakam of Djof. According to the comment of the Austrian 
Consul of Damascus, with this appointment the scope of Ottoman Rule was extended to 
Djof, which was practically independent till then from the Governmental authority, and the 
Ottoman Empire gained a strong point of support in Central Arabia.1175 
 By the resolution of the disagreement between Ibn Rashid and Nuri Shalan, the 
tribal leaders entered into a period of tranquility accepting generally the Ottoman 
Government as their supreme power till the commencement of the Sharifian Revolt of 
Mecca in June 1916.1176 To summarize the attitude of those chiefs in that period, Ibn Saud 
applied a balance policy between the two powers, the British and the Ottoman, but 
recognizing the Ottoman authority. He gave the impression to the British side that he was 
struggling against the Ottoman domination in the region, and he was filled with hatred 
                                                 
1174 HHStA, PA 38/366, Ranzi to Burian, “Die Besitzeergreifung Ibn Reschids von der 
Landschaft Djof”, Damascus, 26 July 1915. 
1175 HHStA, PA 38/366, Ranzi to Burian, “Die Ernennung des Emir Nuri Schalan zum 
Kaymakam des Djof”, Damascus, 29 October 1915; for a reference to Nuri as the 
Kaymakam of Djof, see: BOA, İ.DUİT 66/48, 22 Ağustos 1332 [4 Eylül 1916] 
1176 Although some small events of cooperation between Ibn Saud and Great Britain 
took place, it never turned into an open hostility and rebellion against the Ottoman 
Government. When his suspicious actions were informed, the Ottoman authorities sent him 
money and decoration to keep him loyal in the Ottoman side: PA-AA, Türkei 165, Hesse 
to Bethmann-Hollweg, Baghdad, 21 June 1916. 
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against them.1177 On the other hand, He appeared to the Ottoman officials that he had to 
take the British policy into consideration in his cooperation with the Ottoman Government 
since they were very close to his area of domination. But in reality he didn’t give his 
loyalty to any of the sides unconditionally, and didn’t manifest his side till the British 
supremacy in his region became certain.1178 It is known that Ibn Rashid was a loyal 
supporter of the Ottoman cause and didn’t change his attitude till the very end of the War. 
Different from the other two chiefs, he actively helped the Ottomans in their struggle in the 
Mesopotamian War Theatre and later in the struggle against the Sharif Hussein of Mecca, 
which will be detailed in the next section.1179 Nuri Shalan would change his side towards 
the end of the War in favor of the British side. 
Besides those three chiefs, the Ottoman Empire invited the Imam Yahya of Yemen, 
Sheikh Ahmet Sharif al-Senussi, Sayyid Idrissi of Asir and Mubarak of Kuwait for 
cooperation under the flag of the Caliph.1180 While keeping their ties with Great Britain, 
Idrissi and Mubarak didn’t enter into any considerable hostility with the Ottoman Empire 
                                                 
1177 PRO, FO 371/2140, Ryan to Mallet, Cairo 22 September 1914. When the British 
reports are surveyed on Ibn Saud’s relations with the Ottomans, such an impression will be 
inferred that he was a loyal supporter of the British policies in the region, and filled with 
great hatred against the Ottoman authority. However, when the Ottoman documents are 
studied the picture changes, and it become clear that his expressions to the British 
authorities were a part of his balance policy. For an example of such documents see: PRO, 
FO 371/3047, Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to FO, Basra. 27 November 1916; for 
an example of his efforts to approach the Ottoman Government see: ATASE Arşivi, Kls. 
3215, Ds. 42, Fih. 3, Abdülhamid to Cemal, 9 December 1917. 
1178 Even after the fall of Jerusalem, with the fear of a defeat by Ibn Rashid by the 
support of the Ottoman Government, Ibn Suud planned to approach the Government 
permitting the introduction of the foodstuff to Damascus via El-Usaym. See: ATASE 
Arşivi, Kls. 3215, Ds. 42, Fih. 3, Abdülhamid to Cemal, 9 December 1917. 
1179 HHStA, PA 38/369, From Ranzi to Burian,"Die Politik der mittelarabischen 
Fürsten in dem Konflikt zwischen der Tuerei und dem Emir von Mekka", Damascus. 11 
December 1916. 
1180 ATASE Arşivi, Kls. 159, Ds. 705, Fih. 7-2, Enver to the Yemen Governorate, 7 
Ağustos 1330 [20 August 1914]; ATASE Arşivi, Kls. 1793, Ds. 287, Fih. 1-47, Enver 
Pasha to Idrisi, undated; ATASE Arşivi, Kls. 1793, Ds. 287, Fih. 1-47, Enver Pasha to 
Idrisi, undated. 
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throughout the War protecting a certain neutrality.1181 Senussi and the Imam actively 
cooperated with the Ottoman Empire in its struggle against Great Britain.1182 Apart from 
the great tribal dynasties, plenty of the smaller tribes in Syria, Arabia and Yemen remained 
pro-Ottoman throughout the War.1183As a final remark, it is worth to mention that all these 
policies and negotiations were made in consultation with Cemal Pasha, and his approval 
and advises were always taken into consideration by the policy makers in Istanbul. 
 The outbreak of the Sharif’s rebellion against the Caliph with the support of the 
tribes around Mecca created a change in the Ottoman policy towards the Bedouin tribes. 
However, Sharif’s proclamation of rebellion didn’t cause an essential turn in the attitude of 
those tribes against the Ottoman authority; while the attitude of the great tribal dynasties 
remained principally unchanged until the last months of the War period, some small tribes 
were gained by the British gold towards the end of the War. Some others, however, 
remained loyal to the Ottoman government.  
 
 
7.2.2. Transformation of the Tribal Policy after the Sharifian Revolt 
 
The commencement of Sharif Hussein’s movement in Mecca signified a new 
period in Ottoman tribal policy in Syria and Arabia, and gave a new legitimizing tool for 
                                                 
1181 Mubarak al-Sabah desired more or less the protection of the British Government, 
most probably with fear of the destructive effect of the Ottoman centralization policies on 
the tribal structures: PRO, FO 371/2483, Grey to The Political Resident in the Persian 
Gulf, “Arabs and Turkey”, 6 January 1915. 
1182 PRO, FO 371/2486, Grey to India Office,Negotiations with Grand Shareef. 8 
November 1915. 
1183 ATASE Arşivi, Kls. 159, Ds. 705, Fih. 30-5, The Chief of Veled-i Ali Tribe to 
Ministry of Interior, 10 Zilkade 1330[133?] [30 Eylül 1914]. Most of the tribes between 
Akaba and Mecca were loyal to the Imperial authority: PA-AA, Türkei 165, Bd. 37, 
Moritz to AA, Damascus, 16 January 1915; In the beginning of the War, Mahmut Nedim 
Bey, The Governor of Yemen, achieved to obtain the support of many of the tribes for the 
Ottoman cause, and complained about the lack of money to make all Yemen loyal to the 
Government: BOA, DH.ŞFR. 462/27, Mahmut Nedim to Talat, 7 Şubat 1330 [20 February 
1915].  
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the British endeavors to increase their influence among the tribes. On the other hand, as 
will be detailed below, it meant more disbursement of money and cereals for Cemal Pasha 
to maintain the support of the large and small tribes. In the existing literature, the British-
Sharifian policy, which was tracked to gain the support of the Arab tribes properly 
examined in detail.1184 However, Cemal Pasha’s struggle with them was not yet studied 
thoroughly. One last thing about the sources of the subject, since ultimately, the source of 
all the archival and non-archival resources was the tribes themselves, and they could 
exaggerate the real situation, the present study tries to be as comparative as the limits have 
permitted.  
 Besides the military measures to prevent the increase of the Sharif’s movement into 
Syria and Arabia, Cemal Pasha attempted to refresh the loyalty of the larger and smaller 
tribes, as a counter measure to the British policies of gathering all the Arab leaders under 
the Sharif’s Caliphate.1185 In addition, most of the smaller and larger tribes were supplied 
with great amount of cereals by Cemal Pasha in return for their allegiance. That supply 
would be among one of the most important causes of a profound shortage of food in 
Syria.1186 Besides that, throughout the remainder of the War, Cemal Pasha distributed 
                                                 
1184 For an analysis of the process of forming alliances by Sharif with tribal groups see: 
Teitelbaum, Ibid, p.76-115; Kostiner, Joseph, “The Hashemite ‘Tribal Confederacy’ of the 
Arab Revolt, 1916-1917”, in Evdard Ingram (ed.), National and International Politics in 
the Middle East: Essays in Honor of Elie Kedouire, London: Cass, 1986, pp. 126-143. 
1185 For further information about the British attempts in that direction see: PRO, FO 
371/2480, Clayton to Grey, “Military Operations against Turkey”, Cairo, 3 January 1915; 
for the discussions of the British officials regarding the issue of the Arab Caliphate, see: 
PRO, FO 371/2482, Grey to McMahon, “Moslems and the Caliphate”, London, 14 April 
1915; PRO, FO 371/2480, Holderness to FO, “Possible Measures for Influencing Moslem 
Opinion”, London, 15 January 1915. 
1186 HHStA, PA 38/369, From Ranzi to Burian,"Die Getreideversorgung Syriens", 
Damascus. 25 September 1916; PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.17, From Grobba to AA, “Über 
die wirtschaftliche Lage Syriens und Palaestinas, ihre Entwickelungsmöglichkeiten und die 
Methode ihrer Entwicklung”, Jerusalem. 23 July 1917; HHStA, PA 38/370, From Ranzi to 
Czernin,"Die diesjaehrige Getreideernte im Vilayet Syrien un die Frage der 
Brotversorgung", Damascus. 22 August 1917. 
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medals and decorations to most of the tribal leaders in Syria and Northern Arabia so that 
they didn’t change their sides, or break their neutrality.1187 
As for the tribal dynasties of Northern and Inner Arabia, it wouldn’t be an 
exaggeration to express that Ibn Rashid again stayed as the most loyal supporter of the 
Ottoman struggle with Sharif Hussein. The Ottoman Government intended to encourage 
the Shammar Tribe against the Sharif, sponsoring Ibn Rashid with abundant gold.1188 
During those dates, the Ottoman Government also dispatched some artillery to Ibn 
Rashid.1189 However, according to the Austrian Consul of Damascus, Ibn Rashid didn’t 
draw close to this project since he didn’t want to invite the hostilities of Great Britain and 
other local powers in the region. On the other hand, the Consul neglected the point that the 
Ottoman Government’s final goal in the region was to assert its own authority instead of 
those local chiefs. Therefore, Enver Pasha was reluctant for this action with the concern 
not to “cosset one Amir, while trying to abolish another one”.1190 As will be expressed in 
the last chapter, with the Ottoman’s abandonment of making an operation against Hijaz 
this option fell off the agenda. 
The British capture of Baghdad signified the beginning of the hard times for Ibn 
Rashid. The Shammar Tribe provided all its needs from Baghdad. The prevention of this 
                                                 
1187 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 559/86, Tahsin to Talat, Damascus, 16 Temmuz 1333 [16 July 
1917]; BOA, DH.ŞFR. 565/88, Azmi to Talat, 16 Eylül 1333 [16 September 1917];BOA, 
DH. EUM. 4.Şb. 7/39, Azmi to Talat, 20 Temmuz 1332 [2 August 1916]. 
1188 HHStA, PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian,"Die Politik der mittelarabischen Fürsten in 
dem Konflikt zwischen der Tuerkei und dem Emir von Mekka", Damascus,11 December 
1916; Enver sent 20.000 ltq. gold to Ibn Rashid. But in the document, it is not expressed 
whether this money was sent for an operation against Sharif. It is equally possible that this 
sum was dispatched in return for Ibn Rashid’s loyalty: TTK Arşivi, KO Koleksiyonu 
11/149, Enver to Cemal, 16 Temmuz 1916 [29 July 1916]. 
1189 However, the document doesn’t explain why those batteries were sent. They could 
be for the self-defense of Ibn Rashid; TTK Arşivi, KO Koleksiyonu, Enver to Cemal, 
12/143, 18 Haziran 1332 [1 July 1916] 
1190 TTK Arşivi, KO Koleksiyonu 11/132, Enver to Cemal, 30 Mayıs 1332 [11 Haziran 
1916]; HHStA, PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian,"Die Politik der mittelarabischen Fürsten in 
dem Konflikt zwischen der Tuerkei und dem Emir von Mekka", Damascus,11 December 
1916 
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linkage caused a starvation in Hail.1191 His townsfolk and tribesmen complained about his 
pro-Ottoman policy from which they themselves derived no profit.1192 It was also difficult 
for Cemal Pasha to send them food because of the famine prevailing in Syria. Ibn Rashid’s 
authority among his people received wounds because of that situation.1193 On top of it, the 
Shammar Tribe was to be driven into a blockade by the British Government expelling its 
caravans from Kuwait by force.1194 Nevertheless, the British officials would be 
unsuccessful to win him over their side. 
The intensification of the Sharif’s impact on the tribes along the Hijaz Railway 
around Medina intersected again the Ottoman’s way with Ibn Rashid. As a counter 
measure to Sharif’s actions, the Ottoman Government persuaded Ibn Rashid to resettle in 
Medain Salih, a Hijaz Railway station 350 km. north of Medina. He was resettled there 
with two aims: to frighten the tribes who were disloyal to the Government and to 
strengthen the sense of allegiance among the loyal tribes. According to the statements of 
the Austrian Consul, as a result of his action, the Fukara Tribe abandoned attacking the 
Hijaz Railway, and some branches of the Beni Atije and Beni Sakhr were persuaded to 
protect the Railway. Cemal Pasha offered Talat to award him with the honorific title of 
Rumeli Beylerbeyliği in return for his service in Medain Salih. However, Talat and Enver 
were opposed to this proposal on account of the fact that his rival Ibn Saud was awarded as 
Vizier, and proposed to award him with the same title. In addition The Government sent a 
delegate to Medain Salih to appreciate Ibn Rashid’s actions there.1195 
The resettlement in Medain Salih caused the increase of the problems between Ibn 
Rashid and his tribe. His connection with his people was interrupted since the longevity of 
distance between Hail and Medain Salih. A combination of the problem of provisioning 
                                                 
1191 PA-AA, Türkei 165, Bd. 42, Greenberg ? to Michaelis, Damascus, 20 October 1917 
1192 PRO, FO 371/3057, Cox to FO, Basra, 13 June 1917. 
1193 PA-AA, Türkei 165, Bd. 42, Greenberg ? to Michaelis, Damascus, 20 October 1917 
1194 PRO, FO 371/3059, Fahaid al Rashid to Chief Political Officer in Baghdad, 
Baghdad, 23 June 1917. 
1195 HHStA, PA 38/370, Ranzi to Czernin, “Der Aufenthaltdes Emir Ibn Reschid in 
Medain Salih”, Damascus, 9 October 1917; BOA, DH.KMS. 44-1/20, Cemal to Talat, 
undated; Talat to Cemal, 5 Eylül 1333 [5 September 1917]. 
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and distance made his authority among his people weakened. Ibn Rashid could solve these 
problems with the Ottoman gold, which was the only solution for the tribal dissatisfactions 
in the region at that time.1196 
In the middle of July 1918, Ibn Rashid returned to Hail. According to the Austrian 
Consul of Damascus, He was sent to Medain Salih to struggle with the tribes sided with 
Sharif Hussein. However, after a while the Ottoman Government began to get suspicious 
about the establishment of an alliance between Ibn Rashid and Great Britain. Therefore, 
the Government didn’t send guns and ammunitions to Medain Salih, which was necessary 
for the maintenance of the struggle by Ibn Rashid. When he insisted on staying in Medain 
Salih, he became more suspicious in the eyes of the Government. The Ottoman officials in 
Damascus, applied to the drastic means to enforce him return to Hail, and starved him in 
Medain Salih, preventing the transfer of foodstuffs to him. As a result of that, he had to 
return to Hail.1197 
 When being in bad terms with the Ottoman Government, at about the same time, 
Ibn Rashid approached the Germans while keeping his ties with the Ottoman Empire. In 
June 1918, he requested the German officials in Syria whether they could help him to 
establish a wireless station in Hail keeping it in secret from the Ottoman authorities. He 
made this request to take more trustful information from the German sources regarding the 
course of the War by-passing the Ottoman censure.1198 The German local officials viewed 
that request positively since, by this means, they would be able to informed about the 
events of the region. On the other hand, asserting the German influence over Ibn Rashid 
would make a considerable contribution to the German policies against the British 
                                                 
1196 PA-AA, Türkei 165, Bd. 42, Greenberg ? to Hertling, Damascus, 31 January 1918. 
1197 HHStA, PA 38/371, Ranzi to Burian, “Die erzwungene Rückkehr Ibn Reschids 
nach Hail”, Damascus, 16 July 1918; When Baghdad fell into the British hands some parts 
of his tribes had been reported to incline to their side: BOA, DH.ŞFR. 74/280, Talat to 
Halil, 28 Mart 1333 [28 March 1917]; When Ibn Rashid arrived at Medain Salih, he sent 
telegrams to Enver, Talat and Cemal via Ali Haidar from Medina. the answer was 
diverting for him: BOA, DH.ŞFR. 79/227, Ali Haidar to Talat, 22 Ağustos 1333 [22 
August 1917]. 
1198 PA-AA, Türkei 165, Bd. 42, Schröder to AA, 14 June 1918. 
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designs.1199 However the German Central Government found the proposal of the German 
officials in Syria “fantastic”, and refused it with the reason that it would cause unrepairable 
frictions between the two Empires.1200 
 By the same token, Ibn Rashid, via his representative general Reshid Pasha, invited 
Emile Sprotte, who was working as the German head teacher at Sultani Gymnasium in 
Damascus, to take service with him to teach the European science to his sons and the 
prominent notables of his tribes in Hail. Emil Sprotte was prone to accept this offer with 
consideration of that his prospective students would spread the German influence by 
learning the German language and being acquainted with Germany. In a similar way, Ibn 
Rashid had taken another German (Fritz Görner) to his service working in the Damascus 
tramway operation as a technical employee, to establish an electrical lightning equipment 
in Hail. The Ottoman authorities had knowledge of the project, however, the point that was 
hidden to them was that the one who took care of the business was a German.1201 
 Berlin had a positive attitude about the education project considering that Emile 
Sprotte could function there as a German agent providing direct information to them about 
Ibn Rashid and the tribes in the region.1202 However, upon the reports of the local German 
officials warning the officials in the Capital that Emile Sprotte’s character was not 
appropriate to perform this work. It was stated that Sprotte couldn’t send reports giving 
exact information about the regions because of his character. Thus, this project was also 
abandoned.1203 Shortage of time didn’t permit any other project to be contemplated. As a 
                                                 
1199 PA-AA, Türkei 165, Bd. 42, Neufeld to AA, Damascus, 15 June 1918. 
1200 PA-AA, Türkei 165, Bd. 42, Political Section of the General Staff in Berlin to the 
Ambassador in Constantinople, Berlin, 15 July 1918. 
1201 PA-AA, Türkei 165, Bd. 42, Schröder to AA, 14 June 1918. 
1202 PA-AA, Türkei 165, Bd. 42, Political Section of the General Staff in Berlin to the 
Ambassador in Constantinople, Berlin, 15 July 1918. 
1203 PA-AA, Türkei 165, Bd. 43, Prüfer to German Ambassador in Pera, Constantinople, 
15 July 1918. 
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result, Ibn Rashid strictly remained loyal to the Ottoman Government till the very end of 
the war, which would later cause sounding the death knell for him.1204 
Immediately after the Sharifian Revolt, upon the rumours that Nuri Shalan and his 
son sided with the Sharif, the leader of the Ruela Tribe sent a letter to Cemal Pasha 
declaring the Sharif as his enemy as well as renewing his oath of allegiance to the 
Caliph.1205 After that, Nuri visited Cemal Pasha in Damascus with his son upon the request 
of the latter, and delivered a letter of Sharif Hussein inviting him to struggle against the 
Ottoman Empire. Thereupon, Cemal Pasha granted plenty of gold and decorations to Nuri 
and Nauwaf1206, and requested a brigade consisted of 300 men under his command or his 
son to be employed in the service of the Government. By this way, he aimed to secure the 
loyalty of the Ruela Tribe keeping its leader or its leader’s son in Damascus as “hostage”. 
With the same regard, Nuri himself was appointed as an Ottoman officer.1207 
After his return, although he sometimes got in contact with the Sharifians and the 
British,1208 Nuri maintained his pro-Ottoman attitude. During his stay in Damascus, his son 
Nauwaf was assigned by Cemal Pasha to protect and clear the part of Hijaz Railway in the 
south of Maan from the disturbing tribes, as a result of the increasing raids of pro-Sharif 
Bedouins to interrupt the Railway communication with Medina. If he achieved to perform 
this task, both he and his son were promised to be honored with Pasha title.1209 
                                                 
1204 His city Hail would be captured by Ibn Saud with the British permission. For details 
see: Al-Rasheed, Madavi, Politics in an Arabian Oasis: The Rashidis of Sauida Arabia, 
London: 1991, I.B. Tauris. 
1205 PA-AA, Türkei 165, Bd. 39, Metternich to Bethmann-Hollweg (Transmitting 
Consul Damascus), Constantinople, 2 August 1916.  
1206 He and his son were awarded with 4th degree Ottoman Medal [Dördüncü Rütbe 
Osman]: BOA, DH.KMS. 41/43, Talat to Said Halim, 18 Ağustos 1332 [31 August 1916]. 
1207 HHStA, PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian, "Die Abreise des neuen Grossscherifs nach 
Medina", Damascus, 7 August 1916; BOA, DH.ŞFR. 557/38, Tahsin to Talat, 16 Haziran 
1333 [16 June 1917]. 
1208 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 557/92, Tahsin to Talat, 22 Haziran 1333 [22 June 1917]. 
1209 HHStA, PA 38/370, Ranzi to Czernin, "Eine Mission des Ruelafürsten Nuri 
Schalan", Damascus, 23 June 1917; BOA, DH.ŞFR. 557/38, Tahsin to Talat, 2 Temmuz 
1333 [2 July 1917].Cemal Pasha wrote to Enver on 20 November that he assigned Nauwaf 
Shalan for the protection of Hijaz Railway. It could be inferred that Nauwaf’s task had 
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Approximately two weeks before the fall of Damascus, it became certain for the 
Ottoman Government that Nuri Shalan changed his side and threw in his lot with the 
Sharif, although he didn’t give any active support to him. The reason behind his manner 
change was rather economic. According to the Austrian Consul of Damascus towards the 
end of 1917, he applied to the Ottoman Government for the dispatch of cereals amounted 
to 10.000 Chift [350.000 kg.] and demanded the increase of his subvention from 3.0001210 
ltq. gold to 6.000. The Government skirted his demands, and therefore, he returned to 
Great Britain for help. In the process of negotiations, the latter paid Nuri 70.000 sterling 
gold and 3.000 rifles recognizing his independence in Djof. In return, Nuri was won over 
for the British side.1211 The worsening situation of the Ottoman Front in Palestine and Iraq 
must be added as another factor for Nuri’s change of attitude. Because, after the capture of 
Baghdad, it became difficult for the Ruela Tribe to provide food using the Mesopotamian 
line for their Caravans, and probably the capture of Palestine put him a more difficult 
situation in that regard.1212   
Another critical figure in Arabia was Ibn Saud. In a recent study on the abolition of 
the Caliphate by Nurullah Ardıç, it is claimed that Ibn Saud was “the greatest ally of” 
Great Britain.1213 However, a comparison of the Ottoman documents with that of the 
British will make it clear that, rather than a loyal supporter of the British policies, Ibn Saud 
implemented a policy of balance between the Ottomans and the British. Following the 
                                                                                                                                                    
been renewed at that time.TTK Arşivi, KO Koleksiyonu 7/126, Cemal to Enver, 20 
Teşrin-i Sani 1333 [20 November 1917]. 
1210 For the payment of his salary as 3.000 ltq. for 1917, see: BOA, DH.EUM. 2. Şb. 
32/27, Enver to Dahiliye, 30 Kanun-ı Sani 1332 [13 March 1917]; for the decision to pay 
Nuri a salary in the beginning of the War, see: BOA, DH.İ.UM 6/E-5, Ministry of Interior 
to the Governor of Syria, 15 Teşrin-i Sani 1330 [28 November 1914]. 
1211 HHStA, PA 38/371, Ranzi to Burian, “Der Abfall des Ruelafürsten Emir Nuri 
Schalan”, Damascus 13 September 1918; In February 1918, His salary was paid by the 
Ottoman Government; BOA, DH.ŞFR. 84/104, War Ministry to the Governor of Syria, 19 
Şubat 1334 [19 February 1918]; On 2nd July 1918, the Ottoman Government paid 1.000 
ltq. to Nuri. That shows that he was loyal to the Ottomans till that date; BOA, DH. ŞFR. 
89/18, War Ministry to the Governor of Syria, 2 Temmuz 1334 [2 July 1918]. 
1212 PRO, WO 158/634, Arbur to General Bagdad, Cairo, 1 October 1917. 
1213 Ardıç, Ibid, p. 200. 
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Sharifian Revolt, Ibn Saud continued his neutral attitude. Immediately after the outbreak of 
the Sharifian Revolt, he sent one of his relatives to Cemal Pasha to express his loyalty.1214 
Following that, according to the British reports, he gave an ocular proof of hostility to the 
Ottoman Empire by arresting their emissary and handing over 700 camels bought by 
himself to the British Agent.1215 Immediately after that event, Ibn Saud sent one of his 
close relatives, called Sheikh Abbas [al-Falaji], to Damascus to express to Cemal Pasha 
that his leader didn’t have any treaty with Great Britain, and didn’t contemplate to be an 
ally of Britain.1216 Quite the reverse, he conveyed the event to the British officials so 
different that he had to escape from Damascus because of flying about the news of the 
capture of the mentioned Caravans.1217 On the other hand, the German and Austrian 
Consuls of Damascus reported that Sheikh Abbas was seen off by Cemal Pasha with great 
honor.1218 In situations like this, Ibn Saud explained to the Ottoman officials that such kind 
of treatment happened as a result of the misconduct of some members of his people and 
with the enforcement of the British officials, and restored the Ottoman trust.1219 
Presumably, that action was a demonstration to prove the British Government that Ibn 
Saud sided with them in the War to prevent any British endeavor in the region to his 
detriment favoring Sharif, when the negotiations between Sharif, Great Britain and Ibn 
                                                 
1214 HHStA, PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian,"Die Politik der mittelarabischen Fürsten in 
dem Konflikt zwischen der Tuerkei und dem Emir von Mekka", Damascus,11 December 
1916 
1215 PRO, FO 371/3047, The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to FO, Basra, 16 
November 1916. 
1216 HHStA, PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian,"Die Politik der mittelarabischen Fürsten in 
dem Konflikt zwischen der Tuerkei und dem Emir von Mekka", Damascus,11 December 
1916; PA-AA, Türkei 165, Bd. 41, Loytved to Bethmann-Hollweg, Damascus, 5 January 
1917. 
1217 PRO, FO 371/3055, Cox to FO, “Letters from Ibn Saud and Muhammad Hajuri”, 
Basra, ? March 1917. 
1218 HHStA, PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian,"Die Politik der mittelarabischen Fürsten in 
dem Konflikt zwischen der Tuerkei und dem Emir von Mekka", Damascus,11 December 
1916; PA-AA, Türkei 165, Bd. 41, Loytved to Bethmann-Hollweg, Damascus, 5 January 
1917. 
1219 PA-AA, Türkei 165, Bd. 38, Hesse to Bethmann-Hollweg, Baghdad, 21 June 1916. 
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Saud was taken into consideration. Similarly, he facilitated the pass of the Ottoman 
Caravans from his region with the consideration that an Ottoman attitude favoring Ibn 
Rashid would put the ruler of Najd in a difficult situation in his struggle with the ruler of 
Hail.1220 The statements of the British officials also show that they were in doubt about the 
real attitude of Ibn Saud. They conveyed the remarks of Ibn Saud as ‘alleged’, regarding 
the latter’s correspondence with Ibn Rashid on the restoration of the peace between them 
conditioning Ibn Rashid to change his side.1221 
After the failure of the British project regarding the reconciliation of all the tribal 
dynasties, including the Rashidis, around Sharif Hussein against the Ottoman Caliphate,1222 
the British Government made a great effort to make him attack Hail, the capital of Ibn 
Rashid, since the latter, according to the British reports, had moved towards Medina to 
operate againstthe Sharif’s troops.1223 For that aim, in October 1917, the British Official 
Ronald Storrs was sent to Ibn Saud with a military mission.1224  
In this issue, Ibn Saud was on the horns of a dilemma between the danger for him 
becoming a vassal of the Sharif by losing the British support1225 and an active aggression 
against the Ottoman Government that he always avoided throughout the War. He opposed 
the British request claiming that “to capture Hail by coup-de-main, weak though Ibn 
Rashid is, because one suburb of Hail has been strongly fortified and garrisoned by 
                                                 
1220 ATASE Arşivi, Kls. 3215, Ds. 42, Fih. 3, Abdülhamid to Cemal, 9 December 1917. 
1221 PRO, FO 371/3055, Cox to FO, “Letters from Ibn Saud and Muhammad Hajuri”, 
Basra, ? March 1917; three months later, Sir Percy Cox, the British representative in Basra, 
was complaining about the contradicting reports of the Arab leaders: PRO, FO 371/3057, 
Cox to FO, Basra, 5 June 1917. 
1222 For the details of the suggestions see: PRO, FO 371/3057, General, Basra to FO, 
Basra, 9 July 1916; for details of the reasons of the disagreement between the two chiefs: 
PRO, FO 371/3057, Cox to FO, Basra, 5 June 1917. 
1223 PRO, FO 371/3383, Cox to FO, “Bin Saud”, Basra, 28 December 1917. 
1224 PRO, FO 371/3061, Wingate to FO, “Bin Saud and King Hussein”, Cairo, 2 
November 1917. 
1225 PRO, FO 371/3061, Cox to FO, “Bin Saud and Sherif”, Baghdad, 15 December 
1917. 
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Turks”.1226 Later on, the British officials would be informed that there were no Turkish 
troops at Hail.1227 His good fortune would help him in that issue again. The British 
government had abandoned the project of the capture of Hail considering the power 
balance in Arabia between Ibn Saud and Sharif Hussein.1228 
Ibn Saud didn’t totally cut his relations with the Ottoman Government even 
towards the very end of the War. Immediately after the fall of Jerusalem, at 16th December 
1917, Tahsin Bey, the Governor of Syria reported that Ibn Saud was maintaining his 
service to the Ottoman Empire.1229 Similarly, in May 1918, the Government came to an 
agreement with Ibn Saud with a view to establish communications between Sanaa and 
Medina via Nejd and channel for the receipt from Constantinople of large remittances. The 
Ottoman Government had also ratified the treaty.1230 After that no ocular hostility emerged 
between the Ottoman Government and the Governor of Najd as a result of skillful balance 
policy of the Amir of Najd. Thus, the Ottoman era in Arabia had been closed without any 
serious hostility between the Ottoman Empire and their Governor and the Commander of 
Najd. 
Another strategic group of the Bedouin tribes was those who were distributed along 
with the Hijaz Railroad, and the Bedouins of Hauran. In that regard, Cemal Pasha called 
the chiefs of the Huweitat, Beni Atije and El-Fukara, who were salaried by the Ottoman 
Government, to Damascus, and gave them gifts and gold in return for the refreshment of 
their loyalties. In addition, they were assigned to the protection of the Railways.1231 
                                                 
1226 PRO, FO 371/3057, Cox to FO, Basra, 12 November 1917. 
1227 PRO, FO 371/3383, Basset to Arbur, Jeddah, 4 February 1918. 
1228 PRO, FO 371/3389, FO to Viceroy, 14 January 1918; PRO, FO 371/3389, Wingate 
to FO, “Activities of Bin Rashid and Bin Saud”, Cairo, 7 January 1918. 
1229 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 573/117, Tahsin to Ministry of Interior, Damascus, 16 Kanun-ı 
Evvel 1333 [16 December 1917]. 
1230 PRO, FO 371/3389, G.O.C. Aden to Wingate, “Bin Saud and Turks”, Aden, 21 
May 1918. 
1231 HHStA, PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian, "Die Abreise des neuen Grossscherifs nach 
Medina", Damascus, 7 August 1916; The British reports also confirm the loyalty of those 
tribes to the Ottoman Government. For further informations see: PRO, WO 158/626, 
Clayton to FO, 11 November 1916; PRO, WO 158/626, Graves to WO, “Tribes on Gulf of 
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 With the advance of Faysal’s troops towards north, in the middle of 1917, the 
attitude of those tribes became “worthy of anxiety” for the Ottoman authorities.1232 The 
Huweitat and Beli Tribes in the mentioned regions went into divisions in themselves 
regarding their sides in the battle between the Ottoman Government and the Sharif’s 
troops. While Abu Taje, the chief of the former, was supporting the Sharif, his rival inside 
the tribe Ibn Djazi stayed loyal to the Government. Similarly, Suleiman Pasha, the leader 
of Beli Tribe, kept faith with the Ottoman side, while his son had changed his side with the 
majority of the Tribe.1233 On the other hand, the Druzes, the most important local power in 
the region, Beni Sakhr and Beni Sarwiye tribes stayed in the Ottoman side.1234 
 The increase of the propaganda activities of the Sharif’s men, Sharif Nasir and 
Aude Abu Taye, the leader of Huweitat Tribe, compelled the Government to take military 
precautions for the prevention of their further penetration. In this regard, the Ottoman 
authorities kept an ester-süvar division in Amman as well as dispatching some troops to 
the center of Hauran and increased the number of the Circassian volunteers serving in the 
region.1235 However, these measures didn’t suffice for the obviation of Sharif’s influence 
among the Bedouins. Those tribes were continuously attacking the Hijaz Railway to cut 
the connection with Medina.1236 Thereupon, Mehmed Cemal Pasha, the Commander of 8th 
                                                                                                                                                    
Akaba East Shore and South to Wejh”, 21 November 1916; for the medals given to the 
tribal chiefs see: BOA, DH.KMS. 41/46, Talat to Said Halim, 27 Eylül 1916. In May 1917, 
some tribal chiefs were also awarded awarde with various medals due to their allegiance 
and active support to the Ottoman Government: BOA, DH.KMS. 44-2/19, Talat to Said 
Halim, 12 Mayıs 1333 [12 May 1917]. 
1232 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 557/92, Tahsin to Talat, 22 Haziran 1333 [22 June 1917]. 
1233 HHStA, PA 38/370, Ranzi to Czernin, “Nachhang zu h.a. Berichte 23 Juli”, 
Damascus, 2 August 1917. 
1234 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 557/92, Tahsin to Talat, 22 Haziran 1333 [22 June 1917]. 
1235 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 557/92, Tahsin to Talat, 22 Haziran 1333 [22 June 1917]. 
1236 In four week between the middle of September and October, the pro-British 
Bedouins were able to destroy best of 3 Ottoman locomotives  with these attacks: PA-AA, 
Türkei 165, Bd. 42, Greenberg ? to Michaelis, Damascus, 20 October 1917; Once, they 
had derailed the train of Cemal Pasha, the Commander of 8th Army Corps. For details see: 
BOA, DH.ŞFR. 572/70, Tahsin to Talat. Damascus, 29 Teşrin-i Sani 1333 [29 November 
1917]. 
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Army Corps, was instructed to struggle those tribes. He would create railway protection 
squadrons from the pro-Ottoman tribes in the region. In addition, to support his position, 
the Army Commander Cemal Pasha demanded extra troops from Enver Pasha.1237 
Cemal Pasha made a successful military struggle with the Sharif’s troops, which 
will be detailed in the last chapter. However, both the worsening situation of the Ottoman 
economy in Syria due to the famine and the advance of the British troops in Sinai and Iraq 
changed the picture, to some extent, to the detriment of the Ottoman side. Moreover, the 
smaller Bedouin tribes were more dissatisfied with the Governmental policy of 
conscription and requisition while the larger ones were able to refuse them.1238 
Nevertheless, till the very last moment many smaller tribes remained loyal to the Ottoman 
rule fighting actively with the Ottoman troops.1239 By September 1918, parallel to the 
weakening authority of the Ottoman state, many of the smaller tribes in the east and south 
of the Dead Sea had been won over by the Sharif with the military and financial help of 
Great Britain.1240 It is reasonable from all these to conclude that, in the hostility between 
the British and the Ottoman troops in the southern Palestine the tribes were divided into 
two parts between the sides. While the support to the British were increasing 
corresponding to their military success, the loyalty to the Ottoman rule was not abandoned 
till the last moment.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1237 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 558/48, Tahsin to Talat, Damascus, 2 Temmuz 1333 [2 July 1917]. 
1238 PRO, FO 371/2777, McMahon to FO (Transmitting an intelligent returned from 
Syria), Cairo, 20 May 1916. 
1239 Rogan, Ibid, p. 238-240. 
1240 TTK Arşivi, KO Koleksiyonu 7/49, Fahreddin to Enver, 29 Ağustos 1334 [29 
August 1918]; HHStA, PA 38/371, Ranzi to Burian, “Der Abfall des Ruelafürsten Emir 
Nuri Schalan”, Damascus 13 September 1918. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
 
WAR, FAMİNE AND EPIDEMİCS 
 
 
 
Famine was the most staggering incident in the WWI for the Syrian peoples, who lost 
hundreds of thousands of their members as a result of that calamity, and the other social 
disasters emanated from the famine, like epidemics, inflation and devaluation of paper 
money had that impact. Neither Cemal Pasha’s rule of terror nor the rigors of the battles 
that took place in the Sinai Front became as influential in the change of the attitude of the 
Syrians against the Ottoman Empire as that of famine and its consequences. The impact of 
the starvation was so devastating in that region that, by the end of the War, total mortality 
from both starvation and epidemics reached 500.000.1241 
 In his acclaimed study on the development of Arab nationalism, like many Arabs, 
George Antonius accused the Ottomans of trading grains at high prices on the black 
market. In his viewpoint, the Lebanese was deliberately starved due to their sympathies to 
France.1242 Quite the reverse of him, Linda Schatkowski Schilcher demonstrated in her 
article, titled The Famine of 1915-1918 in Greater Syria the Entente’s responsibility. She 
deservedly examined the role of the Entente’s blockade in the death of the people from 
                                                 
1241 Schlicher, Schatkowski L., “The Famine of 1915-1918 in Greater Syria”, in 
Problems of the Modern Middle East in Historical Perspective: Essays in Honor of Albert 
Hourani, John Spangolo (Ed.), Ithaca Press, Oxford: 1992, p. 229. 
1242 Antonius, Ibid, p. 241. 
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starvation in Syria as well as the inaptitude of the Ottoman officials, who couldn’t prevent 
misuse of the War circumstances, or sometimes profited by the mentioned circumstances. 
The present study aims at widening the analyses of Schichler applying mostly the 
Ottoman, Austrian and the German documents regarding the subject under the study as 
well as attempting an analysis of the changing aspects of the Ottoman government in Syria 
under Cemal Pasha taking famine as a case study. In this context, this study will try to 
demonstrate how the struggle with the famine and its consequences contributed to the 
process of making the Syrians ideal citizens. In such a way that some techniques used by 
Cemal to eliminate the reasons and consequences of the famine also demonstrate the 
changing character of the Ottoman Rule in Syria with Cemal’s appointment. Similarly, 
while struggling with the removal of the destructive impact of famine, such as epidemics, 
the process also paved the way for the consolidation of the government’s control on the 
bodies of the people. All in all, apart from its destructive impact on the different peoples of 
Syria, the famine is an ideal case study to see the nature of the new rule established in 
Syria with the beginning of the war.  
 
 
 
8.1. Reasons behind the Famine 
 
 
The reasons behind the starvation, which ruled over the Greater Syria throughout 
the War period, and implicitly, those who were responsible for the death of the tremendous 
members of people as a result of these disasters, are still a matter of debate in the existing 
literature. In his memoires, Cemal Pasha accuses the Sharifian Revolt as the main factor 
preventing the provisioning in Syria. Cemal claims that, in spite of the destructive impact 
of the locust plague on the harvest in 1915, he had secured the needs of the Syrian 
provinces for food before the outbreak of the Revolt. But, with the start of the Sharif’s 
movement, Cemal had to dispatch the grain of Syria to the Bedouin tribes to guarantee 
their allegiance to the Imperial authority. Therefore, a catastrophic starvation captured the 
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daily life in Syria. In addition, he mentions the Entente’s blockade as another reason.1243 
On the other hand, the Entente states and some academic studies accused Cemal Pasha of 
punishing the pro-Entente components of the Syrian society as in the case of Lebanon. 
They claimed that Cemal Pasha deliberately starved Lebanon because of the pro-French 
tendencies prevailed among the local people.1244 
Schicher’s study, however, convincingly indicates the mutual responsibility of the 
sides –Entente, Ottomans and the Sharif- in the event of the famine in Syria. She analyzed 
in a detailed way both the impact of the Entente’s blockade and the problems of the 
Ottoman rule to handle the issue. Therefore, that section will only give a summary of the 
reasons behind the famine to complete the picture, and some factors neglected in the 
mentioned study will be pointed out, especially regarding the reasons behind the attitude of 
the Ottoman authorities in connection with the new ideology of the state.  
In this sense, the endless requisitions of the agricultural products and the pack 
animals for the preparations of the expedition against Egypt can be mentioned as the first 
reason behind the scarcity of foodstuff in Syria. In the pre-war years, the collection rights 
of the tithe were given out to the tax contractors by contract. In the War period, however, 
this work was taken over directly by the Army. Presumably, the contractors paid regard to 
the balance between the needs of the civil people and the needs of the state. As far as 
inferred from all the available sources, it is impossible to claim the same thing for the 
Army. Additionally, the Army made further purchases from the market for its needs, 
sometimes forcefully with paper money and sometimes by the consent of the peasants with 
hard coin. All these reasons caused a deep scarcity of food in Syria beginning in the second 
year of the War.1245  
                                                 
1243 Cemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 216, 219. 
1244 For an archival document claiming the same thing, see: PRO, FO 371/2779, Sykes 
to FO, “Arabian Report”, Cairo, 15 July 1916; Upon the news, Cemal would send 20.000 
ltq. to Lebanon to buy grains, and would demand the dissemination of the news of this 
assistance in the press: BOA, DH.ŞFR. 532/57, Cemal to Talat, Jerusalem, 5 Temmuz 
1332 [18 July 1916]; for an academic evaluation regarding the intentional starvation of 
Lebanon by Cemal Pasha, see: Kévorkian, Raymond, Ibid, p. 681. 
1245 HHStA, PA38/366, Ranzi to Burian, “Die Lebensmittelversorgung von Syrien”, 
Damascus, 15 December 1915. 
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Schicher deservedly analyzed these factors. However, she neglects the expedition 
against Egypt. All these thoughtless requisitions were largely due to the cruciality of the 
Egyptian expedition for Cemal in the beginning of the War. As demonstrated in the first 
chapter, the Ottoman Central Government and their Governor General in Syria, Cemal 
Pasha, attributed vital importance to the conquest of Egypt, and therefore, all the human 
and material sources of Syria were mobilized for the realization of this goal with the 
beginning of the War in the European Theatres. Secondly, the Ottoman authorities thought 
that the War would come to an end in a short span of time with the success of the Central 
Powers. Therefore, at that time, mobilization was conducted so thoughtlessly that, in the 
remarks of the British Consul in Aleppo: 
“The country has been stripped of horses, mules, carts and, in a great measure, of food 
stores, and great mismanagement and was to have marked the ruthless and despotic 
requisition. More horses have been seized than could be fed, nor does there seem any 
probability of the great food supplies collected being so handled as to suffice for the needs 
of the regular troops for any length of time, not to speak of the Reserves. The reservists at 
Aleppo are left to find food for themselves. The country may be said to be so denuded of 
men and of cereals as to leave little prospect of the land being sown this autumn.”1246 
As a response to this, in the beginning of the mobilization, people shifted their 
requisionable properties to Lebanon, which was then out of effective government control. 
The way leading to ending the autonomy of Lebanon started with these events; upon the 
repeated cables of the governors of Syria and Beirut, The Central Government began to 
think a change in the status of Lebanon.1247  
                                                 
1246 PRO, FO 195/2460, Aleppo Consul to Louis Mallet, Aleppo, 31 August 1914; The 
situation was not different in other towns of Syria. In May 1915, the German Consul in 
Beirut reported that there wasn’t any other city in Syria that the requisitions were 
implemented in a harder way. He also added that the Government requisitioned the cereals 
of the inland cities of Syria as well; PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.11, Mutius to Bethmann-
Hollweg, Beirut, 1 May 1915; The Ottoman Government applied the same rules of the 
requisitions to the citizens of the foreign states. The Ministry of Interior instructed the 
Governor of Jerusalem that, when the pack animals of the foreigners inside his house were 
decided to commandeer, the consul of the mentioned state should have been invited before 
entering into the house. If the consul didn’t arrive in 24 hours, then the state officials were 
authorized to seize the pack animal. If the pack animals were seen outside, the Government 
officials were certified to capture it recording the breed of the animal: BOA, DH.ŞFR. 
44/97, Ministry of Interior to the Governor of Jerusalem, Ağustos 1330 [26 August 1914]. 
1247 For some examples, see: BOA, DH.EUM.4.Şb. 1/2, 28 Ağustos 1330 [10 
September 1914]. 
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Since the conquest of Egypt kept its place in Cemal’s agenda as the first priority in 
the first year of the War, this picture remained mainly unchanged during 1915, pushing the 
planning of the alimentation of the civil people into the background. All the trains were put 
under the Army’s order to satisfy the foodstuff needs of the troops. Without thinking of the 
civil people, most of the cereals were sent to the Army stores. The Governors of some 
cities even requested additional Gendarmeries to be able to seize the harvest from the 
peasants.1248 In Beirut, the implementation of requisition was so exaggerated that, in the 
first quarter of 1915, the city-dwellers were devoid of bread for days.1249 Similarly, in 
some provinces, there would be no seed for the year 1916.1250 However, the good-harvest 
of most provinces in 1915, excluding Palestine, which was damaged by the locust plague, 
mainly forestalled a disaster for that year.1251  
 In the following years of the War, the deterioration of the provisioning situation 
with the impact of the natural disasters like locust plague, the east winds and spread of the 
grain speculation resulted with the increasing weight of Cemal’s iron fist over the peasants 
to seize their products for the military use and to sell their cereals for paper money. Those 
policies made a motivation-breaking effect on the peasants with the thought that they 
would, at all events, be deprived of selling their grains in the free market by their own 
will.1252  
In addition, the recruitment of the agricultural labor and the requisitioning of the 
pack animals, which constituted the entire workforce for agriculture in Syria, contributed 
                                                 
1248 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 487/10, Bekir Sami to Talat, Beirut, 21 August 1331 [3 September 
1915] 
1249 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.11, Mutius to Bethmann-Hollweg, Beirut, 1 May 1915. 
1250 For the seed request of the Governor of Jerusalem, see: BOA, DH.ŞFR. 501/123, 
Midhat to Talat, Jerusalem, 6 Kanun-ı Evvel 1331 [19 December 1915]; for the request of 
the Governor of Syria, see: BOA, DH.ŞFR. 502/91, Azmi to Talat, Damascus, 13 Kanun-ı 
Evvel 1915 [26 December 1915]. 
1251 HHStA, PA 38/366, Ranzi to Burian, “Die Lebensmittelversorgung von Syrien”, 
Damascus, 15 December 1915; BOA, DH.ŞFR. 469/45, Celal to Talat, Aleppo, 19 Nisan 
1331 [2 May 1915]. 
1252 PRO, FO371/2783, WO to FO, “Report of an Inhabitant of Athlit, Mount Carmel”, 
3 November 1916; PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 13, Stotzingen to AA, 17 November 1916. 
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to the decrease of the production. The impact of that factor was so frightful that, in 
September 1915, the Government had to send a telegraph to the Governorates requiring 
them to create labor battalions to do agriculture in the villages.1253 Cemal Pasha 
immediately implemented this measure. According to the remarks of the Austrian Consul 
in Aleppo, these battalions were employed in agriculture and using these battalions, the 
fallow lands were opened to agriculture.1254 However, that was not enough to produce 
sufficient grain for Syria, and even for the Army in the following years. 
Besides that, most of the teachers of agriculture, who were appointed to the towns 
to train the farmers about farming, were recruited to do their “civic duties” in the army. 
After a short description of the negative impact of the conscription on the agricultural 
production, the director for the agricultural issues of the province of Syria [Suriye Vilayeti 
Ziraat Müdiri] complained at the end of 1916 that it was impossible, because of the 
conscription, to find people, who had been graduated from the school of agriculture, to 
employ for the development of agriculture.1255 As a result, most of the agricultural 
producers had to abandon to cultivate their lands.1256 The only exception was the Druzes of 
Hauran, who became immune to all the suppressive measures of the Government.1257 In 
addition, the fear of the Bedouins of being recruited caused a considerable reduction in the 
amount of the agricultural production. Following the proclamation of the mobilization, 
                                                 
1253 BOA, DH.İ.UM.EK. 95/59, Talat to the Governorates, 10 Eylül 1331 [23 
September 1915]. 
1254 HHStA, PA 38/370, Dandini to Czernin,"Fortschritte in der tuerkischen 
Verwaltung", Aleppo, 16 February 1917. 
1255 BOA, DH.UMVM. 137/22, The Director of the Agricultural Issues to Talat, 
Damascus, 22 Kanun-ı Evvel 1332 [5 December 1916]. 
1256 PRO, FO371/2783, WO to FO, “Report of an Inhabitant of Athlit, Mount Carmel”, 
3 November 1916; PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 13, Stotzingen to AA, 17 November 1916; 
PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.13, Ruppin to Abraham Elkus, Constantinople, 13 December 
1916; Similar complaints can be found in the reports of the Governor of Syria. 
Immediately after his appointment as Governor, he grumbled about the limitless violence 
while collecting the product of the peasants. For details, see: BOA, DH.ŞFR. 533/63, 
Tahsin to Talat, Damascus, 13 Eylül 1332 [26 September 1916]. 
1257 For the details of the privileges of the Druzes, see the Chapter 7 
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especially the smaller tribes dispersed in the inaccessible deserts leaving their agricultural 
lands to escape from the recruitment.1258   
The deteriorating impact of the requisitions and natural disasters over the 
agricultural production was accompanied by a deficiency in the transportation means, 
which prevented a proper organization of the food distribution. First, the requisitioning of 
all kinds of pack animals, such as the draught animals, camels, horses, mules and oxen, for 
the army use made it almost impossible to transport grains from the agriculturally 
productive lands to the destitute regions. Secondly, the problems of the railway 
transportation emanating from the lack of coal prevented the transfer of food supply among 
the provinces.1259 The Syrian Railways were operating before the War with the imported 
coal. Following the commencement of the hostilities, the naval blockade of the Entente 
prevented the coal imports, and therefore, the coal reserves in Syria were exhausted in a 
short span of time. Due to that, shortly after the entrance into the War, the train services, 
which had been performed two times in a day, had to be reduced to two times in a 
week.1260 The undertakings to mine coal from Lebanon remained inconclusive.1261 Because 
of the lack of coal, in June 1915, railroad transportation had to be interrupted for a month 
                                                 
1258 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 568/10, Abdülkadir to Talat, Zor, 8 Teşrin-i Sani 1333 [8 
November 1917]. 
1259 PA-AA, Türkei 195, Bd.10, Warburg and Jakobson to AA, 3 November 1916; 
According to the Austrian Consul in Damascus, the only reason for the starvation was not 
the lack of food, but also the problems of the transportation means and the organization 
skills. HHStA, PA 38/366, Ranzi to Burian, “Entente-freundliche Ausstreuungen: 
Einstellung des Verkehrs auf den Syrischen Bahnen”, Damascus, 22 June 1915; 
Furthermore, the Ottoman accounts confirms their evaluations; in a report of the Governor 
of Aleppo on the season of 1914, he described how the harvest was abundant there stating 
that it was rarely happened in last twenty-thirty years such a plenty of cereals. The amount 
of grains in and around Aleppo was so great that besides its own needs, the production of 
the province sufficed to compensate the needs of the 4th Army and, in addition, a 
considerable amount of cereals had been sent to Istanbul. However, the Governor 
complained about the lack of the transportation means inside Syria to transport the needs 
of foods in Beirut and Lebanon. BOA, DH.ŞFR. 469/45, Celal to Talat, Aleppo, 19 Nisan 
1331 [2 May 1915] 
1260 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.11, Mutius to Bethmann-Hollweg, Beirut, 1 May 1915. 
1261 HHStA, PA 38/366, Ranzi to Burian, “Entente-freundliche Ausstreuungen: 
Einstellung des Verkehrs auf den Syrischen Bahnen”, Damascus, 22 June 1915. 
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in Syria. Afterwards, the services could be maintained by the usage of wood as fuel in the 
trains.1262 However, the number of the services and the carrying capacity of the trains were 
considerably reduced. The available trains, too, were employed to provide the needs of the 
Army.1263 Therefore, throughout the War period, food supply to the starving people 
presented an insurmountable question for the Government.1264 The result was the creation 
of the appropriate conditions for the speculation on the cereals, and thus, the tremendous 
increase of the food prices in Greater Syria. 
In addition to requisition, in April 1915, a locust plague, which appeared in 
Palestine and in the Hauran plateau, took a great tool to the food conditions in Syria. As a 
result of that disaster, great amount of the immaturated harvest and fruits in these places 
were destroyed.1265 With the remarks of Von Kress, the locusts had rained like a shower. 
When anybody stayed among the locust flocks flying in the air, he or she felt that the sky 
got dark. Their impact was so terrible that even a leaf did not remain on the trees. The 
plague had changed a green country into a desert in a few hours.1266 According to the 
statement of Cemal Pasha, at that year, the harvest hardly passed the half of the previous 
years.1267 
In the sense of the natural disasters, towards the end of 1916, the eastwinds made a 
great damage on the harvest of Hauran, which could be deemed as the grain basket of 
Syria. The winds destroyed 1/4 of the cereals there. As a result, in the view of the Austrian 
Consul, the remaining grain wouldn’t suffice even for the needs of the Army. Moreover, as 
                                                 
1262 The trains on the railway between Damascus and Birüssebi were consuming 150 
tons of wood daily: PRO, FO 371/2783, WO to FO, “Report of an Inhabitant of Athlit, 
Mount Carmel”, 3 November 1916. 
1263 HHStA, PA 38/366, Ranzi to Burian, “Wiederaufnahme des Verkehrs der 
Syrischen Bahnen”, Damascus, 31 July 1915. 
1264 At the end of the War, the scarcity of rolling stock was so increased that, the 
Governor of Aleppo had to demand coal for the transfer of the Ottoman officials from 
Syria: BOA, DH.ŞFR. Abdülhalık to Ministry of Interior, Aleppo 4 Teşrin-i Evvel 1334 [4 
October 1918]. 
1265 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 11, Löytvet to Bethmann-Hollweg, Haifa, 14 April 1915. 
1266 Von Kressenstein, Ibid, p. 119-120. 
1267 Cemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 214. 
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rightly determined by Cemal above, the commencement of the Sharifian Revolt at that year 
made a fatal impact on the grain conditions of Syria; in such a way that, in return for their 
loyalties, Cemal Pasha had to dispatch to the tribes plenty of food. Worst of all, the 
Government didn’t achieve to take the harvest of the Druzes meaning that a loss of 20.000 
tones of cereals occurred. Afterwards, they would sell their crops like a speculator. Besides 
that, since the military requisitions didn’t leave to the peasants even their seeds, they 
resorted to hide their harvests.1268 
Last, but not the least, a factor that might be mentioned as the reason of the Famine 
stemming from the problems of the Ottoman Government in the food crisis of Syria was 
the ambiguous situation of paper money. The paper money was introduced into Syria after 
the beginning of the War. In the preceding years of the War, the Ottoman Government had 
been circulating the nickel hard coin and the gold in the Syrian market. Similarly, the 
notes, which were published by the Ottoman Bank and accepted willingly in the other 
regions of the Empire, were off the beaten track in the Syrian district in the previous period 
of the War.1269  
Apart from its usage in Syria, the paper money represents the prestige of the state 
among its citizens. If the paper money is not accepted by them as a medium of exchange, it 
means that they don’t trust their state. As a governor, who made a ceaseless effort to assert 
the Ottoman authority over Syria, Cemal didn’t refrain from applying the heaviest 
enforcements to make the paper money widely used. Although the reactions of the local 
people didn’t stem from mistrust against the state, Cemal’s endeavors to disseminate the 
circulation of the paper money, should be evaluated in the category of his activities to 
fortify the state’s authority in Syria 
With the start of the War, the Ottoman Government made that crucial decision for 
the economy of the region, and put the paper money into circulation for the daily use 
signing a Guarantee-contract with Germany. However, despite the severe measures of 
                                                 
1268 HHStA, PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian, “Getreideversorgung Syriens”, Damascus, 25 
September 1916. 
1269 HHStA, PA 38/370, Kiatkowski to Czernin, “Massnahmen gegen die zunehmende 
Entwertung des Papiergeldes”, Beirut, 4 May 1917; PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 13, Deutsche 
Palaestina Bank Jaffa to Von Rosenberg, Jaffa, 4 March 1916. 
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Cemal Pasha, to be dealt below, this implementation didn’t meet with kind reception by 
the local people who were not used to paper money practice. In the second year of getting 
into circulation of the paper money, the sellers either didn’t accept to determine a price 
with that money to their goods, or they demanded extra payment when the customers 
offered paper money.1270 The failure of the paper money was more striking among the 
Bedouins and the Druzes in Hauran, who provided great amount of the provisioning of the 
region. They accepted to deliver their grains for nothing other than the gold money.1271 
There was even a difference between the hard coins; the coins issued in 1916 were called 
“çürük” [corrupt] and devalued because of the smallness of the proportion of silver.1272 
Even State’s officials contributed to the process collecting half of the taxes with hard 
coin.1273 Therefore, the paper money was depreciated throughout the War period. 
As for the Entente responsibility behind the death of hundreds and thousands of 
people from starvation, the blockade implemented by those in the Syrian coasts from the 
beginning of the war should be mentioned in the first place. Especially the coastal cities, 
being Lebanon in the first place, were deeply damaged by the blockade. The reasons 
behind this profound influence by the blockade were mainly because the way of the 
subsistence of the Lebanese. Those cities, to a large extent, subsisted on silkworm-
breeding and its commerce with abroad, especially with Europe.1274 Furthermore, all the 
transportation from the Imperial Centre to the mentioned cities was made by way of the 
                                                 
1270 For example, when a customer wanted to pay paper money to 23 kg. of wheat, 
he/she had to pay 120 ltq. instead of 50 ltq. in gold: PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 13, Deutsche 
Palaestina Bank Jerusalem to the Director of the Deutschen Orientbank Constantinople, 
Jerusalem, 13 October 1916. 
1271 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.13, Deutsche Palaestina Bank Beirut to Von Rosenberg, 
“Bericht für das Jahr 1915”, Beirut, 29 April 1916. 
1272 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 17, Weber to Hertling, Constantinople, 26 June 1918; in 
the other regions of the Empire, -in Anatolia and at Constantinople- the Ottoman paper 
money is generally accepted and supplies can be purchased with paper money: PRO, FO 
371/3050, William Yale to British Ambassador in Washington, “Palestine and Syria 
Situation”, Washington, 13 July 1917. 
1273 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.13, Stotzingen to AA, 17 April 1916. 
1274 Von Kiesling, Hans, Rund um den Libanon: Friedliche Wanderungen waehrend des 
Weltkrieges, Leipzig, Dieterich’sche Verlagbuchhandlung: 1920, p. 30. 
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sea. However, the start of the Entente blockade in the Syrian coasts immediately after the 
proclamation of the hostility with these states terminated both the commerce in the 
mentioned cities and prevented any entrance of food by sea.1275 The British and French 
deliberately used the famine as a weapon of war. Based on the British and French 
Archives, Elisabeth Thompson demonstrated that: 
“In May 1916, Maronite Archbishop Joseph Darien protested the use of famine for 
political ends, urging the French consul in Cairo to demand an immediate Entente invasion 
to save lives. Althoug the French had by then received reports of up to 800.000 deaths, 
Foreign Minister Aristide Briand spurned the consul’s pleas to invade, arguing that it 
would only provoke a general massacre. The consul then urged that France break the 
blockade and ship food to Lebanon. A June 2 British memo to the foreign ministry, 
however, flatly rejected the proposal to feed starving civilians: ‘His Majesty’s Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs expresses his earnest hope that the French Government will not 
encourage any such scheme… the Entente Allies are simply being blackmailed to remedy 
the shortage of supplies which it is the very intention of the blockade to produce.’ The 
British ‘consider the famine as an agent that will lead the Arabs to revolt’ a June 4 internal 
French foreign ministry memo.”1276 
Towards the end of the year 1916, the situation in Lebanon was so severe that, according 
to the calculations of Ali Münif Bey, the Governor of Lebanon, the food subsidy of the 
Government for Lebanon in 1916 corresponded to 4 kg. cereals per person monthly. He 
estimated at the end of 1916 that if the situation remained as such, half of the population 
would die from the starvation.1277 To solve the question to a certain extent, the Ottoman 
Government suggested the Lebanese to grow cereals in their gardens instead of silk-worm 
breeding. However, this was not accepted by the latter. On the other hand, the interruption 
of the Railway transportation with Lebanon due to the lack of coal, and the mountainous 
nature of its geography prevented any Governmental intervention in the starvation in 
Lebanon. The Government made some attempts to supply grains to Lebanon. But, these 
endeavors also failed due to the impact of speculation; the people had to buy cereals for a 
                                                 
1275 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 11, Mutius to Bethmann-Hollweg, Beirut, 1 May 1915; 
PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 13, Ruppin to Abraham Elkus, Constantinople, 13 December 
1916; According to a British report on Lebanon, it is stated that the yearly loss of Beirut 
from the silk trade was 800.000 pounds: PRO, FO371/2783, WO to FO, “Report of an 
Inhabitant of Athlit, Mount Carmel”, 3 November 1916; Von Kressenstein, Ibid, p. 30. 
1276 Thompson, Colonial Citizens, p. 22. 
1277 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 540/105, Ali Münif to Talat, Beirut, 7 Kanun-ı Evvel 1332 [20 
December 1916]. 
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very high price.1278 In addition, in winter of 1915-1916, “a heavy snow blocked travel to 
Mount Lebanon”.1279 
Besides their naval blockade, towards the end of the War, Great Britain blockaded 
the interior sections of Syria preventing the flow of grain from Baghdad and the Persian 
Gulf following the fall of the former in March 1917. Before the capture of Baghdad, there 
was a trade route between Baghdad and Damascus passing from the desert. However, 
shortly after the British invasion, that route was closed. Thereupon, the merchants agreed 
with the Shaikh of Kuwait, and commenced to purchase goods via Kuwait. All the same, 
considering the things to come when the British officials were informed about that trade, 
the Shaikh himself closed this route. The possibility of a trade with Anatolia had already 
finished from the beginning of the War. Thus, almost all the trade routes were blocked 
between the exterior and Syria by Great Britain, before its capture.1280 
As for the shares of the Austrian and German officials posted in Syria and the 
Sharif, the remarks of Schicher seem quite convincing: 
“The German and Austrİan offcials posted in greater Syria were also culpable because they 
were ineffective in remedying a situation for which they were, at least partially, 
responsible. They reacted far too late, gave lame excuses about the likely misinterpretation 
of political interference, refused to commit the necessary funds, and sustained the evil in 
fear of being blamed for its initiation. 
The Arab rebels themselves also share, at least indirectly, some of the responsibility. The 
Hashimits appear to have manipulated tribal allegiances through the food supply and to 
have condoned the Entente blockade of the parts of greater Syria which were still under 
Ottoman control. It was the diversion of grain southwards and the spread of British gold 
through the rebels which contributed to shortages and inflation in 1917 and 1918.”1281 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1278 HHStA, PA 38/369, Nedwed to Burian, “Die Teuerung und Hungersnot, Ihre 
Ursachen und Folgen”, Beirut, 26 October 1916; similar informations can be found at: PA-
AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 13, Ruppin to Abraham Elkus, Constantinople, 13 December 1916. 
1279 Thompson, Colonial Citizens, p. 19. 
1280 HHStA, PA 38/371, Ranzi to Czernin, “Die Eröffnung neuer Handelswege zur 
Verprovianterung von Syrien”, Damascus, 26 January 1918. 
1281 Schicher, Ibid, p. 254. 
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8.2. The Measures of the Ottoman Administration against Starvation 
 
 
As emphasized in the preceding chapter, the increase of the prestige of the Ottoman 
State was one of the most outstanding concerns of Cemal Pasha in Syria. As would be 
clarified below by the remarks of the Ottoman officials under Cemal’s rule in Syria, the 
inadequacy of the Ottoman State to nourish its citizens created a significant threat for its 
prestige in the eyes of the Syrian Ottomans. By that reason, Cemal Pasha and his 
bureaucrats applied all the means to remove this danger, and put heavy punishments for 
ones who didn’t obey his regulations. In that sense, in the beginning of 1916, Cemal Pasha 
took precautions to solve the problem, upon the alarming situation of the food supply in 
Syria. First of all, he determined a maximum price for the cereals, and decided to deliver a 
quantity of cereals per diem to the provincial capitals from the Army stores as well as 
ordering the transportation of them under any circumstances with train or the other means. 
He decided to inflict heavy punishments for those, who transcended the maximum prices, 
and who stockpiled cereals. Furthermore, he invited the Governors of Beirut, Aleppo, 
Lebanon, Jerusalem and Damascus to deliberate about the results of starvation. According 
to the Austrian Consul in Damascus, the energetic intervention of Cemal Pasha made a 
calming effect on people.1282 
As expressed before, the lack of the transportation means and the devaluation of 
money paved the way for a speculation of the grain, which created further disorder in the 
economic life in Syria. At the end of the year 1915, Cemal Pasha abolished the prohibition 
of trade in cereals between the provinces with the aim of stopping further speculation, this 
entered into force in the beginning of the same year, to prevent any speculation of grain 
and any move of cereals to the Entente fleet, which was active in the Eastern 
Mediterranean. That was a usual measure applied by the Ottoman authorities in times of 
crisis to stop speculation.1283 However, during the war time, this measure contributed more 
                                                 
1282 HHStA, PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian, “Hungerkrawall in Damaskus”, Damascus, 11 
January 1916. 
1283 Schicher, Ibid, p. 236. 
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to the speculation of the cereals as a result of the termination of the food supply from the 
grain-wealthy districts to the starving regions.1284  That result enforced Cemal Pasha to 
cancel his decision of export ban, and allowed the free trade of grains between the 
provinces. He delivered this right to the private entrepreneurs and required the transfer of 
the grains with their means, because the railway transportation used for the Army needs. 
1285 However, liberalizing the trade in grains, in Damascus, the people suffered from the 
lack of bread for a few days. As a result, Cemal had to retreat from his decision, and found 
a by-way. He assigned the grain trade to some confidential people of the Government. 
Thus, he would arrange the flow of the cereals to the cities. He also limited the 
consumption of the purchased bread with the bread cards distributed to the people. Cemal 
also prohibited the production of fine quality flour.1286 
At that year, for the sake of the prevention of the speculation, firstly, the 
Government aimed at the control of the merchandizing process of the cereals and 
prohibited the private purchase of the grains from the producers. This job was delivered to 
some concessionaires. They would buy the cereals and hand over to the Government with 
6-10 % profit.1287 The peasants were forbidden to sell their products separately. But a few 
months later, the prohibitions had to be retreated. All the restrictions on the price of the 
cereals were removed, except that of the transportation. The merchants had to transfer their 
goods with their own means. That well-intended attempt, however, totally failed and 
caused an unscrupulous speculation. The merchants bought the grain from the peasants and 
sold it to the people with the hard coin. That directed the people to change the paper 
money in their hands with hard coin. As a result, the paper money was depreciated half in 
                                                 
1284 HHStA, PA38/366, Ranzi to Burian, “Die Lebensmittelversorgung von Syrien”, 
Damascus, 15 December 1915. 
1285 For example, the comparative highness of the grain prices in Beirut and Lebanon 
caused the change of  the direction of the transportation to these cities from Hauran. The 
merhants started to transfer the grains to the cities where the prices were higher: HHStA, 
PA38/366, Ranzi to Burian, “Die Lebensmittelversorgung von Syrien”, Damascus, 15 
December 1915. 
1286 HHStA, PA38/369, Ranzi to Burian, “Getreidenot in Syrien”, Damascus, 3 March 
1916.  
1287 HHStA, PA38/369, Ranzi to Burian, “Getreideversorgung Syriens”, Damascus, 25 
September 1916. 
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value, while a scarcity of hard coin had emerged.1288 The Government again had to return 
to the first practice. That change of system was billed at % 50 increase in the price of the 
cereals, and the maintenance of the requisitioning system caused the peasants to withhold 
their productions.1289 
Upon the inadequacy of the measures to forestall the grain speculation and the 
devaluation of the paper money and to give an order to the economic life, Cemal decided 
to implement his most radical action that was taken in this regard. After a meeting with the 
governors of the Syrian provinces on 24th April 1917, Cemal announced to Al-Sharq 
Newspaper that, beginning from 15 May 1917, the value of the paper money would be 
made equal to the value of the gold coin, and thus, the difference of currency between the 
hard money and the paper money would be resolved.1290 If the exchange difference 
continued, Cemal would choose among the administrators of the Ottoman and Deutsche 
Bank, the great merchants, cambists and the notables of the lands by lot to send 1/10 of 
them to exile into Anatolia. Till the normalization of the currency, he would apply this 
measure at the end of every sixth week. He expressed in the announcement that he applied 
that measure to protect the poor people.1291 
With the maintenance of the currency difference, as he promised in his declaration, 
Cemal chose randomly 21 of notables and merchants of the town to expel. He prorated the 
                                                 
1288 Upon the scarcity of the hard coin the Municipality of Damascus published the 
following proclamation in Al-Muqtabas Newspaper: “All the small vendors, bakers, 
butchers, bathkeepers, vegtable dealers, cookshops, cafekeepers, barbers, and grocers et. of 
all sorts, who receive small change should bring half of the money they receive to the 
municipality, for which they will be given paper money in exchange.”; PRO, FO 
371/2768, Extract from al-Muqtabas of Damascus, “Retail vendors and small change”, 
Dateless. 
1289 HHStA, PA38/369, Ranzi to Burian, “Getreidenot in Syrien”, Damascus, 20 
October 1916; The Vice-Governor of Syria had opposed to the free trade of grain with the 
reason that the release of the free trade would both increase the prices of the cereals and 
push the villagers to the hands of starvation. Because, they would sell all grain in their 
hands due to the increase of the prices: BOA, DH.ŞFR. 517/47, Ahmed to Talat, 
Damascus, 10 Nisan 1332 [23 April 1916]. 
1290 HHStA, PA 38/370, Kiatkowski to Czernin, “Massnahmen gegen die zunehmende 
Entwertung des Papiergeldes”, Beirut, 4 May 1917 
1291 For a German translation of the announcement, see: HHStA, PA 38/370, Ranzi to 
Czernin, “Eine Verordnung gegen die Papiergeldentwertung”, Damascus, 24 April 1917. 
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exiles according to their religions: 7 Muslims, 7 Christians, and 7 Jews.1292 They were sent 
to Adana for exile. However, that measure didn’t make any contribution to the increase of 
the value of the paper money. Six months later, the implementation was abandoned, and all 
those who were expelled from their countries because of the paper money issue were 
allowed to return their home.1293 It is worth to mention that Cemal’s decision met with 
opposition among the local bureaucrats. According to the report of the German Consul in 
Jerusalem, the Governor and his office chief went suddenly on a holiday not to be an 
instrument of “that crazy policy of exile”. Similarly, the Chief of the Police became 
worried about “the countless contradictory decisions of exile”.1294 The Governor of Beirut, 
Azmi Bey, also reported his opposition to the Grand Vizier Talat Pasha against this 
decision.1295 
As an answer to the question of the provisioning, Cemal Pasha also demanded 
foodstuff instead of money from those liable to military service as the exoneration tax of 
their service [Bedel-i Askeri] in the Army.1296 Those responsible were required to pay 
                                                 
1292 The names and the engagements of the merchants were as follows: Muslims: Said 
Kabbani (great trader in colonial produce), Toufik Noulati (the same), Selim Nachlawi (the 
same), Abdel Wahab Smadi (Manufacturer), Shefik Hashim (the same), Muhammad Nadar 
(Miller), Lutfi Hafiz (Chemist), Christians: Khalil Kahla (great cloth trader), Khalil Warde 
(Nouveautes), İskender Kabawat, (Mercerized Goods), Khalil Karduss (Trader in 
Domestic Products), Georges İstifan (the same), Khalil Maatuk (Tombac), Georges 
Maatuk (the same), Jews: Toufik Legnado (Banquier), Arslan Totah (the same), Harun 
Yedid (commissioner), Josef Abade (Cloth Trader), Nathan Katran (the same), Ezra Esetek 
(Money Changer), Benjamin Shamaja (the same), HHStA, Ranzi to Czernin, “Die 
Exilierung von hiesigen Kaufleuten wegen der Papiergelentvertung”, Damascus, 1 June 
1917; The German figures are different than this. The Ambassador reported that 9 Jews, 6 
Christian and 3 Muslims were selected randomly: PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 14, Kühlmann 
to Bethmann-Hollweg,  Constantinople, 23 May 1917. 
1293 HHStA, PA 38/370, Ranzi to Czernin, “Strafnachlaesse und Begnadigung”, 
Damascus, 24 October 1917; BOA, DH.ŞFR. 572/52, Cemal to Talat, Damascus, 27 
Teşrin-i Sani 1333 [27 November 1917]. 
1294 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 14, Kühlmann to Bethmann-Hollweg,  Constantinople, 23 
May 1917. 
1295 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 557/56, Azmi to Talat, Beirut, 18 Haziran 1333 [18 June 1917]. 
1296 In the Ottoman Empire, the ones who were liable to the military service could be 
exempted from their services paying a sum of money. 
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4.000 kg. wheat or 4250 kg. barley, or appropriate amounts of potato, corn, lense, pea or 
millet.1297 They also had to transport those products to the predetermined places. That 
implementation paved the way for the rapid growth of the demand to those agricultural 
products, and therefore, their prices were tremendously increased; a Djift (33 kg.) of the 
wheat, for example, rose from 105 piaster to 140 piaster in a week, and the prices of the 
bread reached to a point that was unaffordable for the poor –from 20 piaster to 32 piaster 
per okka-. However, with this measure, the foodstuff needs of the country had been 
guaranteed for a month.1298  
The deterioration of the food supply system enforced the Government to take more 
radical measures. In that sense, upon the closure of the bakeries in Damascus because of 
the lack of flour, the Ottoman authorities decided to partially evacuate Damascus. For that 
purpose, the military and civil officials started to send their families from the city that was 
fed by the daily assistance of bread by the Government. To take the lead in this process, 
the Governor sent his family from the city. Following him many officials sent their 
families to different places of Anatolia, being Constantinople in the first place. The 
Government also planned to send all the non-Damascene residents of the provincial 
capital, which amounted to 60.000, to relieve the food conditions. As a last resort, the 
government decided to distribute the cereals, brought from Anatolia for the needs of the 
Army.1299 
The Government levied a tax called as the “Voluntary Poverty Tax” [Freiwillige 
Armensteuer] on the well-to-do people of the city to assist the poor people of Damascus. 
                                                 
1297 HHStA, PA 38/370, Ranzi to Czernin, “Die Dritte  Militaerbefreiungssteuer”, 
Damascus, 2 March 1917;  The Government’s announcement published in Journale de 
Beyrouth was as follows: “All those who have been exempted from military service by the 
payment of the exoneration tax may be exempted for another year if they offer, within one 
month from this date, to the military authorities either of the following articles: -4000 
kilograms of wheat, 4550 kgs of barley, 4000 kgs of potato, 5150 kgs of lentils, 3200 kgs 
of dry peas, 3320 kg of Burghul (crushed wheat), 4300 kg of durrha, 8000 kg of berseem”: 
PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.15, The Near East, Cairo, 18 May 1917. 
1298 HHStA, PA 38/370, Ranzi to Czernin, “Die Dritte  Militaerbefreiungssteuer”, 
Damascus, 2 March 1917. 
1299 HHStA, PA 38/371, Ranzi to Czernin, “Die Teilweise Raeumung der Stadt 
Damascus von der Zivilbevölkerung”, Damascus, 16 April 1918. 
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The implementation of that law was initiated without the approval of the Parliament 
although it was contrary to the legislation. According to the statement of the German 
Consul of Damascus, in the distribution of the taxes, some partisanships took place; while 
the wealthiest of Syria, the Senator Abdurrahman Pasha el-Yusuf was paying 3.500 ltq., 
the Christian merchant, who worked as the old honorary dragoman of Germany, had to pay 
5.000 ltq, reminding one of the inequities of the so-called Wealth Tax [Varlık Vergisi] 
during the Republican Times.1300 The obligated people had to pay it willy-nilly with the 
fear of the Government.1301 Similarly, the Government sold some stock certificates to 
supply food for the poor people of Damascus, Beirut and Aleppo.1302 
One of the most interesting events of the WWI is the process of the foreign 
assistance to the starving people of Lebanon by way of the sea. Upon the deterioration of 
the situation in Lebanon, the Apostolic See1303 and the American Government applied to 
the Ottoman Government to help the starving Lebanese. The evaluations of the Ottoman 
authorities in the region and that of Cemal Pasha as their superiors, regarding the issue of 
the foreign assistance to Lebanon makes it clear the mindset of the Ottoman administration 
during WWI. In the beginning, the Ottoman Government refused the aid offer of the 
American Government on the grounds that the organization of the humanitarian assistance 
would cause the reintroduction of the American missionaries to the Ottoman realm, and 
also would pave the way for the American Propaganda.1304 The mediation proposals of the 
neutral states were also refused with the same reason. But later, the worsening situation of 
Lebanon enforced them to accept the proposals.1305  
                                                 
1300 For a study on the Wealth Tax, see: Ayhan Aktar, Varlık Vergisi ve Türkleştirme 
Politikaları, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2000. 
1301 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 17, Ziemke to Hertling, Damascus, 12 April 1918. 
1302 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 580/51, Tahsin to Talat, Damascus, 21 Mart 1334 [21 March 1918]. 
1303 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.14, Bernstoff to Bethmann-Hollweg, 15 February 1917.  
1304 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 540/105, Ali Münif to Talat, Beirut, 7 Kanun-ı Evvel 1332 [20 
December 1916] 
1305 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 13, Ratibor to Bethmann-Hollweg, Madrid, 5 August 
1916. 
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After that, according to the testimony of the Ottoman documents, it seems that all 
the Ottoman officials in the region supported the American assistance to save the Lebanese 
from starvation.1306 However, the distribution of the grain led to disagreement among the 
Ottoman officials. The officials in Syria under Cemal’s rule were concerned that the 
organization of the American assistance would be transformed into a propaganda activity 
of the American missionaries, which was checked to a considerable extent after the 
outbreak of the War. In this regard, both Azmi Bey, the Governor of Beirut, and Ali Münif 
Bey, his counterpart in Lebanon, agreed that the Ottoman Government should purchase the 
cereals sent by the American Government. If necessary, the process of distribution of the 
grain could be supervised by a mutual commission consisted of the Turks and the 
Americans.1307 If the Americans didn’t accept the participation of the Turkish officials, it 
meant that, in the viewpoint of Azmi Bey, they aimed at the restoration of their influence 
in Lebanon, and therefore, their request must be refused.1308 Ali Münif Bey, too, agreed 
with him in this issue, and inclined not to accept the American assistance for fear of the 
American propaganda there.1309 However, Azmi Bey was strongly opposed to this idea on 
the grounds that giving permission to the Americans to distribute food in Lebanon would 
make the Lebanese feel that the Ottoman state was not sufficiently capable to compensate 
for the needs of its citizens, and on the other hand, it would increase the American impact 
among the people. Therefore, at all hazards, the American assistance should not be 
accepted, and the formidable task of provisioning Lebanon should be solved by the 
purchase of more grain from Hama.1310 
                                                 
1306 For a summary of the views of the Ottoman authorities on the issue, see: BOA, 
DH.ŞFR. 538/29, Azmi to Talat, Nazareth, 10 Teşrin-i Sani 1332 [24 November 1916] 
1307 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 538/29, Azmi to Talat, Der’a, 5 Teşrin-i Sani 1332 [19 November 
1916]; BOA, DH.ŞFR. 540/105, Ali Münff to Talat, Beirut, 7 Kanun-ı Evvel 1332 [20 
December 1916] 
1308 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 538/29, Azmi to Talat, Der’a, 5 Teşrin-i Sani 1332 [19 November 
1916] 
1309 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 540/105, Ali Münif to Talat, Beirut, 7 Kanun-ı Evvel 1332 [20 
December 1916]; BOA, DH.ŞFR. 542/3, Azmi to Talat, Beirut, 20 Kanun-ı Evvel 1332 [2 
January 1917]. 
1310 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 542/3, Azmi to Talat, Beirut, 20 Kanun-ı Evvel 1332 [2 January 
1917]. 
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Quite the reverse of what they desired, as he expresses in his memoires, Cemal 
Pasha sent a letter to the American Ambassador in İstanbul via Enver Pasha stating his 
readiness to accept the American assistance unconditionally. However, the failure to obtain 
the consent of the Entente fleet in the coasts of Syria caused these undertakings to fail in 
the end.1311 
 
 
 
8.3. The Social Impact of the Famine in Syria and the Reaction of People 
 
 
“In every place that I have visited, they cry showing me absolute 
misery scenes. Following a trip in the old and narrow streets of 
Damascus, in a place men and women repeatedly complained 
[about their situations], and a man, who appears calm, began to 
bawl putting his head between his hands. [The situation here is] 
always like that!”1312 
The social impact of the Famine in Syria indicates at the same time the reasons behind the 
changing attitude of the Syrians towards the Ottoman Government at the end of the 
Ottoman Rule. On the other hand, the nature of the new rule imposed by Cemal’s drastic 
means can better be observed when we analyze the results of the Famine and its by-
products, such as epidemics and inflation. In this context, this section first concentrates on 
the reaction of the city dwellers to the Famine. Following that, the situation of the 
producers and their reactions against the pressures and impositions of Cemal Pasha will be 
analyzed. Finally, the most crucial by-product of the Famine, i.e. the epidemic diseases, 
will be set out to depict. 
As stated above, the impact of the Famine became insufferable at the beginning of 
1916. At that time, the starvation reached to such an irresistible point that, in Damascus, 
                                                 
1311 Cemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 219. 
1312 Halide Edib to Cavid Bey, Beirut, 1 March 1917, in Murat Bardakçı (ed.), Ibid, p. 
151. 
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Women with the children made a demonstration in front of the headquarters of Cemal 
Pasha, the most fearsome man in Syria, shouting “give us bread, we starve”. The Austrian 
Consul accorded the responsibility for the starvation to the speculation of the cereals by the 
Mayor, who was immediately dismissed by Cemal Pasha after the demonstration of the 
Damascene Women.1313 The situation was not different in other provinces. In March 1916, 
in Aleppo, the most abundant region in the beginning of the War in terms of agricultural 
production, the Governor Mustafa Abdulhalık Bey complained that all the kazas of the 
province were screaming because of the starvation, and added that, if the provisioning of 
the province didn’t suffice in any way, he would have to distribute the collected tithe in the 
stores to the people to save them from dying of starvation.1314 In July 1916, the American 
consul in Beirut reported about the situation of the city’s streets that it was “filled with 
starving women and children…In my early evening walks I frequently see people lying 
dead in the gutter”. The police chief of Damascus told a protestan pastor from Minneapolis 
in the winter of 1916-1917 that he received 70 dead daily, “while the mayor claimed that 
one-quarter of the city’s population had disappeared since the start of the war”. Similarly, 
the American consul in Damascus reported that “starvation and famine [are] everywhere; 
the men either in military service or in hiding, and the women and children reduced to 
beggary”.1315 
The situation of people towards the end of the War had tremendously deteriorated. 
According to Humann, a German military official in Syria, the view of the streets of Syria 
was so miserable that seeing the corpses of the children and beggars in Damascus, Tripoli, 
Beirut and Aleppo became an ordinary event, which was taking place every day.1316 In the 
first quarter of 1918, as the consequence of the terrible starvation, the people started to 
cannibalize. In February of the same year, in Tripoli of Syria, some children at the ages 
changing between 5 and 8 started to disappear. Their parents were unsuccessful to find the 
                                                 
1313 HHStA, PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian, “Hungerkrawall in Damaskus”, Damascus, 11 
January 1916. 
1314 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 514/80, Mustafa to Talat, Aleppo, 13 Mart 1332 [26 March 1916]. 
1315 Thompson, Ibid, p. 20. 
1316 BA-MA, RM 5/2323, Humann to Chef of the Admiralstabs of Marine, Aleppo, 22 
April 1918. 
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children. Upon the discovery of the jacket of a lost child on another one, police managed to 
solve the mystery of the lost children. The cooked bones and heads of the lost children 
were found in a well in the house of two Maronite women from Lebanon. The women had 
killed, cooked and eaten the children due to the impact of the extreme starvation. The head 
of a child was still in the kitchen when the women were caught.1317  
According to Hoffman, a German official in Tripoli, who saw the corpses of the 
children with his own eyes, the women declared to the police that they ate this cannibal’s 
meal due to the starvation, and their body language were proving what they claimed. The 
dimensions of the starvation were so inconceivable that the people also started to eat the 
dead street dogs. Allegedly, in a village called Kalmoun, 4 km. distance from Tripoli, a 
woman cooked and ate her dead children.1318 Thereupon, the Governor of Beirut, Azmi 
Bey, sent 5.000 ltq. to Tripoli for the distribution of food to the starving people.1319 With 
the same goal, the German Government dispatched 10.000 Mark from the propaganda fund 
to be spent for the starving people.1320 
The poverty of the people also increased prostitution in the cities. According to the 
remarks of Ihsan Turjman, An Ottoman soldier in Palestine, most of the prostitutes had to 
engage in prostitution to survive and they wouldn’t practice their jobs except for their 
financial needs.1321 
The ruthless treatment by the Ottoman authorities to seize the grains for thearmy 
needs made a considerably negative impact on the attitude of the city-dwellers and the 
Bedouin tribes to the Government. Even in the first months of the War, in the viewpoint of 
the Austrian Consul of Jerusalem, the requisitioning policy of the Ottoman Government 
                                                 
1317 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 17, AA to German Ambassador in Istanbul, 2 March 1918. 
1318 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.17, Hoffmann to the German Consulate in Beirut, Tripoli 
of Syria, 19 February 1918; Another German official from Aleppo, Humann, made similar 
expressions confirming the report of Hoffmann. For details, see: BA-MA, RM 5/2323, 
Humann to Chef of the Admiralstabs of Marine, Aleppo, 22 April 1918. 
1319 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 17, Mutius to Hertling, Beirut, 1 March 1918. 
1320 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 17, AA to German Ambassador in Istanbul, 2 March 1918. 
1321 Tamari, Ibid, 29 April 1915, p. 114. 
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only contributed to the weakening of its prestige among the local people.1322 The following 
months of the War didn’t make any contribution to the amelioration of the relations 
between the Government and the Arabs. In September 1916, The Governor Tahsin Bey 
reported that the atrocities to seize grain and other requisitions made the Syrian public 
opinion totally infelicitous towards the Ottoman Government.1323 Towards the end of the 
War, the peasants started to hide their grain from the Governmental officials. In return, the 
Government increased the proportion of the taxes on their products, which contributed to 
the rise of the irregularities in the situation of requisitions.1324  
In this sense, the insistence on the circulation of the paper money in the grain 
market and the atrocities and illegal methods of the Gendarmerie caused great disturbance 
among the local people, especially among the Bedouin producers of cereals.1325 In October 
1916, upon the payment of the price of their cereals with paper money by the Government, 
and the incursions of some undisciplined Gendarmerie troops who collected the cereals of 
these Bedouins on behalf of the concessionaries assigned by the Government, the Bedouins 
of Hauran rebelled against the Government. They attacked the stations of the Hijaz 
Railway, killed the gendarmeries providing the security of the Railway, plundered the 
grain stores, and cut the telegraph lines. The insurgents were the members of the Ruela, 
Huwaitat and Beni Sakhr tribes, the dwellers of five villages in Hauran and the army 
deserters living among them.1326  
                                                 
1322 HHStA, PA 12/209, Pallavicini to Burian, “Zur allgemeinen Situation”, 
Constantinople, 15 July 1915. 
1323 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 533/36, Tahsin to Talat, Damascus, 12 Eylül 1332 [25 September 
1916]. 
1324 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 570/103, Bedri to Talat, Aleppo, 7 Teşrin-i Sani 1333 [7 November 
1917]. 
1325 In May 1918, the Deputy Chief of the Gendarmerie Regiment in Lebanon, Şevket 
Efendi, was brought to Court Martial since he sold 8.000 kg of the cereals in the Army 
stores: BOA, DH.ŞFR. 584/79, İsmail Hakkı to Ministry of Interior, Beirut, 16 May 1918. 
1326 HHStA, PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian, “Der Aufruhr im Hauran”, Damascus, 9 
October 1916; HHStA, PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian, “Beendigung des Aufruhrs im 
Hauran”, Damascus, 1 November 1916; BOA, DH.ŞFR. 533/84, Tahsin to Talat, 
Damascus, 17 Eylül 1332 [30 September 1916]; BOA, DH.ŞFR. 533/63, Tahsin to Talat, 
Damascus, 13 Eylül 1332 [26 September 1916].  
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According to the remarks of the Governor Tahsin Bey, the movement didn’t have 
any political aspect1327, but Cemal Pasha writes that the rebellion was provoked by the 
supporters of Sharif Hussein to spread the Sharif’s movement in Syria. In his memoires, 
Cemal condemns Tahsin Bey of being inexperienced about the reailities of the region and, 
therefore, of thinking wrongly about the reasons of the incidents, seeking those responsible 
inside the country.1328 The Austrian and German Consuls thought in a similar way with 
Tahsin Bey.1329 In this regard, it is worth to mention that the Druzes, who were to a large 
extent out of the Governmental control, didn’t join in this rebellion because of their 
privileges to sell their agricultural products freely.1330 
After a small conflict between the rebellious Bedouins and the Government troops, 
which took place near the villages Cakim, Tuy and Enhal, the incident were suppressed, 
and the calmness returned the region.1331 Meanwhile, in the words of the Governor Tahsin 
Bey, some undisciplined Gendarmerie divisions, who committed some atrocities against 
the villagers, left their posts for fear of the revenge of the Bedouins.1332 Afterwards they 
                                                 
1327 The Governor Tahsin Bey reported that he received many tips on the cruelties of 
Gendarmerie on the Bedouins, and the infraction of rules of the small-ranking officials in 
estimation of tithe on the harvest of the rebellious people. He required the amelioration of 
the Gendarmerie and the mentioned officials, and the appointment of a powerful governor 
to Hauran for the restoration of peace permanently: BOA, DH.EUM.4.Şb. 7/73, Tahsin to 
Talat, 29 Eylül 1916 [11 October 1916]; BOA, DH.ŞFR. 533/102, Tahsin to Talat, 
Damascus, 17 Eylül 1332 [30 September 1916]. BOA, DH.ŞFR. 533/63, Tahsin to Talat, 
Damascus, 13 Eylül 1332 [26 September 1916]. 
1328 Cemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 217. 
1329 HHStA, PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian, “Der Aufruhr im Hauran”, Damascus, 9 
October 1916; PA-AA, Türkei 165, Bd.40, Löytvet to Bethmann-Hollweg, Damascus, 12 
October 1916. 
1330 HHStA, PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian, “Beendigung des Aufruhrs im Hauran”, 
Damascus, 1 November 1916; BOA, DH.ŞFR. 533/84, Tahsin to Talat, Damascus, 13 
Eylül 1332 [26 September 1916]. 
1331 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 533/19, Tahsin to Talat, Damascus, 24 Eylül 1332 [7 October 
1916]; in the conflicts from the rebellious, 140 men were killed and more than 50 were 
wounded: BOA, DH.ŞFR. 534/74, Tahsin to Talat, Deraa, 24 Eylül 1332 [7 October 
1916]. 
1332BOA, DH.ŞFR. 533/102, Tahsin to Talat, Damascus, 17 Eylül 1332 [30 September 
1916].  
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were captured by the Army troops and sent to Damascus for trial. In addition, due to their 
responsibilities in the uprising, the administrators of three nahiye in Hauran were brought 
to Damascus with the same purpose. The responsibles Gendarmerie were delivered to the 
Court Martial.1333 As for the rebellious groups, since the Bedouins ran away in the desert, 
the Government could only arrest some villagers. Few of them were sentenced to the death 
penalty and the others received imprisonment.1334 After the incident, 50-60 men from the 
chiefs of the rebellious tribes came to the Governor of Syria for the restoration of the 
peace. In the meeting, they expressed that the rebellion broke out because of the payment 
of the paper money in the purchase of their grains.1335 The suppression of the rebellion was 
crucial for the Ottoman Government since the place of its occurrence had a potential of 
spread to the north of Medina, and thus to contribute to the Sharif’s movement cutting the 
connection between Medina and Damascus.1336 
 
 
 
8.4. Epidemics and the Struggle against them 
 
 
The tremendous increase in the spread of the epidemics created another traumatic 
social impact of the famine. Throughout the War period, various diseases like Typhus, 
Cholera, Typhoid, Malaria Tropica emerged in different districts of Syria, and its spread 
was promoted by malnutrition. Besides starvation, the decrease in the number of 
physicians and nurses, who were available for service, was another reason for the spread of 
                                                 
1333 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 533/19, Tahsin to Talat, Damascus, 24 Eylül 1332 [7 October 
1916]. 
1334 HHStA, PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian, “Beendigung des Aufruhrs im Hauran”, 
Damascus, 1 November 1916. 
1335 BOA, DH.EUM.4.Şb. 7/73, Tahsin to Talat, 29 Eylül 1916 [11 October 1916] 
1336 HHStA, PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian, “Der Aufruhr im Hauran”, Damascus, 9 
October 1916. 
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the diseases. Before the war, many of the medical persons living in Syria were the subjects 
of the Entente states, who were expelled on the Ottoman declaration of war. In addition, 
the large part of the Ottoman physicians was called up for the military service. Some 
others fell victim to the typhus epidemic of 1915. Therefore, the number of the physicians, 
who cared for the civil people, was so dramatically decreased that, in Jaffa, there were only 
four physicians for 40.000 inhabitants while, in Jerusalem, their numbers were six or eight 
for 80.000 people. The number of civil physicians was between twenty or thirty for each 
town before the War.1337 Because of the lack of physicians, in the year 1916, 14 doctors, 
who were older than 45, had to be conscripted to struggle with the epidemics.1338 
A typhus epidemic, as the first case in this sense, appeared in Damascus in April 
1915. A pediculosis of the soldiers, which became the reason of the spread of the typhus 
accompanied these epidemics. Upon the risk of the spread of the epidemic typhus and lice 
among the troops in the Syrian cities, Cemal Pasha assigned the German Professor 
Mühlens1339 to fight the epidemic diseases.1340 Mühlens prepared some instructions to 
sustain the hygiene in the cities and towns of Syria. He determined the marshy areas in 
Syria, which had to be dried up to prevent the emergence and spread of the epidemics. In 
the same regard, the German Professor advised the plumbing of the cities with the Water 
pipes. The most radical measure he proposed against the epidemics was to burn the town 
of Afule, which was the source of the cholera disease in Syria.1341 In Aleppo, at the end of 
June 1915, a clinic for the infectious diseases was created for the common people and the 
sanitation commission would follow closely the course of the epidemic, meeting two times 
                                                 
1337 PA-AA, Türkei 195, Bd.10, Ruppin to AA, 3 November 1916. 
1338 ATASE Arşivi, Kls. 3253, Ds. 7, Fih. 8, 8-2, in Tetik, Ibid. 
1339 Prof. Mühlens was appointed as the health adviser to the 4th Army to struggle with 
the epidemics: Erden, Ibid, p. 141. 
1340 BA-MA, RM 40/678, Mühlens to Chief of the Admiralstabs of Marine, 16 April 
1916; HHStA, PA 38/366, Ranzi to Berchtold, “Die staedtische Verwaltung waehrend des 
Kriegs”, Damascus, 23 May 1915. 
1341 Erden, Ibid, p. 141. 
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weekly.1342 All those instructions were meticulously obeyed. The streets and the water 
canals were cleaned in this context. Significant sanitary regulations were introduced for the 
foodstuffs sold by the street hawkers; in some towns, slaughterhouses were established for 
the butchering of the cattle. In addition, emergency medical services were established in all 
the Garrisons; in all the hospitals of the towns, special rooms were created to clean the 
pediculus.1343 A water supply network was established in Aleppo by an engineer from the 
German colony in Haifa, Dr. Gottlieb Schumacher, using the water source in Ayintel, 4.5 
km distance from Aleppo and spending 15.000 ltq. from the budget of the 4th Army.1344 
Burning of Afule was performed by the orders of Cemal Pasha.1345 At the end of June 
1915, upon the increase of the typhus cases among the people, the Municipality Hospital in 
Jerusalem was evacuated and allocated to the epidemic diseases. The city of Jerusalem was 
divided into nine regions and two doctors were assigned by the Army to each region. All 
the people in Jerusalem were checked up and all the houses were investigated and 
disinfected with sulphur. A quarantine was implemented for 11 days to the patients and, in 
short, the disease was checked.1346 
Upon the arrival of the Armenian refugees from Anatolia, Cemal applied strict 
measures to prevent the occurrence of the epidemic diseases. On 2nd September 1915, He 
issued an order to the Army Inspectorship for Logistic Support in Aleppo demanding the 
examination of the refugees and the other passengers –soldiers or civilians- in the stations 
before sending their ultimate destination, and ordered the treatment of the sick.1347 Two 
                                                 
1342 ATASE Arşivi, Kls. 3243, Ds. 2, Fih. 1, Ali Galib [the Health Director of the 
Fourth Army] to the Ottoman Headquarter, 29 Haziran 1915, in Tetik, Ibid. 
1343 BA-MA, RM 40/678, Mühlens to Chief of the Admiralstabs of Marine, 16 April 
1916; HHStA, PA 38/366, Ranzi to Berchtold, “Die staedtische Verwaltung waehrend des 
Kriegs”, Damascus, 23 May 1915. 
1344 Cemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 235; Kayalı, “Wartime…”, p. 301; Watzinger, Ibid, p. 479. 
1345 Erden, Ibid, p. 141; in a telegram sent to the Comissariat in Aleppo, Cemal warns 
them to follow strictly the measures against the epidemics. For details, see: ATASE 
Arşivi, Kls. 3253, Ds. 5A, Fih.1-5, in Tetik, Ibid. 
1346 ATASE Arşivi, Kls. 3253, Ds. 2, Fih. 1-1, 29 June 1915, in Tetik, Ibid. 
1347 ATASE Arşivi, Kls. 3253, Ds. 2, Fih. 7; Ds. 5A, Fih. 1-6; Ds.6, Fih. 7-1, 2 
September 1915, in Tetik, Ibid. 
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Armenian Doctors, Hachik Bogosyan and Toros Ovacikyan, were assigned to this job.1348 
In December 1915, an epidemic typhus emerged in Northern Syria.1349 During December, 
nearly 500 persons died daily in Aleppo of typhus.1350 Both soldiers and the civilian people 
were profoundly influenced by this disease. To prevent the further spread of the disease, 
Cemal established medical centers in two buildings -one seized from the British Consulate 
and the second was left in the beginning of the War under construction by a French 
institution- to fight the disease quarantining and curing the people and soldiers in those 
buildings.1351 The confiscated French Hospital in Aleppo was evacuated and allocated to 
the Armenian sick.1352 A 200-bed house of isolation and vapor houses with mobile vapor 
teams [seyyar buhar ekipleri].1353 
A process of informing the common people about the ways of the struggle with the 
epidemics was commenced in Aleppo at the same time. Cemal have brochures prepared in 
Arabic and Turkish informing the people how to protect themselves from infection of the 
epidemic diseases. The brochures were distributed to all houses while posters were hanged 
in crowded streets and avenues. Besides that, the people would be informed in Mosques, 
Synagogues, and Churches on the issues written in the mentioned brochures. The ones, 
who acted against those orders, including the doctors, would be punished heavily. The 
schools were closed until further notice. The sick would be treated freely in the “French 
Hospital”. They would be treaeted in Doctor Altunyan’s Hospital paying 3 Majidiyehs, in 
                                                 
1348 ATASE Arşivi, Kls. 3253, Ds. 6, Fih. 7a, 2 September 1915, in Tetik, Ibid. 
1349 In October 1915, in his correspondence with the Aleppo Consul of Germany, V. 
Kress were anxious about the possibility of the spread of the epidemic typhus among the 
troops with the impact of those refugees. For details, see: BA-MA, RM 40/678, Aleppo 
Consul to the Etappen-Kommando in Constantinople, 28 October 1916. 
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1351 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 501/106, Fuad to Talat, Aleppo, 4 Kanun-ı Evvel 1331 [17 
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1352 ATASE Arşivi, Kls. 3254, Ds. 1, Fih. 1-13, in Tetik, Ibid. 
1353 ATASE Arşivi, Kls. 2451, Ds. 219, Fih. 3-4, in Tetik, Ibid. 
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Military Hospital for 1 Majidiyeh, and in the Hospital of the Municipality for 10 
qurush.1354 
That time Cemal appointed another German Physician, Dr. Karl Vayland ?, as 
coordinator general to struggle with the epidemic diseases. He was endowed 500 ltq. by 
the Governorate of Aleppo. Vayland would organize the cleansing and disinfection of the 
city of Aleppo as well as checking over the implementation of the points announced the 
abovementioned brochures. He would also apply coercive measures, if necessary, and 
would arrange the patient trafficking between the city and the hospitals. Like Jerusalem, 
the city of Aleppo was divided into six regions, and, a physician and a commander were 
allocated for each region. The dead would be buried according to the sanitary rules. Cemal 
himself also inspected the kitchens, dining halls, acute inpatient wards, to see whether the 
rules were followed or not.1355 
The year 1916 can be regarded as the year of the epidemics for the Syrian 
Provinces. According to the statistics of the 4th Army, in the year 1916, the number of the 
hospitalized soldiers from an epidemic disease was calculated as 15.130.1356  Only in 
January 1916, 685 personnel of the Army would die because of the epidemics.1357 In 
March 1916, 532 of 2417 typhoid cases; 230 of 381 dysentery cases; 150 of 1535 relapsing 
fever resulted with death.1358 In April, the total number of the deaths from relapsing fever 
was calculated as 748 of 3060.1359 To be more specific in terms of localities, in the 
beginning of the year, an epidemic flecktyphus caused great damage in Jerusalem.1360 
According to Jerusalem consul of Spain, on 16th May 1916, “in a single day there were 97 
cases.”1361 Together with the treacherous conditions of the alimentation, the epidemic 
                                                 
1354 ATASE Arşivi, Kls. 3254, Ds. 1, Fih. 1-13, in Tetik, Ibid. 
1355 ATASE Arşivi, Kls. 3254, Ds. 1, Fih. 1-13, in Tetik, Ibid. 
1356 ATASE Arşivi, Kls. 2184, Ds. 14, Fih. 14-12, in Tetik, Ibid. 
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diseases started to spread. During the summer of the same year, twenty to thirty persons 
fell victim daily to Cholera, and similarly, in Hebron, 700 died of this disease. In 
Birüssebi, according to the Spanish consul, on 14th June, there were quite a few cases of 
cholera; In Asludj, a case of cholera appeared at that day.1362 However, the consul writes 
that, by June 1916, in Jerusalem, typhus cases had been reduced to 5 per day, while it was 
60 for Damascus.1363 All through the Syrian country typhoid became endemic and resultant 
mortality grew to great proportions.1364 In the viewpoint of Prof. Schilling, the hygienist of 
the 4th Army, who spoke to Theodor Wiegand, the reasons of the spread of the epidemics 
were as follows: non-use of any strainer by the municipality for the drinking water, the 
ineffectiveness of the disinfection instruments of the hospitals because of mishandling, 
badly purified cisterns, frequent blogging of the water channels and insufficient 
foodstuffs.1365  
In the same period of time, the northern provinces of the country were also 
suffering from Cholera. According to the testimony of the Secretary of the Beirut Branch 
of the American Presbyterian Board of Missions, the death rate among the soldiers at 
Islahiye were thirty in a day. The sick soldiers were quarantined and as fast as possible 
entrained toward Aleppo.1366 At the same time, according to the diaries of the Ottoman 
prisoners captured in the Battle of Katia by the British Army, large numbers of the 
Armenian refugees fell victim to Cholera.1367 As a measure to prevent the dissemination of 
the disease, the Germans sent 300.000 anti-cholera injection doses to the bacteriological 
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1365 Theodor Wiegand to His Wife, 23 October 1916, Jerusalem, in Wiegand, Theodor, 
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1367 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.13, The Near East, Cairo, 8 August 1916. 
367 
 
laboratory in Jerusalem and these helped to hold it in check.1368 In the same regard, in 
February 1916, a 1000-bed Vatan [the Motherland] Hospital was opened to service in 
Aleppo, and another 1000-bed was ordered by Cemal to be constructed.1369 The 
establishment of a hospital in Beirut by Dr. Neşet Ömer, the Director for the Struggle with 
the Epidemic Diseases of the 4th Army, was projected, and 748.000 qurush was promised 
by Cemal Pasha.1370 In Damascus, a 2000-bed hospital construction was begun in May 
1917.1371 The Zionist societies in America planned an expedition of physicians to Palestine 
to stop the spread of the epidemics among the Jewish people.1372 They achieved to take the 
permission of the Entente States to pass their blockade in the Syrian Coasts.1373 However, 
the realization of their undertakings were not allowed by Cemal Pasha, on the grounds that 
it would serve the propaganda of the Zionist Movement.1374  
A special treatment was applied in the convalescent houses for the adaptation of the 
recovered soldiers to the military service again. In summer, the daily program of the 
convalescent houses was as such:  
“Breakfast at 7:00 o’clock with milky tea, milky chocolate or milky coffee and a soft-
boiled egg with enough bread. Between 09:00 and 11:00 o’clock: light physical training 
and gymnastic plays. At 12:00 o’clock: Noon time. Lesson [Ders] between 16:00 and 
18:00. Dinner at 18:00. Lecture by the physician of the convalescent house between 20:00 
and 21:00 two times in a week on health in the military, and courses in the same number by 
the officer of the house on the military [askeri] theories.” 1375 
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The epidemic diseases did not only influence the lower classes and the soldiers, the upper 
classes of society and the Turkish officials were also severely affected by the varieties of 
the epidemics. Similarly, many Germans had been unable to avoid it. Although they were 
careful about the arrangements such as boiling the water, many of them lost their lives. The 
German Consul in Damascus, Loytved died of Epidemic Typhus. Cemal Pasha’s 
Supervisor for the construction works Maximilian Zürcher was infected with the same 
disease.1376 In September 1916, the wife of the director of the Austrian hospital, Mrs. 
Schrötter died because of an epidemic.1377 A British intelligence report estimated the 
amount of the people in Syria who were affected by the epidemics as % 20.1378  
As the result of precautions taken to prevent the epidemic threat, Cemal created an 
effective health system working throughout the whole Syrian provinces enabling him to 
rule over the bodies of the civilians and the soldiers. By December 1917, the 4th Army’s 
sanitation system was working in an energetic way in the rail and chausseed roads line 
from Pozantı to the Sinai Desert. In Aleppo, Damascus and Jerusalem, sanitation 
institutions investigated, made bacteriological check-up and injected the soldiers and the 
suspected civilians. In Jerusalem, there was a laboratory preparing smallpox vaccine, and a 
medical service for rabies vaccine. In the recruiting offices of Aleppo, Beirut, Damascus 
and Jerusalem, there were cleansing stations serving only the Army personnel. During the 
War period, the hospitals were reformed, re-organized and the Vatan [the motherland] 
Hospitals in Adana, Aleppo, Damascus, Nazareth and Jerusalem.1379  
In conclusion, the conditions conductive to famine emanating from the Ottoman 
rule were generally due to the increasing control of the Government over the people. The 
Entente’s share was considerable in this disaster, especially for the coastal regions. As for 
the measures taken by Cemal Pasha, it was essential to provide an order in the social life of 
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Syria, and most of his endeavors and measures against the famine aimed at achieving this 
goal. Cemal aimed at the survival of the citizens in Syria to be able to assert a full control 
of state over them. On the other hand, as a result of the extraordinary consequences of the 
Famine in the Syrian realm, the attitude of the people towards the Government took a 
negative shape. However, it is worth to note as a final remark that this change didn’t have 
any political aspect. It was only dissatisfaction because of the worsening living conditions. 
The remarks of Ihsan Turjman in his diaries indicate how that reaction was opportunist: 
“Agency news arrived today indicating that German troops have retreated from opposition 
in France. This could mean the beginning of defeat for the Austrians and the Germans. 
Thank God. We all need this war to come to an end. I do not care who wins and who loses. 
If this were a decent government that treats us properly, then my life and my companions’ 
lives would be devoted to the nation. But, as it is, a drop of my blood (and a hair from my 
leg) is worth the thrones of the Ottoman sultans.”1380 
In a similar way, the diaries of Wasif Jawhariyyeh indicate that some parts of people were 
delighted with the rigors of life coming to an end rather than being rescued of the Ottoman 
yoke. Wasif, summarizes his sentiments in his diaries as follows:  
“Truthfully, it was a joyous holiday for all our family because the British had come and the 
Arab people were rid of the nightmare of the tyrant Turks. We all had great hope for a 
better future, especially after what we had suffered from war, famine, and disease, in 
particular, Typhus, which had spread all over the country. Thank God for saving our youth 
from the damned army service.”1381 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1380 Tamari, Ibid, p. 30 September 1915, p. 138. 
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CHAPTER IX 
 
THE UNDOING OF CEMAL PASHA IN SYRIA 
 
 
 
The worsening situation of the Ottoman front in Syria and Iraq against the British 
troops brought the end of Cemal Pasha’s governorate and the rule of the Ottoman Empire 
in the region. The British defeat at Dardanelles and the capture of an large number of the 
British troops at Kut on the Mesopotamian Front damaged the British prestige among the 
Muslims and the Arabs. They embarked on a quest to improve their image. As a result, 
they decided to avenge the Dardanelles by striking a big blow on the Ottoman troops in 
Syria and Iraq.  However, at the beginning, the progress in the east of the Canal aimed at 
the neutralization of any Turkish attempt against Egypt. After Dardanelles and Kut, a third 
Turkish achievement against the British troops in the Suez Front would cause irreparable 
injuries to the British image in its Muslim colonies. Consequently, an immediate invasion 
of the Sinai Peninsula was scheduled by General Murray, the Commander-in-Chef of the 
Egyptian Army.1382 
                                                 
1382 George MacMunn and Cyrill Falls, Military Operations Egypt and Palestine: From 
the Outbreak of the War to June 1917, London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1928, p. 
87; PRO, FO 371/2480, McMachon to FO (Transmitting Kitchener), “Defence of Egypt”, 
Mudros, 11 November 1915; Woodward, Ibid, p. 16, 36; Birinci Dünya Harbi’nde Türk 
Harbi IV/I, p. 324. 
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For those aims, they concluded to evacuate the Dardanelles Front and to transfer 
the troops from there to Egypt for a wider expedition in the Sinai Peninsula. They started 
to withdraw their troops from Gallipoli in the middle of November 1915 and in a month all 
the troops at Gallipoli had debarked in Egypt.1383 Thus, the completion of the withdrawal 
of the forces from the Dardanelles in December 1915 gave the Commander of the British 
Troops in Egypt the necessary tools to implement this policy.1384 With the flow of these 
troops and their equipment, Egypt became the greatest military base outside Britain and 
France,1385 and the number of the troops in Egypt reached 300.000 and in a short while 
they relocated those troops to the east of the Canal.1386  
In the beginning of its movement toward the east of the Canal, the British 
Headquarters in Egypt undervalued the strength of the Ottoman troops in Syria. Especially, 
the preparations made by Cemal in the Sinai Desert to conquer Egypt costed the British 
troops enormous number of soldiers and a great amount of money and other sources. In 
that context, this chapter will be concentrating on the analysis of how Cemals regime and 
the Ottoman domination came to an end in Syria. In the same regard, the role of the Arab 
troops of Faysal in the British progress will be touched as well to assess the claims of the 
Arab nationalists that the Arabs had a crucial part in bringing the Ottoman rule to a close. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1383 MacMunn and Falls, Ibid, p. 87; PRO, FO 371/2480, McMachon to FO 
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Ibid, p. 16, 36. 
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1385 David R. Woodward, Hell in the Holy Land: World War I in the Middle East, 
Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2006, p.15. 
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9.1.The Katia Raid, the Battle of Romani and the Gaza Wars 
 
 
The progress of the British troops in the east of the Canal made a clash with the 
Ottoman troops in the same region inevitable. By this reason, contrary to his desires, both 
to stop the British advance and to prevent the movement of the British troops in Egypt to 
the French front, Cemal was compelled to attack the British troops in the east of Egypt 
with weaker forces to remind them that the Canal was always threatened by the Ottoman 
troops. As a second reason, the British troops in the east of the Canal had constructed a 
railway from Kantara to Romani to supply these troops and they built a constant store at 
Katia.1387 Towards the end of April, that railway reached a point, which necessitated for 
the British side the invasion of the whole district. For the Ottoman troops, on the other 
hand, the possession of this well-watered zone [Katia] was an issue of life or death with 
100 miles of practically waterless desert behind them. 1388  
The battle took place around Katia on 20th-25th April 1916. In this raid, the 
Ottoman troops won a victory. They took 1 colonel, 23 officers and 230 soldiers prisoners. 
Several hundred horses were taken as spoils.1389 In 25 April, all the British forces left 
Katia.1390 The Ottoman victory in Katia battle created a great impression in Egypt and a 
                                                 
1387 BA-MA, RM 40/678, Braasck to Chef des Admiralstab. "Bericht über die 
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great fear in the British officials. The Turcophile sentiments among the Egyptians 
revived.1391  
Following that attack, the inability of the 4th Army to obtain the requirements for a 
larger expedition against the Canal and Egypt, and the progress of the British fortifications 
towards the Ottoman frontier at Sinai, compelled Cemal Pasha to make an attack in smaller 
scale to give an end to the progress of the British troops in the east of the Canal. For that 
reason, Cemal decided to organize a second expedition against the Canal. In early days of 
July 1916, Von Kress was authorized to organize this opoeration by Cemal.1392 He gives 
the number of the troops as 16.000 in total. But, he doesn’t give any details on the 
deployment of the troops in various places.1393 The number of the British troops deployed 
from Kantara to Romani was 32.000.1394 The battle started on 4th August, with the attack of 
the Ottomans against two very strongly entrenched British camps (Mehemdia on the coast 
and Romani) to enforce the British to leave their positions with a flank attack and a frontal 
attack. The Ottoman troops progressed up to the middle of the British trenches. They were 
able to reach the wire fence of their enemies from the left wing of their deployments.1395  
After that the British troops started to attack the Ottomans. At the end of the battle, 
the amount of the Ottoman losses as killed and wounded was huge. The 39th Regiment was 
surrounded by the British and they were captured by them with their officers. Similarly, 
the 3rd Mountain Artillery Squadron was captured by the British troops. Finally, the 20th 
Mitralleuse squadron received the retreat order too late and they weren’t able to leave their 
position till morning. In the morning, they were captured as well.1396 
                                                 
1391 BA-MA, RM 5 / 2321, Humann to the Chef of the Admiralstab of Marine. Berlin, 
29 November 1916; SHD, GR 7 N 2135, Quentin to MG, Cairo, 8 May 1916. 
1392 Von Kressenstein, Ibid, p. 179-180 
1393 Von Kressenstein, Ibid, p. 181. 
1394 Murray, Ibid,  p. 61. 
1395 ATASE Arşivi, Kls. 168, Ds. 730, Fih. 102-51, Cemal to Enver, 25 Temmuz 1332 
[6 August 1916]; MAEE, Guerre 1914-1918, 874/Turquie, Syrie et Palestine, Defrance to 
MAE, Cairo, 9 September 1916; BA-MA, RM 40/678, Braasck to Chef des Admiralstab. 
"Bericht über die Operationen gegen den Suezkanal 1916", 16 October 1916.  
1396 ATASE Arşivi, Kls. 168, Ds. 730, Fih. 102-52, Cemal to Enver, 25 Temmuz 1332 
[6 August 1916]; SHD, GR 7 N 2136, Saint-Quentin to MG, Cairo, 15 Augugst 1916. 
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All the Ottoman attacks failed and the groups that made the main attack to the 
south were destroyed or captured. This defeat led to the retreat of the Turks who were 
closely pursued by the cavalry of the A.N.Z.A.C. The British reoccupied Katia, then 
Birelabd on 9th August, and Salmana on 10th August. On 16th August, the Turkish 
rearguard stayed in Birmezar and Mageibra, the main force returned to Birüssebi and to the 
Coastal cities, El Arish, Rafa, Khan Yunus, Gazza.1397  
The commander of the Romani Battle, Von Kress blamed Cemal Pasha for the 
failure in the Battle of Romani claiming that Cemal attached greater importance to the 
Hijaz front than the Sinai Front and sent the foodstuffs of the Army to the Hijaz 
Expeditionary Force.1398 However, taking his reports and memonrandums sent to both 
Istanbul and Berlin regarding the needs of the Army for a second larger expedition, it can 
be easily concluded that Cemal made an energetic effort to procure the needs of the Army 
for the achievement of the aims of the Canal Expedition rather than attributing greater 
importance to the Hijaz Expedition.1399 As will be explained in the section on Faysal’s 
expedition, Cemal didn’t give the first priority to the Hijaz front and considered evacuating 
Medina in favor of the Sinai front due to military reasons. 
After the British victory in Romani, they intensified construction works at Sinai, 
and expanded the railway at an average rate of fifteen miles in a month. The next three 
months in the aftermath of the Battle of Romani passed in tranquility, but with an intense 
British work to make the railway expand to El-Arish. In the middle of December 1916, 
they managed to extend the railway within 13 km. of El-Arish. On 21st December, they 
attacked and occupied El-Arish and then on 23rd December, surrounded the Ottoman 
Battalion at Magdaba. After a battle, they were able to capture it with 1.282 prisoners 
while losing 146 men, of which 22 were killed. Following the battle, the British forces 
withdrew to El-Arish again. With the invasion of El-Arish, the British forces had the 
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ability to reinforce its forces there with the help of the ships from the sea. They decided to 
use El-Arish as a military base for the later attacks.1400 In the beginning of the year 1917, 
the British troops were able to control the whole Desert and reach a point threatening the 
Gaza-Birüssebi line. Throughout the next three months, with the completion of the 
gathering of the troops at Rafah, Murray believed that he would be able to capture Gaza as 
the first facilitating step of the great expedition against Palestine and, on 19th March, he 
acquired permission from the General Headquarters for the realization of this plan.1401 
Meanwhile, the exploration activities of the Ottoman aviators let them to know 
about the intention of the British troops. Therefore, with the expectation of a British attack, 
before the battle, the Ottoman troops were withdrawn from the various places around Gaza 
to fortify the trenches in that town.1402 The garrison in Gaza was strengthened by a 
regiment of infantry and some batteries. The total amount of the Ottoman forces reached 
seven battalions, five batteries (two Austrian, two Turkish and one German) and some 
machine gun companies, two of which were German. In addition, the force holding the 
coast at Jaffa in a fear of possible landing, was ordered down to the Palestine front to meet 
the expected British attack.1403  
On the evening of March 25th, the British force was assembled and ready to move 
on Gaza.1404 The British first made a frontal attack on 26th March against Gaza with three 
cavalry troops and another group of the troops tried to surround the east of the city, so as to 
prevent the retreat of the Ottoman garrison and to hold off Turkish reinforcements.1405 In 
the beginning of the battle, the British forces gained some ground and were able to enter 
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into one battery front of the Austrians. The A.N.Z.A.C. troops captured the commander 
and the staff of the 53rd Ottoman division. On 27th March, the fighting continued inside the 
town.1406 Throughout the daytime, a lot of street and barricade fighting took place in the 
centre of Gaza. The commanding grounds of the town were captured in the beginning by 
the British Army, but later the Ottoman forces recaptured them.1407 On the evening of 27th 
March, as a consequence of partly the increase in the casualties by the increasing pressure 
of the Turkish forces, which were converging on Gaza, and partly by considerations of 
water supply, the British troops were ordered to retreat.1408  
The first battle of Gaza ended with a great victory for the Ottoman side. In this 
battle, the British commandership calculated their losses close to 4.000, of which 523 
killed, 2.932 wounded, and 512 missing.1409 5 officers and 241 other ranks, wounded and 
unwounded, fell into the Ottoman hands.1410 According to Cemal Pasha’s report to Enver, 
the Ottoman Casualties were as such: 8 officers and 153 soldiers killed, 9 officers and 409 
soldiers wounded, 15 officers 590 soldiers were accounted for lost. A mobile hospital, a 
labor squadron and 2 batteries were captured by the English. 2 batteries were destroyed by 
the British fire.1411  
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Murray commenced the preparations for a second attack immediately after the first 
defeat in Gaza. In three weeks between the first and the second attempt against Gaza, both 
sides worked actively to compensate for their deficiencies. For the British side, the railway 
was expanded nearer to the Gaza Front. In the first battle, the British railway was 20 miles 
from Gaza.1412 In this period, this space was reduced to five miles and reached to Deir al 
Balah.1413 They also had the opportunity to supply the needs of their army in Gaza by 
ships.1414 On the other hand, the Ottoman forces had covered their troop deficiencies to 
react to a renewed attack of the British.1415 The Ottoman trenches were fortified by three 
regiments in Gaza, two regiments east of the town, two at Hureira, one at Tell esh Sheria 
and one in the neighborhood of Huj. Thus, the Tell esh Sheria-Gaza line was deployed as a 
contiguous front.1416 
On 17th April, the British forces, to make a second attack on Gaza, gathered at Han 
Yunus and commenced to progress towards Wadi Gaza. On 18th April, some Ottoman 
trenches in and around Gaza were covered with fire by the artilleries of the warships and 
by a frontal attack.  The main British troops made a ground attack on 19th April with 
artillery firing aiming at the capture of the south-east of Gaza. They advanced without 
much difficulty over ground thoroughly explored during the First Battle of Gaza. As 
occurred the day before, a British warship flottila supported them firing against the Turkish 
trenches.  In the afternoon of the same day, the British infantry made 3 great attacks 
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against the Ottoman trenches inside Gaza. But, they were repulsed by the Ottoman troops. 
Finally, they ordered the infantry to attack supported by the cavalry and shielded by the 
armoured cars. They succeeded to capture some outpost lines of the Ottoman 
deployments.1417  
However, the Ottoman troops managed to protect their main trenches and took their 
forward lines of position back with a series of counter attacks against the British 
infantry.1418 The battle continued till the morning and then the British forces started to 
withdraw in the direction of Telelcemaa with the loss of every hope of success on their 
behalf. On 20th April, the British forces were back in their trenches that they were settled 
before the expedition. During the battle the Ottoman aviators outclassed the British in the 
air and they achieved to make a British aviator crash in the air fighting, while another one 
was destroyed in its station.1419 
As for the casualties, the consequence was disastrous for the British troops. 
According to the account of the British official history, “the [British] casualties from the 
17th to the 20th April were 6,444, of which the 54th Division suffered 2,870 (the 163rd 
Brigade alone 1,828), the 52nd Division 1,874, the 53rd Division 584, and the Imperial 
Mounted Division 547. The total of casualties to animals, including camels, was 2,129, 
about two hundred prisoners were captured by the British.”1420 Cemal Pasha estimated the 
British casualties in his report roughly in between 6.000 and 7.000. He didn’t give any 
details about the casualties of the Ottoman troops and only noted its proportional 
                                                 
1417 ATASE Arşivi, Kls. 171, Ds. 741, Fih. 68, Cemal to Enver, 21 Nisan 1333 [21 
April 1917]; Macmunn and Falls, Military Operations, p. 332. 
1418 ATASE Arşivi, Kls. 171, Ds. 741, Fih. 67, Cemal to Enver, 21 Nisan 1333 [21 
April 1917]  
1419 ATASE Arşivi, Kls. 171, Ds. 741, Fih. 68, Cemal to Enver, 21 Nisan 1333 [21 
April 1917]; Macmunn and Falls, Military Operations, p. 332; Birinci Dünya Harbi’nde 
Türk Harbi IV/I, pp. 601-651. 
1420 Macmunn and Falls, Military Operations I, p. 348. 
379 
 
smallness.1421 In a book published by the Turkish War Academy, the amount of the 
Ottoman casualties was calculated at 1970.1422  
The British defeat on the Gaza front caused essential changes in the command 
echelon of the forces deployed around Gaza. “On the 21st April, by order of Sir A. Murray, 
Lieut.-General Sir Philip Chetwode, Bt., assumed command of the Eastern Force, Lieut.-
General Sir Charles Dobell returning to England. Major-General Sir H. G. Chauvel 
succeeded General Chetwode in command of the Desert Column, and Br.-General E. W. 
C. Chaytor replaced him in command of the Australian and New Zealand Mounted 
Division.1423 In a month following the second defeat, the Commander-in-Chef Murray 
would share the same fate and he was replaced with General Allenby.1424 
After the second Ottoman victory in the Gaza Front, Enver demanded a counter-
attack by the help of the left wing of the Army and to drive the British forces into the sea. 
However, the Ottoman abilities for a counter attack were very limited because of the 
unfavorable situation of the troops in the Sinai Front. Cemal –and also von Kress- always 
refused his repeated enthusiasm regarding a counter-attack with reason of the 
transportation and foodstuff deficiencies. He answered that they had to watch the 
exploratory forces of the British forces to enhance their losses instead.1425  
After that, the battles in the Palestine front entered into a long period of tranquility. 
In this time period, with the loss of Baghdad, the Ottoman Headquarters directed its focus 
to the Iraqi front, whereas the British continued their fortification activities near Gaza with 
the aim of the conquest of Palestine. 
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9.2.Loss of Baghdad, the Yıldırım Undertaking and the End of Cemal’s Rule in Syria 
 
 
While the preparations were continuing for a third battle in Gaza, the situation of 
the Palestine Front was fundamentally changed with the outbreak of a revolution in Russia 
and with the capture of Baghdad by the British troops on 11th March 1917.  The great 
change in Russia and the dislocation of the British troops in Salonika released some 
Ottoman troops on the Easern and Western Front of Anatolia and enabled the Ottoman 
Headquarters to use those troops in the other fronts. As a result, there were only the fronts 
in Syria and Iraq where battles continued in the Ottoman lands. All those developments 
diverted Enver Pasha’s interest on the recapture of Baghad, and, without loss of time, he 
commenced the preparations for the recapture of the city.1426 Due to the problems in the 
railway transportation and the telegraph machines, intercommunication between the 
Headquarter and the Army commanderships in these regions presented some difficulties. 
For that reason, before the idea of the Yıldırım to take Baghdad back, Enver contemplated 
to remove his headquarters to Aleppo to provide quicker communication with these 
fronts.1427 He kept this idea in his mind even after the creation of the Yıldırım, until the eve 
of the capture of Jerusalem by the British troops. In one of his telegrams to Talat in the 
middle of November 1917, while he was in Syria, Enver was mentioning about the 
removal of its headquarters to Aleppo in 15 or 20 days.1428  
On the other hand, Enver Pasha’s plan to reconquer Baghdad was appreciated by 
the German Headquarters. Insomuch that they actively intervened in the process of 
                                                 
1426 For the process of the decision to recapture Baghdad, see: Birinci Dünya Harbi’nde 
Türk Harbi IV/II, Ankara: Genel Kurmay Basımevi, 1986, pp. 69-74. 
1427 Yıldırım, p. 2; Wavell, Ibid, p. 82, 90. 
1428 TTK Arşivi, KO Koleksiyonu 1/7, Enver to Talat, Damascus, 16 Teşrin-i Sani 
1333 [16 November 1917]; PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.16, Bernstoff to AA, Constantinople, 
24 November 1917.  
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preparations and prepared a plan necessitating the collection of all the command of the 
Armies in Syria and Iraq under one German commander. It is not because that the 
Germans only wanted to assist their allies, but they saw this project as an opportunity to 
increase the German influence in Arab districts and reserved enormous amount of money 
for this project. As a result, on 2nd July 1917, they created the Yıldırım Army Groups in 
Istanbul, whose staff officers were mostly Germans, for the recapture of Baghdad and 
appointed General Falkenhayn, the ex-chief of staff of the German army, as the 
commander of these groups. The forces released from the Russian Front and the Western 
Anatolia Front was to constitute the main body of these army groups.1429  
This army group had been created by the German Headquarters, and it seems that 
they didn’t only disregard the Turkish sentiment, but they neglected to take proper account 
of the local conditions. According to Liman von Sanders, his mission, which had the 
advantage of three and a half years' experience of Turkey, was not even consulted in the 
change of the army structure in Iraq and Syria, nor was its personnel utilised. The 
headquarters staff of the Yıldırım consisted of sixty-five German officers and nine Turks; 
these latter were junior officers, used mainly for liaison purposes.1430 
Since they needed the German assistance urgently, the Ottoman Headquarter 
couldn’t oppose this plan very much. The German Headquarter reserved 5 million gold 
liras and promised to provide for the requirements of soldiers and batteries. They would 
establish wireless stations and would bring the aviator detachments. In summary, they held 
out all the requirements for this expedition. Moreover, The Ottoman troops struggling in 
Roumania were ordered to be brought back for this undertaking.1431The testimony of the 
American consul at Aleppo shows the enthusiasm to recapture Baghdad. He conveyed that: 
                                                 
1429 Yıldırım, p. 13; for the observations of the Americn consul of Damascus regarding 
the process of the preparations to recapture Baghdad, see; PRO, FO 371/3058, Grahame to 
FO “Memorandum of Conversation with Mr. Samuel Edelman, late United States Consul 
at Damascus”, Paris, 10 June 1917; For a description of the process of the establishment of 
Yıldırım, see: Birinci Dünya Harbi’nde Türk Harbi IV/II, pp. 83-88. 
1430 Liman von Sander, Fünf Jahre Türkei, Verlag von August Sherl, Berlin:1920, 
p.219; PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.16, Bernstoff to Foreign Ministry; (Trasmitting Graf 
Schdenburg, Damascus), Constantinople, 21 November 1917 
1431 PRO, FO 371/3058, Grahame to FO “Memorandum of Conversation with Mr. 
Samuel Edelman, late United States Consul at Damascus”, Paris, 10 June 1917,  
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“While en route from Aleppo during the last week in May I met many train loads of troops, 
ammunition and great quantities of heavy artillery. I spoke to an Austrian officer about this 
business, who confirmed the fact that transports of heavy artillery on an intensive scale 
were going on. I imagine from what I saw that some of these guns were 8" or 9" guns… 
I want to convey the idea that the attack on Baghdad is certain. The information was also 
confirmed all along my line of journey. Aviators were seen going south in good numbers.  
While in Constantinople from May 29th to July 19th may thousands of troops were sent in 
that direction which proves that an effort is to be made at an early date in the attempt to re-
take Baghdad at all costs.”1432 
Besides the transportation of troops to Iraq, the extention of the Baghdad railroad to Mosul 
and the production of Shahtur boats for sailing the troops towards Baghdad in the 
Euphrates were planned. Some parts of these plans were commenced to put into practice, 
especially for those regarding the production of the boats.1433  
On the other hand, the British troops in the Sinai Front were intensifying their 
preparations for the capture of Palestine, and that process coincided with the Ottoman 
organization for an offensive to recapture Baghdad. Both the exploratory flights of the 
Ottoman aviators and the Bedouin intelligence reports made it clear for Cemal Pasha that 
in the short run, a third larger attack would take place against Gaza. The appointment of 
General Allenby, who was famous with his devoutness and bravery, as the commander-in-
chief of the EEF with broad authority made it obvious that the British side was seriously 
considering the invasion of Palestine.1434  
Unlike the situation in the Sinai Front, although the Ottoman Empire had lost its 
provincial capital, Baghdad, the state of affairs in the Iraqi front didn’t have any indication 
of urgency. Following that achievement, the British troops proceeded to repair the existing 
railways and to start the construction of the new ones. Therefore, in the eyes of the Turkish 
commanders, the British expedition in Iraq had reached its natural boundaries for the time 
being and in a short while, they didn’t expect any British advance in that front.1435 
                                                 
1432 PRO, FO 371/3058, British Ambassador in Washington to FO, “Statement made by 
Mr. Jackson,[late] American Consul from Allepo”, Washington, 30 August 1917.   
1433 Yıldırım, p. 20-23. 
1434 Von Kress to Cemal, 10 August 1917, in Yıldırım, p. 52. 
1435 Yıldırım, p. 37. 
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Moreover, the situation of the Ottoman troops in Aleppo, the Ottoman 7th Army, 
which reserved for the reconquest of Baghdad didn’t paint a promising picture and the 
means in the hands of the Ottoman Army made the Baghdad project physically impossible. 
According to the remarks of Mustafa Kemal [Atatürk], the commander of the 7th Army:  
“The effectiveness of the divisions which would carry out the venture are weak and low in 
value. After two months' marching they would be nothing more than a rabble -to use a 
slight exaggeration. Our shakturs and Camels cannot compare with the enemy's railways 
and ships to Baghdad. Finally, one of the surest indications of the futility of the plan is that 
after two days' marching regiments would melt away.”1436   
On the other hand, the conditions of the troops in the Sinai Front needed an urgent 
reinforcement. According to the remarks of Von Kress, epidemics and desertions 
weakened very much the effectiveness of the army. The soldiers, who were sent to Gaza to 
cover the deficiencies of the divisions, arrived there “ruefully”1437 and %25 of the 
reinforcement troops sent from Anatolia to cover the soldier deficiencies of the divisions 
deserted before they arrived at their destinations.1438 Moreoever, the gap in the amount of 
the soldiers between the British and the Ottoman sides had tripled in five months after the 
second battle of Gaza. Therefore, Von Kress urged Cemal to insist before Enver on 
sending the new troops, which were in Aleppo for an offensive against Baghdad, to the 
Sinai Front.1439 
In spite of all these disadvantages, Enver was extremely reluctant in the beginning 
to abandon the Baghdad enterprise. Persuading Enver Pasha to the necessity of the 
reinforcement in Gaza costed 5 months for the Ottoman side, which was so valuable for 
                                                 
1436 PRO,  FO 370/215, Mustapha Kemal to Enver Pasha, 30 September 1917; the 
Turkish version of this report is available at; Yıldırım, p. 73. However, the date of the 
document is written as 20 September. When we take the abolishment date of the 4th Army 
and the appointment of Falkenhayn as the commander of the troops in Syria -26 
September- 20 September is more plausible as the date of this document. 
1437 Von Kress to Cemal, 10 August 1917, in Yıldırım, p. 53; BA-MA, RM 5/2322, 
Humann to the Chef of Admiralstabs of Marine, Constantinople, 16 September 1917.  
1438 PRO, FO 371/3050, Sykes to FO, “Rough Notes of an Interview with Mr Edelman, 
recently American Consul at Damascus”, Cairo, 6 July 1917.  
1439 Von Kress to Cemal, 10 August 1917, in Yıldırım, p. 53; BA-MA, RM 5/2322, 
Humann to the Chef of Admiralstabs of Marine, Constantinople, 16 September 1917.  
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the preparations in the Sinai Front to react to a strong British attack.1440 In that period, the 
British side almost completed all their preparations for a third attack.  At the end, in a very 
late date for the Ottoman troops in the Sinai, Enver understood the critical situation of the 
Sinai Front, and decided that a defeat in that front would “paralyze his undertaking to 
invade Baghdad” and was convinced to send the 7th Army to the Sinai Front.1441 
After the persuasion of Enver, the position of Falkenhayn appeared as another 
issue, which caused problems between Enver, Cemal and Falkenhayn. Sending him back to 
Germany meant to abandon the German military and monetary assistance, which was 
required as the main condition to strenghten the Army in Palestine, and to reconquer 
Baghdad in its aftermath. Therefore, the question of Falkenhayn needed to be solved as 
early as possible to get the German assistance for both fronts. The first option was to put 
him under the command of Cemal Pasha, but he didn’t accept it.1442 On the other hand, 
Cemal was strongly opposing to putting the Ottoman forces in Syria under the command of 
Falkenhayn, since it would mean the practical abolition of his authority in Syria.1443 In 
addition to that, Cemal was opposing to Enver’s and Falkenhyn’s course of action 
regarding the Sinai Front out of military considerations. They were planning to make an 
offensive to the British forces in the Gaza front by surrounding them in the desert. Instead 
of this, Cemal considered Palestine as the most critical front of the Ottoman Empire and 
proposed to reinforce it as strongly as possible with the troops, which would be transferred 
from the other fronts.1444 In his telegraph to Enver some 3 three months before the fall of 
                                                 
1440 Indeed, Enver didn’t change his mind about the recapture of Baghdad, while he was 
sending Falkenhayn to Gaza. He only delayed this plan as a result of increasing pressure 
regarding the necessity of reinforcement in Gaza. He explained his ideas on this issue in 
his telegram that was sent to Cemal Paşa. For further details see: TTK Arşivi, KO 
Koleksiyonu 3/64, Enver to Cemal, 3 Eylül 1333 [3 September 1917] 
1441 TTK Arşivi, KO Koleksiyonu 3/62, Enver to Cemal, 1 Eylül 1333 [1 September 
1333] 
1442 Yıldırım, p. 48-58. 
1443 PRO, FO 371/3058, Rumbold to FO, Bern, 4 September 1917; BA-MA, RM 
5/2322, Humann to Chef of Admiralstabs of Marine, Constantinople, 16 September 1917; 
PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.16, Bernstoff to AA, Constantinople, 24 November 1917.  
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Jerusalem, Cemal expressed his opposition to that kind of action with a very strong 
language:  
“From now, I would like to clarify that I can not consent to Falkenhayn who drove a nail to 
the Germans in Verdun to drive a[nother] nail to us in Sinai in the territory of my army as 
long as I command the 4th Army… I assume it as the strongest treason [vatansızlık] to 
tolerate an action which would be a disaster for the salvation of the fatherland ...”1445 
In that case, the only solution was to recall Cemal Pasha to Istanbul. Indeed, His 
replacement had been contemplated in Istanbul with the change of the military situation in 
Sinai in favour of the British from the beginning of February 1917. The central 
government considered his removal necessary to win over the Arabs in this critical time. 
Furthermore, the moderation of the Arab policy and the reconciliation with the Arabs 
could only be realized by his dismissal.1446 However, this action was inconvenient for two 
reasons; firstly, both German and Turkish authorities believed in the necessity of Cemal’s 
“iron fist” on Syria and Palestine to control the “public order” in those regions. Therefore, 
his dismissal could have invited an uprisal in Syria. Secondly, his departure from Syria 
could have caused a problem of the provisioning for the Army corps in the Syrian 
provinces.1447 
Another issue was the emergence of a possible Turco-German conflict with the 
appointment of a Christian commander as the head of the army. It was almost certain that 
putting all the command of the armies in Syria and Iraq under a German commander, 
would increase the conflict between the Ottoman and German soldiers. Therefore, almost 
all the Turkish commanders, Cemal Pasha and Mustafa Kemal being in the first place, 
were opposed to the combination of the armies of these two districts under a non-Muslim 
                                                                                                                                                    
1444 TTK Arşivi, KO Koleksiyonu 5/54,Cemal to Von Kress, 5 September 1917; 
Djemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 188; Cemal Paşa, Ibid, p. 14; TTK Arşivi, KO Koleksiyonu 5/46, 
Cemal to Enver, 29 Temmuz 1333 [29 July 1917] 
1445 TTK Arşivi, KO Koleksiyonu 5/54, Cemal to Enver, 5 September 1917. 
1446 PA-AA, Türkei 165, Bd.41, Kühlmann to Bethmann Hollweg (Transmitting v. 
Kress, Jerusalem). Constantinople, 23 February 1917. 
1447 TTK Arşivi, KO Koleksiyonu 3/62, Enver to Cemal, 1 Eylül 1333 [1 September 
1917]; PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.16, Bernstoff to Foreign Ministry; (Trasmitting Graf 
Schdenburg, Damascus), Constantinople, 21 November 1917.  
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commander, and insisted to put Falkenhayn under the command of a Muslim general.1448 
As expected, following the emergence of the Yıldırım, most people in the Ottoman 
conscious circles met it with little symphaty and assessed as a harmful undertaking for the 
wealth and power of Turkey.1449 
Howoever, the appointment of Falkenhayn, both would guarantee the German help 
and the modus operandi of the troops Sinai Front would be rearranged in the direction of 
Enver’s desires, i.e. in an offensive way. In his telegram to Cemal, he explained that he 
sent the 7th Army from Aleppo to Gaza to make a striking offensive to the British forces 
there and to throw them out of the Sinai Peninsula.1450 Now a delicate task came to Enver 
and, in agreement with the German Head Quarter, Enver decided to appoint Falkenhayn as 
the commander-in-chief of the Armies in Iraq and Syria on 26th September –only one 
month before the start of the third battle in Gaza. Before he made this decision, he sent a 
long telegram to Cemal when he was in Germany and convinced him that protecting 
Palestine from the British occupation could only have been possible when the resources 
reserved for the recapture of Baghdad transferred there. He also implied that this 
movement could only be realized if the commandership of these troops put under the 
command of Falkenhayn. That is to say, the arrival of the German assistance was 
conditioned with the appointment of him to the Sinai Front. Enver also convinced Cemal 
that the latter’s existence was absolutely necessary for the maintenance of the public order 
in Syria.1451 As a result, the 4th Army of Cemal Pasha was abolished and a new 
                                                 
1448 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.16, Bernstoff to Foreign Ministry; (Trasmitting Graf 
Schdenburg, Damascus), Constantinople, 21 November 1917; PRO, FO 370/215, 
Mustapha Kemal to Enver Pasha, Ibid; Yıldırım, p. 75-76;  
1449 BA-MA, RM 5/2322, Humann to Chef of Admiralstabs of Marine, Constantinople, 
16 September 1917. 
1450 TTK Arşivi, KO Koleksiyonu 3/62, Enver to Cemal, 1 Eylül 1333 [1 September 
1333]; Even in the middle of September, Humann, a member of German military mission, 
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1451 TTK Arşivi, KO Koleksiyonu 3/62, Enver to Cemal, 1 Eylül 1333 [1 September 
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commandership was created to rehabilitate his tarnished honor, the commander-
generalship of Syria and West Arabia. His headquarter were to be established in Damascus 
and his only military task was to provide the provisioning of the Yıldırım groups.1452  
 
 
 
9.3.The Defeat in Birüssebi and Gaza, and the Capture of Palestine by the British 
 
 
While the Ottomans were trying to agree on which front they had to concentrate 
their attacks, the British optimism on the easiness of the capture of the Palestine had 
already been destroyed with the shock of the two defeats at Gaza. Following the two 
battles of Gaza, they understood that they had to make considerable reinforcements to the 
Sinai Front in the sense of troops and ammunitions to prevail against the Ottoman forces 
there. As a second reason to make more concentration on Palestine was the British change 
of strategy comprised the advance on the eastern fronts to resolve the deadlock in the 
French Front and to enforce the Central Powers to a peace. 1453  
When the shift of the Ottoman and German interests to recapture Baghdad were 
taken into consideration, to attack the Ottoman front in Palestine was more advantageous 
for the British side than reinforcing the Iraqi Front since they had already made significant 
improvement in Iraq and made considerable reinforcement in the Sinai front for the Gaza 
wars. On the other hand, an occupation of Palestine by the British forces would enforce the 
Ottomans to transfer their troops to this front instead of mobilizing them to occupy 
Baghdad.1454 
                                                 
1452 ATASE Arşivi, Kls, 77, Ds. 393, Fih. 30-1, Enver to Fourth Army and Yıldırım, 26 
Eylül 1333 [26 September 1917]; the same document also available at: TTK Arşivi, EP 
Koleksiyonu, 4/55; and TTK Arşivi, KO Koleksiyonu 3/30,  
1453 Wavell, Ibid, p. 95. 
1454 Wavell, Ibid, p. 97. 
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Meanwhile the Commander of the British troops was changed and Allenby 
appointed as the Commander General of the troops in Egypt. The new commander was 
widely supported by the British Headquarters and all his demands were responded to.1455 
When the fighting started in Gaza and Birüssebi on 30th October, as a result of their intense 
preparations, the British forces were trebled the Ottoman troops.1456 The third Battle, 
which took place in Birüssebi and Gaza, continued 9 days in a 50 km long front. The 
distance between the armies defending Gaza and Birüssebi brought the British army to a 
successful conclusion. Their achievement was to break the Gaza-Birüssebi line and to cut 
the intercommunication between the 7th Army defending Gaza and 8th Army defending 
Birüssebi. Thus, the reinforcement of the troops at Birüssebi was prevented and in a few 
days, these troops had to retreat behind Gaza. The Ottoman troops lost their grips there, 
due to the overwhelming prevalence of the British troops with respect to manpower and 
material support.1457 On the other hand, the Ottoman troops at Gaza were exposed to cross 
                                                 
1455 The existing literature on the history of the Palestine campaigns attributes a special 
importance to the appointment of Allenby in acquirement of the achievements in Palestine. 
However, when we considered the enormous support given to him by the War Cabinet and 
the mentioned developments in the Ottoman front, the impact attributed to the change of 
the leader of the operations will be minimized. It won’t be an exaggeration to conclude that 
Murray would also acquire the similar consequences, if he had been supported in the same 
measure; Woodwards, Ibid; Grainger, Ibid; Wavell, Ibid,  
1456 According to the account of the British official history “The official rifle strength of 
the E.E.F. on the 28th October 1917 was :Infantry Divisions and Camel Brigade 80,000, 
Cavalry 15,000. These figures include, however, large numbers employed in special duties 
and not available with battalions and regiments. The actual strengths may be taken as about 
60,000 and 12,000 respectively. An army on the defensive can employ a considerably 
higher proportion of its rifle strength than one which is attacking.” Macmunn and Falls, 
Military Operations II, p. 35; On the other hands, the number of the Ottoman infantry was 
approximately 25.000 souls and the number of the Ottoman artilleries was one-half of the 
British artilleries, approximately 206. Consequently, the British side had an overwhelming 
prevalence against the Ottomans in the third battle, quite the reverse of the first two. 
Yıldırım, p. 177; In addition, When the first fightings broke out, the morale of the Ottoman 
troops started to be progressively worse because of under-feeding. It made the resistance of 
the Ottoman troops weaker; 1456 PRO, FO 371/3058, Thomson to Campell, “Situation in 
Turkey”, New Scotland Yard, 4 October 1917; Yıldırım, p. 177-179  
1457 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.16, Bernstoff to Foreign Ministry; (Trasmitting Graf 
Schdenburg, Damascus). Constantinople, 21 November 1917; for the retreat report see: 
Von Kress to Yıldırım, 8 November 1917, in Yıldırım, p. 167; For a detailed description of 
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fire from the sea and the ground. The response of the German U-boots to the naval action 
of the British side was so weak because the flat ground of the sea. According to the 
German consul in Damascus, the British frontal artillery fire and aviator attacks made an 
additional demoralizing effect on the Ottoman troops. Following that, at the end of a 9-day 
lasting battle, on 8th November, the Ottoman soldiers started to “stampede” from their 
trenches towards Jerusalem.1458 
The loss of Gaza would presumably end up with getting Jerusalem out of hand. The 
following day of the finalization of the battle for Gaza with its loss, Falkenhayn advised 
the German Consul of Jerusalem to prepare for the departure from the city. In the same 
day, the Consul transferred the deposits of the consulate to Damascus and agreed with the 
Spanish consul on the diplomatic representation of Germany by the latter in Jerusalem. He 
also told German representative in Jaffa to depart in the direction of Nablus if necessary 
and wait ready for the departure.1459 The German diplomatic personnel at Jaffa were left 
there on 10th November, as soon as they took Falkenhayn’s advice.1460 
On 16th November, The British troops advancing throughout the coast had entered 
Jaffa. The invasion of Jaffa made them nearer to the capture of Jerusalem. The next day, 
the British threat against Jerusalem caused to the relocation of Falkenhayn’s headquarters 
to Nablus. After that, the British side started to entrench their positions for an attack 
against Jerusalem and they reinforced their deployments with new troops. They were very 
cautious about the attack by the impact of their experiences in the first and second battle of 
Gaza.1461   
On 8th December, the British forces made a surprise attack to the Ottoman trenches 
in Jerusalem taking the advantage of rainy and foggy weather. As a result of the 20 hour 
                                                                                                                                                    
the third war in Gaza from the Ottoman Military sources, see: Birinci Dünya Harbi’nde 
Türk Harbi IV/II, pp. 130-150.  
1458 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 16, Brode to AA, Damascus, 8 December 1917. 
1459 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.15, Bernstorff to AA (Transmitting Jerusalem Consul), 
Constantinople, 10 November 1917.  
1460 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.15, Bernstoff to AA, Constantinople, 14 November 1917. 
1461 Yıldırım, p. 218-249. 
390 
 
lasting battles the British troops forced the Ottoman forces to evacuate Jerusalem.1462 
According to Ali Fuad’s [Erden] report, the commander of the 20th Ottoman Army Corps, 
he had defended his deployment in Jerusalem. But, Falkenhayn didn’t want to cause the 
destruction of the city of Jerusalem with conflicts and therefore, his army corps evacuated 
the city and withdrew towards north. He also complained about the lack of reinforcement 
and claimed that Jerusalem was wasted [by Falkenhayn] [zayi edilmek].1463 The governor 
of Jerusalem confirmed his remarks. However, he narrated this event with positive words 
expressing that his soul wouldn’t accept the destruction of such a city, which was 
presumed as sacred by the entire world, under the artillery fire.1464 On 8th December, He 
delivered a letter to the mayor of the city addressing the British commander and created a 
police force for the maintanence of the order in the city. After that, on 9th December, he 
left there in a silence with the Ottoman officials under his administration. Thus, the 
destruction of this sacred city was prevented except for some small damage on the 
buildings in the exterior side of the city.1465  
The capture of Jerusalem offered an opportunity to Cemal to criticize both the 
policies of the Ottoman Central Government and the actions of the Yıldırım Army Group. 
In each opportunity he criticized Falkenhayn.1466 In a banquet held in Beirut in his honor, 
Cemal expressed that he would defend Palestine if the Central Government had not 
intervened in his actions there, sending Falkenhayn to this front. He, too, devastated the 
entire front changing the order of the troops from a defensive character to an offensive 
                                                 
1462 TTK Arşivi, KO Koleksiyonu 10/48, Ali Fuad to Cemal, 10 Aralık 1333 [10 
December 1917]; Falkenhayn to Enver, 9 December 1917, in Yıldırım, p. 255. 
1463 TTK Arşivi, KO Koleksiyonu 10/48, Ali Fuad to Cemal, 10 Aralık 1333 [10 
December 1917] 
1464 DH. ŞFR. 573/68, İzzet to Talat, Eriha, 10 Kanun-ı Evvel 1333 [10 December 
1917]. 
1465 DH. ŞFR. 573/68, İzzet to Talat, Eriha, 10 Kanun-ı Evvel 1333 [10 December 
1917]; PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.16, Ziemke to Hertling, Jerusalem, 18 December 1917; ; 
For a detailed description of the military operations around Jerusalem, see: Birinci Dünya 
Harbi’nde Türk Harbi IV/II, pp. 385-439. 
1466 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.16, Bernstoff to Foreign Ministry, Constantinople, 24 
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one.1467 In another meeting, he expressed his frustration against Falkenhayn with the words 
“imbecile” and “adventurer”.1468 Similarly, in his telegram sent to Enver immediately after 
the loss of Jerusalem, he expressed his frustration: 
“I do not give my blessing to Falkenhayn Pasha and I do not forgive him, since he wasted 
the available forces for the sake of an offensive warfare fantasy, before securing the 
absolute defense of Jerusalem... [He was the one who] caused the fall of the city. All the 
material and moral responsibility of this incident belongs to this man, who grasped this title 
unjustly.”1469 
On the other hand, the capture of Jerusalem made a great echo in Istanbul among the 
prominent members of the CUP at the same time. A telegram, which was sent, by Cemal 
Pasha and harshly criticizing Falkenhayn was read in the meeting of the central committee 
of the CUP in the presence of the ministers. The situation in Jerusalem caused a great 
demoralization among the members of the Central Committee. However, they were ready 
to support the government to prevent any internal crisis.1470 
One of the most interesting reactions came from the Papacy. The State-Secretary of 
the Pope published a declaration in L’Osservatore Romano (The Roman Observer), the 
semi-official newspaper of the Holy See, and congragulated the British Army since they 
saved the holy lands from the yoke of the infidels. The reaction of the German 
Government to this expression was to respond to the Holy See that the British Expedition 
against Jerusalem didn’t resemble that of the Crusades and it didn’t differentiate from their 
expeditions in Mesopotamia and Dardanelles. At the same time, they endeavored to 
prevent the dissemination of this declaration inside Germany.1471 In the response of the 
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Papacy, it was pointed out that they didn’t have any political aim with this explanation. 
This declaration purely reflected their religious thought.1472 
The fall of Jerusalem signified the end of Cemal in Syria as well. After it became 
apparent that Jerusalem would fall into the British hands, Cemal applied to Enver to return 
to Istanbul. In his telegram to Enver on 20th November, he stated that, after the relocation 
of the Yıldırım’s headquarters to Nazareth, he “came to a position that doesn’t allow him to 
stay in Syria.” He noted that Akka and Kerak towns were included in the Yıldırım’s region 
of control, and soon Damascus would be added to them. Following that, he would be 
harmfully redundant there. Therefore, he suggested to Enver, leaving all the moral 
thoughts aside, to accept the following offers: firstly, to abrogate the General 
Commanderate of Syria and the West Arabia and to re-create the 4th Army again under the 
Command of Mersinli Cemal Pasha and leave the organization of the Arab affairs to this 
army, which would be attached to the Central Headquarters directly. Secondly, Cemal 
offered that the Yıldırım Army Groups should have had the authorization to give orders to 
the 4th Army in the issues of provisioning and transport of the troops. He especially 
demanded Enver to give the organization of the Arab affairs to Mersinli Cemal Pasha to 
keep the Germans away from asserting their existence on Syria.1473 Mersinli Cemal had an 
advanced grasp of Arabic, and he was employed in the region for a long time. Therefore, 
The Arabs and the tribes in the region gave a wide credence to him.1474 
In his supplementary telegram that he sent three days later, Cemal described the 
way he would be deposed. In his plan, he would be deemed as off-duty for five months 
under the color of the health problems. In the same telegram, he guaranteed that in case of 
necessity, he was always ready to return to his post in Syria.1475 In the same day, Enver 
                                                 
1472 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.16, Eugen Paulli to Hertling, Monaco, 26 December 1917. 
1473 TTK Arşivi, KO Koleksiyonu 7/126, Cemal to Enver, 20 Teşrin-i Sani 1333 [20 
November 1917]. 
1474 Liman von Sanders, Ibid, p. 269. 
1475 TTK Arşivi, KO Koleksiyonu 8/142, Cemal to Enver, 23 Teşrin-i Sani 1333 [23 
November 1917]. 
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answered his request and accepted all his offers.1476 Cemal notified his departure to 
Falkenhayn. The lattler received this event with pleasure, and expressed his sorrow of not 
being able to find a way to work together for the mutual aim.1477 After that, he packed his 
house and sent it to Istanbul.1478 On 13th December he left Damascus for Istanbul.1479 Thus, 
an era had been closed in the history of Syria.  
Shortly after Cemal’s return from Syria, Falkenhayn was also dismissed and 
returned to Germany. After that, Liman von Sanders, the president of the German Military 
Reform Committee was appointed as the Commander-in-Chief in Syria. The Ottoman 
Army in Syria could successfully resist the British attacks in the east and west of the 
Sharia River for some ten months. On 1st October 1918, however, the British forces 
managed to capture the provincial capital, Damascus, which signified the end of the 
Ottoman rule in Syria.1480 
 
 
 
9.4.The Impact of the Sharifian Revolt on the Military Situation in Syria 
 
 
While the British Expedition was taking place from Egypt against Syria, another 
expedition started to move towards the same direction in Hicaz under the command of 
Faysal, the younger son of the Sharif. The prominent members of the Arabist movement 
and the contemporary Arab academics attributed crucial importance to the role of this 
                                                 
1476 TTK Arşivi, KO Koleksiyonu 8/141, Enver to Cemal, 23 Teşrin-i Sani 1333 [23 
November 1917]. 
1477 TTK Arşivi, KO Koleksiyonu 8/148, Falkenhayn to Cemal, 30 Kanun-ı Evvel 1333 
[30 December 1917]. 
1478 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.16, Bernstoff to AA (Trasmitting Graf Schdenburg, 
Damascus), Constantinople, 21 November 1917.  
1479 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 16, without signature to AA, 15 December 1917.  
1480 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.18, Bernstoff to Foreign Ministry (Transmitting consul 
Damascus), Aleppo, 6 October 1918.  
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movement in their memoirs1481 and studies1482 in the Ottoman rule’s coming to a close in 
the Arab lands. Taking the validity of these claims into question, this section aims at an 
analysis of the role of Faysal’s expedition in the Ottoman defeat in Syria. 
Immediately after his proclamation of revolt in Mecca against the Ottoman 
authority, Sharif Hussein was dismissed from the post of the Meccan Amirate and, instead 
of him, Ali Haidar was appointed as the new Amir. Simultaneously, Cemal Pasha was 
ordered by the Central Government to start preparations for an expedition to suppress 
Hussein’s revolt1483, and to secure the possession of Medina.1484 As the first measure in 
this sense, on 28th June, Fahri Pasha, the Commandant of 12th Army Corps was sent by 
Cemal Pasha to Medina to command the Hijaz Expedition1485 with considerable amount of 
auxiliaries. His initial task was to recapture Mecca and to suppress the Sharif’s movement. 
In a month, after the outbreak of the Revolt, 11 battalions, 2 machine-gun companies, 1 
Mountain battery and some field batteries were ready to depart for Medina. According to 
Metternich, a German official, the soldiers, to be sent to Medina were only of Turkish 
                                                 
1481 Ahmad Kadri, Ibid, p. 283-288; Darwaza, Ibid, p. 289-292; Amin Saeed, Ibid, p. 
229. 
1482 Kadri Kal’acı, Es-Sevretü’l-Arabiyyetü’l-Kübra 1916-1924,Beirut: Şeriketü'l-
Matbuat li't-Tevzi ve'n-Neşr, 1993; Mustafa Talas, Es-Sevretü’l-Arabiyyetü’l-Kübra, 
Damascus: Talas Liddirasat ve’t-Tercume ve’n-Neşr, 1987; Sulaiman Musa, Es-
Sevretü’l-Arabiyyetü’l-Kübra, Amman: Dairetü’s-Sekafe ve’l-Fünun, 1966.  
1483 PA-AA, Türkei 165, Bd.40, Marguerr to AA (Transmitting Stotzingen), Jerusalem, 
14 September 1916. 
1484 TTK Arşivi, KO Koleksiyonu 11/124, Cemal to Enver (transmitting the Protector 
of Medina), 11 Haziran 1332 [24 June 1916] 
1485 PRO, FO 371/2773, McMahon to FO, “Arab Question”, Cairo, 28 June 1916. In the 
beginning of the Revolt, Enver proposed to enable sheding blood between Sharif and the 
tribes supporting him to facilitate the suppress of the Sharif’s movement. It would prevent 
the collaboration of the two sides for further actions against the Government. He proposed 
to assign this mission to Ibn Rashid. However, he warned to avoid coshering-şımartmak- 
Ibn Rashid, while trying to get rid of another one; TTK Arşivi, KO Koleksiyonu 11/132, 
Enver to Cemal, 30 Mayıs 1332 [11 Haziran 1916]. 
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origins, “meaning that they were qualified soldiers”.1486 Addition to that, to reinforce the 
troops in Medina, a few regiment from Aleppo were sent there.1487 
Before the arrival of the Hijaz Expeditionary Force in Medina, the attempt of 
Sharif’s oldest son, Sharif Ali to capture Medina, synchronous to his father’s uprisal in 
Mecca, was easily repulsed by the Ottoman forces in Medina. 1488 After reaching some 
auxiliaries to Medina, Fahri Pasha managed to sustain the Ottoman domination in Medina 
strongly and guaranteed the security of the Hijaz Railroad.1489 By 29th July 1916, the 
Ottoman Government had ensured tranquility in the Northern Hijaz killing 3.000 bedouins, 
taking 700 of them as hostages and executing 50 of the Medinans who supported the 
Sharif.1490  
Cemal had made enthusiastic preparations in the beginnings of the Sharif’s 
movement to destroy it totally. In a short span of time, he fully realized that this task had 
great difficulties. First of all, this operation would need a great number of soldiers. In 
addition, they had to be supplied continuously with foodstuffs from Syria, which was in 
dire straits itself. Finally, the condition of the railroads reaching Medina was not promising 
for a continuous support.1491 As a result of all these problems, in a few months, after the 
outbreak of the Sharifian Revolt, an idea of the Meccan Expedition was totally abandoned 
and Fahreddin Pasha’s mission was restricted to protect Medina.1492  
                                                 
1486 PA-AA, Türkei 165, Bd.38, Metternich to Bethmann Hollweg, Constantinople, 23 
July 1916. 
1487 PA-AA, Türkei 165, Bd.38, Metternich to Bethmann Hollweg (Tranmitting Consul 
Damascus), Constantinople, 2 July 1916.  
1488 PA-AA, Türkei 165, Bd.38, Loytved to Bethmann Hollweg, Damascus, 25 June 
1916.  
1489 PA-AA, Türkei 165, Bd.38, Metternich to Bethmann Hollweg, Constantinople, 23 
July 1916. 
1490 PA-AA, Türkei 165, Bd.38, Metternich to Bethmann Hollweg, Constantinople, 1 
July 1916. 
1491 PA-AA, Türkei 165, Bd.40, Marguerr to AA (Transmitting Stotzingen), Jerusalem, 
14 September 1916. 
1492 BOA, DH. ŞFR. 540/100, Ali Haydar to Talat, Medine, 6 Kanun-ı Evvel 1332 [19 
December 1916]; PA-AA, Türkei 165, Bd.41, Loytved to Bethmann Hollweg, Damascus, 
5 January 1917. 
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The number of the troops in Medina was around 20.000, and far more exceeding 
the limitations of this city.1493 Furthermore, the daily need for provisioning of troops in and 
around of Medina was reaching 46 tones of grain.1494 As a result, in a short while, a danger 
of famine appeared among the troops there. Six months after the outbreak of the revolt, the 
new Amir, Ali Haidar, was swearing that they didn’t have foodstuffs for the troops even 
for one day.1495 His greatest fear was to be captured by Sharif Hussein as the consequence 
of a capture of Medina by the latter.1496  
However, after a short while, both the difficulties to supply foods in Medina and 
the deterioration of the Ottoman situation in the Sinai Front made the Ottoman and 
German officials in Syria thought to relocate the Medina Garrison at Maan to reinforce the 
defense of Palestine in spite of its tremendous political and religious consequences. With 
the surrender of Medina, the title of the Ottoman Caliph as the protector of the Holy Places 
would be meaningless.1497 On the other hand, the capture of Palestine would mean the loss 
of Medina as a result of the disconnection of Medina with Syria.1498 In his visit to Syria, 
Enver was persuaded by Von Kress to the necessity of an evacuation of Medina with 
military considerations.1499 But, Talat objected to this project on the account of the fact that 
the leaving of Medina to the hands of Sherif would cause the loss of the support of Ibn 
Reshid and Ibn Saud for the Ottoman Empire. As a result, the idea of evacuation was 
                                                 
1493 PA-AA, Türkei 165, Bd.41, Kühlmann to Bethmann Hollweg, Constantinople, 13 
March 1917; HHStA, PA 38/369, From Ranzi to Burian. "Der Aufstand im Hedjas". 
Damascus, 22 July (June ??) 1916. 
1494 Ali Fuad to Yıldırım, undated, in Yıldırım, p. 292-293. 
1495 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 540/51, Ali Haidar to Talat, Medine, 2 Kanun-ı Evvel 1332 [15 
December 1916].  
1496 BOA, DH.ŞFR, 542/64, Ali Haydar to Talat, Medine, 28 Kanun-ı Evvel 1332 [10 
January 1917].  
1497 PA-AA, Türkei 165, Bd.41, Kühlmann to Bethmann Hollweg, Constantinople, 13 
March 1917. 
1498 PA-AA, Türkei 165, Bd.41, Kühlmann to Bethmann Hollweg (Transmitting v. 
Kress). Constantinople, 23 February 1917.   
1499 PA-AA, Türkei 165, Bd.41, Kühlmann to Bethmann Hollweg (Transmitting v. 
Kress), Constantinople, 4 March 1917. 
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totally shelved.1500 Instead, the evacuation of Medina was restricted to the relocation of the 
ones, who didn’t have any military function, such as wounded soldiers and some of the 
local people.1501 
Meanwhile, the abandonment of the Meccan Expedition and, thus, the certainty that 
Sharif’s rebellion would continue, increased the support to Sharif among the Bedouin 
tribes in and around Mecca,1502 who had to find an ally to be able to compensate their 
needs for foodstuffs.1503 With the increasing support of Britain and securing the loyalty of 
the Bedouins by the British gold, the Sharif started to expand his movement towards the 
north, being tangent to Medina since it was strongly fortified by the Ottoman forces. The 
move towards the North could only be actualized with gaining the support of the Bedouin 
tribes on the road. It was not difficult for him as long as the British gold and foodstuffs 
continued to pour. As was expressed by Cemal Pasha, if the Ottoman Empire had more 
gold, then the loyalty of these tribes would be obtained by the Ottoman side.1504 
There were no Ottoman troops untill Akaba. The only thing to be done to take 
control over those places was to obtain the support of the Bedouins. Faysal advanced up to 
that place without confronting any serious difficulty by the Ottomans. However, with the 
appearance of the Sharifian danger for Akaba, the Ottomans reinforced their troops in that 
place creating the volunteer troops from the Bedouins1505 and by the forces transferred 
                                                 
1500 Talat to Cemal, 7 March 1917, in Feridun Kandemir, Fahreddin Paşa’nın Medine 
Müdafaası, Istanbul: Yağmur Yayınları, 2009, p. 75. 
1501 Kandemir, Ibid, p. 77-79; the transfer of the troops holding in Medina to the 
Palestine Front had concerned the British Side. Therefore, they tried to manipulate Faysal 
to surround Medina instead of advancing towards north. Teitelbaum, Ibid, p. 90. 
1502 TTK Arşivi, KO Koleksiyonu 11/124, Cemal to Enver (transmitting the Protector 
of Medina), 11 Haziran 1332 [24 June 1916] 
1503 ATASE Arşivi, Kls. 3208, Ds. 16, Fih. 2-1, Cemal [Mersinli] to Cemal, 13 
Temmuz 1333 [13 July 1917]. 
1504 Djemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 34. 
1505 Rogan, Ibid, p. 233. 
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from the Canal area, although it was not so strong to assure the city from Faysal’s 
capture.1506  
In April 1917, Faysal decided to capture Akaba. The following three months passed 
with the activities to establish good relations with the tribes around Akaba. After securing 
their support, on 6th July Akaba was surrounded and in two weeks, its capture had been 
completed.1507 After the occupation of Akaba, the EEF and Faysal’s troops had come very 
close to each other -180 km1508 and a direct connection had been established between the 
two fronts. Therefore, the combination of them was required. The British officials in Cairo 
sent Lawrence to Jeddah to persuade the Sharif. He persuaded the Sharif and Faysal 
himself and his troops came under the command of Allenby. Thus, the combination of the 
two fronts was achieved.1509 
However, Faysal’s troops were not adequate to retain the city for long. The remarks 
of a member of the British military mission there clarify the situation at Akaba after the 
invasion: 
“The regular Arab Army although showing great improvement in organization and 
discipline can as yet scarcely be reckoned on as a fighting unit of much military value. 
Lack of good officers is the great difficulty, and the old feud between Baghdad and Syrian 
nationalities among the officers makes itself felt in the lower ranks and impairs its 
efficiency as a whole. Transport difficulties also have not yet been adjusted, or are likely to 
be for some time to come, therefore a considerable portion of the Army is quite immobile 
and could not be supplied in the field with either food or other necessaries. The regular 
Arab Army therefore and the Bedouins can scarcely be considered a sufficient garrison to 
Akaba in the event of the Turks making a determined effort to retake the place, and are in 
reality more of a bluff than an effective fighting force.”1510 
Faysal was “very frightened that any day now the Turks may attack and that he would not 
have a single transport animal fit to carry supplies and ammunition to his troops”. In the 
                                                 
1506 PRO, FO 371/3047, Viceroy to High Comissioner in Egypt, Delhi, 4 December 
1916.  
1507 Teitelbaum, Ibid, p. 91-93. 
1508 Kandemir, Ibid, p. 126. 
1509 Teitelbaum, Ibid, p. 93. 
1510 PRO, WO 158/634, Joyce to Clayton, Akaba, 12 September 1917; the weakness of 
Faysal’s troops was also confirmed by a member of French Military Mission in Akaba. For 
further information see: MAEE, Guerre 1914-1918, 881/Turquie, Syrie et Palestine, 
Mercier to MAE, Cairo, 20 November 1917.  
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same way, the commander of the Ottoman troops assigned to fight Faysal had expressed in 
his dispatch to Cemal Pasha that he was sure about recapture Akaba easily.1511 However, 
the lack of food and water compelled him to fortify Maan instead of undertaking to 
recapture Akaba with cavalry and infantry.1512 In the following months, the provisioning 
and ammunition of the troops in Akaba was provided by the British and the French 
Warships from Egypt.1513 
Although the British Army in Egypt largely supported them, the Ottoman side was 
outstandingly superior to Faysal’s troops in Akaba. His troops organized raids against the 
Hijaz Railway. Therefore, Mersinli Cemal Pasha, the commander of the 8th Army Corps 
was assigned to suppress them with a considerable number of troops.1514 In regard to that, 
Cafer Pasha el-Askeri was complaining to Mercier, a member of the French Military 
Mission in Cairo, in his visit to Akaba that the Ottoman field artillery was faster than 
theirs, and in a battle they had destroyed four of their artillery pieces before the start of the 
fighting.1515 The small-scale fightings between the Ottoman soldiers and Faysal’s solders 
culminated in heavy losses of the latter. An Ottoman attack to the Bedouins in Fuyle 
resulted with heavy losses of them, and the Ottoman troops were always able to control 
them.1516 In another attack to Wadi Musa on 21st October, their casualties were 200 in 
                                                 
1511 ATASE Arşivi, Kls. 3208, Ds. 16, Fih. 3, The Commander of the 8th Army Corps 
to Cemal, 12 Temmuz 1333 [12 July 1917]. 
1512 PRO, WO 158/634, Joyce to Clayton, Akaba, 12 September 1917; ATASE Arşivi, 
Kls. 3208, Ds. 16, Fih. 2-1, Cemal [Mersinli] to Cemal, 13 Temmuz 1333 [13 July 1917]. 
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Cairo, 20 November 1917. 
1514 ATASE Arşivi, Kls. 176, Ds. 726, Fih. 26-1, Fuad to Enver, 13 Teşrin-i Sani 1333 
[13 November 1917]. 
1515 MAEE, Guerre 1914-1918, 881/Turquie, Syrie et Palestine, Mercier to MAE, 
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killed and 300 in wounded.1517 Similar fightings continued at intervals till the total 
withdrawal of the Ottoman troops from the region.1518 
Following the occupation of Akaba, the Hijaz Front entered into a period of 
tranquility. The tribes under the command of Faysal organized small-scale raids against the 
Ottoman troops resulted with small losses, and sabotaged the Hijaz Railroad that was 
taking foodstuffs and ammunition to the troops in Medina.1519 However, In spite of their 
attacks to the Railroad continuing through the next 1.5 years, they failed to invade the 
Railroad and cut the communication with the Ottoman troops in Medina.1520 As a result of 
the capture of Akaba, the support of the small Bedoun tribes to Faysal in and around the 
region increased.1521 Nevertheless, the main improvement of the troops in the east of 
Sharia River could be possible by the turn of the British troops from Palestine towards the 
east following the capture of Jerusalem, rather than the success of Faysal’s Bedouins. The 
attempts of General Allenby to combine Faisal’s troops with that of himself on 21st 
February and 25th March 1918 by the invasion of Transjordan was repulsed two times by 
the Ottomans and his tribal alliances. In the second attack, the British troops obtained a 
temporary success in Salt, but the Ottomans reconquered it. The position of the Ottoman 
troops there, was defended till the final British attack on 18-19th September 1918, which 
                                                 
1517 PRO, WO 158/634, Arbur to Dirmilint, Cairo, 26 October 1917. 
1518 For the examples of such attacks see: ATASE Arşivi, Kls. 3208, Ds. 17, Fih. 21,21-
1, Cemal to Enver, 3 Ağustos 1333 [3 August 1917]; ATASE Arşivi, Kls. 3208, Ds. 17, 
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1520 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.17, Oppenheim to Ludendorf, Berlin, 27 July 1918.  
1521 ATASE Arşivi, Kls. 3208, Ds. 16, Fih. 15, 15-1, Cemal to Enver, 14 Temmuz 1333 
[14 July 1917]; ATASE Arşivi, Kls. 3208, Ds. 16, Fih. 34, Cemal to Enver, 14 Temmuz 
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would cause the end of the Ottoman rule in Syria.1522 The Ottoman troops defended Kerak, 
Salt and Hauran with success until the very last moment.1523 The capture of the east Jordan 
could be achieved only several days before the capture of Damascus.1524 
Taking the struggle between the Ottoman troops and that of Faysal into 
consideration, it can be concluded that the Sharif’s revolt didn’t acquire an outstanding 
achievement in military terms against the Ottoman forces both in Medina and in Syria.  
They were able to make considerable improvement towards Syria after the collapse of the 
Ottoman front in the east of the Sharia River. In other words, the main share in the capture 
of Syria belonged to Allenby’s forces. On the other hand, the Ottoman Army in Syria was 
considerably affected with the outburst of Sharif’s Revolt both pinning considerable troops 
in Medina and deploying troops in Maan to drive away the Bedouin raids against the Hijaz 
Railroad in and around Akaba.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1522 Rogan, Ibid, pp. 234-240; When the British forces entered into Salt, They proposed 
to the leaders of the most prominent family of the city, the Tufan family, to take the British 
side, and promised great rewards in exchange for their support. In reply to that offer, the 
members of the family refused this offer and preferred to take the Ottoman side. Hereupon, 
the British forces imprisoned and tortured them. However, the leaders insisted in their 
attitudes and waited till the recapture of the city by the Ottoman side to release; BOA, DH. 
ŞFR. 584/160, Tahsin to Talat, 21 Mayıs 1334 [21 May 1918]. 
1523 Between 26th and 31th March the British forces made several attacks to these places, 
but in each time they had been repulsed along the whole front following a fierce 
competition: BA-MA, RM 5/2323, Humann to Chef Admiralstabs of Marine, Aleppo, 22 
April 1918; Liman von Sanders, Ibid, p. 268-270; They repeated the attack between 30th 
April and 4th May, and able to capture Salt temporarily. But, the Ottoman troops could 
recapture there after a decisive victory; Liman von Sanders, Ibid, p. 278-298. 
1524 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd.18, Waldburg to Hertling (Transmitting Consul 
Damascus), Constantinople, 25 September 1918; Liman von Sanders, Ibid, pp. 337-382. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
When Cemal Pasha departed from the Haydar Pasha station in İstanbul for Syria, 
he was not only determined in terms of the conquest of Egypt as his ultimate goal, but he 
was seriously premeditating the “re-formation” of the state in Syria, which was “occupied” 
by the penetration of the foreign states by various instruments for decades. The conquest of 
Egypt was an exciting ideal for Cemal Pasha, which would make him a hero of the 
Ottoman history as well as paving the way for the higher positions in the Ottoman 
Government. Furthermore, a victory in Egypt would bring prestige to the Ottoman state 
among its citizens, while putting Cemal in the center of the War. The overwhelmingly pro-
Ottoman attitude of the various sections of the Egyptian society increased the success 
expectancy of this operation in spite of the proportional power of the British troops in 
Egypt. For those reasons, even after the failure of the first expedition, for a long while, 
Cemal considered to organize a second expedition against the Canal with a larger army. To 
the contrary of what the existing sources claimed, he earnestly desired the conquest of 
Egypt and made preparations in Syria for a conquest expedition against Egypt via the Suez 
Canal. The great construction works of railways and chausseed roads endeavored in the 
Sinai Desert to facilitate the transport of the soldiers make that aim evident.  
When the construction works by Meissner Pasha, in the sense of railroad and 
chausseed roads in the Sinai Desert upon the order of Cemal, for an expedition against 
Egypt are taken into consideration, the claims of Cemal Pasha and the people in his 
entourage that the expedition was organized as a tactic to bind the British troops in Egypt, 
give the impression that they were, in fact, excuses produced later to legitimize the failure 
of the expedition. However, in spite of Cemal’s failure to capture Egypt, the preparations 
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made for this expedition in the Desert provided a strong defense to his troops in Syria 
during the British expedition from Egypt, and caused great casualties to them. If Enver had 
not intervened in the defense of the Palestine front and had made the necessary assistance 
to Cemal instead of the organization of a new expedition to recapture Baghdad, it would 
not have been a weak possibility for Cemal’s troops in Gaza to defend their fronts in a 
stronger way, and perhaps, would enforce Great Britain to a peace without losing the 
Syrian territories, as indeed claimed by Cemal in his memoirs. 
As for the second aim, i.e. the “re-formation” of the state in Syria, or with the 
remarks of the German consul in Damascus the “re-conquest” of it from the foreign 
penetaration and any kind of local intermediary, Cemal was more successful at least in the 
short term. First of all, it is worth to clarify that, throughout his governorate in Syria, 
Cemal didn’t consider the possibility that the Ottoman Rule in Syria would come to an end 
following the WWI. On the opposite, all his actions analyzed throughout the chapters of 
this study clearly demonstrate that he calculated the Ottoman rule in Syria as permanent. 
Thus, Cemal’s governorate in Syria was not a life and death struggle to make the Ottoman 
state living. Rather, he endeavored to “re-form” the Ottoman state in Syria for the post-war 
period, using the modern nation-states as a model. In this regard, the direction of Cemal’s 
activities in Syria and the picture of the Syrian urban and Bedouin society when he arrived 
there, also open the consequences of the processes of centralization in the preceding 
periods up for discussion. On the verge of the WWI, due to the character of the reform 
movements of the pre-war times that took the localities into consideration and due to the 
competition with the Great Powers, the local interest groups and some autonomous 
structures continued to exist as important factors in the local politics of Syria. However, 
Cemal assessed these socially efficient groups as an impediment or barrier for a direct 
control of the state over its citizens in Syria, and, as one of the most important leaders of 
the ruling party CUP and, as a significant member of the Cabinet, he set out to eliminate 
them. 
In this regard, first of all, Cemal turned a hand to the question of Arabism with his 
strong personality in the Ottoman politics, which showed, according to him, a potential to 
mobilize the sentiments of the Muslim population in Syria, which constituted the great 
majority, towards the Ottoman state in future. The CUP circles thought it for a long time 
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that the Arabist movement, which had some connections with the foreign states, was a 
threat for the unity of the Ottomans. Although, the CUP leaders looked for a way to 
compromise with the Arabists after the first Arab congress in Paris in 1913, it is 
understood from their special reports and memoirs, that they did not consider the Arabists 
as serious reform demanders, but rather some self-seekers caring for their personal 
benefits. Due to these misperception, the prejudices of the Republican Turkey regarding 
the Arabs as the “traitors” to the Empire were based on the Unionist misunderstanding of 
the aims of the Arabists, and their perception of this movement as an organization 
facilitating the designs of the Great Powers. It would not be an exaggeration to claim that 
there was at least one very strong group within the body of the CUP thinking like that.1525  
However, during the CUP time, that bias was only restricted to the Arabists while the 
Republican Kemalist ideology generalized it to all Arabs. It is worth to mention as a final 
remark that, the principal Unionist concern was to hold the Empire together, rather than 
subjugating the “pre-modern” Arabs as claimed by Makdisi.1526 
On the other hand, the Arabist opposition, consisted mainly of the Arab notables, 
was considered a social interlayer preventing the penetration of the state to the Syrian 
realm even before the outbreak of the war. Therefore, Cemal’s claim that he punished the 
Arabists because of their preparations for a rebellion in Syria seems to be a weak 
argument. Rather than that, he eliminated the influence of the Arabist notables of Syria by 
executing or exiling them since they could be an impediment for the direct imposition of 
the state authority on Syria. Although Cemal’s atrocities created an antipathy among the 
people against the State, when his long term policy of “re-formation” of the State in Syria 
is thought, it is reasonable to conclude that he disregarded the reaction of the Syrians of his 
day in return for the ideal Syrian-Ottomans, who would be loyal to the Ottoman rule and 
                                                 
1525 Some intermediation undertakings of the prominent CUP members to save some 
Arabist from death penalty, which would be detailed below, and some critics in the 
memoirs demonstrate that there was an opposition within the body of the CUP against the 
actions of Cemal towards the Arabists. The Governor of Beirut, Azmi Bey intermediated 
and saved Rıza es-Sulh from death penalty: Arslan, Ibid., p. 139; Similarly, Talat Pasha 
endeavored several times to save Abdulhamid Zehravi from his fate; Birgen, Ibid.,  p. 272; 
and offered Abdulwahab el-Inglizi to help him to go abroad: Kurd Ali, Ibid., p. 152-153. 
1526 Makdisi, Ibid, p. 769. 
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against any foreign influence in the future. Furthermore, by the destruction of the Arabist 
movement, he would prevent any demad of autonomy or independence during the peace 
negotiations after the War. Meanwhile, it is worth to mention that Cemal’s punishment of 
the Arabists did not intend to abolish the existence of the Arab culture and replace it with 
that of the Turks. His insistence on teaching Turkish, the official language of the Empire, 
to the Syrians was due to the eagerness for establishing direct communication between the 
Syrians and the Ottoman state. Yet, he did not do anything to abolish the Arab culture. 
Rather, he took some protective measures to protect the Arab heritage of Syria, like the 
restoration of the monuments built by the Umayyads. In his struggle with Arabism, Cemal 
used an Ottomanist-Islamist discourse to gain the support of the Syrians and published a 
newspaper called al-Sharq to spread those ideas as well as opening a new university 
named Selahaddin-i Eyyubi Külliyesi. 
Possibly, Cemal’s harsh intervention in the Arabist movemen and the execution of 
its members made a permanent influence in the Syrian politics for the post-Ottoman 
period. It can be concluded that, with the destruction of the prominent intellectuals and the 
civil political leaders, Syrian political life was made more suitable for the ensuing military 
or authoritarian regimes. It can be asserted that, with these executions, Cemal Pasha played 
a role in drawing of today’s picture of the Syrian politics. 
The outbreak of the Sharif’s revolt in Mecca turned the tide against the indisputable 
ruler of Syria and formed an opinion in the Central Government that Cemal’s activities in 
Syria triggered this revolt, although the motives of this movement were very different. 
When the possibility of suppression of the rebellion disappeared, the Central Government 
tried to find a way for the moderation in the Arab policy, with the concern of sympathy 
among the Syrians towards the Sharif. In the beginning, they planned to persuade Cemal to 
return from Syria. But, because of the critical military situation in the Sinai Front, a change 
in the command of the Syrian Army was abandoned. Nevertheless, a moderation of the 
methods took place in the Arab policy. Towards the end of his governorate, Cemal 
launched the negotiations with the Sharif. Following the removal of Cemal at the end of 
the year 1917, many of his rigorous policies were abandoned. In this regard, most of the 
exiles in Anatolia were allowed to return to Syria. In the same direction, the negotiations 
with the Sharif for a peace agreement were continued. But, the reluctance of the 
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Government to give some guarantees and some kind of administrative autonomy to the 
Sharif obstructed the road to arrive at a quick conclusion in these negotiations. While the 
process was continuing the British forces occupied Syria and caused the interruption of the 
process.  
Besides the Arabist movement, Cemal also intervened with his “iron fist” in the 
other autonomous bodies in Syria with the same reasons, which had some kind of influence 
over the peoples there. For this purpose, he endeavored to reconstruct the relations of the 
Zionists, the Christian clergy and the autonomous Government of Lebanon with the state 
to limit their impact on the Jews, the Christians and the Lebanese, who were seen as 
potentially disloyal components of Syrian society. In spite of the resistance of Germany 
and some circles in İstanbul, due to the strong personality of Cemal, some serious steps 
were taken to check the Zionist movement: First, all the non-Ottoman Jews were put under 
the direct authority of the state through naturalization. Those, who did not accept Ottoman 
citizenship, were deported. Second, the prominent Zionists, who were administering the 
Zionist organization, were sent into the exile. It is worth to mention that Cemal’s action 
was not a deliberation aiming at the destruction of the Jews due to an anti-semitic 
worldview, nor he did endeavor to Turkify Palestine by exiling the Jews. The evacuation 
of Jaffa makes this aspect evident. Although, in the beginning, Cemal showed tendency for 
the evacuation of Jaffa as an occasion to weaken the Zionist movement, afterwards this 
purpose was abandoned and they were distributed to the various cities of Palestine because 
of the military reasons.  
The immunity of the Christian clergy was another issue that Cemal dealt with. 
Since most of them, especically the Maronites, were the agents of the French influence in 
Syria, it was important for Cemal to put them under state control. For that purpose, during 
Cemal’s time of rule, the Maronite patriarch come to be appointed by the decree of the 
Ottoman Sultan. For the first time similar actions to subjugate the clergy of the Christian 
sects were undertaken. Thus, the “uncrowned king” of Syria gave the message to the 
Christian communities that the only power in Syria that they had to rely on was the 
Ottoman Government. Thus, another interlayer between the state and its citizen had been 
checked. By all these implementations against the Christians, Cemal tried to abolish the 
traditions of the millet system for the non-Muslims. 
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The transformations that the Lebanese Government experienced were not different 
than them. By the intervention of Cemal Pasha, for the first time in the history of the 
autonomous government of Lebanon, a Muslim-Turk, Ali Münif Bey, was appointed as its 
governor. As a leading Unionist, Ali Münif Bey undertook to integrate Lebanon into the 
Ottoman administrative system and to transform Lebanon into an ordinary province of the 
Empire.  
Cemal’s treatment of the Armenian deportees could be assessed in the same 
category. As mentioned before, different from Talat Pasha’s attitude of neglect towards the 
Armenians, Cemal was from the “pro-Armenian” party of the CUP, and wanted to 
integrate them to the Syrian society as a harmless minority [cüz’iyet] politically, dispersing 
them to various regions of Syria. But it should be clarified that it was not a kind of 
ethnicity engineering aiming at the turcification of the Armenians. Rather to make them 
harmless politically for the goals of the CUP.  
Quite the reverse of the claims in the existing literature, he intervened in both the 
deportation and settlement of the Armenians to facilitate the process, as much as he could. 
Throughout this process, he struggled with the interventions of the Central Government led 
by Talat, and as a result of his strong influence among the CUP circles and due to his 
absolute authority in Syria he could save many Armenians from a grave end. Cemal saw 
the maltreatment of the deportees as an incident that could show the state weak in the eyes 
of its citizens, which was one of the most sensitive issues for him. That is another reason of 
his intervention in the process of the deportation and the settlement. On the other hand, he 
didn’t follow a serious policy of conversion to Islam for the Armenians. In the same way, 
his orphanages did not have a program of Islamization for the Armenian children protected 
there. It was only a pretext to protect them from the interventions of the “anti-Armenian” 
party.  
While trying to remove the interlayers from the social space, Cemal didn’t 
disregard the struggle with the foreign influence in Syria, which competed with the 
Ottoman Government for the sympathy of the Syrians, and created a barrier for the control 
of the Ottoman rule to the country for years as a result of the privileges provided by the 
Capitulations. In this regard, firstly, Cemal made an effort to erase the French influence in 
Syria seizing all the institutions established directly or indirectly by France as well as the 
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deportation of those, who disseminated the French influence such as priests and nurses. In 
the same direction, he did his best to forestall any replacement by Germany or Austria as 
foreign powers. Any intervention by a representative of Germany or any other state was 
rigorously rejected by Cemal. During his period of rule, the Pasha prevented, to a 
considerable extent, any cultural propaganda of Germany and Austria, since he considered 
it as a threat for the establishment of the authority of the state in Syria. All these 
undertakings were performed by mainly Turkish and the CUP member bureaucrats, since 
Cemal only trusted the Unionist Turks in a struggle against the internal and external 
“enemies” of the Ottoman unity. However, Cemal’s preference of Turks was not due to 
that he saw the Arabs as the second-class citizens of the Empire. Appointment of many of 
the Arab bureaucrats to the Anatolian provinces, which was populated in majority by 
Turks, is the most obvious proof of Cemal’s indifference about ethnicity in his 
governmental actions. 
On the other hand, Cemal Pasha didn’t neglect to create the necessary means and 
institutions, which would assert the control of the State in the bodies and minds of the 
Syrians. In this sense, the process of the conscription, which began with the military 
mobilization for the Expedition against Egypt, offered a good opportunity for Cemal to 
control the bodies and bringing the people in discipline, which created an important 
process to modern states to make their citizens eligibly disciplined. In the beginning of the 
War, many of the Syrians willingly entered into the military service with the enthusiasm of 
the Egyptian Campaign. But the failure of the first expedition caused among the Arab 
soldiers a loss of motivation. In addition, the hardships of the military life combined with 
constant delay of the second expedition as well as the increasing impact of Cemal’s “iron 
fist” over Syria, made the military life a nightmare for the Arab soldiers. Furthermore, 
some of them were employed in the labor battalions; most of the construction works done 
by Cemal in Syria could be realized by the labor battalions consisted of the conscripted 
Syrians. The Arabs, who didn’t experience a military life on that scale before, found the 
military service difficult and therefore, the desertions in the army considerably increased. 
Cemal made a considerable effort to suppress their brigandage throughout the War. It is 
worth to mention that Cemal did not trust on the non-Muslims in the military service and, 
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different from the Muslims, they were mainly employed in the labor battalions and the 
other auxiliaries. 
Besides that, Cemal opened new educational institutions in Syria to ottomanize the 
minds of the people in Syria under the supervision of the prominent woman intellectual 
Halide Edib. That ottomanization was not, however, a transformation of the Arabs 
culturally into a Turkish character. It rather aimed to develop a sense of Ottomannes 
among the Syrians, nourished by an antagonism against the Great Powers. He opened 
schools both in Turkish and Arabic. Cemal solely intended to modernize Syria by the 
Ottomans instead of the institutions of the Great Powers, which caused, according to him, a 
shift in the sentiments of the Arabs towards the Ottoman state. Cemal also undertook to 
transform the cities that would make the visibility and penetration of the State easier and 
would increase the prestige of the state in the eyes of the Syrians. In this regard, he opened 
new avenues as well as widening the existing ones. Moreover, the dead-end streets were 
transformed, as to allow free passage. One aim of all these constructional and educational 
undertakings was to make Syria as developed as Egypt, which became an ideally 
developed country following the British invasion in the eyes of the Syrians. Finally in the 
context of the construction works, some historical monuments were restored by his 
undertakings. In this enterprise, he didn’t only undertake to restore the Ottoman and 
Byzantine buildings but the monuments belonging to the early periods of Islam constructed 
by the Arabs were also repaired.  
Cemal’s policy of the tribal and nomadic Arab societies was rather different than 
those described above. Quite the reverse of his predecessors’ policy of settlement towards 
the tribal structures to take them under the state control, Cemal maintained the traditional 
imperial policy of giving freedom of action to those communities because of the War 
circumstances. He was rather afraid of a rebellion of the Bedouin and the Druze tribes with 
the provocation of Great Britain. Here, the Government felt ilself comparatively unrivalled 
till the outbreak of the Sharifian Revolt. However, that movement compelled the 
Government for further investment for securing the loyalties of the tribal and nomadic 
societies. In spite of dissemination of the British gold to those communities, almost all of 
the great tribal dynasties led by chiefs such as Ibn Rashid, Nuri Shaalan, Ibn Saud did not 
show open hostility to the Ottomans to the very end of the War. When Faysal’s failure to 
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go beyond Akaba towards the north until the end of the War is taken into consideration, 
this reality will be understood more clearly. 
Besides these groups, Cemal had to struggle with a disastrous famine and 
epidemics, which dealt the heaviest blow in the plans of Cemal Pasha in Syria. Neither his 
policy of Arabism nor those of the others caused a dislike of the people towards the 
Ottoman Government as much as the social impact of the famine. The decrease in the 
quantity of the grains due to the conscription of the agricultural labor increased the impact 
of the military requisitions, which paved the way to antagonize the peasants with the State. 
Similarly, the problems of provisioning in the cities created the same results for the urban 
societies. However, Cemal’s rule was not the only guilty one in the issue of Famine; the 
entente states used famine as a weapon to make the Arabs revolt against the Ottoman 
authority. On the other hand, as a result of malnutrition, several epidemic diseases caused 
the death of a considerable number of people. The Ottoman struggle with the epidemics 
also provided them to control the bodies of the people in a modern way. 
All of these projects, which were implemented by an “iron fist” in Syria, created a 
significant dissatisfaction among the peoples there. However, it is worth to mention that 
today’s image of Cemal Pasha al-Saffah [sanguinary] did not emerge as a result of 
Cemal’s atrocities. It was rather the result of following process of nationalization. The 
Arab nationalists, who became influential in Syrian society following the end of the 
Ottoman rule, utilized the atrocities of Cemal Pasha to otherize the Ottoman period.1527 
Thus, the image of Cemal Pasha was transformed to al-Saffah during the process of the 
nationalization of the Syrian society following the termination of Ottoman rule. 
As for Cemal’s relations with the Central Government during his governorate, in 
spite of some problems emanating from the actions of the latter in contradiction of the 
regulations of the former, Cemal worked in a considerable harmony with the Central 
Government in many issues and took the consent of the Central bureaucracy in his 
activities. The most important confrontation of him with the Centre was in the issue of the 
                                                 
1527 For a study on the influence of the Arab nationalists in the post-Ottoman Syria, see: 
Khoury, Philip S., “The Paradoxical in the Arab Nationalism: Interwar Syria Revisited”, in 
James Jankowski and Israel Gershoni (eds.), Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle 
East, New York: Columbia University Press, 1997, pp. 273-287. 
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Armenian deportees. Cemal was opposed to the implementations of the Government and 
adopted a protective attitude towards the Armenians. In reverse, in the issue of the Arab 
executions, the Central Government was more lenient and made some attempts to prevent 
their implementations. Apart from these, as a member of the acting cabinet, Cemal was in 
harmony with the Central Government, and took the consent of his friends in Istanbul in all 
his implementations. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1: BOA, DH.EUM 5.Şb 3/23, Cemal to the Governorates of Syria, Beirut 
and Aleppo, 28 Teşrin-i Evvel 1330 [10 November 1914] 
4.Ordu ve Bütün Suriye ahalisinin umum kumandanı sıfatıyla memleketin müdafaası için 
atideki tedbiratın ittihazını ilzam görüyorum. 
(1)Bütün  sevahil mevkii kumandanları ve jandarma fırkaları kamilen ba'dema emrim 
tahtında ve bugünden itibaren bütün müracaatlarını bana yapacaklardır. Yalnız Akabe'de, 
Bi'rüsseb'de, Hanyunus'ta bulunan bölükler 8.Kolordu emri tahtında bulunacaklardır. 
(2) Mülkiye memurları memleketin müdafaasına ve aşayişin teminine aid bilcümle mesail-
i siyasiyede doğrudan doğruya orduya merbut ve ordudan emir alacaklardır. Bu husus için 
icabında ordudan aldıkları emirleri dakikasında icra ve neticesinden mafevklerine  
malumat vermelidirler. mafevklerinden  emr geldiğinde icra-yı te'hir etmeyeceklerdir. 
(3)Ecnebi konsolosları, memurlarıyla birlikte memleketi terk edebilecekler yalnız Rus 
konsolosları memurları burada alıkonulacaktır. Düşman hükümatının bütün tebaları 
İstanbul'dan vürud edecek evamire kadar katiyyen memlekette kalmalıdırlar. Onların 
burada bırakılmalarından maksad sevahil şehirlerimizin düşman gemileri tarafından 
bombardıman edilmemesini temindir. tebaların bulundukları mahalleri terk etmemelerini 
başka bir suretle temin etmek kabil olamazsa o vakit düşman hükümet tebaları bu 
mahallerde tevkif olunacaktır. Firar niyetinde olanların ve kendi harb gemilerine haber 
vermeye teşebbüs edenlerin birahmane kurşuna dizileceklerinin teba-yı mezkura tebliği 
lazımdır. 
(4) Muharib devletler bankalarına vaz-ı yed edilecek ve bütün nukudları hemen Osmanlı 
Bankası'nın Şam, Halep ve Kudüs Şubelerine tevdi edilecektir. alınan nukud miktarı derhal 
orduya bildirilecektir.  
(5) Memleketin iç taraflarına rehn olarak götürülen ecnebi tebaları evamir-i ahireye kadar 
bulundukları mahallerde kalacaklardır. 
(6) Ahali tarafından düşman hükümeti tebalarına vuku bulacak hakarete katiyyen meydan 
verilmemeli. su-i muameleden muhafaza edilmelidir. Me'murin-i askeriye, mülkiye 
memurini tarafından istenilen muaveneti diriğ etmeyecektir. 
(8) işbu emrin alındığı saat telgrafla bildirilecektir. 
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Appendix 2: BOA, DH.ŞFR.453/28, Cemal to Ministry of Interior, Damascus, 29 
Teşrin-i Sani 1330 [11 December 1914] 
Lübnanlılara bir beyanname neşr  eyledim bunda  Lübnanın nizamatının mahfuz olduğu 
fakat idare-i örfiyyenin Lübnana  da şamil olduğunu ilan ve ahaliyi taht-ı liva-yı saltanat-ı 
osmaniyye etrafında  toplanmağa davet etdim Lübnansunuf-ı muhtelifeden mürekkeb 
müfreze tarafından işgal edilmişdir müfreze kumandanlığına Miralay  Rıza Beyi tayin 
eyledim Devletin yeniden gösterdiği lutf ve atûfetin kadrini Lübnanlıların takdir 
eylemelerini ihtar etdim Lübnanlılar namına arz-ı sadakat etmek üzere bu sabah Maruni 
Patriki tarafından bir heyet-i mebuse geldi Heyet-i mebuse teyid-i sadakat etdi 
Lübnanlıların saadetlerini devlet-i aliye-i Osmaniyyeye medyun olduklarını temin etdi. 
Kendilerine ahkam-ı örfiyyeye riayet etmek şartıyla nizamat-ı mevcude  Baki olduğunu 
tebliğ ve fimabad refah ve saadetlerini düvel-i hamiyyeden beklemeyüb yegâne devlet-i 
hâmiyye olan saltanat-ı seniyyeye rabt-ı kalb eylemelerini tavsiye eyledim. Lübnan 
müfreze kumandanına ahalinin namusunu mal ve canını müvekkil olmasının parasız hiçbir 
şey mübayaa etmemesini asker tarafından hukuk-ı şahsiyyeye karşu vaki olacak edna 
tecavüzün mütecasirini derhal ve bila-istizan eşedd-i ceza ile tecziyye idebileceğini emr 
etdim. Beyrut Divan-ı Harb-i Örfisini de müfreze kumandanlığının emrine verdim. Lübnan 
jandarna kumandanı inzibatca müfreze kumandanının taht-ı emrine verilmişdir. İdari ve 
mülki nukât-ı nazarca mutasarrıflığa merbut kalacakdır. Lübnan dahilindeki düvel-i 
muhasamaya mensub müessesat işgal olacak ve bundan askerin ikametime lazım 
olmayanları Lübnan Maarif-i milliyyesine tahsis olunacakdır. Lübnan meselesinin bu 
suretle hal edilmiş olduğun ifade ederim. Lübnan Mutasarrıfı cesur ve metin bir zat 
değildir. Vaziyeti takdir eyledi ve lede’l-hâce artık bir davet üzerine istifa ideceğini 
söyledi. Mûmâ-ileyhin tebdili içün şimdilik bir sebeb yok ise de eger İstanbul’da daha 
muvâfık bir zat var ise buraya gönderilür. Mûmâ-ileyh muvasalatını mütakib mutasarrıf-ı 
hazır istifa etdirilür ve bade mutasarrıf-ı cedid ba-irade-i seniyye-i mülukane tayin 
buyurulur ise düvel-i hamiyyenin inzimam-ı muvafakati olmaksızın hükümet-i seniyyece 
mutasarrıf tayin edilmesi maddesi de emr-i vaki haline getirilmesi re’y-i alinize menutdur 
bu telgraf makam-ı sadaret-i uzmaya arz edilmişdir fi 28 Teşrin-i sani sene 330 
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Appendix 3: BOA, DH. ŞFR. 486/115, Bekir Sami to Ministry of Interior, Aleppo, 19 
Ağustos 1331 [1 August 1915]. 
Haleb. 19 Ağustos 1331 tarihli yazıya cevaptır. Seferberlik bidayetinden beri vilayet 
dâhilinde Ermenilerin ahali-i İslamiye’ye ve hükümete karşı tecavüz ve hareket-i 
isyaniyelerine delalet eder bir halleri görülmediği ve şu kadar ki muhacirine muhalefet 
eden ve binaenaleyh çekilen Antakya’nın Süveydiye nahiyesi muzafatından birkaç Ermeni 
karyesi ahalisinin tedib ve tenkil için kuva-yı askeriye sevk olunduğu ve geçen Kilis 
kazasının ve Çingen karyelerine gelen otuz kadar müsellah Zeytunlu ve Kervenli 
eşkıyadan da meyyiten istihsal edilerek diğerlerinin Maraş ihtilaliyesine ve Kilis 
Ermenilerinin de iştiraki mahalli Ermeni rahibinin oğlu Hınçak cemiyetinin kâtibi Tomasi 
ile bu cemiyet müseccel efradından Agop Kazaz’ın Dersaadet Divan-ı Harb-i Örfisi 
kararıyla aldırılarak orada akdem eli muhakeme sulben idam edilmeleriyle sabit ise de 
esbab-ı avalimesinin buraca meçhul Ayıntab’da cihet-i mülkiye ve askeriyece cem‘ edilmiş 
elli üç parça fotoğraf ve dokuz takım evrak olup bunların da fırkadan altıncı kolordu 
kumandanlık vekâletinden gönderildiği ve Haleb’de edilen şüphe vuku bulan ihbar üzerine 
bazı Ermeni haneleri taharri olunmuş ise de haiz-i ehemmiyet vesaik bulunmadığı ve 
bunlardan başka bir hadise olmayıp Ayıntab’dan gönderilen evrakın bera-yı mutalaa 
kumandanlıktan istenildiği ve bade’l-mutalaa neticesinin bildirileceği maruzdur. 
 
Appendix 4: BOA, DH. ŞFR. 475/9, Cemal to Talat, 28 Mayıs 1331[10 June 1915]. 
Karargâh, Kudüs. Malum-ı âlileridir ki, Filistin kıtasında Siyonizm namıyla bir mesele-i 
siyasiye vardır. Bu mesele-i siyasiye zannedildiği kadar ehemmiyetsiz bir mesele değildir. 
Çünkü bunun aleyhine hareket edildi mi umumiyetle Yahudilik aleyhine hareket 
ediliyormuş gibi göstererek bütün cihana yayılmış olan Siyonistler gayet bi-edebane 
yaygaralara başlıyorlar. Hükümetin menafiine ilka-yı zarar ediyorlar. Bunun suret-i 
katiyede halli için uzun uzadıya düşünerek bir plan hazırladım. Fakat bu planı tatbik için 
adama ihtiyaç vardır. Soruşturdum. Selanik Hahambaşısı Jakob Mayer Efendi’yi tavsiye 
ettiler. Eğer bu zatın hüsn-i ahlakına bize muhibb ve sadık olduğuna sizin kanaat-i 
vicdaniyeniz var ise İstanbul’da Hahambaşı Nahum Efendi’yi celb ettiniz. Şimdiki Kudüs 
Hahambaşısını azl ile yerine Jakob Mayer Efendi’yi tayin ettirdiniz. Mümaileyh Jakob 
Mayer Efendi İstanbul’a gelinceye kadar Kudüs Hahambaşılığına tayin edildiğini ilan 
428 
 
etmeyiniz. Bu icraatı yaparsanız ben de o zaman mufassal bir rapor ile Siyonizm mesele-i 
siyasiyesi aleyhine harekete devam etmekle beraber arz-ı Filistin Yahudi mesele-i 
ictimaiyesini kemal-i sühuletle nasıl halledebileceğimizi arz eylerim. Emr-i cevabınıza 
muntazırım.  
 
Appendix 5: BOA, DH.ŞFR. 479/21, Cemal to Talat, 24 Haziran 1331 [7 July 1915] 
Bera-yı teftiş Haleb’e muvasalatımda Ermenilerin hüsn-i iskânı meselesiyle meşgul oldum. 
Bunların Bab, Mübeytim ve Ma‘re kazalarına iskânını münasib görerek mezkur üç kaza 
kaymakamı talimat-ı şifahiye ile davet ettim. Meselenin ehemmiyet ve nezaketine nokta-i 
nazarlarını bizzat celb etmek için Haleb öşrüne münhemik olduğunu haber almıştım. 
Mümaileyh filhakika benimle görüşmek için Haleb’e de sarhoş gelmiş ve Haleb’de de her 
gün mest-i la-ya‘kal gezmekten çekinmemiştir. İktidarsızlığını zam edince derhal azlini 
Haleb valisi beyefendiye söyledim. Bu suretle şimdiden vazifeden el çektirildi. 
Mümaileyhin şu hal-i müstehasına nazaran artık memuriyet-i devletin istihdama 
uğrayacağından kanun-ı cedid mucibince salahiyet-i devletleri dairesinde tekaüde sevkini 
istirham ederim. Kaza kaymakamları hakkında tetkikat-ı amika icra etmekte olduğumdan 
kendilerinden katiyen fayda memul olmayan ve liyakat ve ehliyetleri kaymakamlık için 
gayr-i kafi gelenlerin tekaüdleri icra kılınmak üzere kariben esamisini arz edeceğim.   
 
Appendix 6: BOA, DH.ŞFR. 491/112, Hulusi to Talat, 19 Eylül 1331 [2 September 
1915]. 
Dördüncü ordu kumandanı Cemal Paşa hazretlerinden alınan 17 ve18 Eylül sene 1331 
tarihli telgrafname hülasa-i müeddası vaziyet-i coğrafiye ve Ermeni muhacirlerinin Suriye 
vilayeti dâhilinde iskânını icab ettirdiğinden ve bu mesele cereyan-ı resmiyesine bırakılırsa 
ağleb-i ihtimal kısm-ı azamının mahv olacağından insaniyetin bunu takdir ile 
kaydetmeyeceğinden bahisle bu gibi kurun-ı vusta harekâtının men edilmesi dördüncü 
ordu mıntıkasının temiz kalarak isminin lekelendirilmemesi zımnında bunların bir an evvel 
yerleştirilmesi Ermeni köyleri teşkil olunması suretiyle hem acizleri ve hem memleket 
namına şeref kazanılması için memurların bu hususa fevkalade bezl-i ihtimam eylemeleri 
ve bu günün en mühimi Ermeni işini tedabir-i ameliye ile ber-vech-i maruz netayice isal 
eyleyecek esbabı temin eylemek üzere acizleri tarafından Kerek ve Havran cihetlerinde bir 
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seyahat-ı teftişiye yapılması merkezindedir. Kumandanlığının salifü’l-beyan mutalaat-ı 
vesayasını mevki-i icraya koymak hayli mesarif ihtiyarına ol babda tedabir-i mahsusa 
ittihazına mütevakkıf olduğu evvel ve ahir huzur-ı devletlerine arz olunmuş idi. Gerek 
alınan telgrafname cevabında tertib ve teşebbüsat için muhacirin müdürü Şükrü Beyin bu 
havaliye izam kılındığı bildirilmiş ise de mümaileyh henüz buraya vasıl olmadığından 
kumandanlığının anifü’l-beyan tebliğ ve mutalaatı fiile isal etmek üzere her nerede ise 
Şükrü Bey’in Şam’a gelmesi zımnında kendisine emr ve vilayete de malumat ita 
buyrulması mütevakkıf-ı rey-i devletleridir.  
 
Appendix 7: BOA, DH. ŞFR. 487/35, Bekir Sami to Ministry of Interior, 23 Ağustos 
1331 [5 September 1915] 
Haleb. Riyak’taki muhacirinin sevkine kadar Haleb’e muhacirin sevkine nihayet verilmesi 
Adana vilayeti, Urfa ve Osmaniye mutasarrıflıklarına yazılmış ise de hala bu Haleb’e 
sevkine devam edildiği ve Adana vilayetinden cevaben alınan telgrafnamede Haleb’e 
gelmek üzere yollarda yüz bin nüfus mevcud olduğu ve Adana Ermenilerinin de bunlara 
ilaveten sevkleri zaruri olduğu işar olunuyor. El-yevm nefs-i Malatya’da on yedi bini 
mütecaviz muhacir ve Resü’l-ayn ile Rase’den başlayarak buraya kadar muhtelif 
istasyonlarda da takriben yirmi bini mütecaviz Ermeni bulunduğuna ve yollarla 
istasyonlarda bunlardan günde iki üç yüz vefat vukua gelerek ve vefatlarına yetişememekte 
olunduğuna nazaran bu müthiş mikdardaki muhacirini Haleb’e doldurmak bunların bir an 
evvel mahallerine ve dolayısıyla buralarda her türlü emraz-i müstevliyeye maruz bırakarak 
gerek şehrin ve gerek ordunun sıhhat-ı umumiyesini tehlikeye bırakacağından, 
buradakilerin arkasını alıncaya kadar sevkiyatın tehiri lüzumunun icab edenlere emr 
buyrulması selamet-i memleket namına istirham ederim. 
 
Appendix 8: BOA, DH.ŞFR. 487/119, Cemal to Talat, 25 Ağustos 1331 [7 September 
1915] 
Maruzatımın tervici hakkındaki lutf-ı samilerine arz-ı şükran ederim. El-yevm Nasıra 
kaymakamlığında Ruhi Efendi’nin Duma kaymakamlığından ne suretle kaldırılmış 
olduğunu dosyasını bi’t-tetkik anlayacak olursanız mümaileyh bir daha kaymakamlıkta 
kullanılmamak için bir tedbir ittihaz buyurursanız halbuki biz buralarda pek muktedir 
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kaymakamlara muhtacız. Mümaileyh azl edildiği takdirde yerine Birü’s-seba kaymakamı 
nakl buyurmanızı ve Birü’s-seba içinde pek muktedir bir Türk bulup tayin etmenizi rica 
ederim. Bilmiyorum Azmi Bey nasıl düşünür. Akka mutasarrıf-ı lahiki Hakkı Behiç Bey 
ile becayiş ettirseniz pek musib olur kanaatindeyim. Ahiren gerek mutasarrıflığa Asaf Bey 
isminde birisini tayin etmiş olduğunuzu gazetelerde okudum. Bu Asaf Bey Adana vukuatı 
zamanında Cebel-i Bereket mutasarrıfı olan Asaf Bey ise onun mutasarrıf tayin edilmesini 
katiyen muvafık görmedim. Bu derece korkak ve iş bilmez bir adamı gerek mutasarrıflığa 
tayin etmeyi bilmem ki nasıl terviç buyurdunuz. Allah aşkına rica ederim bu adamı geri 
gönderiniz. Şayet adam bulamıyorsanız harbin nihayetine kadar ben ümera-yı askeriyeden 
pek muktedir birisini intihab ederim. Vekâleten onu tayin buyursanız Kerek’te urbanın 
ufak bir hareket çıkarmaması ve Suriye’deki gibi teşebbüsatımı alt üst eden Asaf Bey 
benim bildiğim oraya gelir gelmez on on beş gün sonra vukuat-ı adidenin pek tahaddüs 
edeceğine kanaat-ı kamilem vardır. Şayet mutasarrıf yapmak için adama ihtiyaç var ise 
size pek muktedir bir mülkiye memuru tavsiye edeyim. El-yevm Yafa kaymakamlığında 
bulunan zat eğer pek genç ve pek kıdemsiz değilse bir müddet sonra başka tarafa 
kaldırılmasını galiba Azmi Bey ile müştereken rica edeceğimiz Nablus mutasarrıfı Yusuf 
Ziya Bey’in yerine terfi ettirirseniz pek isabet buyurmuş olursunuz. Hülasa Hama sancağı 
da el-yevm pek muktedir bir mutasarrıfa intizar ediyor. Nasıra kaymakamı Fevzi 
Beyefendinin Safed kazasını idare edeceğini ümit ediyorum. Her halde tayinini rica 
ederim.  
 
Appendix 9: BOA, DH.ŞFR. 506/108, Cemal to Talat, 12 Kanun-u Sani 1331 [25 
January 1916]. 
Akka mutasarrıfı beceriksiz Pek hafif bir zattır. Benim bu kanaatime Beyrut valisi Azmi 
Bey ve sekizinci kolordu kumandanı Cemal Paşa dahi iştirak ediyor. Eğer kendisini 
Anadolu’da sehlü’l-idare bir mutasarrıflığa nakl ettirirseniz pek isabet buyrulmuş olur. 
onun yerine evvel Suriye vilayeti mektupçusu iken Hulusi Beyin münasebetsizliği 
yüzünden taaccübünüzü kaybettiğine kani olduğum Tortum kaymakamlığından müstafi 
Nuri Beyi tavsiye ederim. Bu zatın her halde buralarda iyi bir mutasarrıf olabileceğini 
zannediyorum. Muvafakatinize dair cevab-ı alinize muntazırım.  
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Appendix 10: BOA, DH. ŞFR. 537/39, Azmi to Talat, Beirut 3 Şubat 1332 [16 
February 1916] 
Beyrut. Pek mevsuk-ı külliyede buradaki Amerika konsolosu Cebel-i Lübnan ve Beyrut’a 
bir vapur zahire celbi için sefir vasıtasıyla itilafçılar nezdinde teşebbüsatta bulunduğunu 
haber aldım. Şayet böyle ise ve hükümette bunun müsait bulunmaya mecbur kalacaksa 
Amerika sefirleri nezdinizde doğrudan doğruya teşebbüsatta bulunularak orduya 
verilmeyeceği temin edilmek ve bedeli buraca tesviye olunmak şartıyla on bin tonluk bir 
vapurla Beyrut ve Cebel-i Lübnan’a zahire celbi pek muvafık olur. Muvaffakiyet hasıl olur 
ise vesait-i nakliye fıkdanından dolayı Cebel-i Lübnan’da pek büyük sefalet başlayacaktır. 
Buna mani olarak Beyrut’ta dahi iaşeyi tevsi etmiş oluruz. İtilafçıların müsaade etmemesi 
halinde dahi efkar-ı umumiye üzerinde her türlü teşebbüsatta bulunduğumuz anlaşılarak 
mevkiimiz yükselir. Her gün güçlenmekte olan düşmanlar için dahi mucib-i nefret ve lanet 
oluyor. Bendenizce muvafık olan bu suret tasvib buyrulduğu takdirde işar buyrulmasını arz 
ederim efendim.  
 
Appendix 11: BOA, DH. ŞFR, 527/19, Cemal to Ministry of Interior, Damascus, 20 
Temmuz 1332 [2 August 1916]. 
Karargâh/Şam, 17 Temmuz 1332’ye cevaptır. Zor’a sevk olunan Ermenilerin orada 
mütekâsif bir halde kalmalarına mani‘ olmak üzere yegâne çare olarak benim Suriye’de 
tatbik eylediğim usulün derhal vaziyetini bulmaktayım. Ben Suriye’ye külliyetli mikdarda 
sevk olunan bu Ermenilerin çöl hududlarında topladım. Ve teşvik ettiğim bazı zevat 
vasıtasıyla Müslüman olmalarını temin ederek ve içlerinden la-akall binini Müslüman 
yaparak Suriye’nin kasabalarına serptim. Dul kadınları Müslüman erkeklerle tezviç ve 
yetimlerini de tesis ettiğim darü’l-eytamlara sevk ederek Müslüman terbiyesiyle Müslüman 
olmamakta mütemerrid olanları da çöle ve vilayetin münteha-yı şarkiyesine sevk 
ettirmiyorum. Ve hiçbir yerde ekseriyet-i azime teşkil etmeyeceklerine meydan 
vermiyorum. Bu usulün ahiren pek ziyade kesb-i ehemmiyet eden Zor ve havalisinde de 
derhal tatbikini bir emr-i zaruri telakki ediyorum. Ancak bunu orada mutasarrıfın başına 
çıkarılmayacağını ilaveten arz ederim. Bunun zat-ı devletlerince şayan-ı itimat zikr ve 
cüretkâr birinin on yirmi bin lira ile Zor’a izamını ve bu suretle orada ıslahatın icrası 
lazımdır. Zor jandarmasının takviyesi meselesine külliyetli ve gayr-i kabil icra olunacağını 
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müsaadenizle arz etmeye mecburum. Çünkü hala ordunun jandarma kuvvetleri kendi 
mıntıkalarının bile asayişi muhafaza ve idameden aciz ve gayr-i kâfidir. Bundan dolayıdır 
ki Urfa sancağı dördüncü ordu emrinde iken, liva jandarma kuvvetini tezyid etmiştim. 
Haleb de aynı haldedir. Nizamiye kuvvetinin sevki ise adimü’l-imkândır. Ba-husus bu liva 
ahiren dördüncü ordunun mıntıkasından fekk-i irtibat etmiştir. 
 
Appendix 12: BOA, DH. ŞFR. 542/3, Azmi to Talat, 20 Kanun-u Evvel 1332 [2 
January 1917] 
Beyrut. Amerika’dan zahire celbi hakkında dahi zat-ı samileriyle cereyan eden muhabere 
üzerine Ali Münif dahi bazı maruzatının olduğunu kendisinden haber aldım. 
Müşarünileyhin nokta-i nazarı menafi-i memlekete muzır gördüğüm cihetle tasdike cesaret 
ettim. Ali Münif Bey Cebel’deki fukara yollu bin kişinin emr ve iaşesi buradaki 
Amerikalılara tevzi suretiyle Amerika’dan zahire celbi imkânı ihzar ettiğinden dolayı 
memnundur. Suret-i iaşe ve tevziatta her ne tedbiri ittihaz etsin, Amerikalılar vasıtasıyla 
Cebel’deki fukaranın iaşesi öteden beri Fransa ve İngilizlerin siyasi propagandalarına 
maruz kalan ve hemen hiçbir rabıtası olmayan bilhassa Cebel-i Lübnan’da harpten sonra 
hükümet etmek ve bu halka bir Osmanlı hükümeti var olduğunun anlatmak imkânını elden 
çıkarır, harpten evvel arz ettiğim siyasi propagandalara diğer bir vesile ile karışmış olarak 
cebelde kendilerinin dahi bir mevki tutmalarına çalışan Amerikalılar fırsatı bir nasihat 
bilirler ve kendisinden ilan-ı meserret eyliyorlar. Bendeniz Ali Münif Beyefendi ile bu 
hususu birleşemedim. Bendeniz gelecek olan ilk zehairi şimdiye kadar cereyan ve devam 
ettiği vechle tevzi ettirdiği Amerikalılara kabul ettirdim. Amerikalılar nokta-i nazar-ı 
aciziyi kendi sıfatlarına muvafık olmadığı halde takdir ettiklerini haber alıyorum. Cebelin 
ihtiyacatı hakikaten pek azimdir. Cebelde açlıktan telefat cidden şayan-ı endişe bir 
haldedir. Fakat Ali Münif Bey ile bendeniz büyük bir mesai sarf ettiğimiz halde pek azim 
müşgilatı iktimam mecburiyetinde olmakla beraber iaşeyi mümkün mertebe temin 
edeceğimize ve açlıktan insan ölmesine mümanaat edeceğimize kaniim. Bu defaki 
tetkikatıma göre Hama livasında daha yedi milyon zahire mübayaa etmek mümkündür. 
Bunun sevki hususunda biraz mücadele ile beraber bu zehairi Cebel ve Beyrut’u iaşe 
edebilir. Beyrut’ta bugün Cebel’den nakleden cebellilerle beraber yüz elli bin, burada üç 
yüz bin nüfusu vardır. Beyrut’ta da ihtiyac-ı insan nispetinde zahire verilmemekle beraber 
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açlıktan fevt olmuş bir şahıs yoktur. Açtığım fukara tahaffuzhaneleri ile ve sair vesaitle 
halkını iaşeye muvaffakiyet hâsıl olacaktır. Şayet evvelce arz ettiğim vechle hükümet veya 
belediye namına zahire celbi mümkün olursa bu halleri için bir olursa yoksa Amerikalılar 
tam Cebel-i Lübnan’a gelecek ve anlar vasıtasıyla tevzi edilecek zehair Cebel-i Lübnan’ı 
elde etmekten bizi uzaklaştırır ve harpten yüzlerde pek nafi vazifeler elde edecek, sonra 
olan hükümet her hususta karşısında Amerikalıları görecek ve Cebel’in bunlara karşı 
şimdiden hâsıl olan minnettarlığı hükümeti buralarda cidden küçük düşürecektir. Bu hali 
arz etmeyi zat-ı samilerini tasdike cüret-yab oldum efendim. 20 Kanunu evvel sene 1332.          
 
Appendix 13: BOA, DH. ŞFR. 560/10, Cemal to Talat, 19 Temmuz 1333 [19 July 
1917]. 
Aliye Karargâhı, Kudüs. Vilayata tebliğ buyrulduğu üzere Arab ailelerinin hafiyeten 
nezaret ve takip altına alınmaları muvafıktır. Bunun kâffesinin bulundukları yerlerde 
iskanları ve memleketlerindeki emlak ve araziye mukabeleten gittikleri yerlerde 
kendilerine emlak ve arazi itası takarrür ettiğine ve yalnız bir iki vilayette hepsinin 
memleketlerindeki emlak ve arazilerine tekabül edecek emlak ve arazi bulunamayacağına 
nazaran bir iki vilayette cem‘ eylemeleri caiz olamayacağı kanaatindeyim. Bu emlak ve 
arazi mübadelelerine esas olacak defterleri kısmen takdim ettim. Kısm-ı mütebakisini 
Kudüs’ten takdim edeceğim. Bu maddenin bir an evvel itmamı yed-i eşhasın avdet ve afv 
ümitlerini kesecektir efendim.  
 
Appendix 14: BOA, DH. ŞFR. 572/23, Tahsin to Talat, Damascus, 24 Teşrin-i Sani 
1333 [24 November 1917]. 
Şam. Paşazade Abdülkadir’in ……….’dan firar ederek bu havaliye geldiği ve ara sıra 
ailesiyle de temas ettiği hakkında ordu kumandanı paşa hazretlerine vuku bulan işarat-ı 
fehimanelerine muttali oldum. Abdülkadir ihtifa eylediği köyden bendenize mahrem bir 
vasıta ile haber gönderdi. Mülakat taleb etti. Kendisine aman verdim. Ve müracaatını kabul 
ettim. Hissiyat-ı kalbiye ve diniyesini uzun uzadıya İslam’dan müteellim olduğunu 
kendisine Şam ve havalisinde ika-i ihtilal ettiğinden para verildiği fakat vicdanının buna 
müsaade etmediği, bilakis hükümet lehine teklif edilen her emri ifaya amade olduğunu 
ağlayarak söyledi. Mütekaiden kumandan paşa hazretleriyle de görüştü. Müşarünileyhte 
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tensibleriyle cibale göndererek mektub ve şahıs takibatında bulundu. Tekevvül ettiğini 
görüyorum. Her halde bu adamdan her ne mikyasta olursa olsun bir fayda ve hizmet ümit 
ediyorum. Arz ettiğim şekil ve sebebler Abdülkadir elimizde ve takib-i setr lehimize 
hizmet ediyor. Ve yaptıklarını bittabi peyderpey arz ederim.  
 
Appendix 15: TTK Arşivi, KO Koleksiyonu, 1/70, Tahsin to Cemal, Damascus, 26 
Kanun-ı Sani 1334 [26 January 1918] 
Şerif Faysal Bey’e yeni gönderdiğiniz mektubların cevabı geldi. Biri gayet mufassal, 
resmi, diğeri kendi hatt-ı destiyle imzasız olarak hususidir. Ba husus mektubu şifre ederek 
aynen arz ediyorum. Mufassal mektubun mündericatı her vakit tekrar eden müddeiyattan 
ibarettir. Vehib Paşa’nın hicaz valiliğindeki ahvalini, Arablik, Türklük, gayesinin takib 
edildiğini ve itilaf devletlerince Araplığın ve Arab hükümetinin muahedat ile taht ı 
emniyete alındığı uzun uzadıya bahsettikten sonra suriyedeki icraatı malumeyi tenkid 
ediyor. Bu ahvale ne kendi ve ne de pederi tarafından sebebiyet verilmediğini ve zat 
ıakdesi hilafetpenahiye, hanedan ı ali osmana merbutiyeti kalbiyeleri bulunduğunu beyan 
ediyor. Bu mektubu posta ile takdim edeceğim. Şeyh bedreddin ve Emir Abdülkadire 
yazdığı cevabda ise beynelmüslimin kan döküldüğüne müteessir bulunduğunu ve hükümeti 
seniyyece arablık that ı temine alındığı halde anlaşabileceklerini ve itilaf mülakatının kendi 
mıntıkaları dahilinde yapılabileceğini ileri sürüyor. Şifre edilen hususi mektub faysalın 
bütün hissiyatını ve efkarını ve amalini teşrihe kafidir. Hususi malumata nazaran 
ingilizlerle şerifin ve Abdullah ile faysalın arası yani kendilerine olan taahüd ve 
mütalebelerden dolayı ictihadları şu günlerden hadi bir şekil almıştır. Faysal bu metubda 
bundan bahsetmiyorsa da her türlü tehlikeyi göze alarak zat-ı alilerine arz ı hal ediyor. 
Mektubda ne istediği pek güzel anlaşılıyor. Cemal Paşa ile uzun uzadıya görüştük. Kendisi 
dün akşam kereğe gitti. Ya benim veyahud Cemal Paşayla muayyen bir noktadan meseleyi 
daha yakın ve daha esaslı müzakere etmekliğimizi teklif ediyoruz. Çünkü mektubun bir 
fıkrasında anlaşmak için zaman geçmediğini [yani zamanın geç olmadığını] ve zat-ı 
devletlerlerinin cevabı alınıncaya kadar muhasemata pek resmi olarak devam edeceği 
yazılıyor. Buna binaen bu mülakatı teklif ettik. Kendisi bir [burada boşluk var] 
mahiyetinde teklifte bulunur ise bittab’ sözü orada keseceğiz. Yok mevzu ve dini tekalifte 
bulunur ise bab ı aliye arz ile alınacak talimat mucibince hareket edeceğiz. Mülakatı Kabul 
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etmekdiği halde Kerekde bulunan Cemal Paşa daha sıkı bir muhabere ve mürasele temin 
ederek maksadını anlayacaktır. Bugün de Urbanın vaziyeti mühim bir şekil almıştır. Faysal 
müheyyic bir kuvvet ile vadi-i musada şerif ali ve nasır kalatürrızktadırlar. Kendisini 
ziyarete giden hüseyin naïf ve rüfekasını bu defa şerif nasır tevkif ettirmiştir…. Para 
alınamadığından dolayı urbana ve hatta malumul esasi eshabı maişete tedibat yapamıyoruz. 
Zahire mubayaatı durmuş ordunun iaşesi hemen tehlikeli bir vaziyet almıştır. Şu hale 
nazaran şarif faysal ile az çok fedakarlık ederek bir mukaranet tesis vatanın selameti 
namına şayanı arzudur. Ahvali dahilliyye hemen kendi haline kalmış ve bundan hem 
inglizler hem şerif istifade etmiştir. Ordunun açlığı ahvalin keşmekeşliği tufeylenin sukutu 
yek diğerini ettiği takdirde şu güzel suriyeye yazık olacağını bir daha arz ederim.  
Suriye valisi tahsin  
Suret 
Husus gerek taraf ı alilerinizden ve gerekse şeyh bedreddin effendi tarafından namıma 
gelen tahriratın bu tarzda kaleme alınmış bulunmasından dolayı cevab-ı mezkuru tahrire 
mecbur oldum. Cenab-ı hakk bilir ki hiçbir maksad ı şahsi takib etmiyorum. Vicdanıma 
karşı mahkum olmamak ve dediğiniz gibi bir hizmet-i din ifa eylemek maksadıyla gayet 
sarih fakat hususi olarak beyanat-ı atide bulunmayı bir vazife bilirim. Paşa hazretleri! Eğer 
buyurduğunuz gibi maksad İslamiyet ise hakiki, açık konuşalım. Hakikati arayalım. Siz de 
takdir edersiniz ki maalesef bugün türkler ve türklük pek elim bir vaziyette bulunuyor. 
Bunun için aff-ı umumi gibi ali kelimeleri bırakalım. Teala yolunu arayalım. 
Mektubunuzda, son telgrafınızda bahs buyuruyorsunuz. Ve ledeynatını anlamak 
istiyorsanız bunun için derim ki hakikatte o ledeynat mevcut. Fakat evvela içinizi, 
zımmiyenizi bilmekliğim lazım. Bu sulh teklifinizin mahiyetini anlamaklığım iktiza eder. 
Hakikat mi, telaib –oyunlar- mi yoksa aliye hapishanelerini doldurmak mı ? affınıza 
mağruren bunları gayet sarih ve hususi yazıyorum. Biliyorum ki bu kelimelerle izzet-i 
nefsinize dokunuyorum. Fakat hakikat-i hal her ne kadar acı ise de yine hakikattir. Zat ı 
aillerinizi karşımda zannederek gıyaben müşafehede bulunuyorum. Bilirsiniz ki ben her 
şeye vakıfım. Çünkü bütün hayatımı Türklerle geçirdim. Sizinle iyi müşerref oldum. Ve 
iyice tanıdım. Vesikaya hacet yok. Çünki sizce idama mahkum bir adamım. Zaten sizinle 
hal-i harbde bulunuyorum. Fakat emin olunuz vicdanım beni dinime ve vatanıma karşı 
mahkum etmemiştir. Ihtimal ki mektubuma hiddetle, hayretle ve yahud başka bir nazarla 
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bakarsınız. Bu benim vazifem değil. Vazifem fırsat bulmuş iken hakikati ifşa etmektir. Siz 
nasıl telakki edeseniz ediniz. Yalnız efendim bu yönetimde? üç şey mevcud. Birincisi 
müslümanlık, ikincisi Arablık, üçüncüsü türklük. Çünkü hayatımın kısm ı azamını onlarla 
geçirdim. Binaenaleyh müslümanlık ve arablık bence mukaddestir. Türklük üçüncü 
derecede kalır. Eğer sizlerde arablar için ufak bir merhamet görmüş olsaydım hadd-ı 
e^alim sizlerden ayrılmazdım. Fakat ne diyeyim. Karşımda arabları astılar. Hükümetiniz 
pederimin hatırını kırdı. Mahv etmek istedi. Ve müslümanlığı uğraş için bir alet gibi 
kullanmak istedi. Vicdanınız her halde bu hakikati inkar etmez. Binaberin bazı halleri 
görürüm de nasıl tahammül ederim. Tabii ma’zurum. Vicdanım buna mani olur. Düvel-i 
itilafiye zahiren ve batınen Arablığı ve Arab hükümetini tasdik etti. Muahedenameleri 
mahfuz. Katiyyen şeke ve şüpheye mahal yok. Fakat hususi bir zan vardır. O da arabları 
türklerle birleşmektir. Menafi-i milliye herşeyin fevkindedir. Siz buna kizb deyiniz. Ne 
derseniz deyiniz. Fakat bir şartla ki her iki millet hukukunu bilsin. Hiç birisi diğerinin 
hukukuna ve umuruna müdahale etmesin. Her ikisi yek vücud olarak çalışsın. Bu suretle 
hakiki bir İttihad-ı İslam husule gelsin. Pek büyük bir saadet. Fakat bugün Arablar, 
Türklerden korkuyor. Ne yalan söyleyeyim. Ben bunun için kavi ve sağlam bir kefil 
bulunmadıkça emniyet edemem. Çünkü intikamdan gayet ilğaya ? korkarım. Milletimin 
Ermeniler gibi olmasını istemem. Hicaz ve Arabistan kıyamı bir emr-i zaruri ve icbari idi. 
Üç milyon nüfusu açlıktan ölecek idi. Hicaz ve Suriye Arabları bilacürüm aileleriyle 
beraber ermenilerle becayiş ettiriliyordu. Her ne hal ise orasını geçelim. Muhakkak ki 
bugün arablar türk-alman ittihadına dahil olur ise safha-i harb başka bir şekil alır 
zannederim. Vaziyet-i coğrafiye ve askeriye bugün Arapları hakim bir vaziyette 
bulunduruyor. Tabii askersiniz. Meseleyi benden daha iyi takdir edersiniz. Hal böyle iken 
bu dediklerim hasıl olursa ümid ederim ki aradaki kan davaları kavi bir ittihada münkalib 
olur. Buyurduğunuz gibi bu mesele müslümanlık lehine halledilmiş olur. Cesede giren 
cism-i habisden kolaylıkla bir eser kalmaz. Bil ki o zaman Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Garbi 
Afrika’dan Şarki Asyaya kadar hükümran olur. Beyanat-ı sayikama ciddi nazarla bakınız. 
Dökülen müslüman kanları tahkim için kaçamak yolları arayanların boynundadır. Vaziyet 
tebedddül etse de etmese de ben sözümde ölünceye kadar sabitim. Mamafih müslümanlığı 
ve müslümanca dermeyan eden beyanatı nazar ı itibara alarak harekatı harbiyeme cevab ı 
kati alınıncaya kadar hafif bir surette devam edeceğim. Eğer mektubunuz hüsnü niyetle 
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makrun değilse türklerin sözüne itimad caiz olmadığına bir delil daha nazarıma karşı 
çıkacaktır. Herhalde cenab ı hakk ümmet I islamiyeye hayırlısını nasib etsin temennisiyle 
hitam-ı kelam ederim. 
 
Appendix 16: BOA, DH. ŞFR. 584/160, Tahsin to Ministry of Interior, Damascus, 21 
Mayıs 1334 [21 May 1918]. 
Şam. İngilizlerin iki defa Salt’a girip çıkarıldıkları malum-ı samileridir. Arabistan’da bu 
din u devlete cidden sadık ve tealisi için cidden fedakâr pek çok zevata ve ailelere tesadüf 
olunuyor. İngilizler Salt’a girdikleri zaman Salt’ın en büyük bir ailesi sayılan Tufan 
ailesine İngilizler kendilerine hizmet ve sadakat gösterdikleri takdirde pek büyük mükâfata 
nail olacaklarını söyledikleri halde bu ailenin iki rükn-i mühimi olan Seyfeddin ve Alaattin 
Tufan Beyler bunu şediden red ve Osmanlılıkla öleceklerini bir lisan-ı kati ile beyan 
etmişlerdir. İngilizler her iki zatı hapis ve ta‘zib ettikleri halde bu âli cenab iki kardeş iman 
ve kanaatinizden tekevvül etmemişler ve Osmanlı ordusunun Salt’a girmesiyle kendilerine 
hiçbir şey yapılmayarak tahlis edilmişlerdir. Kendilerine Babıâli namına teşekkür 
edilmesini ve gazetelerle ilanını ve her ikisine üçüncü rütbeden Osmanî nişanı itasını 
istirham ederim.  
 
Appendix 17: BOA, DH. ŞFR. 594/31, Nazım to Ministry of Interior, Adana, 2 Eylül 
1334 [2 September 1918]. 
Adana. Şam’a tehcir olunan Ermenilerden Adana havalisi ahalisinden bulunanların 
develerle ve çöl tarikiyle bila-mezuniyet dolaşmakta olduklarından seyahat varakasız 
olarak ubur edenlerin tarassuduyla mahfuzan iadeleri Suriye vilayetinden bildirilmiştir. 
Şimdiye kadar techizden firaren avdet bu kabil Ermenilerin firaren istihsaliyle tebaları icra 
kılınmakta idi. Firaren avdet edecek olup da müessesata kayd olunanların adem-i 
kabulüyle memurlarının teb‘id olundukları mahallere izamı için ahz-i asker riyasetice 
derdest olunan bu kabil eşhasda canib-i mülkiyeye tevdi‘ eden 29 kanun-ı sani sene 1332 
tarihli telgrafname-i samilerine tevfikan kafile suretinde sevkleri icra tutulmak üzere firar-ı 
askerisinin itası zımnında on ikinci kolordu kumandanlığına vaki olan işara cevaben 
merkumların isnan erbabından bulunmalarından mebni mesele ihdasına gayr-i muktedir 
bulunduğundan cihet-i askeriye menfaatine harekat-ı muhtelife ile hasat işlerinde 
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istihdamlarına lüzum gösterilmiş; ve vilayetçe de işar-ı vaki münasib görülmüştü. Sahil 
olmak itibarıyla ehemmiyet-i askeriyesi ve haiz olmasından dolayı mukaddema 
mensubinlerinden dolayı buradan uzaklaştırılan bu eşhas ile geleceklerin tekrar burada 
müctemi bir halde bulundurulması her ihtimale karşı mahzurdan gayr-i salim 
görülmektedir. Suriye’den firarı bildirilen eşhasın bugünlerde Dürzîleri muhtemel 
bulunduğundan iade ve cihet-i askeriyeye ve Dürzîler hususlarında tereddüd hâsıl 
olmuştur. Bunlarla isnan dâhilinde bulunmayan kadın ve erkekler hakkında olunacak 
muamelenin tayin ve idaresi maruzdur. 
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Appendix 18: PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 17. 
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Appendix 19: HHStA, PA 38/366.
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Appendix 20: Le Journal de Beyrouth,Semi Official Newspaper of the Ottoman government
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Appendix 21:al-Sharq, Arabic newspaper published by Cemal Pasha in Damascus
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Appendix 22: Sample from the DH.ŞFR. Documents: DH.ŞFR. 475/9 
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Appendix 23: Sample from the DH.ŞFR. Documents: DH.ŞFR. 527/19 
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